Angela Eagle MP: speeches

Speeches

• 15 Jul 2026 · National Security · Hansard source

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  I am tempted to say hold my beer, as there are 50 minutes left, but I suspect that many people will want to have their beers elsewhere, in front of a larger screen than we have in this House. I am grateful to all colleagues who have contributed to the debate. The bodies that we have discussed today—the IRGC, the IMCR and the GRU Volunteer Corps—represent different manifestations of a common challenge: foreign power threat activity conducted directly by states through proxies. The hon. Member for Stockton West (Matt Vickers) asked why it has taken so long to take this action. This power has been developed specifically to address the growing challenge posed by state-linked bodies where it is not always appropriate to use existing counter-terrorism powers. It provides a targeted and proportionate means of disrupting those involved in foreign power threat activity based on the recommendations of Jonathan Hall KC, the independent reviewer of state threat legislation. To answer the hon. Member’s question, we had to have that review by Jonathan Hall and look at the way in which current terrorism legislation is working. We then had to change the law to create this new designation, which is akin to proscription, but in the different context of states—one cannot proscribe a state and suddenly announce that it does not exist, but one can designate proxies that act on behalf of states, which gives our intelligence and police services very similar powers to deal with the malign influence that they seek to bring to bear on our shores. Designation will disrupt these bodies and those that support or facilitate them by providing stronger tools to our law enforcement and intelligence agencies. It will mean that anyone who supports, assists or obtains material benefit from these organisations will face sentences of up to 14 years in prison, and will make it easier to prosecute certain offences under the National Security Act 2023. The hon. Member for Stockton West talked about getting that Act on the statute book in 2023. At the time, I was serving on the Intelligence and Security Committee from the Opposition Benches. The ISC brought to the House various amendments to that Act, hoping to make it better. I now see from the other side—from the Government Benches—that it has made it easier to use. So that the House can take an assessment, I note also that designations for the foreign influence registration scheme are also up and running—something else that this Government have done that makes it easier for us to keep an eye on what is going on on our shores. My hon. Friend the Member for Birmingham Selly Oak (Al Carns) and the hon. Member for Lewes (James MacCleary) widened the debate slightly from the threats facing us to talk about the threats to destabilise our democracy and to ask what we can do about social media companies and the disinformation and misinformation that is swirling around us at the moment. In the context of designation, the regulations now introduce offences relating to supporting the GRU Volunteer Corps, the IRGC and the IMCR. We expect platforms to act responsibly and not to provide space for state threat-linked activity, propaganda or recruitment. We will be keeping a close eye on that, as well as liaising with social media companies to tell them about how this law impacts them. We are clear that any harmful propaganda and material has no place on the internet, and we will continue to take robust action in response if we see it there. The designation introduces the supporting offence, which enables us to talk directly to those hosting such material. Members including the hon. Member for Lewes and my hon. Friend the Member for Leeds South West and Morley (Mark Sewards) talked about how important it is to defend our Jewish communities, and we all understand and support that. We all want to see antisemitism driven out of our country. This Government have introduced support for the Jewish communities who have been threatened and directly targeted by IRGC proxies. Just a couple of days ago, my right hon. Friend the Prime Minister announced an extra £250 million for policing to ensure that we can support and protect our Jewish communities. In general, the kind of attacks on our democratic way of life that my hon. Friend the Member for Birmingham Selly Oak talked about have been aimed also at the Muslim community. The rise of hate speech, intolerance, grievance and division is an issue that I, as current chair of the defending democracy taskforce, am only too aware of. We have to tackle this across Government, and I promise the House that we are doing that. The debate has highlighted the seriousness of the threats posed, as did the debate we had before this one. All the cases that have been mentioned underline the need for a robust response to proxy activity on our streets that is state-directed. The United Kingdom faces a growing and evolving threat from foreign states and proxies acting on their behalf. Through this statutory instrument, we are strengthening our ability to respond effectively. We will protect our national security, support our communities and ensure that those who seek to undermine this country are met with a clear and firm response. I commend this instrument to the House. Question put and agreed to. Resolved , That the draft National Security Act 2023 (Designated Bodies) Regulations 2026, which were laid before this House on 13 July, be approved.

