Blake Stephenson MP: speeches

Speeches

• 15 Sept 2026 · Immigration and Asylum Bill (First sitting) · Hansard source

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  Q Clause 23 would empower the Secretary of State to require successful asylum seekers to pay costs for the support that they had during their passage through the system. To what extent might asylum seekers factor that into their decision making? Jon Featonby: I will take that decision making in a few stages. In terms of whether that measure will deter people from coming to the UK, I do not think it will have any real impact at all. A previous panel touched on how complicated this body of law is. For those who have engaged with successive immigration Bills, it is quite complex. To expect somebody who is seeking protection to follow it, and to expect Parliament or even organisations such as the Refugee Council to be the main place that those people get their information, does not reflect reality. We are concerned about the potential impact on decision making because it is important to remember that asylum support is available only to those asylum applicants who would otherwise be destitute. The Home Office puts in place quite a high bar for someone to even access support. Our concern is that if people are aware that they may be faced with debts of around £10,000, that will prevent them from accessing support. Their alternative then is to remain destitute. That is obviously very bad for those individuals and families, but it is also well established that putting people in destitution has negative consequences from a public health point of view and for wider communities. We are also concerned by that provision because, although it applies to anybody who receives asylum support, with some minor exemptions, the majority of people who will ever be in a position to even start to pay back that money are people who are going to go on to get protection. We are concerned that that will take money away from people who probably have very little in the first place and that, because not having paid back that money could be a bar on settlement in the future, it could lead to people looking to borrow the money from quite dangerous moneylenders, putting people at risk of exploitation at that point. It is quite hard to work out exactly what this will look like because there is not much detail in the Bill, but there are potentially disincentives for refugees to work. In our work at the Refugee Council, we see that people want to be able to work—they want to contribute—and the people who we support into employment, including employment in the NHS, are contributing. We think a far better use of time and resources would be to help refugees to overcome some of the barriers that they face, particularly in employment. That would allow them to contribute far more to the UK, including from tax receipts.

• 15 Sept 2026 · Immigration and Asylum Bill (First sitting) · Hansard source

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  Q Can we briefly return to clause 1(8), which I think you described, Professor Ekins, as a poor attempt at an ouster provision. Would you be able to describe why you think that? If it was better drafted, what would the constitutional and practical benefits be from that clause? Professor Ekins: We have a long tradition in our country, and in the common law world more broadly, of interpreting ouster clauses—clauses in legislation that would limit the jurisdiction of the court on judicial review—narrowly. The courts take for granted that Parliament is probably not going be excluding their supervisory capacity; if a provision is going to genuinely exclude that capacity, the courts expect it to be spelled out categorically, in black and white. There is a long history of their looking at a clause that you might have thought, especially if you had not really been attending to these clauses and their tradition and reception, did say that, and interpreting it to have a much more limited effect or no effect at all in practice, whereas the point was perhaps to exclude review. Looking at that clause and knowing what I do about the history of the reception of those clauses, I just do not think it will be understood to mean, “There can be no judicial review of a decision of the adjudicative body that, for example, is procedurally unfair, or that is so unreasonable that no adjudicative body would have reached it.” Now what it might do, and I think this is how it would be read, would be, “No judicial review challenges to that adjudicative decision on grounds of error of law, because, if you think there is an error of law, you appeal to the upper tribunal.” Fine: it would have some limited effect there. But if the point was to categorically exclude judicial review of adjudicative decisions of this body—and I do not know whether that was the policy of the Government or quite what the drafters had in mind—it certainly will not achieve that. I say “certainly”, I think it is probably the case, but I think it is very unlikely. If you drafted a different ouster clause, then one might have more hope that it would be effective; in a sense, you could specify and categorically exclude the particular grounds of judicial review that you as Parliament do not want this decision of the body to be subject to. Then, in a sense, you are taking full responsibility for what judicial review should look like in relation to this body after the legislation comes into effect. Parliament has in recent years enacted some more thoroughgoing and careful, if you like, precise, ouster clauses along those lines. These are sometimes called partial ouster clauses, because they do not categorically exclude judicial review, but they very severely limit it. There is one such ouster clause in the Judicial Review and Courts Act 2022, which protects some decisions of the upper tribunal from judicial review. That model could be applied here. I should add there are some drawbacks to so doing, because this new adjudicative body, as our previous discussion may suggest and I think the structure of the Bill shows, is not a court. It will be an adjudicative body with some independence, but it will not be like the upper tribunal, which, frankly, is just like the High Court in a different mode. The constitutional case against doing it is certainly stronger than was the case with the upper tribunal; but, if Parliament takes the view that there should be no judicial review here or it should be only on these specified grounds, then there are other models available for drafting an ouster clause. If I were in your shoes, I would not rest content with clause 1(8) as it stands.

