Mark Garnier MP: speeches

Speeches

• 21 Oct 2025 · Co-operative Sector: Government Support · Hansard source

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  It is not in her gift, as she says from a sedentary position, but it is quite interesting. Notwithstanding the £17 billion black hole in Thames Water’s balance sheet, the water utilities are very geographically prescribed and millions of people use them, so they have a built-in membership. The most important issue that people are talking about is the pollution of waterways such as the River Thames. By mutualising an institution like Thames Water—by the way, this is not Conservative policy, but— [Laughter . ] But it is a debate we must have, Mr Turner. With mutualisation, members could have a proper debate about what investment they want to make in the purity of the waters. My final point is about skills. I do not want to bring up the ugliness of the debate over the former chairman of the Co-op bank, the Rev. Paul Flowers, back in 2011 or 2012, I think, but he came before the Treasury Committee when I was a member of it and made a very good point. He said that his election as chairman of the Co-operative bank was because he was a member of it, not because he was good at finance. It is incredibly important, particularly with things like corporate governance, that we ensure there is training for corporate governors. Running a bank or a big chain of supermarkets is an incredibly difficult job, so we must make sure that that training includes not only people who work in the bank but those responsible for the corporate governance that looks after the organisations. My experience of the Co-operative in Kidderminster has been absolutely fantastic. A few years ago we were trying to stop a 4G telephone mast. This was several Governments back—perhaps around 2007 or 2008—when 4G masts were first going up, and there was a proposal to put one opposite the Co-op. I had a conversation with the managers there and they said, “We will buy the site in order to prevent the telephone mast from going up.” So I have always been a huge fan of them, and I cannot imagine why it has taken me 20 years to actually join the Co-op. I thank the hon. Member for Oldham West, Chadderton and Royton for securing the debate. As I said, there has been an outbreak of unanimity, which is fantastic to see. I am only sorry that I did not bring more of my friends with me.

• 11 Sept 2025 · Pension Schemes Bill (Eighth sitting) · Hansard source

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  We tabled new clause 37 partly to try to get some reassurance from the Minister. Two years is still quite a long time, as is five, but it is incredibly important that we are on top of what is going on in the pension industry, not least because we do not want any of our constituents to end up with miserable retirements. However, I am marginally reassured by the Minister’s comments. I beg to ask leave to withdraw the motion. Clause, by leave, withdrawn. New Clause 38 Guidance on the roles of the Financial Conduct Authority and the Pensions Regulator “(1) The Secretary of State must establish a joint protocol outlining the roles and responsibilities of the Financial Conduct Authority and the Pensions Regulator regarding their regulatory responsibility of the pension industry. (2) A protocol established under subsection (1) must include— (a) an overview of the coordination mechanisms between the two bodies; (b) a published framework for oversight of hybrid or work-based personal pension schemes; (c) a requirement for regular joint communications from both bodies to clarify regulatory boundaries for industry stakeholders.”— (Mark Garnier.) Brought up, and read the First time.

• 11 Sept 2025 · Pension Schemes Bill (Eighth sitting) · Hansard source

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  I am partially reassured by the Minister’s comments, but it really comes down to the kindness of my heart—I would not want the hon. Member for Hendon to be pulled off the Committee and put in an awkward situation. It would be unfortunate to force him to fall out with the Whips so early in his parliamentary career, so I beg to ask leave to withdraw the motion. Clause, by leave, withdrawn. New Clause 37 Review of impact of this Act “(1) Within five years of the passing of this Act, the Secretary of State must carry out a review of the impact of the provisions of this Act on actual and projected retirement incomes. (2) The review must consider— (a) the impact of the provisions of this Act on actual and projected retirement incomes, and (b) whether further measures are needed to ensure that pension scheme members receive an adequate income in retirement. (3) The Secretary of State must prepare a report of the review and lay a copy of that report before Parliament.”— (Mark Garnier .) This new clause would require the Secretary of State to prepare a report on the impact of this Act within 5 years of its passing. Brought up, and read the First time .

