Al Carns MP: speeches

Speeches

• 9 Sept 2026 · Jaguar Land Rover: Redundancies · Hansard source

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  Four thousand job losses will have a massive impact on the west midlands, and particularly on Birmingham Selly Oak, where hundreds of jobs will be affected and people’s economic futures will be cut short. I welcome Richard Parker’s half a million pounds of support, but I worry that JLR’s “global market conditions” boils down to three key things: Chinese domination of the electrical vehicle market, not just in the UK, but across the entirety of Europe; tariffs from America; and perhaps the first salvo in what we would call advanced or artificial intelligence taking over administrative and managerial roles in major manufacturing companies across the entirety of Europe. What are the Government doing to prepare themselves for AI replacing a lot of these jobs, and what are we doing to help?

• 7 Sept 2026 · Topical Questions · Hansard source

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  Community-led housing plays a vital role in meeting our housing targets. In my constituency, the Stirchley Co-operative Development has built 39 social and affordable homes, but delays and cost overruns by the housing association have pretty much dropped everyone into despair. Will the Minister meet me to bring a resolution to the issue?

• 1 Sept 2026 · Direction of Government · Hansard source

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  I welcome the Prime Minister to his place. In this short time in government, we have done a fantastic job of changing the lives of young people—I always say that the next generation is our greatest legacy. The number of people not in education, employment or training is now below 1 million for the first time. Will the Prime Minister lay out what the strategy will be for people not in education, employment or training, and make it a national mission to give them the opportunity that they deserve?

• 15 Jul 2026 · National Security · Hansard source

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  As Russia becomes increasingly boxed in in Ukraine, it looks towards horizontal escalation. I welcome today’s announcement and the move to proscribe some of these groups. The IRGC, GRU and the SVR—multiple different organisations—are seeking ways to undermine our democracy, using physical, electronic, financial, diplomatic and a multitude of other avenues to try to undermine the right to self-determination, the centrality of democracy in the western world, and, importantly, the way in which we govern. As we move towards an increasingly fractious and dangerous period of time with Russia and in the middle east, will the Minister, in her summing up, say what more we can do to clamp down on hostile state disinformation, Russian disinformation in particular, on social media?

• 15 Jul 2026 · Iran · Hansard source

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  Open-source media has highlighted that when the US and Israel struck Iran many months ago, a certain target was destroyed in Tehran. Overnight, a large proportion of Scottish independence media died, which underlines the point about division and protecting the right to self-determination and democracy in this country. Through social media and other means, we are allowing foreign states to play into political division in the United Kingdom. Could my hon. Friend give some insight as to what we are doing collectively to protect against those threats?

• 13 Jul 2026 · Death of Ann Widdecombe · Hansard source

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  I echo the thoughtful and meaningful comments that Members from across the House have made today. I did not know Ann Widdecombe, but I definitely knew what she stood for: public service. She was a unique character and an amazing public servant, with many years of sacrifice. How have we ended up in a position where individuals who put so much time and effort into public service are at risk? One of the reasons is that when we were young, we would walk into a library, and the librarian was apolitical; she or he would allow us to read whatever we wanted, within a set boundary. Now, that librarian is no longer apolitical; it is an algorithm, and that algorithm is bought by anyone from American tech bros to Russia and China. This is not four or five different threats; it is one consistent threat, which is swaying the minds of large chunks of populations across the globe. Can the Home Secretary give me some detail on how we are clamping down on some of that adversarial, nefarious activity and making online activity much safer?

