Mark Garnier MP: speeches

Speeches

• 9 Sept 2025 · Pension Schemes Bill (Fifth sitting) · Hansard source

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  Amendments 248 and 249 talk about removing mandation—something I spoke about when we debated clause 38, so I will not cover those amendments other than to say that it is something we feel strongly about. Amendment 275 concerns mandation with regard to the water industry. It comes as a result of an announcement from the leader of Reform about potentially using pension fund money to invest in Thames Water, and part of Reform’s manifesto talked about nationalising the water industry, but using pension fund money to own 50% of those holdings. To a certain extent, that is performative because we are talking about a specific sector. This amendment specifically talks about the water companies, but it could be carried forward to any other potentially nationalised sector.

• 9 Sept 2025 · Pension Schemes Bill (Fifth sitting) · Hansard source

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  I beg to move amendment 250, in clause 38, page 37, line 12, at end insert “or (c) the relevant Master Trust meets the innovation exemption requirement.”

• 9 Sept 2025 · Pension Schemes Bill (Fifth sitting) · Hansard source

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  Again, this is all very technical and rather dry.

• 9 Sept 2025 · Pension Schemes Bill (Fifth sitting) · Hansard source

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  I am not entirely happy with the Minister’s comments. I am slightly surprised, and I thought he might have listened a bit more carefully. We absolutely understand the economies of scale. A large, £25 billion pension fund can do amazing things. We are 100% behind that. We have not disagreed with that at all. However, I somehow feel myself listening to the Minister and hearing the reverse of the arguments we were making as we tried to allow new-entrant banks into the market after the financial crisis. Those of a certain age—and the Minister turned 43 the other day, so he will remember the financial crisis—know that the problem was that a few very big banks were spreading the contagion. I remember being on the Treasury Committee and the Parliamentary Commission on Banking Standards after the financial crisis, when we were trying to sort out Labour’s previous mess, and not a single ab initio banking licence had been issued for 100 years. The only way that companies could get into the banking market—as Virgin and Metro were doing—was by buying dormant banking licences. I remember having long conversations—successfully, as it turned out—in order to try to allow companies such as Starling into the market. I think that Starling received the first ab initio banking licence for 100 years. Having learned over the past 10 or 15 years about the effects of having large scale only, we are now having an argument about potentially stifling the pensions equivalent of companies such as Starling, Metro, Revolut and other innovators coming into the pensions market. I was hoping that from debating the amendments I could be convinced that the Minister would take away the thinking behind what we have come up with: that innovation should be good, and that there should permanently be new, fresh blood coming through. However, I do not think that he has got it. I was not going to push the amendments to a vote, but I now feel motivated to do so.

• 9 Sept 2025 · Pension Schemes Bill (Fifth sitting) · Hansard source

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  I think the Minister has got this the wrong way round. It was the lifetime pot, which was being paid into as people went around, that the industry did not like, because that was administratively quite difficult. The stapled pot—stapled to the lapel, or whatever, to be dragged around like the Australian one—is what we are proposing this time round, which is the new version that the industry does agree with. I think the Minister might have got his notes upside down.

• 9 Sept 2025 · Pension Schemes Bill (Fifth sitting) · Hansard source

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  I will speak to our new clause 36. I am grateful to the Minister for his comments; I will come to those in a minute. The Government dropped plans for the lifetime provider or “pot for life” model, which would have allowed individuals to direct all workplace pension contributions into a single, personally chosen pension pot throughout their career. That was first proposed by the Conservative Government. Although we appreciate that the initial lifetime pot model has not had support from the current Government or, to be fair, from the industry, we believe there is much merit in exploring a model that would allow for pensions to follow individuals between jobs. The new clause would ensure that fragmented small pots are not left as workers move between jobs. By changing our current proposals from a lifetime pot to a magnetic pot proposal where the pot follows the individual, we hope we can bring down some of the administrative costs of the initial lifetime pot proposal. Our new clause 36 will provide for a pension pot that would follow members from job to job, consolidating with each new workplace scheme rather than relying on a single lifetime provider. This approach could reduce fragmentation while retaining the advantages of employer oversight and collective governance. This would have similarities with the Australian system, where a person can staple to their first chosen pension provider so that it follows them from job to job. That helps to reduce the administrative burden on individuals and the number of small pots, and that can reduce costs for consumers and help the overall consolidation of the market. These changes have been backed by some in the industry, including Hargreaves Lansdown, which has said that having a single pot would simplify someone’s pension investment, bringing transparency and clarity. It has said that for those who move jobs frequently, a single pension pot would be invaluable. The Minister made a couple of points. The first was about the substantial overhaul of the system to be able to deliver reform. Although I appreciate that this may be outside the scope of the Bill, we should not worry about substantial overhauls to make things better for people who are saving for their retirement. It is incredibly important that we get this right. Just because it is a lot of work does not necessarily mean it is a bad thing to do, so I urge him to think about it. The Minister made a very important point: somebody could move from one job to another and find that their pension moves from a fund that offers good value for money and is performing well to a fund that is performing worse. But exactly the opposite is also the case. If somebody frequently changes jobs, the law of averages and statistics means that over their lifetime they will get the average rate, which means they do not get stuck in one or the other. One would cancel the other out—it is a maths problem. The Minister has made his points. This is not something we want to press, but we feel very strongly that the Treasury and Treasury Ministers should think very carefully about it, because, as I say, hard work is not a reason not to do the right thing. There is much more support from the industry for the magnetic pot rather than the lifetime pot, which stays with one provider.