• 11 Sept 2025 · Pension Schemes Bill (Eighth sitting) · Hansard source

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  I beg to ask leave to withdraw the amendment. Amendment, by leave, withdrawn. Amendments made: 225, in clause 101, page 98, line 24, leave out “after 31 December 2029”. This amendment, together with Amendment 227, means that relevant Master Trusts and group personal pensions will not have to comply with the scale requirement until after 2030, but that Chapter 3 of Part 2 (including provision relating to the scale requirement, such as the application can otherwise be brought into force at any time in accordance with regulations. Amendment 226, in clause 101, page 98, line 25, at end insert— “(ba) Chapter 3A comes into force on such day as the Secretary of State and the Treasury jointly may by regulations appoint;”. This amendment provides for commencement by regulations of the new Chapter referred to in the explanatory statement to NC15. Amendment 227, in clause 101, page 98, line 30, leave out subsection (5) and insert— “(5) Regulations under subsection (4)(b) may not provide for the following to come into force before 1 January 2030— (a) section 38(4), in respect of the insertion of Condition 1 in section 20(1A) of the Pensions Act 2008 (Master Trusts to be subject to scale requirement); (b) section 38(8), in respect of the insertion of section 26(7A) of that Act (group personal pension schemes to be subject to scale requirement) (but nothing in this subsection prevents section 38 from being brought into force before that date in respect of the insertion in that Act of other provision related to that mentioned in paragraph (a) or (b)).” This amendment ensures that schemes will not be legally subject to the scale requirement before 1 January 2030. It allows, however, for provision relating to that requirement (e.g., provision around applications for approval) to be commenced before that date in anticipation of the requirement itself taking effect. Amendment 228, in clause 101, page 98, line 34, at end insert— “(5A) If section 38 has not been brought into force before the end of 2035 in respect of the insertion of— (a) Condition 2 in section 20(1A) of the Pensions Act 2008 (asset allocation requirement: Master Trusts), and (b) subsection (7B) in section 26 of the Pensions Act 2008 (asset allocation requirement: group personal pension schemes), section 38 is repealed at the end of that year in respect of the insertion of those provisions.” This amendment transposes and clarifies the provision currently in clause 38(16). It provides for the key provisions imposing the asset allocation requirement to fall away if they are not brought into force before the end of 2035. Amendment 242, in clause 101, page 98, line 37, at beginning insert— “( ) Chapter 1 of Part 4 comes into force at the end of the period of two months beginning with the day on which this Act is passed. ( ) Chapter 2 of”. This amendment provides for the commencement of the new Chapter relating to the consequences of the Virgin Media case . Amendment 243, in clause 101, page 99, line 5, after “section 96” insert “and (Information to be given to pension schemes by employers)”.— (Torsten Bell.) This amendment provides for the commencement of NC20. C lause 101, as amended, ordered to stand part of the Bill. Clause 102 ordered to stand part of the Bill.

• 11 Sept 2025 · Pension Schemes Bill (Eighth sitting) · Hansard source

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  I am highly reassured by the Minister’s words. The important point is to ensure that if the bodies are to work together and do this, we need to keep them held to account on it. The Financial Conduct Authority was set up as an independent regulator and reports back to such things as the Treasury Committee. Presumably, TPR reports back to the Work and Pensions Committee. Already we can see a potential problem there, because separate Select Committees are doing the investigation. That is an important point, but I am confident that the Minister and his civil servants are aware of the problem and will be resolutely super sharp-focused on this issue to ensure that we have regulatory clarity. I beg to ask leave to withdraw the motion. Clause, by leave, withdrawn. New Clause 39 Section 38: commencement “(1) The provisions in section 38 shall not come into force except in accordance with regulations made by the Secretary of State. (2) A statutory instrument containing regulations under subsection (1) may not be made unless a draft of the instrument has been laid before and approved by a resolution of each House of Parliament.”— (John Milne.) This new clause would require that the provisions in clause 38 could only be enacted once agreed through secondary legislation. Brought up, and read the First time .

• 11 Sept 2025 · Pension Schemes Bill (Eighth sitting) · Hansard source

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  When we look at the thrust of the Bill, the mandation measure is all about trying to get pension funds to help to create greater productivity within the UK economy. A couple of days ago, in a very helpful intervention on a speech made by my hon. Friend the Member for Mid Leicestershire, the hon. Member for Hendon made the point that, while we are standing against mandation, we must ask: what are we standing in favour of? How are we trying to get behind the grain of the Bill? These three new clauses respond to that question of what we are doing to ensure that the Bill actually can use pension fund money to promote economic growth, invest into the UK and get better returns for the pensioners. One of the problems facing defined-benefit pension schemes is that, in response to the outrage over Maxwell and Mirror Group Newspapers pinching money from pension schemes back in the 1980s and 1990s, rules were introduced that were basically designed to ensure that it would not happen again. They were introduced in such a way to ensure that, if a defined-benefit pension scheme were to go into deficit, the deficit would be reflected on the balance sheet of the host company. We still see that today in some larger companies; I think the British Telecom pension scheme currently has a deficit of £7 billion, and that appears on British Telecom’s balance sheet. That does two fundamental things. First, if a company has a deficit on its balance sheet, that restricts its ability to raise equity or debt to invest into its business, so the host business cannot expand because it has a defined-benefit pension scheme with a deficit attached to it. A second problem then comes as a result of the Maxwell rules: the trustees of a defined-benefit scheme with a host company will be reluctant to invest that into high-volatility assets. We know that, over a long period of time, the equity market will perform far better than the bond market. The problem is that we can have volatile markets in the short term, which could introduce a deficit in the defined-benefit pension scheme that translates to a deficit on the balance sheet. For example, if we look at stock market performances from the 1980s to now, we will see a very steady rise in the stock markets over time, which have done particularly well. However, if we go back to 1987 or various other times, such as 2000-01, we will see big stock market crashes that will have appeared on the balance sheets of those defined-benefit pension scheme host companies. As a result, these pension schemes are missing out on the long-term growth to push away the short-term volatility that hits the host company. With these three new clauses, we are trying to get that out of the way so that defined-benefit pension schemes feel more comfortable about investing in higher-growth and therefore higher-volatility assets.