• 8 Jul 2026 · Rearmament and Warfighting Readiness · Hansard source

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  I could not agree more with my hon. Friend. Data is the new gunpowder. AI is absolutely critical in defence, and we should use all of our technological advantage to move faster and further than ever before. We should be bold and jump to the next generation of systems, and not wait for anyone else to lead—we should lead ourselves. The lesson from my perspective is clear: stockpiles matter, but the ability to regenerate them matters even more. That is why I welcome the Government’s commitment to rebuild munition stockpiles, expand domestic production capacity and invest in British defence industry. Those are investments not just in military capability, but in national resilience. The same is true for technology. Ukraine has demonstrated that innovation cycles measured in months can outperform procurement cycles measured in decades. Drones, autonomous systems, software and artificial intelligence are changing warfare at an extraordinary speed, and it will only ever get faster. Readiness, therefore, means building a procurement system that can adapt just as quickly, giving innovative British companies a route into defence and ensuring that our armed forces can evolve as rapidly as the threats they face. We have at present over 10,000 people in Defence Equipment and Support—that is, 10,000 people doing procurement. I am not saying that it is inefficient, but I am saying that bureaucracy sometimes gets in the way of speed.

• 8 Jul 2026 · Rearmament and Warfighting Readiness · Hansard source

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  I have been clear, since several weeks ago, that I was not content with the funding for the DIP or the transformational nature of it. I have been really encouraged in the last couple of weeks by the speed at which it is moving. We need to move more, and I think the spending review in due course will round that off. My perspective is that we must not underestimate the level of change that is required. This is systemic within the Department and within the single services, and it has to move a quantum leap forward—no pun intended—if we are going to deliver the change that is required. If Britain wants armed forces that are capable of fighting and winning, we must build a country that can endure, adapt and sustain them. In modern conflict, as Ukraine has taught us, the line between the military and civilian worlds has all but disappeared. That is what true readiness looks like, and that is the challenge before us.

• 8 Jul 2026 · Rearmament and Warfighting Readiness · Hansard source

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• 8 Jul 2026 · Rearmament and Warfighting Readiness · Hansard source

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  I completely agree with my hon. Friend. This is about cultural change as much as adopting technology. If we were to adopt even the very simplest AI models now in how we do procurement, and move on to the next generation, we would find that the system speeds up, efficiencies are made and the right kit gets into the right hands far quicker than it does now. Ultimately, rearmament is not about preparing for war because we expect it; it is about ensuring that war never happens in the first place. The purpose of rearmament is deterrence, and deterrence rests on three foundations: capable armed forces, political resolve and the industrial capacity to sustain both. If any one of those is missing, deterrence becomes far less credible when faced with an autocratic nation with huge industrial resilience. As we discuss rearmament today, let us think beyond platforms, procurement and spending lines. The defining lesson of modern conflict is that warfighting readiness is not simply a military condition; it is a national condition.

• 8 Jul 2026 · Rearmament and Warfighting Readiness · Hansard source

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  Everyone in this debate will rightly speak about defence spending, procurement and ammunition, and those things all absolutely matter, but I want to ask a broader question: what does warfighting readiness actually mean in 2026? For too long, we have measured military strength by the number of ships afloat, aircraft we fly or tanks we field, and those capabilities will remain essential, but recent conflicts have reminded us that wars are rarely won by militaries alone; wars are won by nations. They are won by industries that can out-produce an adversary, economies that can absorb shocks, and societies resilient enough to sustain conflict over time. I have seen this at first hand in Ukraine. Time and again, I have met individuals whose courage is beyond question, but courage alone is not enough. Success depends on whether ammunition arrives when it is needed, whether new technology can be adapted in weeks rather than years, and whether industry can keep pace with the demands of the battlefield. The side that learns, adapts and regenerates fastest gains the advantage, and that should challenge how we think about readiness. Warfighting readiness is no longer simply the responsibility of the Ministry of Defence. It is an industrial strategy, an energy strategy and a technological strategy. Ultimately, it is a national resilience strategy. If our energy networks are vulnerable, if our communications can be disrupted, if our supply chains depend on hostile states, if our British industry cannot rapidly increase production when conflict begins, our armed forces will inherit those weaknesses from day one of any crisis. That is why resilience must sit at the heart of our national security. We often talk about stockpiles, and rightly so, but I think the more important question is not how many missiles are sitting in a warehouse today; it is how many missiles British industry can produce every month after six months of sustained conflict. Modern warfare consumes munitions at a pace that few of us can comprehend or imagine, but Ukraine is teaching us lessons: 7,000 to 10,000 drones flying a day; 12,000 artillery rounds fired a day; and 1 million drones, in some cases, produced over two months.