• 15 Jul 2026 · National Security · Hansard source

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  I beg to move, That the draft National Security Act 2023 (Designated Bodies) Regulations 2026, which were laid before this House on 13 July, be approved. I am grateful to the House for its consideration of this draft statutory instrument, which will see three bodies designated: the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps, the Islamic Movement of Companions of the Right, and the GRU Volunteer Corps. Threats from foreign powers and their proxies have grown in scale and complexity, and we have just had a debate about one of the areas of the world from where these threats emanate. Designation is a powerful tool for disrupting state bodies and those acting in concert with them, and it sends a strong message about the UK’s commitment to tackling foreign power threat activity globally. The Home Secretary has determined that the three bodies are involved in foreign power threat activity, so we propose to designate them under this new power. Before I give more detail on the bodies in question, it is worth setting out the legislative basis of the decision. For a body to be designated, the Home Secretary must reasonably believe that it is involved in foreign power threat activity, as defined in the National Security Act 2023. The definition of “foreign power threat activity” covers the most serious offences in the Act, including espionage, sabotage and foreign interference. It also covers broader activity that constitutes a serious threat to life or public safety when carried out for, on behalf of, or with the intention to benefit a foreign power. If that test is met, the Home Secretary must then consider whether designation is necessary to protect the safety or interests of the United Kingdom. She will take account of considerations such as foreign policy and the impact on human rights. Once a group is designated, it is a criminal offence within the UK’s jurisdiction to support, assist or obtain material benefits from that designated body, and the penalties for such offences are imprisonment for up to 14 years and/or a fine. Where an individual commits certain espionage conduct or sabotage for a designated body, this can attract sentences of up to life in prison. Designation therefore enables law enforcement and intelligence agencies to disrupt designated bodies more effectively. Given its wide-ranging impact, the Home Secretary will exercise this power only after thoroughly reviewing the available evidence, including intelligence material and cross-Government advice. A decision to designate is only taken after great care and consideration, and it must be approved by both Houses. I turn now to the bodies in question, starting with the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps. The long-standing threat posed by Iran and its proxies is well established; indeed, we have literally just debated it. We know that the Iranian intelligence services have a pattern of targeting dissidents, Persian-language media organisations and journalists, and Jewish and Israeli communities globally. The IRGC Quds Force and the IRGC Intelligence Organisation, together with the Ministry of Intelligence and Security, form the Iranian intelligence apparatus. As a key component of the Iranian state’s security apparatus, the IRGC is answerable directly to Iran’s Supreme Leader. Its role extends beyond conventional military operations and includes intelligence activity, the use of proxy actors, and influence operations that are designed to advance Iranian state objectives. Activity linked to the IRGC has involved threats to life and intimidation on UK soil, including credible plots to target individuals in the United Kingdom. The IRGC also supports militant groups overseas, and has been associated with cyber-attacks and other state threats that are actively aligned with Iranian state objectives. I will move on to the Islamic Movement of Companions of the Right. The IMCR has publicly claimed seven attacks at UK locations linked to Jewish and Israeli communities and to Persian-language media, including the antisemitic arson attack on four Hatzola ambulances in Golders Green on 23 March. Sitting behind the IMCR are members of the Iran’s Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps Quds Force, who almost certainly directed attacks across Europe by the IMCR. These incidents, including acts of arson and intimidation, have caused real fear and distress, and they have a profound effect on the communities affected. It is clear that this sustained activity directly threatens the safety and the interests of the United Kingdom. On the GRU Volunteer Corps, Russia’s threat to the United Kingdom extends far beyond conventional military action. The Kremlin increasingly relies on proxy organisations to pursue its objectives, seeking to undermine our security while maintaining a degree of plausible deniability. The so-called GRU Volunteer Corps is a clear example of that approach. It is not an independent force or a loose collection of volunteers. It is a proxy organisation operating under the direction and control of the GRU, Russia’s military intelligence service. These formations are directed, supported and sustained by the GRU, and they are already operating across conflict zones, most notably in Ukraine in support of Russia’s illegal invasion. We are seeing a conscious attempt by the Russian state to blur the lines between military action, intelligence activity and criminality, using deniable forces to carry out sabotage, destabilisation and violence beyond its borders. This is not conjecture; it reflects a pattern of behaviour that underpins Russia’s aggression in Ukraine and has been seen repeatedly across Europe, including here in the United Kingdom. In 2024, two men organised an arson attack on a Ukrainian-owned business in east London on behalf of the Wagner Group, another proxy body that acts on behalf of the Russian state, and which is proscribed as a terrorist organisation in the UK. It is notable that large parts of the Wagner Group have been absorbed into the so-called Volunteer Corps, which demonstrates the threat posed to the UK. With the House’s consent, these bodies will be designated. Having carefully considered all the evidence, the Home Secretary has decided that there is sufficient evidence for her reasonably to believe that each body is involved in foreign power threat activity, and that designation is necessary to protect the safety or interests of the United Kingdom. Designation will strengthen our ability to disrupt these bodies and those who support and facilitate them. More broadly, it sends a powerful message to any foreign power or proxy intent on harming the United Kingdom or our interests. We will do whatever it takes to prevent such activity on our soil. This debate is a significant moment, because this is the first use of a new power introduced by this Government to answer an urgent need. We are taking action because the three bodies in question, in their different ways, pose a threat to our country, and because designation is a necessary and proportionate response to their activities. With that, I commend the regulations to the House.