• 11 Sept 2025 · Pension Schemes Bill (Eighth sitting) · Hansard source

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  I beg to move, That the clause be read a Second time.

• 11 Sept 2025 · Pension Schemes Bill (Eighth sitting) · Hansard source

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  I beg to move amendment 255, in clause 101, page 98, line 22, leave out “Chapters 1 and 2” and insert “Chapter 1”.

• 11 Sept 2025 · Pension Schemes Bill (Eighth sitting) · Hansard source

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  I want to follow on from the two powerful speeches by the Liberal Democrat and SNP spokespeople, the hon. Members for Torbay and for Aberdeen North, in highlighting the fact that this problem is—dare I say it—disappearing over time. This feels slightly similar to the ongoing contaminated blood debate, and it is a similar type of thing. The people who would be compensated for the contaminated blood are, for tragic reasons, disappearing. Indeed, I think there are now 86,000 pensioners who were caught up in this particular problem, and the longer this is kicked down the road, the smaller the problem will become, for obvious reasons. The principle behind this is absolutely right. It is incredibly important that we as a country, society and community look after all these people. Where people have done the right thing and put money into their pension, but it has not followed through, that is a big problem. One thing does bother me: I do not want to be too political, but the Government have dug themselves a freshly made £30 billion black hole in the last year. Although the SNP spokesperson is absolutely right that the £12 billion in the PPF is available to spend only on pensions, the problem is that because it appears on the country’s balance sheet, if the money to pay the price for this—I think it is £1.8 billion—came out of that, there would be a £1.8 billion increase on the country’s collective balance sheet. The argument would go that it would then reduce it. At some level, fiscal prudence has to come in to make sure we are not creating a deeper black hole. Because of the change of accounting at the back end of last year, this could turn the Government’s £30 billion fiscal black hole into a £32 billion one, even though that money is earmarked only for pensions. I would like to hear from the Minister how the Government will resolve that. I would like him to make an undertaking that we will hear something about it on 26 November, and that there will be something in the Budget to resolve this fiscal conundrum. We need to know where the money will come from, and that the Government have set it aside. This is a perfect opportunity to deal with a problem that has been going on since 1997, and that becomes more profound every time the Office for National Statistics announces the rate of inflation. If the Minister gave us that assurance, I would trust him—being an honourable and decent man—that he could make his current boss get something done about this on 26 November.

• 11 Sept 2025 · Pension Schemes Bill (Eighth sitting) · Hansard source

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  The Minister raises an interesting point. We have talked about a lot of different bits and pieces with complexity and all the rest of it. We have not spoken about when we educate people about money. In the olden days, when I was a newly elected MP, I was one of the chairs of the all-party parliamentary group for financial education for young people. That was about getting financial education into the curriculum. It is probably now more important than ever that we teach people of school age about the importance of financial planning, including pensions. Can the Minister assure the Committee that he will take up with his colleagues in the Department for Education the changes that could be made to bring this type of education into the curriculum for kids, who are all going to be adults soon?

