Al Carns MP: speeches

Speeches

• 14 Apr 2026 · Armed Forces Bill (Fourth sitting) · Hansard source

  More

  Clause 10 places a duty on the Secretary of State for Defence to issue an updated code for victims in the service justice system. The existing armed forces code of practice, which identifies the services and support to be provided to victims in the service justice system itself, is set out in regulation and has not been substantively modified since it was introduced in 2015. Clause 10 revokes the 2015 regulations. Since 2015, we have continued to make improvements to the service justice system to provide a better service to victims and witnesses, such as with the creation of the Victim Witness Care Unit, which I think the Committee saw when they went down to Portsmouth. This clause will introduce important legislative changes to the service justice system that were made to the civilian criminal justice system through the Victims and Prisoners Act 2024. The legislation will require those responsible for providing a service to victims of service offences in accordance with the code to do so unless there are good reasons not to; and the flexibility afforded by guidance will allow future modifications and improvements to the service justice system to be easily reflected in the contents of the new code. Clause 10 also places a duty on the Secretary of State to issue guidance about victim support roles, improving clarity and encouraging greater consistency, so that service providers will be held to similar standards as their equivalents in the civilian criminal justice system.

• 14 Apr 2026 · Armed Forces Bill (Fourth sitting) · Hansard source

  More

  I thank the right hon. Member for Rayleigh and Wickford for tabling amendment 9, which seeks to add retired officers to those who are qualified for court martial membership. However, I believe that the amendment is unnecessary and most likely counterproductive. The first argument made was about capacity and the lack of senior officers to sit on courts martial and hold people to account. As the Committee knows, we keep those things under constant review. The right hon. Member mentioned a case from several years ago that highlighted a lack of capacity to charge senior members. We pushed through secondary legislation in 2024 to amend two of the armed forces court martial rules so that if a defendant was at one star or above, the president of the board would be at one-star level; they did not need to be of higher rank. That was a significant change. As for lack of capacity, I will throw out a question to the Committee: how many one-stars do we have in the military? We actually have 200 one-stars—let that sink in—and that does not include the reserves. There is no capacity issue here. Secondly, the amendment could be counterproductive, because it is vital that the board members have up-to-date knowledge and real-time experience of the latest single-service policies. I say that from experience, because sentencing at court martial fulfils a number of purposes, including punishment, maintenance, discipline and deterrence.

• 14 Apr 2026 · Armed Forces Bill (Fourth sitting) · Hansard source

  More

  As someone goes across the single services and joint staff colleges, there will be different sections where they are trained on administering justice and the rights of a commanding officer. Importantly, there will be joint standing procedures produced around the clause, which everyone who becomes a commanding officer will have to read and ensure that they adhere to. Question put and agreed to. Clause 18 accordingly ordered to stand part of the Bill. Clause 19 ordered to stand part of the Bill. Clause 20 Qualification for membership of the Court Martial

• 13 Apr 2026 · North Atlantic Submarine Activity · Hansard source

  More

  I respect the hon. Member’s insight into this issue, especially given his constituency. Atlantic Bastion is moving forward fast; we are using some of the requirements and the needs in the middle east to see what we can test and trial. We are pushing forward as fast as we can. Taking the lessons from Ukraine and ensuring that they are inculcated into what we are doing in the slightly rougher and bigger seas in the north Atlantic is an exceptional challenge, but we are moving forward as fast as we can to do it. When combined with our Type 26 fleet, between us, Norway and hopefully others we will have one of the most effective counter-submarine fleets in the world.

• 13 Apr 2026 · North Atlantic Submarine Activity · Hansard source

  More

  I completely agree. A more effective and better understood communication and education plan about what those threats really mean to the population is essential. If I were to turn around to the population and say that there was a cyber-attack on Jaguar Land Rover, people in and around Jaguar Land Rover would be affected and would take notice. If I were to say that the cost of the attack on Jaguar Land Rover was half that of lifting the two-child benefit cap, that would resonate far more widely across the nation. If I were to say that cyber-attacks cost more than £10 billion last year alone, and that the MOD has seen a 50% increase in hostile state attacks, that would start to resonate. We need to ensure that we continue to communicate that narrative in the easiest way, but also that it resonates with every section of society. I could not agree more with my hon. Friend.

• 13 Apr 2026 · North Atlantic Submarine Activity · Hansard source

  More

  We regularly make clear to our Russian counterparts what they are up to and what is happening, and ensure that the severity of their activities is explained to them. The idea that Russia poses no threat to our critical national infrastructure is fundamentally wrong. The reason for Russia’s mapping it and trying to understand it is to find a gap, develop capabilities and, at a time of its choosing, perhaps use them. We acknowledge that we are watching. We have clear indicators and warnings, and I have complete assurance in our armed forces’ ability to deter it.