• 8 Jul 2026 · Rearmament and Warfighting Readiness · Hansard source

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  What the hon. Member says brings a huge historical relevance to today. Throughout history, whenever we have been moving towards crisis, we have got rid of almost all of our procurement rules and regulations to streamline capability and get it into the hands of warfighters. Does he agree that the procurement system and those 10,000 people in DE&S could use AI and some of the incoming quantum capabilities to streamline our whole procurement process?

• 8 Jul 2026 · Rearmament and Warfighting Readiness · Hansard source

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  Does the hon. Gentleman agree that, from sail to ironclad, ironclad to dreadnought, dreadnought to highly capable frigate, we need to make the next generational leap? If we find ourselves caught in programmes that deliver last year’s capability, we will remove any wriggle room or space to make that jump into autonomy and automation.

• 6 Jul 2026 · Defence Investment Plan · Hansard source

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  We have seen a 30% increase in Russian subsurface and surface activity, Russian proxies rampant across Africa, £15 billion-worth of cyber-attacks across Europe, sabotage and drone incursions across the border. Can the Secretary of State confirm that if the Russians were to test us on NATO’s eastern flank, they would look across that flank and see not a NATO brigade, but something that looks like a Ukrainian brigade?

• 30 Jun 2026 · Defence Investment Plan · Hansard source

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  I thank the Secretary of State and his collective team for all the work that has gone into the defence investment plan. I also welcome the increase in spending. There are a multitude of lessons from Ukraine that we have all heard much about. One is on scale and capacity in both Russia and Ukraine’s industrial capability, where they are now building 1.1 million drones every two months. Will the Secretary of State outline to the House the percentage of the defence budget, particularly in the equipment plan, that is being spent on uncrewed systems and whether that is docked into the defence industrial strategy?

• 23 Jun 2026 · Defence Spending and Readiness · Hansard source

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  On my comments on drones, there is a requirement to bring drones into the system so that training tactics, procedures, doctrine and concepts can be taught. The point was about drones going out of date within six weeks. The innovation the hon. Gentleman just talked about was changing so fast that if we were to buy en masse, the drones would be out of date over time. The right context is that there is a requirement to teach and train our armed forces to interoperate with drones.

• 22 Jun 2026 · Armed Forces Bill · Hansard source

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  As we progress the Bill collectively, we could, in some areas, look at giving better support to employers, but it is worth being clear that the Bill looks to extend service from anything from four to 16 years. It allows for the return to service of ex-military personnel until they are 65. That is being standardised across officers, other ranks, the Navy, the Army and the Air Force. By doing that, we will increase our strategic reserve pool. If we get caught in a crisis in any way, shape or form, their skills can be harnessed to help the nation out. There is a further discussion to be had, at a later stage, about how we include civilians in that. This Bill puts in place a whole range of important provisions—on improving the standard of living and housing for the armed forces, on reserves and on the service justice system—while, importantly, keeping us safe at home and abroad.

• 22 Jun 2026 · Armed Forces Bill · Hansard source

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  We have seen movement on the covenant, and the introduction of the Defence Housing Service and Op Valour. Would it be possible for the Minister to set out their impact on recruitment, retention and morale across the armed forces over the past year or two?

• 22 Jun 2026 · Armed Forces Bill · Hansard source

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  The Bill has four key themes. First, it creates the Defence Housing Service, which is a fantastic move forward; it will change for a generation how our people are looked after in service family accommodation. Secondly, it will make major improvements to our service justice system, which is another fantastic move forward. Thirdly and most importantly, it will look at how we renew our reservists. It looks at how we extend duty for our strategic reserves.