• 11 Sept 2025 · Pension Schemes Bill (Eighth sitting) · Hansard source

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  I beg to move, That the clause be read a Second time. Under new clause 37, the review of the impact of the Act would focus on pensions adequacy. The current Government plan to delay the comprehensive consideration of pensions adequacy to future phases of the pensions review. Any resulting reforms from those future evaluations are projected to take several years to develop and implement, and there is widespread concern that without a mandated regular review process, inadequate pension outcomes will persist. Millions of people in the UK therefore risk having insufficient retirement income, particularly lower earners, ethnic minorities, the self-employed and those with interrupted careers. Automatic enrolment has expanded workplace pension participation and now covers over 88% of eligible employees, but significant savings shortfalls remain. Recent forecasts and analysis warn of a retirement crisis, with many future pensioners expected to have less income than today’s retirees unless action is taken. The Government’s renewed Pensions Commission is due to report in 2027, focusing on the adequacy, fairness and sustainability of the retirement framework, but that report will only come in 2027. The new clause would create a statutory obligation for the Secretary of State to conduct a full review within five years of the Bill’s passage, focusing on its impact on actual and projected retirement incomes. It would require an assessment of whether current policies and contribution levels are sufficient to ensure adequate retirement incomes. The Secretary of State would have to report the findings to Parliament, increasing accountability and transparency. That would formalise an ongoing review cycle to monitor pension adequacy regularly, preventing the consideration of the issue being indefinitely postponed. As we all know, pension adequacy is vital to preventing poverty in later life and to ensuring quality of life for retirees. Despite expanded coverage through auto-enrolment, however, many people are still on track to fail to meet retirement income targets. Financial resilience frameworks show disparities in adequacy among lower earners, women and other vulnerable groups, and current retirement income depends on a number of variables, including contribution, sufficiency, investment returns, longevity and state pension level. The new clause would ensure that the Government take responsibility to monitor and report regularly on pension adequacy outcomes. It would mandate a formal review mechanism, enhancing policy responsiveness and parliamentary oversight. Ultimately, it aims to safeguard millions of future retirees from inadequate incomes, and support a sustainable and fair retirement system.

• 11 Sept 2025 · Pension Schemes Bill (Eighth sitting) · Hansard source

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  I beg to move, That the clause be read a Second time. This will be the last new clause I will be talking to. It looks at the guidance on the roles of the Financial Conduct Authority and the Pensions Regulator. In preparing for this Bill, we spent a lot of time engaging with the industry just a mile and a half up the road. Among the industry there is persistent confusion regarding the division of regulatory responsibility between the Financial Conduct Authority and the Pensions Regulator. The FCA regulates contract-based pension schemes—personal pensions, group personal pensions and stakeholder pensions—focusing on firm authorisation, conduct and consumer financial advice. TPR regulates trust-based occupational schemes, including defined-benefit and defined-contribution trust schemes, and it targets schemes, governance and employer duties. Overlapping interests exist in hybrid or workplace pension schemes, but unclear boundaries and differing enforcement powers can create regulatory gaps and inconsistencies. That ambiguity causes compliance difficulties for employers, trustees and industry stakeholders, and may ultimately affect pension savers. The new clause would require the Government to establish a statutory joint protocol between the FCA and TPR, clearly defining and publishing their respective roles and responsibilities. The protocol must outline formal co-ordination mechanisms between the FCA and TPR, include a published framework specifically addressing oversight of hybrid and workplace personal schemes where regulatory remit overlaps, and include a requirement for regular joint communications from both regulators to guide industry and clarify regulatory boundaries. That matters because collaboration between the FCA and TPR ensures comprehensive consumer protection across all pension products. With pension system complexity increasing—with mega schemes, master trusts and hybrid arrangements—co-ordinated regulation is critical. That will enable both regulators to leverage their strengths—the FCA in consumer conduct and financial advice, and TPR in governance and compliance enforcement. That will help trustees, employers, firms and savers to better understand which regulator to engage to resolve issues and access support. Industry feedback consistently calls for more precise demarcation to avoid confusion and compliance risks. The Government’s wider reforms and digitisation initiatives, such as pension dashboards, further heighten the need for co-ordination. The new clause would promote regulatory clarity and efficiency through mandated guidance, protecting pension consumers and enabling robust governance across the sector. Clear regulatory pathways will better support pension savers by ensuring consistent standards and enforcement across all types of pension schemes.

• 11 Sept 2025 · Pension Schemes Bill (Eighth sitting) · Hansard source

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  Amendments 255 and 256 relate to the value-for-money framework timeline that we discussed when we considered clause 41 on Tuesday and are related to Conservative amendment 257, which was withdrawn. When we considered amendment 278, which was tabled by the hon. Member for Tamworth, the Minister committed to consider the matter on Report, so I will not press those amendments today. This is, however, because I think it is the last time that I will speak in this Committee—or I hope it will be—a good opportunity to thank everyone. I say a huge thank you to everyone who has worked incredibly hard: the Clerks; you, Ms Lewell, and your fellow Chairs; and all the DWP officials who have supported the Minister who, frankly, with his not inconsiderable inexperience and youth, has done a magnificent job of working in his first Bill Committee. I think we can all agree that he has a terrific future in front of him as an individual who can get stuck into really quite dry, anodyne Bills. Of course, I also thank the members of my office staff, who have worked extraordinarily hard. I had not quite realised how difficult it is to be in opposition and up against the might of the Government, but my office staff have done very well, so I thank them all very much indeed.