• 15 Sept 2026 · Immigration and Asylum Bill (First sitting) · Hansard source

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  Q I do not wish to cut you off, but I asked the question to all three panellists. Eleanor, briefly, please. Eleanor Lyons: Very briefly, touching on part 5 of the Bill in particular, I do not think we will restore confidence in the asylum system by weakening protections for victims of modern slavery. I welcome some parts of the Bill, including better advocacy for child victims of exploitation, devolving decision-making pilots, and work around tackling forced labour in supply chains, but that should go further than it does at the moment. Fundamentally, the Bill makes it harder for safeguarding professionals to identify victims of exploitation in communities across the country, including child victims and UK national victims, and I do not think that that restores public confidence in the system. Unfortunately, I think it erodes confidence that we are not safeguarding cohorts who need our help and support, who do not get the right to remain even if they are confirmed to be victims of modern slavery.

• 15 Sept 2026 · Immigration and Asylum Bill (First sitting) · Hansard source

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  Q In answer to Matt Vickers’s question, you said that, as a result of the Bill, exploiting our borders will be less attractive for organised criminals. What specific measures in the Bill does your organisation think contributes to that assessment? Helen Rance: The strongest deterrence effect will come from sustained law enforcement activity. If we can continue to disrupt facilitators, seize boats and engines, and target criminal finances, it will have an effect on the operation of organised immigration individuals and networks. The Bill makes it harder and less attractive for those networks to operate within the United Kingdom.

• 15 Sept 2026 · Immigration and Asylum Bill (First sitting) · Hansard source

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  Q Given the concerns that you have raised, how likely is it that the Bill will restore confidence in the asylum system? If that is not likely, what else would you like to see in it that would restore confidence? Vicky Tennant: I go back to what I said: legislation is only part of the answer. There are elements of the Bill—particularly those that focus on trying to ensure the quality, efficiency and sustainability of the appeals process—that, if made to work successfully, could contribute to building public confidence in the system. As I said, UNHCR recognises that public confidence is what underpins the refugee convention; we can all speak about the law and the refugee convention, but what is needed to deliver these things in practice is public support for welcoming refugees and for a well-functioning system. On what would be needed in addition, there is a lot of work under way, particularly to make the first instance decision-making process quicker and to improve the quality of decision making. UNHCR has been working directly with the Home Office on that front for some time, and we have been encouraged by the progress. As I said, it is also about the ability to remove people who are found not be in need of international protection. One can do that only if there is a well-functioning system and there is confidence that it gets the decisions right. Safe, regular routes are a big part of a well-functioning, fair system. From the public perspective, what we see consistently in the polling and the various surveys that have been done is that the British people want to welcome refugees. There is support for maintaining the UK as a place of refuge, and the more safe, regular, managed pathways there are to do that, the more it can be delivered and that confidence can be sustained. That cannot be a replacement for access to territorial asylum, which is where it can sometimes be very challenging. As UNHCR, we recognise the challenges the Government face in addressing the crossings in the channel. Nobody wants to see a situation where people are forced into dangerous journeys and where the business is essentially controlled by smugglers and criminals. What is really essential is that you have a good, functioning system for considering asylum claims quickly and removing people who are not in need of asylum, and that also involves the management of arrivals in a sensible way. Partnership with international partners is an absolutely critical aspect of that, including with France but also with other international partners. That is about co-operation upstream to make sure people have alternatives and do not feel they have no alternative but to move onwards, but it is also about co-operation around the management of arrivals at UK borders. The international standards, the refugee convention and the European convention on human rights provide that common baseline that enables the UK to work with international partners in trying to find solutions to these common challenges.