• 15 Jul 2026 · Iran · Hansard source

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  That is very controversial!

• 14 Jul 2026 · Extreme Heat: Preparedness · Hansard source

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  My hon. Friend the Member for Kingston upon Hull West and Haltemprice (Emma Hardy), the Minister for Water in DEFRA, is probably in a better position to give the hon. Member details on that. The water White Paper will seek to create a more coherent system than the one that we inherited, which we know is inadequate. The Government are strengthening long-term climate adaptation by setting stronger objectives based on common planning assumptions, informed by the guidance that we requested from the Climate Change Committee. Yesterday, in the statement given on the Floor of the House by my hon. Friend the Nature Minister on the state of climate and nature, she announced on climate adaptation that we are building our resilience for a minimum of 2% of warming by 2050 “and supporting combined authorities to increase their resilience to climate change, too.” —[ Official Report , 13 July 2026; Vol. 789, c. 649.] The Government will take forward that minimum temperature increase as an assumption in our adaptation planning; I think that is what the hon. Member for South Cambridgeshire (Pippa Heylings) was asking me about.

• 14 Jul 2026 · Extreme Heat: Preparedness · Hansard source

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  I absolutely accept that, and so do the Government. It is not ideal that 2% is the minimum that public authorities must plan their adaptation assumptions on. We want to avoid getting to 2%, but the fact is that the way things are going, that is a realistic assumption for our planners to incorporate into their work.

• 14 Jul 2026 · Extreme Heat: Preparedness · Hansard source

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  I was hoping to deal with a lot of these issues, but I want to leave the hon. Member for Waveney Valley enough time to say a few things. I have many more things to say, so perhaps we can resume this debate in the future.

• 14 Jul 2026 · Extreme Heat: Preparedness · Hansard source

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  It is a great pleasure to serve under your chairship, Sir Christopher, in this debate on a matter that has affected a great many of our constituents and all Members who are struggling through the London heat. I am grateful to Members for their valuable contributions. I thank the hon. Member for Waveney Valley (Adrian Ramsay) for securing the debate. I hope to give all Members some confidence that we are making progress in what is an extremely complicated and interconnected problem. It is not only interconnected in this country; it requires action locally, nationally and internationally, and it cannot be solved easily or quickly. Despite some of the issues and considerable challenges—they are considerable—that hon. Members have pointed out in their contributions, I want to cheer people up slightly with the statement that the Nature Minister, my hon. Friend the Member for Coventry East (Mary Creagh), made on the Floor of the House yesterday. She pointed out that before the Paris agreement, the world was on track for 4% of warming, but we have now got it down to 2.5. That is still way too high, but I use that example because I want to inject a little bit of confidence that if we can get our processes right—internationally as well as nationally—we can do something about this. Such issues are so complex and interrelated that it is easy for people to think that the problem is too great and we cannot possibly deal with it, and then be despairing about it, so I wanted to inject that little bit of optimism. We have made progress, and we have to make sure that we carry on making progress. The Government recognise that extreme heat fuelled by climate change is no longer a rare seasonal event to be managed with temporary emergency measures; it is a chronic, recurring, structural risk to our economy, public health and national security. Every hon. Member who has contributed today has recognised that point. Our response to extreme heat is built on a combination of tried and tested plans and capabilities that have been refined over time, and also longer-term programmes to meet the specific challenges of climate change. Evidence suggests that without action, the physical impacts of climate change could cost England’s economy between 1.1% and 3.3% of GDP by 2050, and at least 7.4% by the end of the century. We are taking action now in recognition that it is economically beneficial to invest early to reduce emissions. As Nicholas Stern said many years ago, the more money spent on investing to prevent, the cheaper it is to deal with the consequences. The Government have put clean energy and climate action at the heart of their agenda, which includes showing global leadership by setting a world-leading target to reduce emissions by at least 81% by 2035. Cutting emissions remains our first line of defence, but it is harder when the political consensus that existed about climate action has broken down globally and in this country. There are still people who claim that climate change does not exist and that we are spending a load of money for no particular reason, when we know that scientists are universally agreed that the increase in heat and changes in climate that we are talking about have been caused by human effects on our planet’s climate. The sooner that everybody recognises that globally, the easier it will be for the great ingenuity of the human race—when it is in a good mood—to deal with the consequences of what was done in the past with industrialisation. We are taking action as well as mitigation to prepare the UK for the impacts of climate change. Under the Climate Change Act 2008, we maintain a robust climate change risk assessment, and through the national adaptation programme, DEFRA co-ordinates a rigorous cross-Government response to ensure that our sectors remain resilient.