• 9 Sept 2025 · Pension Schemes Bill (Fifth sitting) · Hansard source

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  This is a very uncontentious and highly technical part of the Bill. We have no objections to any of these provisions and so will be supporting them.

• 9 Sept 2025 · Pension Schemes Bill (Fifth sitting) · Hansard source

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  Perhaps it is exciting for those who enjoy dry reading. We in the Opposition have no objections. Amendment 36 agreed to. Amendments made: 37, in clause 29, page 27, line 30, leave out— “a relevant person, other than the FCA,” and insert— “the small pots data platform operator or the trustees or managers of a relevant pension scheme”. This amendment ensures that the FCA cannot be required to pay compensation under small pots regulations. Amendment 38, in clause 29, page 27, line 39, leave out “Subject to subsection (4),”. This amendment is consequential on Amendment 39. Amendment 39, in clause 29, page 28, line 3, leave out subsection (4). This amendment removes provision that is no longer needed because of the general data protection override in section 183A of the Data Protection Act 2018, which was inserted by section 106(2) of the Data (Use and Access) Act 2025 and came into force on 20 August 2025. Amendment 40, in clause 29, page 28, leave out lines 8 and 9.— (Torsten Bell.) This amendment is consequential on Amendment 39. Clause 29, as amended, ordered to stand part of the Bill. Clause 30 Enforcement by the Pensions Regulator Question proposed, That the clause stand part of the Bill.

• 9 Sept 2025 · Pension Schemes Bill (Fifth sitting) · Hansard source

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  Again, I have no real comments, apart from to ask the Minister, perhaps when winding up, if he could explain how the Government came to the penalty levels of £10,000 for individuals and £100,000 for others. It would be useful to understand what the thinking was behind that.

• 9 Sept 2025 · Pension Schemes Bill (Fifth sitting) · Hansard source

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  We have no objection to the technical amendments, but we will oppose the whole clause.

• 9 Sept 2025 · Pension Schemes Bill (Fifth sitting) · Hansard source

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  On a point of order, Ms McVey. Might it be easier, for brevity, if we vote on amendments 251 to 253 together?

• 9 Sept 2025 · Pension Schemes Bill (Fifth sitting) · Hansard source

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  I beg to move amendment 248, in clause 38, page 41, line 4, leave out from beginning to end of line 9 on page 43. This amendment would remove the ability of the Government to set mandatory asset allocation targets for certain pension schemes, specifically requiring investments in UK productive assets such as private equity, private debt, and real estate.

• 8 Sept 2025 · Draft Markets in Financial Instruments (Miscellaneous Amendments) Regulations 2025 Draft Financial Services and Markets Act 2023 (Capital Buffers and Macro-prudential Measures) (Consequential Amendments) Regulations 2025 · Hansard source