• 11 Sept 2025 · Pension Schemes Bill (Seventh sitting) · Hansard source

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  I will be incredibly brief. We have heard a number of details from the Minister. Clauses 93 to 96 contain what we believe are sensible and welcome amendments that reflect current market and scheme conditions. In particular, the changes related to the Pension Protection Fund are positive. With a strong funding position in many defined benefit schemes recently and the PPF’s healthy reserves exceeding £14 billion, these legislative changes are timely. The industry strongly supports the option for a zero levy, which reduces financial pressure on well-funded schemes. The Opposition wholeheartedly support these clauses.

• 11 Sept 2025 · Pension Schemes Bill (Seventh sitting) · Hansard source

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  I am keen to speak to these Liberal Democrat new clauses, because we have a fundamental problem. Research by Pensions UK shows that more than 50% of savers will fail to reach their retirement income targets set by the 2005 Pensions Commission, and closing the gap between what people are saving and what they will need must be a pressing concern of any Government. So, we need the second part of the pensions review to be fast-tracked, with a laser-like focus on pensions adequacy. This takes me back to when I first became a Member of Parliament some 14 or 15 years ago. The big issue at the time in the independent financial advisers market was the retail distribution review. My hon. Friend the Member for West Worcestershire (Dame Harriett Baldwin) and I held our first Backbench Business debate on the retail distribution review, and it is recorded in Hansard that we predicted this would be a problem as a result—fewer independent financial advisers being available to give advice. There were three key elements of the retail distribution review. They were very well-intended, and let us not beat about the bush: there were reasons why they were brought about. One of them was intended to raise the professional standards of independent financial advisers, and I think we would all agree that that has to be a good thing. The advisers complained at the time because they did not want to take exams. If they had been in the business for 40 years, why would they feel that they needed to take an exam? But why should they not improve their standards? There were issues to do with lifetime liability—advisers’ taking responsibility beyond seven years for advice that they had given, which was very contentious. Also there was clarity on the models of advice being given. However, the key element that caused the problems was where independent financial advisers, prior to that moment, were being paid a commission on the product that was being sold, which potentially led to product bias. If a commission was being paid at 2.5% on one product and 1% on another, the independent financial adviser would have a material interest in selling that higher-commission product, even if it was a worse product. That could have been dealt with by having a maximum commission rate on all the products; it could have been set at 100 or 150 basis points, which would have dealt with that problem. We saw this issue in the London stock exchange until 1986, when there were fixed rates of commission, so nobody could undercut another broker by providing cheaper dealing measures. We therefore knew it could work. The direct result of all this was that when the retail distribution review was brought in by the FCA in January 2013, we saw a massive drop in the 35,000 independent financial advisers. That has since recovered, and we now have around 36,000 advisers. The important point is that a financial adviser who goes out to persuade somebody to take advice on their pension now needs to charge a fee. Before that, to the person receiving the advice, the financial adviser would appear to be doing it for nothing. There would be an agreement, so it would be transparent and they would know exactly what was going on. However, the point is that now, if I am being asked to put money into a pension fund and I know I am paying the 1.5%, the fact that the commission is coming out of the money going in feels much less restrictive than being sent a bill for £1,500 or £2,000. That is much more difficult to meet, even though it comes to the same point in the end. The result of this is that, whereas about 50% of people used to put money into pensions and receive financial advice, the number is now 9%. There are an awful lot of newly elected Members of Parliament here. After 10 or 15 years, they will find themselves in a Bill Committee making these points and saying, “We told you this would be a problem. We told you so, yet here we are trying to resolve a problem that we knew was going to happen, and we allowed it to.” I am very cynical about Parliament sometimes, as all Members will be eventually. The important point is that the Liberal Democrat new clauses are an attempt to deal with the problems that we knew would come about. Auto-enrolment is brilliant—we really like auto-enrolment—but there are various things coming in under this Bill. We have to be careful that the things we bring in with the best intentions do not end up creating bigger problems due to unforeseen circumstances. If the Liberal Democrats pressed new clause 1, we would happily support it, as it is a good amendment. It will be interesting to see if that comes through, but this is something we have to get right. People need to get advice because far too many people are going to go barrelling into their 67th birthday, or whatever it is, and suddenly discover that they have run out of money, and that is not a good place to be.