• 13 Apr 2026 · North Atlantic Submarine Activity · Hansard source

  More

  We have seen billions of pounds-worth of cyber-attacks in the UK and a 30% increase in Russian surface and subsurface capability in the High North. We have seen tactics and training cross-pollinated between Russia and Ukraine, and now Iran, across 10 different countries, with low and slow-flying drones and high-end ballistic missiles mixed into a very effective strike programme. On the other side, we have also seen the capabilities from Ukraine deploying into the middle east to defend against those very same tactics. It is clear for everyone to see that there are countries working together to undermine the west, not just in the physical domain, but in the cyber and influence domains. The quicker we push back against that, the better.

• 13 Apr 2026 · North Atlantic Submarine Activity · Hansard source

  More

  A country without a navy has destroyed, or rendered irrelevant, one of the biggest fleets in the world, the Black sea fleet. The lessons that we can learn from the hybrid activity in Ukraine are some of the most important ones for our island nation, and we will ensure that they are inculcated and integrated into our major capability platforms to ensure that we have a high-low mix of hardware and sophisticated software combined into fantastic high-end systems such as the Type 26 frigate.

• 13 Apr 2026 · North Atlantic Submarine Activity · Hansard source

  More

  That is a fantastic question. The Nimrod capability was taken out of service many years ago. The P-8 programme is a huge success. Many other allies and partners use those same aircraft. When we combine that with some of the best frigates and the best Navy personnel, and with our subsurface capability, that multi-domain spectrum of finding submarines and tracking them is second to none. A £100 million investment has gone into the P-8 programme. Of course we will ensure that that money is spent wisely on maintenance, and other gaps if required, and we will spend more if there are issues with the P-8 programme in the future. It is the frontline of our deterrence and indicator network.

• 13 Apr 2026 · North Atlantic Submarine Activity · Hansard source

  More

  Yes, there is a physical threat from Russian submarines, Russian surface ships, bombers and the war in Ukraine, but there is actually a more subversive threat—one that is based on the influence on the hearts and minds of our nation and on the political divide of our nation. That is why we have seen members of some parties do over 10 years in prison because of their connections to the Russian regime. In some of those areas, I and my ministerial colleagues are now working exceptionally hard to quantify what that threat looks like from a cyber and influence perspective, and then to put measures in place to neutralise it, so that democracy can thrive.

• 13 Apr 2026 · North Atlantic Submarine Activity · Hansard source

  More

  It is a delight to see a Member from the hon. Member’s party sat in the Chamber during a statement on a defence subject—it is a first. I remind him of the capability that we have seen as this Russian operation takes place. The UK has deployed assets to map and track it, and then expose it. That, in fact, is one of the best deterrents, because no longer can Russia or indeed Putin claim that an operation or sabotage that took place was not them. That was the whole purpose of that operation, which has been fantastically conducted by the best Royal Navy in the world. Remember, it is not just the ship or the aircraft; a whole plethora of individuals—in fact, 500 people—sat behind this operation, conducting it, and it was successfully prosecuted.

• 13 Apr 2026 · North Atlantic Submarine Activity · Hansard source

  More

  As my hon. Friend will know, we have the carrier group deploying up there. That will be a NATO exercise with a multitude of different assets attached, running through all sorts of mission rehearsals and deterrent operations. On top of that, we have had international engagement with our joint expeditionary force partners, and that will increase over time—and of course we have 1,500 exceptionally effective Marines deployed in the High North, protecting our NATO flank and our allies and partners.

• 13 Apr 2026 · North Atlantic Submarine Activity · Hansard source

  More

  Depending on the situation, we could put frigates to sea at any point in time. That comes down to the balance of risk around health and safety and operational readiness, depending on the threat.

• 13 Apr 2026 · North Atlantic Submarine Activity · Hansard source

  More

  I thank the hon. Member for a really focused question. Part of this problem set is about looking at early warning when systems appear, either in our waters or close to our waters, or indeed close to any critical national infrastructure. That is a multi-domain operation, ranging from space all the way down to other intelligence assets, which gives us very early warning of what is happening, where, when and why, and allows us to pre-position capabilities to meet them, or to ensure that we can understand exactly what they are up to and therefore put in an operation to deter that if required.