• 13 Jul 2026 · Topical Questions · Hansard source

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  Today, my right hon. Friend the Home Secretary has laid statutory instruments to designate three bodies engaged in foreign power threat activity under the National Security (State Threats) Act 2026. They are the Islamic Movement of Companions of the Right, who have publicly claimed seven attacks at UK locations linked to Jewish and Israeli communities, and Persian language media; and Iran’s IRGC; and Russia’s GRU Volunteer Corps. Designation will make it an offence to support, assist or obtain benefits from any of these organisations.

• 13 Jul 2026 · Topical Questions · Hansard source

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  I extend my sincere condolences to the family following the tragic death of Hannah. The hon. Gentleman will appreciate that in line with legal confidentiality obligations, I can neither confirm nor deny whether a request for mutual legal assistance has been made or received. It would be inappropriate for me to comment on an investigation in another jurisdiction. I am happy to meet the hon. Gentleman, if that is what he wishes.

• 7 Jul 2026 · Fraud Strategy 2026-29 · Hansard source

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  The banking hubs are at an early stage of their development. They are a good development. At the moment, they are less sophisticated in the services that they can offer. We have to work with banks, which are—because most of their customers wish it—going online and leaving the high street. That does leave in a more vulnerable situation people who perhaps are more vulnerable to being scammed online. In our work with the banks, we have to try to make the case that they need to have special relationships and ways of dealing with those who are neurodiverse or who may be easier, in some ways, to fool. In my experience, almost anyone can become a victim of this kind of fraud if they get caught at a vulnerable moment or when they are upset about something, so we have to deal with education in a much more holistic way, rather than just categorising people. But I understand the hon. Gentleman’s point. Using data from Report Fraud, we are improving our ability to identify emerging fraud trends and local fraud hotspots, which enables us to work with police forces and community partners to deliver targeted interventions where we see they are needed most. We are just beginning to get to the stage at which we can start spotting these kinds of trends and trying to prevent them, rather than trying to pick up the pieces after a fraud has happened. It is equally important to co-ordinate the fraud protect networks, for which City of London police has responsibility. Bringing together local, regional and national law enforcement, the network helps to reduce the threat of fraud and repeat victimisation through consistent prevention messaging, practical safeguarding advice and targeted public engagement. I think that as we see more of these issues developing, we will be able to see what the trends are and be more preventive and ahead of the trends before they cause damage. An estimated 70% of fraud has an international element: it knows no borders. As part of our effort to counter that, the UK sponsored the UN Office on Drugs and Crime and Interpol global fraud summit in March. That ministerial summit brought together over 1,000 attendees across 115 Governments, over 40 Ministers and senior law enforcement, and over 500 private sector companies, including big tech, with the aim of strengthening international co-operation, raising global standards and agreeing co-ordinated, multi-sector action plans to deal with fraud. We also want to do what we can to try to shut down some of the scam centres that we know are appearing in particular areas of the world; where we can, we will sign memorandums of understanding with countries that may have a particular issue that we see impinging on our citizens. The international part is extremely important. As the hon. Member for Yeovil mentioned in his speech, working with the telecoms companies and the big tech companies is equally important. I assure him that our new fraud strategy is particularly aimed at being able to ensure that we bring these different strands together and bear down on the current levels of fraud, which are completely unacceptable. Question put and agreed to.

• 7 Jul 2026 · Fraud Strategy 2026-29 · Hansard source

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  We need to look at where the issues are, where the loopholes are and where people are being exploited. We need to see what we can do, both as law enforcers and as regulators, to close those loopholes. I am not going to say yes immediately to the hon. Gentleman’s question, not least because it is not directly in my bivouac, but he can rest assured that we will look at the trends and see how we can harden the target, if I might put it that way. A whole range of individuals can be scammed and fall for very sophisticated frauds without realising—and by the time they do realise, it is too late. Obviously the private sector, specifically the banking sector, has an important part to play with the warnings that it puts on its electronic banking systems. We need to do an enormous amount of co-operative work in all this, to ensure that our online crime centre can pick up and collaborate with all parts of the system that is there to try to protect people. As I said earlier, “Stop! Think Fraud” is an important part of that. If something looks too good to be true online, it almost certainly is. We have to get that education out there, be it through influencers or other types of people, to the people who are potential victims in this area.