• 11 Sept 2025 · Pension Schemes Bill (Seventh sitting) · Hansard source

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  The Opposition support the clauses and welcome the action to legislate formally for defined-benefit superfunds. Securing this in a legislative framework will give trustees and sponsors greater confidence when considering this new consolidation option for defined-benefit schemes. The measures build on the consultation conducted under the previous Government, as well as the intention that the former Chancellor of the Exchequer, my right hon. Friend the Member for Godalming and Ash (Sir Jeremy Hunt), laid out in his 2023 Mansion House speech. Superfunds are capital-backed consolidators that allow defined-benefit schemes to shift liabilities away from the sponsoring employer, thereby enhancing the security of members’ benefits. By transferring pension obligations to a superfund, companies can reduce long-term liabilities and refocus on core operations, while maintaining strong protection for retirees. Superfunds offer a new endgame strategy for DB schemes unable to secure an insurance buy-out, helping to safeguard member benefits in underfunded or marginal schemes. These measures all seem reasonable, and as I said, this work started under the previous Government, so we wholeheartedly support it. Question put and agreed to. Clause 51 accordingly ordered to stand part of the Bill. Clauses 52 to 56 ordered to stand part of the Bill. Clause 57 Prohibition of unapproved superfund transfers Question proposed, That the clause stand part of the Bill.

• 9 Sept 2025 · Pension Schemes Bill (Sixth sitting) · Hansard source

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  I completely understand that. The question is, what is plausible? One man’s plausible might be another man’s impossible. That is the bit that we are worried about: how to ensure that someone is not squeezed out who otherwise could be in it.

• 9 Sept 2025 · Pension Schemes Bill (Sixth sitting) · Hansard source

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  I rise to speak to new clause 32, which looks at the effects of some of the changes on the UK gilt market. Defined-benefit pension schemes are major holders of UK Government bonds, with pension funds holding around 28% of the gilt market —the UK Government bond market—as of early 2022. Those investments provide stable, long-term funding for the UK Government and are essential to the functioning of the debt market. Significant shift by DB schemes away from gilts and into equities—which, in itself, is not a bad thing, as long as it does not happen in a disorganised way, which could be prompted by policy changes—may reduce the demand for gilts, potentially increasing yields and destabilising the market. At the end of the day, if 28% of the ownership of the gilt market is taken away, somebody else needs to be found to buy it. Otherwise, there will be a falling market. We all know what a gilt crisis looks like for pension funds. The 2022 gilt crisis highlighted the market’s vulnerability to large and sudden sales by pension funds, which triggered a fire-sale spiral and required Bank of England intervention to stabilise prices. It was not a good day. The Debt Management Office and market experts have noted that the gilt market is highly reliant on pension fund investment, and any structural reduction in demand could impact Government borrowing costs and market stability. The Office for Budget Responsibility has highlighted concern about the impact of a low gilt allocation scenario, which is likely if the Bill achieves the outcomes that the Government want. A low gilt allocation scenario would mean that pension sector allocation of gilt holdings would drop to 10% of GDP by around 2040, down from around 30% today. That in itself, all other things being equal, would result in an extra £22 billion of debt interest payments on the current gilt market. We are highly concerned that a wholesale move from the gilt market by the pension industry places even more burden on the Treasury to manage debt payment. As the deficit continues to grow, the Government must have laser focus on the impact on the gilt market in relation to how they fund Government debt. The new clause introduces a requirement for an impact assessment before any regulatory or policy changes that could materially alter DB schemes’ asset allocations away from gilt. It should mandate consultation with the Debt Management Office and industry stakeholders to monitor and mitigate risk to market stability. We are not trying to stop the Government persuading pension funds into equities or other alternative investments, but we need a proper conversation with the Debt Management Office about what that means for the cost of Government borrowing, which could potentially be significant.

• 9 Sept 2025 · Pension Schemes Bill (Sixth sitting) · Hansard source

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  I beg to ask leave to withdraw the amendment. Amendment, by leave, withdrawn. Amendments made: 143, in clause 41, page 53, line 8, leave out “Powers to make” and insert “Treasury”. This amendment is consequential on Amendment 144. Amendment 144, in clause 41, page 53, line 25, at end insert— “(1A) The Treasury must by regulations require the FCA to include provision of a description specified in the regulations in general rules made in compliance with section 117E(4)(a) (how to determine whether a person is independent), alongside any other provision included in such general rules. (1B) Regulations under subsection (1A) must in particular require the FCA to include in such general rules provision designed to ensure that the independent person does not have a conflict of interest.” This amendment requires the Treasury to make regulations about the requirements that need to be met by an independent person appointed under section 117E. Amendment 145, in clause 41, page 53, line 38, leave out from “benefits”” to end of line 39 and insert “means money purchase benefits within the meaning of the Pension Schemes Act 1993 (see section 181(1) of that Act) or the Pension Schemes (Northern Ireland) Act 1993 (see section 176(1) of that Act);”. This amendment is consequential on Amendment 140. Amendment 146, in clause 41, page 54, line 3, leave out from “scheme”” to end of line 4 and insert “means a personal pension scheme within the meaning of the Pension Schemes Act 1993 (see section 1(1) of that Act) or the Pension Schemes (Northern Ireland) Act 1993 (see section 1(1) of that Act);”. —(Torsten Bell.) This amendment is consequential on Amendment 140. Clause 41, as amended, ordered to stand part of the Bill. Clause 42 Default pension benefit solutions