• 13 Apr 2026 · North Atlantic Submarine Activity · Hansard source

  More

  We have a multitude of allies and partners. The US has been a partner for the last 20 years and will continue to be so for some time to come. We share a plethora of different capabilities and have done so for the last 20 years. We also do the same with our European allies. As the hon. Member will know, the Lunna House agreement with Norway has resulted in a frigate deal. Our Trinity House deal with the Germans and, of course, our capability and co-operation with Poland have resulted in millions of pounds of investment, but also thousands of skilled jobs, from Scotland and Cornwall to Ireland and Wales.

• 13 Apr 2026 · North Atlantic Submarine Activity · Hansard source

  More

  We had already supported a US boarding of a sanctioned vessel and, of course, multiple other allies as well. Russian naval escorts do escort some of these vessels. When they do, that is also putting a considerable strain on the Russian fleet, which is relatively limited when combined with its subsurface capability, and this is having an effect. What I can say is that the MOD is absolutely ready to board any ship that meets the parameters, and will do so if that happens.

• 13 Apr 2026 · North Atlantic Submarine Activity · Hansard source

  More

  We need to accept that Ireland in itself is exceptionally close to the mainland and we therefore have shared security interests. The Prime Minister has had constructive conversations with his Irish counterparts to ensure that, where applicable, we share those resources and protect both Ireland and, of course, Great Britain and Northern Ireland.

• 13 Apr 2026 · North Atlantic Submarine Activity · Hansard source

  More

  I am glad that the Government took a defensive stance on Iran. We were clear that we did not have a legal mandate, there was not a plan and there was no clear end state, and if we are going to put people in harm’s way, we need those three things before we can do so. While the defence investment plan not has not arrived yet, five classes of ship or submarine are on order or being built, including 13 frigates on order—eight Type 26s and five Type 31s—which is a collaborative effort to ensure that our maritime capability is fit for purpose as threats diversify and increase, in particular in the High North. We are learning the lessons from Ukraine and ensuring that we have the best autonomous capability, and our Atlantic Bastion platform is moving in the right direction. We have worked exceptionally hard, and the Foreign Office is pushing as well, to sanction thousands of Russian individuals, companies and, of course, vessels, to reduce the illegal flow of resource back into Russia, which is funding the illegal and brutal war waged by Putin on Ukraine.

• 13 Apr 2026 · North Atlantic Submarine Activity · Hansard source

  More

  We have taken some of the most extensive action on sanctions of any country, sanctioning thousands of individuals and enterprises, and we will continue to do so as long as that money is fuelled into the illegal and barbaric war in Ukraine.

• 13 Apr 2026 · North Atlantic Submarine Activity · Hansard source

  More

  I have a lot of experience, as does the shadow Minister, in boarding ships. The MOD is absolutely ready to go, but we must ensure that those ships meet certain criteria; as soon as they do, they will be boarded and deterred.

• 13 Apr 2026 · North Atlantic Submarine Activity · Hansard source

  More

  I thank my hon. Friend for his really focused question. We have been watching the underwater research programme for years now. We understand exactly what they are up to and why they are up to it. They understand some of the vulnerabilities—I would not say weaknesses—in the west, and they are trying to identify and, indeed, threaten them at a point in time of their choosing. I recognise the report’s recommendation on a sovereign capability to fix cables. We are working with industry and partners, and of course we have a multitude of capabilities within defence that can support the types of operations that may need to take place should anything happen to our undersea cables.

• 13 Apr 2026 · North Atlantic Submarine Activity · Hansard source

  More

  I can confirm that the submarines were not within the 12 nautical miles of UK territorial waters, and the hon. Member will know that the rules of the sea have all sorts of rules and regulations around the use of force. We have been watching and observing those vessels, and calling this out and telling the world exactly what they are up to actually reduces their ability to do something and then deny it and blame it on someone else, which in itself is probably the most effective deterrence that we have done.

• 13 Apr 2026 · North Atlantic Submarine Activity · Hansard source

  More

  The reality is that Russia failed on this occasion, and it failed because we exposed its activity, which meant that there was no way, shape or form that it could deny its activity in the first place. I was at the London defence conference and I heard certain discussions about undersea cables. I can confirm that no sabotage took place this time, but the Russians put a lot of effort into mapping and understanding our undersea critical national infrastructure, and we will do everything to map, track and expose it, should it take place.