• 15 Sept 2026 · Immigration and Asylum Bill (First sitting) · Hansard source

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  Q The same question, briefly, Will. Do you also have any international experience that it might be worth us hearing about, maybe from Australia and so on? Dr Prescott: Building on what the others have said, there are obviously bits in the Bill that are very positive. The expansion of the reporting requirements—again, you have learned a bit from the Australian experience and the Canadian experience—into public sector organisations is obviously very positive. But, to build on the earlier point, the ultimate way to improve confidence is to improve processes in the system. It is about making sure that organisations have a dedicated point of contact so that there is someone who is directly responsible for modern slavery in first responder organisations. It is about improving and standardising training so that people know what signs to look for when they are dealing with potential victims. That is the best way to stop the last-minute claims, which, though small in number—I think Eleanor said they are less than 2%—have a disproportionate psychological effect. That will also be much better for victims. A lot more attention needs to be on improving the processes, improving the training and making sure someone is actually responsible in first responder organisations.

• 15 Sept 2026 · Immigration and Asylum Bill (First sitting) · Hansard source

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  Q That is very helpful, thank you. Do you want to add anything, Dr Casey? Dr Casey: Yes, I agree. I will just say that I think that, because the Independent Immigration Appeal Authority will not be a judicial body, the courts might be more anxious in scrutinising whether a clause ousts judicial review. At the moment, the way it is drafted, as a public lawyer you read a clause trying to oust and you think how a court would read it. I can imagine a court looking at that at the minute and inserting brackets and making it “A (rational and reasonable) decision of the IIAA”, and interpreting it in that respect.

• 15 Sept 2026 · Immigration and Asylum Bill (First sitting) · Hansard source

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  Q You can do all the things you have described without the Bill, so what in the Bill will make it easier for your organisation to “smash the gangs”? Helen Rance: Smashing the gangs, to coin a phrase, really comes with a lot of different measures and policies. Target hardening and making the UK less attractive is just one of those measures. I do not think there is anything specific in the Bill, other than making the UK a tougher environment for criminals to operate in and less appealing for them to exploit.

• 15 Sept 2026 · Immigration and Asylum Bill (Second sitting) · Hansard source

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  Q My question is for you, Alp, picking up on some of the earlier commentary. You made reference to Australia, Denmark, the USA and Greece, which have reduced numbers applying for asylum through measures that bear no resemblance to the Bill. What should we put in the Bill to replicate the success of those countries? Alp Mehmet: We could start by declaring our intention to come out of the ECHR. Human rights can be dealt with perfectly well by a country like ours without our having to be signed up to the ECHR. We could also pull out of the Council of Europe convention on action against trafficking in human beings. We should announce that the Human Rights Act 1998 will be repealed. All of that would allow us to deal with the sort of people who are, understandably, looking for a better life. I have no problem with that, but are we really saying that anyone and everyone of 118 million will be able to come here? This may sound relatively minor, but the other thing I would do is put the onus on arrivals—we used to call them passengers in the old days. We should put the onus on the migrants arriving to satisfy the immigration official dealing with them of their bona fides. That is what used to happen. Our courts have pushed us in the opposite direction: we now have to disprove. If we do not have any evidence to back that up, we are effectively saying, “Okay, we can’t prove it otherwise. We don’t know who you are. You haven’t got a passport, but we’re going to give you the benefit of the doubt, because the Home Office can’t provide the evidence to do otherwise.” That is absurd. It is also dangerous. Those are the things that I would include in the Bill. Perhaps you would expect me to say a lot of that. Look at what the Americans have done. Whatever anyone feels about some politicians in the United States, they have nevertheless been successful in closing the southern border to illegal immigration. We should put in place effective measures to stop those coming across the channel not just in boats, but in other ways. If the French were sensible and serious enough to stop the whole thing, they should volunteer to take the migrants who make their way to us from there, as should the EU. That is not going to happen anytime soon, I suspect. All in all, I am a little disheartened by the Bill, the measures in it and what is likely to happen.