• 9 Sept 2025 · Pension Schemes Bill (Sixth sitting) · Hansard source

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  I beg to move amendment 257, in clause 41, page 53, line 7, at end insert— “ 117GA FCA guidance (1) The FCA must issue guidance on contractual overrides. (2) Guidance on contractual overrides must include— (a) when and how overrides can be used; (b) how to demonstrate transfers are always in members’ best interests; and (c) how contractual overrides are independently certified.” Amendments 255, 256 and 257 ensure that contractual override powers are operational in advance of the first value for money assessments. The amendment is very similar to amendment 278, which was tabled by the hon. Member for Tamworth. The industry has highlighted to us a concern that the Government’s proposed sequencing will not provide enough time between contractual overrides becoming permissible and VFM assessments being conducted, which will totally undermine the effectiveness of consolidation and value improvement. Pensions UK has encouraged the Government to accelerate that and to bring forward the implementation to allow schemes to make progress on consolidation sooner, so that the override is in place well in advance of the VFM framework. We drafted amendment 257 with the idea that if transfers took place before the VFM framework was implemented, further guidance from the FCA would be required on how and when overrides could be used. However, we welcome the compromise set out in amendment 278, which would ensure that external transfers do not take place until VFM assessments are available. Frankly, that amendment is better-crafted than ours. If we had done them the other way around, I would have deferred to the advice of the hon. Member for Tamworth on whether she wanted to move the amendment. She was right to withdraw her amendment, and we will withdraw ours, but I urge the Minister to write to us both on the outcome of this matter before Report. It would be useful to have his comments beforehand so that we can challenge him on Report, and possibly move the amendment again—who knows?

• 9 Sept 2025 · Pension Schemes Bill (Sixth sitting) · Hansard source

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  I thank the Minister for talking through the amendments. We understand the intention behind them, but we are worried that, as can often be the case, there may be an unintended consequence: the creation of a closed shop for master trusts. We do not want suddenly to find that, in trying to make a transition pathway, we end up making things more difficult because it has been interpreted in the wrong way. We are minded to oppose the amendments, but perhaps the Minister could instead give us his thoughts on how we can ensure that they do not get used the wrong way and that we do not end up with a closed shop of master trusts.

• 9 Sept 2025 · Financial Services Reform · Hansard source

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  I also congratulate the hon. Member on her elevation to Economic Secretary to the Treasury; I am sure she will do very well. The UK banking sector provides a valuable service to our economy, keeping money in circulation, funding business and mortgages and all the rest of it. The financial services sector is the UK’s biggest export sector. According to UK Finance, UK banks generate around £45 billion in tax every year, but because of things like the bank levy, UK banks now pay an effective rate of around 46%, which is higher than competitors in New York, Frankfurt, Dublin and Singapore. The Chancellor of the Exchequer has managed to dig her own £30 billion black hole in the economy, but can the Minister reassure the City of London and this House that there are no plans to increase taxes on our banking and wider financial services sector in the upcoming Budget in November?

• 9 Sept 2025 · Pension Schemes Bill (Fifth sitting) · Hansard source

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  This is rather strange, because I wanted to intervene on the intervention, but I hope that my hon. Friend will come on to the various other things that we have proposed. For example, we have proposed looking at the Maxwell rules, which are driving the incentive of pension fund trustees to invest in gilts because of the implications of volatile markets for balance sheets. We are trying to look at the wider regulation that is driving certain behaviour, and I hope that my hon. Friend will raise that in due course. We are 100% behind the Bill—not every single part of it, although the thrust is very good—but, as my hon. Friend will mention, there are areas that could be changed to achieve its aims.