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  Quite right. The hon. Gentleman’s leader is with the parliamentary Labour party right now, I think, which will be very exciting. The regulations are technical, dry but welcome changes to the detailed firm-facing regulations and definitions in the MiFID organisational regulations and capital buffers regime. They follow the comprehensive changes to regulation and tax that the last Government introduced through the Edinburgh reforms, while helping to implement the announcements the Chancellor set out in her 2024 Mansion House speech. We on the Conservative Benches will always support reforms that aim to make the UK financial market more competitive and growth-oriented. Our financial services are our biggest export and it is vital that we do everything we can to ensure we keep them competitive with their counterparts in Europe and the rest of the world, while at the same time ensuring the UK is a principal destination for international capital. Let me be clear that we support the considered approach being presented, which will allow us to embrace the regulatory autonomy that Brexit provides while keeping us relatively aligned to EU frameworks such as MiFID. That is important because although we need to innovate to maintain our competitive advantage, we must equally avoid trying to reinvent the wheel on financial services regulation. I push the Minister to look at the wider regulatory burden that MiFID II has placed on UK financial firms. Many in the sector think the reporting obligations, investor protection rules and governance standards have imposed significant compliance costs and operational complexity. Although the intention is noble, we can over-regulate and we must remember that risk will always be something that we cannot remove completely. That was highlighted in a submission by UK Finance to a recent House of Lords Committee inquiry that showed that the rules have constrained the City’s ability to innovate and grow capital markets. Although we welcome the regulations, the Government now have the freedom to go further and simplify the onerous rules MiFID II introduced. Doing so would unlock growth in our financial services sector and help us to regain ground lost to competing hubs such as New York and to emerging financial centres in the EU. Nevertheless, we have to accept that the EU is our largest trading partner, so it is right that the changes do not significantly deviate from what was in place before. As I said, the UK deviating to a new regulatory regime would not necessarily help our cause. We also welcome the fact that the changes will help to make the UK more responsive to emerging trends and risks. That is crucial as we seek to be competitive in an ever more volatile world and it would be remiss of me not to mention that many stakeholders feel the regulatory burden placed on them by the FCA and PRA is already too high and, in some instances, unnecessary. Although the changes should not increase that burden significantly, I hope the Minister and Treasury officials will be mindful of that when making changes in the future. All together, we broadly welcome the technical changes that the regulations introduce as they will help to streamline capital market regulation and ensure legal coherence. I was going to ask some questions, but I think in the interests of time we can probably pass on that—we do not want to keep anybody waiting. I will leave it at that.

• 8 Sept 2025 · Draft Markets in Financial Instruments (Miscellaneous Amendments) Regulations 2025 Draft Financial Services and Markets Act 2023 (Capital Buffers and Macro-prudential Measures) (Consequential Amendments) Regulations 2025 · Hansard source

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  It is a great pleasure to speak in this incredibly dry debate about incredibly technical aspects of regulation. I am only disappointed not to see the new Economic Secretary to the Treasury make her debut today, although it is always nice to see the Chief Secretary.

• 4 Sept 2025 · Pension Schemes Bill (Fourth sitting) · Hansard source

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  In a broad sense, we are very happy to support the clause. There are, though, a number of issues, and the point about benchmarking and what performance is being valued against can be rather complicated. We heard from the Liberal Democrat spokesman, the hon. Member for Torbay, a little earlier about his father’s experience of putting money aside and finding himself wanting to take it out in October 1987—I remember it well; I had been a dealer on the floor of the London stock exchange, so a stock market crash was a pretty hideous thing. However, if we look at a chart of the FTSE 100 from the early 1980s up to now and the 1987 crash, although I think it was down 37% at one point, looks like the smallest of blips in what was otherwise a very long-term bull market that continues to this day. The one thing we do know for sure is that those wanting better performance are likely to be investing in slightly more volatile assets. That can come from investing in equities or higher-growth businesses. There is no doubt that some higher-growth businesses will go bust, because they are taking risks, but ultimately, how many of us wish we had put more money into Amazon, Google or Apple back in the late 1990s? At the time it was not necessarily seen as a brilliant thing, but some of these businesses have done unbelievably well. That said, how can anybody understand how a company like Tesla, which is really a battery manufacturer, is worth more than General Motors, Ford and Chrysler? It does not necessarily make a huge amount of sense, and yet people are still investing in it. We can find ourselves looking at the value for money framework and come up with a load of benchmarks, which brings us to the point about the intermediate rating. We could find that an intermediate rating is done at a time when there are particular problems in the stock market, yet, looking at the long term, we could have what could turn out to be a stunning performance. We have to be very careful and not find ourselves throwing out the good in favour of the perfect. This will be something quite complicated; I do not necessarily think it is something for the Bill to worry about, but, as we continue the discourse of pensions performance and adequacy, we need to be very careful that we do not become obsessed with ruling out risk. There is a big argument about risk in our economy at the moment, which, again, is not for this place, but we could find ourselves ruling out risk. The other thing worth bearing in mind is that, by ruling out risk, we could stop money being invested into businesses that may look absolutely bonkers today, but turn out to be the next Apple, Amazon or Google. We just have to be careful about that. I suspect we shall have lots of debates over this. The Pensions Minister is on such a meteoric career progression at the moment that I am sure he will find himself as Chancellor of the Exchequer before very long—probably quicker than he imagines—but this is something that we need to keep an eye on. As I say, it is about making sure that we do not rule out the good in pursuit of the perfect.