• 7 Jul 2026 · Fraud Strategy 2026-29 · Hansard source

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  It is a great pleasure to be in this Chamber with you in the Chair, Mrs Harris. I congratulate the hon. Member for Yeovil (Adam Dance) on securing the debate. I also thank him for how he has set out some of the very difficult problems that all our constituents have faced as technology has provided the wherewithal to industrialise frauds and scams, often from abroad. There is now no way to get a handle on what they are doing without involving ourselves in international co-operation. As technologies advance, the threat of these kinds of activities evolves, and we have to do what we can to try to keep pace with them and hopefully get ahead, so that we can do some prevention rather than trying to pick up the pieces after terrible things have happened. At this juncture, I express my empathy and sympathy with the hon. Member’s constituents, some of whom he has mentioned today, including Christopher, who was the subject of a romance fraud, and Jason, who was subjected to fraudulent behaviour and the temptation of wealth creation that was not really there. One thing that has struck me very strongly since I took up this post three weeks ago, and from my own constituency caseload over many years, is how invidious and difficult it is for the victims of these kinds of behaviours to admit that they have fallen into a trap, because many of them feel a bit silly and embarrassed and do not know where to turn to try to get redress. The way that redress has worked in this country in the past has not kept pace with the industrialisation of fraud, its international aspect and its sophistication. It has been difficult, therefore, as the hon. Member for Yeovil recounted, for systems to keep up. People feel not only embarrassed, worried and a bit shameful that they have fallen into those traps, according to my constituency caseload, but they do not find it easy to get redress. I congratulate the hon. Member on his constituency work, and the way he has used the systems that we are putting in place to ensure that the money can be refunded in many cases, though obviously not all. My esteemed colleague Lord Hanson leads on this area of work. Despite all the innovations in our constitution since I have been in this House, we do not allow Lords to speak in Commons debates, thank goodness. I am here, however, and more than happy to talk to Lord Hanson about some of these issues. Before I come to the points raised, I want to make some simple but important ones of my own. Fraud is high volume and high harm, for the reasons the hon. Member for Yeovil outlined. Hon. Members will know that is true from their experience in advice surgeries. It deprives law-abiding people of their hard-earned money; it hits businesses with sometimes crippling losses; it destroys lives and livelihoods; it destroys confidence and mental health; it drains our economy; and it weakens our resilience and undermines confidence in the rule of law. This problem is directly linked to my work as Security Minister, because it helps to fuel some of the most serious threats we face as a country, as well as causing the human harm we have heard of today. Our response has to match the scale and impact of the threat. I believe the Government have acted with clarity and ambition, with the new fraud strategy published in March, as the hon. Gentleman mentioned. I thank him for acknowledging that he was happy to see elements of that, such as crucial international action and the replacement of Action Fraud—it was so difficult to see any action coming from it that it would have been better named “Inaction Fraud”. Thankfully, that has been replaced. As the strategy is put into effect, it will include Report Fraud, victim-support schemes and charters on advertising. In its broadest sense, the strategy brings together all parts of the system, including Government, law enforcement, industry and civil society, and goes further and faster in our fight to disrupt fraudsters and protect the public. The strategy is built on clear principles: to disrupt criminals, to safeguard people and businesses, to respond strongly, to protect victims and to enforce the law. The Government have invested £250 million and will work with everyone to clamp down on the fraud epidemic. We will try to make that money work as hard as possible in co-operation with other parts of the system to get best value for money. To some extent, that is my answer to the question the hon. Member for Yeovil asked about whether £250 million is enough: it is not a bad start, and we will see how it develops to ensure that we cover the bases that we need to cover in this area as quickly as possible. At the heart of the new approach is a new online crime centre, which has over £30 million of investment to bring Government, law enforcement, GCHQ and industry together in one place. Its mission is clear: to identify the technological enablers of fraud, which are rapidly evolving and industrialising, as I said before; to disrupt fraud at scale; and to deliver high-impact interventions at speed. The online crime centre is working on those things even as we speak. Safeguarding and supporting victims is also at the forefront of the strategy. We are strengthening public awareness through an expanded “Stop! Think Fraud” campaign because it is important to remember that, as plausible as some of these people are, the more we can increase the suspicion and resilience of the people who interact in these systems, the more likely we are to be more resilient to fraud. I acknowledge absolutely that the psychological cleverness of a lot of fraud is something to behold. These people are very clever at what they do. They are very sophisticated in how they draw people in. All of us have a duty to try to warn individuals about the kind of dangers out there from those very sophisticated approaches.

• 6 Jul 2026 · National Security (State Threats) Bill · Hansard source

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  I am grateful for the contributions of all right hon. and hon. Members. The hon. Member for Stockton West (Matt Vickers) was worried that we had changed the Bill in a way that would make it less effective, and my hon. Friend the Member for Rotherham (Sarah Champion) still made the case for having an exemption rather than a defence for humanitarian assistance. I confirm that in our view the Bill as originally written would have excluded humanitarian assistance completely, because of the primary purpose rule, but we felt that there was some merit in the argument about the chilling effect of not having a defence. That is why we accepted the amendments in the other place, but that is belt and braces—nothing has changed. We are trying to accommodate potentially legitimate worries and chilling effects that might have an effect on the operational effectiveness of some NGOs, even though the law itself would not have caught them.