• 16 Jun 2026 · Personal Statements · Hansard source

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  With your permission, Mr Speaker, I would like to make a speech on my resignation. I start by echoing the remarks of so many in the House on the 10th anniversary of the death of Jo Cox. While I did not know Jo, I know what she stood for. Her unwavering commitment to equality has left a lasting legacy, and her words—we have more in common than that which divides us—still ring true and are still worth fighting for. I also pay tribute to my right hon. Friend the Member for Rawmarsh and Conisbrough (John Healey). This is the second time I have followed him in the last week, and it is a privilege to do so. Last week, I resigned as Minister for the Armed Forces. It was an exceptionally difficult decision. I have never quit anything in my life, as my mother will confirm; she tried to get me to quit the Marines for 24 years, but failed many times. I spent those 24 years in uniform, serving in operations around the world. I commanded men and women in combat and carried responsibility for their lives; I buried friends and stood beside families receiving the worst news imaginable. When I accepted ministerial office, I did so with a simple purpose: to serve those who serve us. I remain grateful to the Prime Minister for the opportunity to do so. I thank my ministerial colleagues, my hon. Friends on the Labour Benches, civil servants and, above all, the servicemen and women I have had the privilege to represent. But there comes a point when honesty requires action, and for me, that point came last week. As hon. Members know, I came into politics for one reason: to enact change. In order to work out where we are going, we must realise where we have come from. The Labour party that I joined was chiselled out of the mines of the north-east, hammered out of the shipyards of Govan, Liverpool and Belfast, and forged in the factories of the industrial revolution by people with calloused hands and sore backs—people who did a hard day’s graft and asked for one thing in return: a Government who have their back. That is the tradition in which I serve in this House, and it is the tradition that shaped the decision I took last week. I resigned for several reasons—first, because I no longer believe that the defence investment plan is preparing us for the wars we are most likely to fight. The character of warfare is changing at exceptional speed. In Ukraine, a navy without a ship has destroyed a navy. A drone costing thousands can destroy a tank costing millions. A drone can now strike 2,000 km into Russia at a fraction of the cost of a fighter jet. It is not either/or; it is an equitable mix of high-end sophistication coupled with low-end mass. That is the balance we must seek. In my view, the defence investment plan does not strike that balance for various reasons. I want to give just a small example to bring home that point, because it can often get lost. In a town in Ukraine the size of Hereford, there were 12,000 drones in the air in one day. Just comprehend that: 12,000 drones in the air. Some 90% of all casualties are from drones—not the rifle, the grenade, the tank or the artillery, but the drone. I ask the House: what will it take to realise that these figures are not fiction? They are not an embellishment of the truth, but a hard fact born out of the blood and steel of a hot war. That is the maths of modern war: millions of drones against high-end, sophisticated systems that deliver late, with huge levels of inflation, and, importantly, cannot be reproduced at the pace required to sustain a conflict against a major adversary. What will it take to learn that lesson? Do we need to rerun the Snatch Land Rover? Do we need to rerun the lack of body armour? Do we need to rerun the lack of protected vehicles in Afghanistan, which I saw impact men and women on the frontline? We do not, and we should not. Moreover, as the clouds of war darken Europe’s borders once more, do we need to learn the lessons our forefathers learned in world war two, or indeed the cold war? This is not about individual items of equipment or bespoke defence funding lines, but about preparedness, unity of purpose, prioritisation and national resilience. We are no longer packaging up our military to deploy to a foreign field; we must be ready to fight from here—from the home base—for democracy, for the right to self-determination and for European security. The reality is that we are spending too much time preparing for last year’s war, not tomorrow’s. I urge the House to push hard for transformation and to push for delivery this side of 2030. Secondly, I resigned because even if the plan had been right, it was not adequately funded. I do not lay all the blame at the door of No. 10 or No. 11; we failed—I failed—to make that argument. But national security and economic security are not competing priorities; they are the same priority. A country that cannot defend itself will not stay prosperous for long. Put simply, a country that cannot defend itself will struggle to protect its prosperity. Thirdly, I left because I could no longer ignore the continued failure to address the treatment of our veterans in Northern Ireland. It is a difficult issue, and I cannot describe how difficult this fight has been. Whatever people’s view of the troubles, a country owes a duty to those it sent into harm’s way