• 15 Sept 2026 · Immigration and Asylum Bill (Second sitting) · Hansard source

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  Can or does? Is it an objective or a political assessment? Neal Barcoe: If done well, it can absolutely improve. If we can ensure that the quality is there, that it is staffed up properly and that we have the right levels of independence, as set out in the Bill, I think it would be an improvement on the current system. I recognise what underlies your question—we have had a lot of immigration and asylum bills, and that change of perspective is difficult for people in the system, which it undoubtedly is—but I think there are very sensible things in the Bill that seek to improve the current situation. One of the things—the Public Accounts Committee has spoken on this, and the NAO—is about how Departments come together and co-operate more effectively in this space, looking at the whole system. I think that that is what the Bill is about; it is about trying to look at the whole system as one. As I say, at an official level, we are doing that much more than we were before.

• 15 Sept 2026 · Immigration and Asylum Bill (Second sitting) · Hansard source

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  Q Okay. The third witness panel—I think it was the KC who joined us, Professor Ekins—described it as a poor attempt at an ouster provision. Given what you have described as your intent, you presumably disagree with that and think the provision is well drafted. Dan Hobbs: On the basis of today, I think we will take that away and verify it. As I say, I do not think we intended that. I will go away and check.

• 15 Sept 2026 · Immigration and Asylum Bill (Second sitting) · Hansard source

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  Q But from where and how many? Angela Afzal: The opportunity of having safe routes means that the Government can control the numbers and where people come from. That would provide a controlled route. The Government would know where people are coming from and who they are, and could control the numbers. That is why we would advocate that.

• 15 Sept 2026 · Immigration and Asylum Bill (Second sitting) · Hansard source

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  Q May I just stop you? I appreciate what you are saying, but you are not answering my question. If you do not think that the Bill will be adequate to stop people from crossing the channel in an unsafe way, how many legal routes would your organisation want to open up? Angela Afzal: I am starting by saying that we welcome the three new safe routes; that development has gone alongside this. Our main concern with the Bill is clause 21 and the impact on refugee integration. Ultimately, we would like to see safe routes so that people can arrive here from regions and do not have to travel to Europe—

• 15 Sept 2026 · Immigration and Asylum Bill (Second sitting) · Hansard source

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  Q We have heard quite a bit of evidence today from people who have suggested that if the Home Office were to sort out how it goes about dealing with the backlog and its decision making in the first instance, we would not need this new authority. What are your views on whether setting up this IIAA is just a complete waste of public money, a distraction causing more complexity in the system? Do you have any views on that as a Ministry? Neal Barcoe: That might be better addressed to MOJ Ministers, but as a civil servant, I do not think that this is a waste of public money. It is vital that we address the cases that are in the system, and that we look at all ways to do that properly while retaining quality. That is what we are trying to do, to manage that process as well as possible, but with 150,000 cases in the system, it is taking much longer than anyone would like for those cases to be disposed. Something that increases capacity in this way—if we can protect the quality—has to be a good thing. It is about being flexible as well, and I think that that is what the new body brings—we can flex that capacity.