• 6 Jul 2026 · National Security (State Threats) Bill · Hansard source

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  The first duty of any Government is and will forever be to secure this country and keep all its inhabitants safe. It is a mission that has challenged us relentlessly, but it has grown and evolved in recent years. The threat posed by foreign powers will be known by all here: physical threats against individuals and property; theft of trade secrets; attempts to interfere in and influence our democracy; and cyber-attacks targeting both the state and the private sector that disrupt critical infrastructure and compromise sensitive data. As the House has heard many times before, the source of those threats has come predominantly, though not exclusively, from three countries: Russia, China and Iran. The threats from each present differently, but those threats are very real, and they are evolving. The Bill before us will strengthen the Government’s ability to disrupt hostile intelligence services and their proxies by adapting counter-terrorism tools to tackle state-based security threats to the UK. In developing this legislation, we have worked closely with the police, security and the intelligence agencies. The Bill gives our operational partners the powers that they need, and it does so in a way that reflects the differences between state and non-state actors. As Jonathan Hall himself has said, this Bill “does the job”. As the Bill progressed through its stages, the Government listened carefully to the arguments about legitimate humanitarian assistance, as well as concerns expressed by non-governmental organisations and the International Development Committee. The Government’s position remains that the Bill should not criminalise legitimate humanitarian aid work or the important work of journalists and diplomats.

• 6 Jul 2026 · National Security (State Threats) Bill · Hansard source

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  Yes, my hon. Friend may know her Pepper v. Hart, and I have just put it on the record in this House, but obviously I will take a close look at the guidance as it is developed. The hon. Member for Woking (Mr Forster) made a powerful speech, particularly about the rising level of threat that we face. That is why the Bill needs to be on the statute book as quickly as possible. My hon. Friend the Member for Leeds South West and Morley (Mark Sewards) asked about the designated threats defence. Again, the answer is the same: it is about the chilling effect.

• 6 Jul 2026 · National Security (State Threats) Bill · Hansard source

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  I do not want us to go into specific examples, but I can assure the hon. Gentleman that we keep a very close eye on what proxy actors and state actors by proxy are doing in our country. We believe that designation, which is what this quite narrow Bill will allow us to do, will make it much clearer that we know what they are doing. It will make for a harder operating environment for those who wish us ill and are directed by state actors. That is what the legislation is intended to do. Against a backdrop of growing threat from foreign states and their proxies, including through espionage, interference, sabotage and threats to life, the Bill will strengthen the ability to disrupt hostile intelligence services and their proxies by adapting counter-terrorism tools to tackle state-based security threats in the UK. It will create a new power for the Secretary of State to designate organisations involved in foreign power threat activity, backed up by new criminal offences of supporting, assisting or obtaining benefits from designated bodies. There has been some concern, both in this House and in the other place, regarding potential unintended consequences, but I reassure the House that the Bill was never intended to, and does not, criminalise genuine humanitarian activity by NGOs or journalists or other legitimate activities. We have listened to the arguments, and it is right to put that matter beyond doubt. The amendments do that. We have worked closely with operational partners, and I am satisfied that these narrow amendments do not weaken the Bill. The Bill will enable proxy organisations to be treated in practice like foreign intelligence services, making it easier to prosecute those acting on their behalf. Overall, this manifesto commitment will strengthen the national security framework so that the UK becomes a more difficult operating environment for foreign intelligence services and state-linked proxies. With that, I commend the Lords amendments to the House. Question put, That this House agrees with Lords amendment 1.

• 6 Jul 2026 · National Security (State Threats) Bill · Hansard source

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  I do not agree with my hon. Friend’s interpretation of the Bill at all. The threats that we are facing mean that this Bill ought to be on the statute book sooner rather than later, so that we can begin to deal with them. As I was saying, the Government’s position remains that the Bill should not criminalise legitimate humanitarian aid work or the important work of journalists and diplomats, and it remains our view that the Bill does not have that effect. However, to avoid a potential chilling effect, the Government felt that it was better to accept amendments to the Bill to put that matter beyond doubt. That is why the Government supported amendments 1, 2, 4 and 6, tabled by Baroness Northover in the other place.

• 6 Jul 2026 · National Security (State Threats) Bill · Hansard source

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  I beg to move, That this House agrees with Lords amendment 1.