• 4 Sept 2025 · Pension Schemes Bill (Fourth sitting) · Hansard source

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  This seems like a very technical clause, and we certainly have no objections to it. I also have no doubt that we will not be voting against the Government amendment. I think we are very happy with it.

• 4 Sept 2025 · Pension Schemes Bill (Fourth sitting) · Hansard source

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  Conservative amendment 258 would ensure that all regulations made under proposed new section 37(2A) of the Pensions Act 1995, which governs surplus payments from defined-benefit pension schemes, are subject to the affirmative procedure always, not just the first time that they are made. That would give Parliament ongoing oversight and scrutiny of any future regulations in the area. Without the amendment, regulations on defined-benefit surplus extraction would not consistently require parliamentary approval. That would potentially lead to insufficient scrutiny. The amendment aims to provide better parliamentary control over regulations as they are introduced. The key worry is the risk that the Secretary of State, whoever he or she may be, might use these powers to allow the payment of a surplus at funding levels below buy-out standards at some point in future, which could jeopardise scheme security and could happen without parliamentary scrutiny. The amendment is about improving the transparency and accountability of surplus extraction regulations for DB pension schemes, ensuring that Parliament maintains consistent oversight and guarding against premature surplus extractions that might undermine scheme funding security.

• 4 Sept 2025 · Pension Schemes Bill (Fourth sitting) · Hansard source

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  I beg to move amendment 254, in clause 10, page 10, line 20, at end insert— “(2A) Value for money regulations must require responsible trustees and managers to make an assessment of, benchmark and regularly report the— (a) net benefit outcomes, (b) investment performance, (c) quality of service, and (d) long term members outcomes of regulated VFM schemes.” This amendment broadens the definition of value for money to require assessment of net benefit outcome, investment performance, quality of service, and long-term member outcomes, and require schemes to report on these. On the wider point about value for money, we broadly support the introduction of a robust value for money framework as set out in clause 10. The framework, which was initially introduced under the previous Government, is essential to promoting transparency and accountability in the management of defined-contribution pension schemes, and it mandates responsible trustees or managers to assess and publish reports on the performance of their schemes. Ultimately, that should mean improved performance. It is worth bearing in mind, though, that there are potentially perverse outcomes —as we have seen, for example, with the Phoenix Group—as the consequences of an intermediate rating could drive less growth. I suppose it could be a less risky approach, but greater risk can lead to greater growth. None the less, we need to be careful as there could be perverse outcomes. I tabled the amendment as we are worried that the current value for money framework for defined-contribution pensions risks focusing too narrowly on costs and charges as the primary determinant of value for members. By contrast, the Australian superannuation system adopts a more holistic definition of value for money, including a net benefit outcome metric, which is defined as the sum of contributions and investment earnings minus all costs, fees, taxes and insurance premiums. Australian trustees are required not only to consider costs, but to act in members’ best financial interests, broadly encompassing factors beyond merely minimising fees. The Australian framework incorporates additional core metrics including service quality, investment performance and member outcomes. This broader approach reflects a more comprehensive assessment of value for money delivered to members.

• 4 Sept 2025 · Pension Schemes Bill (Fourth sitting) · Hansard source

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  These are not amendments that we feel particularly inclined to support. They would require pension fund managers to make, publish and keep under review data to show that their portfolio investments are consistent with the goals of the Paris agreement on climate change and clean energy. That would include publishing prescribed information relating to climate change alignment and sewage discharge. Those are immensely important and worthy ambitions and intentions; we share their spirit, as we want a cleaner planet, cleaner waterways and improvements to our climate, but I do not think that this is the place to do it. Pension funds should be allowed to look at the best interests of their members, irrespective of wider public and social aspirations, so this is not a proposal that we feel we can support.