• 15 Sept 2026 · Immigration and Asylum Bill (Second sitting) · Hansard source

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  Q What changes would you like to see to clause 21? Just to make sure that I do not go off track, what changes does your organisation want to see to clause 21 and why? What would the implication be for the potential number of asylum seekers claiming in the UK compared with today? Angela Afzal: Clause 21 seeks to introduce the core protection framework. Our concern is that the clause gives the Home Office very broad powers to introduce changes of entitlements for refugees. The core protection framework, set out in the “Restoring Order and Control” statement last year, indicates that there is an intention to reduce entitlements for refugees. Our concern is that the core protection framework would have a detrimental impact on refugee integration, rather than deterring people from arriving. I can explain in more detail why we feel that the temporary protection, removing the right to family reunion and having the work and study pathway would impact refugee integration from our experience of delivering integration in the UK.

• 15 Sept 2026 · Immigration and Asylum Bill (Second sitting) · Hansard source

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  Q Okay. I am sure we will pick that up in line-by-line scrutiny. We spoke earlier about the general drafting of the Bill, and there was quite a lot of criticism from witnesses of the legal drafting and—no offence if any of you were involved—of its general sloppiness. I have some questions relating to judicial review. Clause 1(8) is the ouster provision. For my clarity, could you please describe what you are trying to achieve with that clause so that we can give it some thought as we move to the next stage? Anna Turley: Sorry, which clause was that again?

• 15 Sept 2026 · Immigration and Asylum Bill (Second sitting) · Hansard source

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  Q The Government argue that introducing the new appeal authority will reduce delays. What are the Ministry of Justice’s views on that, and what evidence have you relied on to conclude that the appeals system will improve performance? Neal Barcoe: Thank you for that question. It is important to start by recognising that judges and the court system have responded very strongly to the significant increase in demand coming through the system. They have increased capacity and improved productivity, but demand is growing considerably faster. On receipts, back in 2023 we had about 58,000 cases coming into the system. In 2025-26, that was up to 118,000. The outstanding caseload has risen in that same period from about 50,000 to 150,000 cases. The courts have tried to look at every available option and opportunity to improve productivity in the system. They have increased the number of legal officers in the system by 70%, and have expanded things such as the virtual region to make sure that more cases are being heard on any given day. They have looked at case progression and how you can speed up cases, so that cases are ready for court more quickly. They are looking at all forms of technology to improve productivity and have improved their listing practices, too. We have sought to grow the judicial workforce as quickly as possible. Since last year, we have seen a net increase of about 21% in the number of judges. We are up to just over 300 now, with 65 fee-paid and 25 salaried judges starting earlier this year, and more recruitment in train. While we have had that recruitment success, it has demonstrated an upper ceiling and a real challenge to going further and faster. The pool of candidates is relatively constrained: if you want to come in as a fee-paid judge, you need five years post-qualification experience in a relevant field; and, traditionally, if you come in as a salaried judge, you need to have had previous judicial experience, too. Taking on a salaried role also means giving up your practice, so on immigration and asylum matters, we have struggled to go further and as fast as we would like. The process is not quick—it takes 12 to 18 months to recruit judges—so I think that the proposition for the Independent Immigration Appeals Authority is that, if we are able to recruit trained adjudicators from a broader range of professional backgrounds, it should be possible to increase capacity and add more flexibility, while retaining their legal support, and ensuring that there are proper assurances on quality and that we have the upper-tier oversight. That is the thinking on where we are.

• 15 Sept 2026 · Immigration and Asylum Bill (Second sitting) · Hansard source

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  Q A final question, if I may. Will the Bill make the life of immigration lawyers and practitioners more or less complicated? On the whole, will it improve our immigration system, or is it a retrograde step? Neal Barcoe: Again, as an official, I think that it does and can improve the system—

• 15 Sept 2026 · Immigration and Asylum Bill (Second sitting) · Hansard source

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  Q In which case you are not concerned that, by tightening up article 8, you will end up with article 3 claims. Dan Hobbs: With the immigration system, we always have to think about displacement and human behaviour, which is not entirely predictable. We will go away and review that point with the Minister, but I cannot not immediately see how someone could use a subsisting relationship under article 8 as an article 3 barrier.