• 6 Jul 2026 · National Security (State Threats) Bill · Hansard source

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  We are very confident that the Bill as it is written does not place journalists in any jeopardy. In fact, these measures allow us to act against those who are conducting harmful activity in the UK, including targeting journalists here in the UK because of their attempts to expose activities in other regimes. The right hon. Gentleman makes a more general point about the jeopardy in which journalists put themselves in war zones, and I would agree that their news reporting is some of the bravest. We all support a free press and journalists’ ability to report in war zones, but I would say respectfully to him that these things are slightly different and he is combining the two issues. We are convinced that this Bill does not and will not put journalists in any more jeopardy in this country—certainly not for reporting. Baroness Northover tabled amendments 1, 2, 4 and 6 in the other place. They introduce a new defence into the offences at new sections 17B and 17C of the National Security Act 2023, specifically to cover legitimate humanitarian aid activity. This means that non-governmental organisations that have to engage with a designated body in order to carry out legitimate humanitarian activity will benefit from the same protections under the Bill as do UK diplomats. The Government also supported amendments 3 and 5, which were tabled by Lord Anderson. These amendments were based on the advice of Jonathan Hall KC and also had the support of Lord Carlile. They add a reasonable excuse defence in new section 17C of the 2023 Act for obtaining, accepting or agreeing to accept information from a designated body. This means that where a person has a reasonable excuse for receiving information from a designated body, they benefit from a defence. This might include, for example, a journalist conducting an interview or a charity receiving information on the location of landmines. The Government considered the case for exempting humanitarian NGOs from the offences, but we were advised by our operational partners that this would provide a loophole that hostile actors would seek to exploit, which in turn could make the NGOs themselves a target for infiltration. In fact, that is the case that I made to this Chamber in Committee. I am grateful to the other place and the International Development Committee for their engagement on this Bill and for the constructive amendments, which have helped strengthen the Bill and broaden its support. The Bill represents an important new addition to our toolkit to address the growing threat from foreign powers. As I said in Committee, my officials have worked closely with operational partners in the creation of this power and the accompanying offences, and our partners are fully supportive of the Bill. It closes a gap, and they have been explicit that it provides them with vital tools capable of addressing the sharpest threats that they are tackling.

• 29 Jun 2026 · Cabinet Office · Hansard source

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  I agree, and it is important for the hon. Lady to understand that we are integrating climate change risks into our work. The Department for Environment, Food and Rural Affairs is the leading Department on work on climate adaptation, not mitigation. It is important that lead Departments can focus on the issue at hand, and DEFRA is doing adaptation.

• 29 Jun 2026 · Cabinet Office · Hansard source

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  I give way.

• 29 Jun 2026 · Cabinet Office · Hansard source

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  I congratulate my hon. Friend the Member for Warwick and Leamington (Matt Western) on securing the debate. He will, of course, know the importance to this Government of the topics discussed today. Keeping the country safe is the first responsibility of any Government, and as the world changes, the way we uphold that responsibility must change with it. This adaptability is set out in the national security strategy, published last year at the beginning of the NATO summit in The Hague. Alongside it was the commitment to spend 5% of GDP on national security by 2035—3.5% for core defence spending and 1.5% for broader resilience and security spending. The Majority of the UK’s hard national security capabilities, such as the recently announced 150,000 drones that the Ministry of Defence will supply to Ukraine by the end of the year, are funded and delivered by line departments. The Cabinet Office’s role is ensuring the effective running of government, and co-ordinating cross-cutting policies and operations. More than 90% of the national security and resilience budget for the Cabinet Office is therefore spent on the day-to-day running costs of the National Security Secretariat. That is a vital body that works with Departments to implement the national security strategy. It develops, leads and delivers policy across Government, and aligns, convenes and brokers the collective efforts of our stakeholders and partners on all aspects of national security. It is the nerve centre of our collective cross-Government security response. However, that spending it is not by any means the vast amount that is spent on national security and resilience across Government. The Cabinet Office does invest in some assets. For example, the National Situation Centre, which is highly regarded internationally, provides situational awareness for crisis response by bringing together data analysis and expertise. The emergency alerts system is one of many public warning and informing capabilities that the UK Government, devolved Governments and category 1 responders have at their disposal. Since its launch, it has become an integral part of keeping the public safe, allowing the quick sharing of lifesaving information, and it is regularly tested to ensure its resilience. The UK Resilience Academy forms an important part of the skills and engagement offer. It was established in April last year to build the skills that are needed across the whole of society to respond to emergencies. The national security strategy consolidates various reviews and strategies related to national security into a single, coherent framework. It outlines the strategic context, identifies the main challenges we face as a nation in an era of radical uncertainty, and establishes the framework that the UK uses to guide its actions both at home and abroad. It is both a clear-eyed and a hard-edged plan to deal with the breadth of the challenges that we face, setting out a long-term vision for how we will do three crucial things: protect security at home, promote strength abroad, and increase our sovereign and asymmetric capabilities. The Government have developed an internal implementation approach to ensure the accountability and delivery of the national security strategy, as well as ensuring that we adapt to a volatile geopolitical landscape. That is why our national security is not the remit of one Department or Minister. We have identified specific objectives, and have assigned lead and assisting Departments to deliver them. Departments are responsible for periodic reporting on progress, and taking action to address any deficiencies. The Government will continue to update the Joint Committee on the National Security Strategy on progress, through formal public sessions and confidential sessions where appropriate. As part of the implementation of the strategy, we continue to make ourselves a harder target for hostile actors who seek to exploit our open, democratic society. That includes bolstering our cyber and economic security defences, which are essential to the fostering of innovation and growth. Additionally, we are strengthening the defence of our borders and territorial waters. In April the former Defence Secretary, the right hon. Member for Rawmarsh and Conisbrough (John Healey), exposed covert Russian undersea activity, paying tribute to the readiness of the UK’s armed forces to respond. In May, Baroness Lloyd, the Parliamentary Under-Secretary of State in the Department for Science, Innovation and Technology, outlined DSIT’s plans to present new legislative proposals to modernise and strengthen penalties for malicious activity impacting our undersea infrastructure. As I am sure events in recent weeks have made clear, our overriding priority is ensuring stability and security in the Euro-Atlantic area, starting with our unwavering support for Ukraine. In total, the UK has committed up to £25 billion for Ukraine: £16 billion in military support, £5.6 billion in non-military support, and £3.5 billion in UK export finance. We continue to go further, renewing and deepening our key alliances, particularly those with the United States and the European Union. All this work is bolstered by new international partnerships, especially in emerging policy areas such as technology—for example, the UK-India technology security initiative and the UK-Japan frontier technology partnership. It remains the Government’s intention to publish the defence investment plan before the NATO summit, which will take place on 7 July. The plan will set out much of our future strategy when it comes to how we will protect and defend our country. Let me give Members some idea of its focus. We will rebuild our core defence industrial base, focusing on achieving greater resilience in our stockpiles and supporting warfighting readiness.