• 9 Sept 2025 · Pension Schemes Bill (Fifth sitting) · Hansard source

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  The Bill sets a minimum asset threshold of £25 billion for workplace pension schemes to operate as megafunds by 2030. This is not, in itself, particularly controversial, and we are all fully aware of the arguments about scale being effective when running pension funds. The requirement is intended to drive consolidation, improve economies of scale and boost investment in UK assets, but there is concern that such a high threshold could disadvantage boutique or niche funds or new entrants into the market that provide specialist services to cater for financially literate members who prefer a more tailored approach to their pension management. For example, Hargreaves Lansdown has highlighted that its £5 billion fund serves members who value investment autonomy and expertise. The risk is that the policy could reduce competition, limit consumer choice and stifle innovation by making it harder for smaller, specialist providers to operate or enter the market Clause 38 provides little detail of the meaning of the “ability to innovate” and how “strong potential for growth” will be measured, but it is essential that the Bill provides a credible route to support innovation. If we tie the pensions market up by restricting it to a handful of large providers focused on back-book integration and building scale, there will be less space for innovation aimed at pension member engagement. The benefit of the existing market is that its diversity provides choice and creates competition, and competition is an important part of this. Smaller schemes are chosen by employers for specific reasons. If we lose that diversity and essentially create a handful of the same scheme propositions, employers and members will lose out on this benefit. Realistically, it will be extremely challenging for new entrants to the market to have a chance of building the required scale. Our amendments create an innovation exemption for pension funds that provide specialist or innovative services as part of the new entrants clause. This will allow boutique or niche providers to continue operating if they demonstrate diversity in the market or serve a specific member need, even if they do not meet the £25 billion threshold.

• 9 Sept 2025 · Pension Schemes Bill (Fifth sitting) · Hansard source

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  I would like to speak to the wider clause before coming to our amendments. It is important to get on the record that this is a very bad clause. The Minister mentioned asset allocation, and this measure, which is known as mandation, has gone down incredibly badly with the pensions industry. Mandation risks undermining the core obligation of trustees, which is to act in the best interests of savers. Pension savings reflect decades of work and are not an abstract figure on a balance sheet—they are the hope of a secure future for millions of people. Trustees and fund managers bear a legal responsibility to protect and grow these savings, investing wisely where the best opportunities may be found. Their role is not to follow political direction but to uphold the trust placed in them and the fiduciary duty they owe, which is the foundation of confidence in the pension system. As has been said in multiple responses to the Bill, clause 38 as currently written undermines the UK’s reputation as a predictable and rules-based investment environment. When trustees select investments, they must find the safest and strongest options for beneficiaries. Can we even be confident that the Government will be able to provide a pipeline of investment opportunities? Pension funds could end up being forced to fight against each other for a selection of low-performing assets. If these powers are used, it changes accountability. If mandated investments fail, is it the trustees or the Government who should answer for those losses? Savers deserve clarity about who ultimately protects their hard-earned pension pots. It has been said that this merely provides the powers to do mandation and does not necessarily force firms to do this, but I will come to that later. Our amendment 275 highlights the fact that there is a political party, whose Members are not in attendance here, which has already said that if it gets into government—and, let’s face it, it has a fighting chance—it will mandate pension funds to invest in the UK water industry in order to support the Government renationalising the UK water industry. I would like to highlight some of the issues that have been raised. The Pensions Management Institute has said: “this provision sets a dangerous precedence for Government interference in the fiduciary duty of trustees to act in members’ best financial interests.” Pensions UK has said: “this ambition is subject to fiduciary duties and is dependent on supporting actions by Government, namely that there will need to be a strong pipeline of investable UK assets. Without this, schemes will be competing against each other for the same assets, which risks asset bubbles and poor value for money.” The Investment Association has said: “It comes with significant risks for members in the form of capital being poorly allocated if political preferences take priority over member needs. Any resulting poor investment outcomes will be borne by the member. By creating the risk of political interference in capital allocation, the power undermines the UK’s global reputation as a predictable and rules-based investment environment”. Which? has said that this measure “may result in schemes making worse or riskier investment decisions that may not be in the best long-term financial interests of savers.” Aviva has said: “as currently drafted in Section 28C, the power in the Bill goes far beyond this policy intent and the scope of the Accord, with very limited constraints on how, and under what circumstances, the requirements could be introduced.” The Institute and Faculty of Actuaries has said: “We are concerned about the introduction of investment mandation powers, and potential interference of those powers—or their threatened use—with trustees’ fiduciary duties.” Unison has said: “We have significant concerns about these clauses. Fiduciaries are best placed to set the correct balance between asset classes, and equities have liquidity, governance, transparency of pricing, equality of treatment between investors, and other advantages for pension funds.” Finally, the Association of British Insurers said: “A mandation reserve power would undermine trust in the pension system and create a risk of political interference in capital allocation, which would undermine the UK’s reputation as a predictable and rules-based investment environment.” I understand that this is a reserve power of mandation, but it sets a very bad precedent, so we will oppose the clause.