• 15 Sept 2026 · Immigration and Asylum Bill (Second sitting) · Hansard source

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  Q That is a nice bridge for me to ask about article 8. We have heard that the tightening up of article 8 may drive article 3 claims. Does the Bill not take the Government to a place of playing whack-a-mole with the ECHR yet again? Dan Hobbs: We are really clear about article 8, as we have set out in the impact assessment and elsewhere. Article 3 is used much less, and would normally be tested through the asylum claim. An article 3 breach would normally fall within the asylum and protection angle. Article 8 is already a qualified right, so I do not immediately follow the logic that people would then make article 3 claims, because that would already be considered under their asylum claim. If people had article 3 rights, they would be raised and are raised. We get article 3 challenges in various elements, so it is used now, but I am not clear how an article 8 right, which is a qualified right, can transpose into article 3, which is an absolute right.

• 15 Sept 2026 · Immigration and Asylum Bill (Second sitting) · Hansard source

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  Clause 1(8). Dan Hobbs: This provision is about decisions on errors in law going to the upper tribunal. That is the case now: first-tier tribunal challenges on errors in law go to the upper tribunal. What we are setting out there is the procedure. Appeals against decisions of the new authority on the basis of law go to the upper tribunal.

• 15 Sept 2026 · Immigration and Asylum Bill (Second sitting) · Hansard source

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  Q In the view of the International Rescue Committee, what safe routes should be opened up today to deal with the issue that you have just described? Angela Afzal: We welcome the safe routes that the Home Secretary has recently announced. We think that they are a positive development. There has been a wide consultation with communities and stakeholders, and the approach has allowed communities to offer consent for the refugees who come to them. There can be planning for people arriving so that services are ready. Our experience shows that that is when you get good refugee integration and good social cohesion. We welcome the offer of complementary safe routes, so that people who want to come here to study and work, but are not able to access the usual immigration rules—

• 15 Sept 2026 · Immigration and Asylum Bill (Second sitting) · Hansard source

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  Q Just stepping back for a moment, do you expect the result of the Bill will be that the numbers arriving on small boats will decrease and the numbers removed from the UK will increase? Anna Turley: As I said at the beginning, it is an important part of our armoury for reducing the numbers in small boats. We have evidence clearly showing that people who come to the country think we have, essentially, a more liberal system than many other countries in Europe. Of course, there are other reasons why people want to come to the UK, but people generally think that we have a looser interpretation of some of our responsibilities than other countries. It is important to us that we are clear, through the Bill, that we will fulfil our obligations, but also that we will ensure people cannot exploit the system or find loopholes, and that we will have a system that is fair, efficient and effective. This is one part of our armoury that, alongside all the other measures we are putting in place, will see our trajectory of reducing small boats continue. I am convinced that the Bill will certainly speed up the time it takes to undertake removals and deal with some of the last-minute claims. You have heard from my colleague about people finding yet another opportunity to thwart the system when they are literally on their way to the planes. Bas Javid: I would add that the very act of removal, when it is done properly and legitimately, acts as a deterrent in itself. For people who are looking to come to the UK or to remain illegally after a legal arrival, the very act of removal, done in the right way, is a deterrent.

• 15 Sept 2026 · Immigration and Asylum Bill (Second sitting) · Hansard source

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  Q To achieve that, do you need changes in the Bill? Angela Afzal: Our focus in the Bill is the impact of the core protection framework, which is in clause 21.

• 10 Sept 2026 · Ukraine and Russia · Hansard source

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  I thank the Secretary of State for his statement and welcome him to his place. I also welcome the ongoing commitment to defend Ukraine. In his statement, he reaffirmed the UK’s commitment to providing more than 120,000 drones to Ukraine this year, which I very much welcome. He also mentioned the recent plot to sabotage a UK drone factory. What action is being taken to ensure that UK manufacturing facilities are safe and secure, and if any action is required, who is funding that?