• 29 Jun 2026 · Cabinet Office · Hansard source

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  The hon. Lady points out that adaptation is a cross-Government, cross-departmental thing. The way that the UK Government are organised means that Departments that are responsible for school buildings or transport deal with the adaptation issues that crop up in those Departments. I do not disagree with the hon. Lady’s analysis, but while the Cabinet Office does have a co-ordinating role, I do not necessarily think that having a Minister co-ordinating it would make an awful lot of difference.

• 29 Jun 2026 · Cabinet Office · Hansard source

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  All I will say is that it is important that we rebuild our industrial infrastructure and make sure that we not only maintain but strengthen our sovereign capabilities, not only for now but with forward-looking tech and investment. The Government are determined to do that. A foundation of our national security is our ability to assess, mitigate, respond to and recover from the risks that we face, should they manifest. These risks could come from anywhere. They could be natural hazards, as we have all been experiencing over the last few days, or they could be deliberate attacks, disease outbreaks or other civil emergencies.

• 29 Jun 2026 · Cabinet Office · Hansard source

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  The hon. Lady is correct, and she talks about mitigation. There is also an adaptation issue here, which I was addressing, but clearly the cross-departmental nature of co-ordination happens within the Cabinet Office. Our country’s resilience is front and centre of our approach to national security. Without security and resilience at home, we cannot deliver economic growth or any of our other missions to improve the lives of the British people. My hon. Friend the Member for Bolton West (Phil Brickell) gave a good speech about what happens if corruption is allowed to get out of hand and people who defraud the public purse of money are allowed to get away with it. I thank him for asking important questions about Tom Hayhoe’s recommendations. I promise to make inquiries with colleagues in Government, and commit to writing to him about the specific issues that he raised in his speech. The Government inherited a resilience landscape that had too often been neglected, leaving our nation exposed to the shocks of an increasingly volatile world. The resilience action plan, published last July, sets out the Government’s strategic approach to creating a stronger and more resilient UK, and the steps being taken to deliver it. We face a rapidly changing global risk landscape. From severe weather to geopolitical instability, the risks are complex and numerous. We must be honest with the public about the challenges while demonstrating our resolve to address them head-on, and we have to strike a balance by giving an appropriate warning without panicking people. Building a truly resilient society requires a fundamental cultural shift in the way that emergency preparedness is thought about. That includes being clear about the risks we face and the actions that we can all take to improve collective resilience, as the hon. Member for Hazel Grove (Lisa Smart) said from the Liberal Democrat Front Bench. In summary, our No. 1 priority is to keep the country safe. The Government are undertaking plenty of work within our own shores to strengthen our stance, which is further bolstered by our unshakeable commitment to Europe-wide security. That responsibility has been spread right across the Government, and it is emblematic of the good work that can come when collaboration is at the heart of planning. Thanks to this work, the risk landscape is not an unknown country; we have made it familiar terrain through rigorous mapping of what could harm us and our citizens, and of what our response should be. It is through level-headed planning that we will create resilience at home and, through that work, create a secure foundation for families, businesses and economies to thrive.