• 13 Apr 2026 · North Atlantic Submarine Activity · Hansard source

  More

  With permission, Madam Deputy Speaker, I wish to make a statement on north Atlantic activity. Let me begin by thanking the many members of our armed forces who are currently deployed in over 30 operations across the globe. Their efforts are often unseen by the British people, but they are always appreciated. They defend the very freedoms that we enjoy. Last week, my right hon. Friend the Defence Secretary revealed details of one such operation. While the focus of many has been drawn to the middle east, UK armed forces, in partnership with our allies, have been deployed to deter the increased Russian activity that we have witnessed in the Atlantic. The specific operation involved a Russian Akula-class submarine and a concurrent deployment of two specialist submarines from GUGI—Russia’s main directorate of deep-sea research. Last November, the Defence Secretary outlined to the House how GUGI vessels, including the spy ship Yantar, are directed by President Putin to engage in hybrid warfare activities against the UK and its allies, specifically around critical undersea infrastructure. Their mission is to survey pipelines and cables during peacetime and then potentially, if required, sabotage them in conflict. In response to the Russian subsurface activity, the Defence Secretary deployed a Royal Navy warship and a Royal Air Force P8 aircraft alongside allies and partners to ensure that the Russian vessel was monitored during every phase of the operation. The Akula subsequently retreated home, having been closely tracked throughout, and we continued to monitor the two GUGI submarines when they were in and around UK waters and, of course, beyond. Our armed forces left them in no doubt that they were being monitored, that their movements were not covert as planned, and that their attempted secret operation had been exposed. The two GUGI submarines have now left UK waters and headed back north, and this operation, which lasted more than a month, has now concluded. In often treacherous conditions, our pilots racked up over 450 flying hours and our frigates sailed several thousand nautical miles. Some 500 British personnel were involved in the response. I know that the whole House will join me in paying tribute to every single person involved. We exposed this military operation undertaken by Russia for three key reasons: first, to send a message to Putin that he failed to remain covert, and that any attempt to damage critical undersea infrastructure will not be tolerated and cannot be denied; secondly, to demonstrate that even with significant capabilities and personnel deployed in the middle east, we will always do what is necessary to protect our homeland; and thirdly, to highlight a significant operation carried out by our armed forces, who met this challenge with the characteristic determination and professionalism that we all know too well. This operation reminds us why the seabed matters, especially for the island nation of Britain: it connects us to everything, and that connection is sustained beneath our waters without interruption through a vast network of cables and pipelines on which much of our way of life relies—much of the gas that heats our homes, 99% of international telecoms and data traffic, and trillions of pounds of global trade each day. Because the seabed matters to us, it is a prime target for our adversaries. The UK’s undersea network is highly resilient, but the threats are increasing, so we are stepping up our action to defend it, including by providing an extra £100 million for our vital P8 submarine-hunting aircraft; launching our Atlantic Bastion programme to combine the latest autonomous technologies with the best warships and aircraft to create a British-built hybrid naval force; and making the biggest sustained increase in defence spending since the cold war, after years of hollowing-out and underfunding by various Governments. The threat is clear, and our resolve to confront it is absolute. That is why this year we are deploying our carrier group where it is most needed—the north Atlantic and the High North—and supporting NATO’s new mission, Arctic Sentry. I want to put on the record our thanks to our allies, with whom we have co-operated closely throughout this operation, including Norway. Our shared commitment to confront Russian aggression in the north Atlantic is at the heart of our Lunna House agreement, and together we are now building a combined fleet of new submarine-hunting frigates and new uncrewed systems. Let me say a few words on Ukraine, from where I returned just last week. Today, two wars on two continents are being fought at the very same time. Putin wants us distracted while he steps up strikes on Ukraine relentlessly, and indeed at enormous scale, with around 7,000 attacks a day on the front line and 55,000 drone and missile strikes last year alone. We must always remember our duty to Ukraine and recognise that Russian aggression is growing across Europe once again. Let me finish where I began, with praise for our people. We have the very finest armed forces that a nation could hope for. They are second to none. As I speak, we have personnel deployed across every domain, every moment of the day, in every part of the world. They are in constant confrontation with our adversaries, from the depths of the seabed to the reaches of space. When a crisis erupts, as it has done in the middle east, I understand people questioning why all UK military assets and personnel have not been sent to deal with it. But as demands on defence rise, we must deploy our resources to best effect across multiple priorities. Because of our increase in defence investment, we will be able to call on more and more resources in the coming years. As we defend our interests and partners in the middle east, we will tackle increasing threats in the High North. We will stand with Ukraine. We will meet our NATO obligations. Above all, we will always fulfil the first duty of government: to protect our homeland and keep the British people safe. I commend this statement to the House.

• 13 Apr 2026 · North Atlantic Submarine Activity · Hansard source

  More

  I recognise the right hon. Member’s experience in this space. I would say that eight Type 26 towed array frigates is the right level. I would like to see our ability to cover the ocean expanded through the use of autonomy and some of the lessons that we have learned from Ukraine. That is why I talk about the Atlantic Bastion; major capability platforms matched with mass uncrewed systems will provide us with a far more effective way to find, deter and neutralise subsurface threats in the future.