• 4 Sept 2025 · Pension Schemes Bill (Fourth sitting) · Hansard source

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  We are very happy with this measure. One of the important points, which has been made on a number of occasions, is to do with the wider financial education piece. One would hope that the satisfaction surveys would ask not only whether members of pension schemes are being given sufficient information, but whether they are being taught how to understand what that information means. That is quite important. It is more of a cultural thing than something that should go into the Bill. When we start talking about the complexities of pension funds, it does not necessarily mean a huge amount to the vast majority of people out there, and customer satisfaction surveys should be constructed on that basis. We need to ensure action on that financial education piece, but aside from that, we are very happy to support the clause. Question put and agreed to. Clause 13 accordingly ordered to stand part of the Bill. Clause 14 VFM ratings Question proposed, That the clause stand part of the Bill.

• 4 Sept 2025 · Pension Schemes Bill (Fourth sitting) · Hansard source

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  Sir Christopher, I am happy to proceed in order to get things moving. Question put, That the amendment be made.

• 4 Sept 2025 · Pension Schemes Bill (Fourth sitting) · Hansard source

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  I beg to ask leave to withdraw the amendment. Amendment, by leave, withdrawn . Question proposed, That the clause stand part of the Bill.

• 4 Sept 2025 · Pension Schemes Bill (Fourth sitting) · Hansard source

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  That is a very good question. Ultimately it means, “What is the performance of the fund?” Members’ best interests can include a lot of different things, but ultimately we need to see the fund grow with the best performance it possibly can, given all things brought together. When members start to receive their pensions, they will therefore get the best terms they possibly can. We run the risk of trying to look at the wrong definition. For example, there has been an argument recently about the local government pension scheme—this came up earlier this week—with the Reform party talking about the fact that the scheme is charging 50 basis points. The argument is that reducing it to 10 basis points would save money. However, as I was discussing with a Government Back Bencher the other day, one of the problems is that if fees are too low, that reduces the ability of the managers to assess more complicated financial opportunities. If fees are kept at 50 basis points, the capacity to start analysing unlisted investments is retained. If fees are reduced to 10 basis points, the ability and skill of the managers to look into more than investing in other people’s funds or into simple listed equities is reduced. If we start to look at it as a cost-based issue only, we miss out the fact that we get quite a lot of extra expertise if slightly higher management fees are paid. The Australian framework incorporates additional core metrics including service quality, investment performance and outcomes. There is a concern that the UK value for money framework overemphasises costs and risks discouraging investment in asset classes, as I discussed, that historically produced higher returns but that might have higher shorter-term fees or complexities. This narrow focus could also dampen innovation in pension scheme design and reduce member engagement, ultimately harming long-term retirement outcomes for scheme members. It may be valuable to learn from the Australian approach by developing a value for money framework that balances cost transparency with metrics that encourage good investment strategies and quality services, aligning regulators’ and trustees’ incentives with members’ long-term financial interests. Our amendment tries to broaden the definition of value for money using the Australian model as a template. It would require the assessment of net benefit outcome, investment performance, quality of service and long-term member outcomes, not just cost. It would introduce a requirement for schemes to report and benchmark across these holistic measures, thereby enabling a more balanced and meaningful comparison of value.

• 4 Sept 2025 · Pension Schemes Bill (Fourth sitting) · Hansard source

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  As we have heard, the amendment authorises the use of surplus pension funds to contribute to the provision of free, impartial pension advice and guidance services to scheme members. The age of 40 is very important, and I hope that the Minister, on his 42nd birthday—

• 4 Sept 2025 · Pension Schemes Bill (Fourth sitting) · Hansard source

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  My hon. Friend makes an incredibly important point. The story that the Liberal Democrat spokesman, the hon. Member for Torbay, told about his father is the most important point here. As we come to the point where we want to cash in the defined-contribution pension, we could find ourselves cashing in at completely the wrong moment. In a stock market crash, although it could be just a blip in a long-term bull market, none the less the hon. Member’s father would have seen a 37% drop in the value of his equities if he was benchmarked to the FTSE 100. If he was in higher growth businesses, he could, as the hon. Member said, have seen a 50% drop. So we have to be very careful. We can be as risky as we like when we are 21 years old. I cannot remember whether it was Adam Smith or Einstein who said that the eighth great wonder of the world is compound interest. Obviously we want to take risk early but, as we come up to that day when we finally turn our papers in and go home on the last day of work, we need to make sure we have got as much money out of our pension fund as we possibly can. That is why it is important to ensure that the VFM framework does not cause problems.