under lawful orders, and that duty does not end when the uniform comes off. The labour movement was built on a simple idea—that the people who do the hard work that this country asks of them deserve the backing of the state in return. Too many veterans have carried uncertainty for too long, while others have benefited from political accommodations that were never available to those who served. I could not reconcile that with my own understanding of duty. To go into slightly more detail, the IRA failed to achieve its political ends through the use of terrorist tactics, and we must be exceptionally careful that we do not help them achieve those ends through other means. Constant, never-ending legal wranglings that undermine the contract between the nation and those who serve is neither a good use of taxpayer money nor an effective execution of strategy. Having inquests, inquiries and an independent commission creates a hierarchy of truth. It will cost us hundreds of millions for 15 years, painting the state as an aggressor, supporting our adversaries, leading to political objections and causing untold anguish for those who only ever deployed to protect us. We have neither the political capital nor the resources to spare for this unjust journey. In broader terms, in 2026 security means more than military strength alone. It means secure borders, secure energy, secure jobs and secure communities. It means people knowing that if they work hard and contribute, one unexpected bill will not push their family into crisis; it means knowing that their children will have opportunities that they did not. These things are absolutely connected. The cost of living is shaped by conflict thousands of miles from here. Hostile states target our infrastructure, supply chains and democracy. Energy security shapes economic security. Economic security shapes social cohesion. Importantly, above all else, social cohesion shapes national resilience. The old line between domestic policy and national security is breaking down in front of us, but our history points the way. In 1945, Britain was exhausted and in debt. Our cities had been bombed, and rationing went on for years. Yet Attlee’s Government did not conclude that Britain could afford only one priority. They built the NHS, expanded the welfare state and invested in housing. They took the decision that Britain would become a nuclear power. Those decisions came from the same understanding of what this Government and Labour are for. A country worth defending should look after its people. A country that wants to look after its people must be secure enough to do so. That is the Labour tradition. It is also, I would argue, the British tradition at its very best, but somewhere along the way we stopped thinking like that. We began treating defence, growth, energy, public services and social mobility as separate conversations. They are not. They are different parts of the same challenge: whether Britain can still provide security, opportunity and resilience for its people in a more dangerous world. That is why I ultimately concluded that I could no longer remain in Government. The issue was never simply a defence budget. It was whether the Government were moving with the urgency that the moment demands. Nearly a million young people are outside education, employment and training. Poor mental health costs this country hundreds of billions. We know that our armed forces need modernising. We know that our adversaries are becoming more aggressive. We know that our energy system remains exposed. We inherited a mess, but the population is fed up of us pointing the finger. They are looking to us for courage, clarity and conviction to make changes at the scale and, importantly, the speed that the nation requires. I have seen what our country can do. I have seen it in uniform. I have seen it in the communities across the nation. I have seen it on these Benches, where we are at our very best. The talent, the ideas, the passion, the courage—it is all here. Indeed, we have it all. I resigned because I believe that Britain and this Labour Government can deliver. I believe that we can think longer term and act earlier. I believe that we can once again build a country that provides security in the broadest sense of the word—security for our nation, communities, working families and the next generation. That is the debate that I am confident my resignation has started.

• 2 Jun 2026 · Armed Forces Bill · Hansard source

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  I remind Conservative Members that clause 12 of the Overseas Operations (Service Personnel and Veterans) Bill, introduced by the previous Government, would have required any future Secretary of State to consider whether to make a derogation under article 15 in relation to significant overseas operations. The previous Government removed elements of clause 12 during the Bill’s final stages, because concerns were raised that the provision risked damaging the UK’s reputation for upholding the rule of law and being committed to human rights. It was the previous Government who did that. Clause 12 was also seen as unnecessary in that the Government can already derogate under article 15 of the ECHR, meaning that the provision did not add any additional legal powers. New clause 3 seeks to place a requirement on the Secretary of State to appoint a national veterans commissioner for England, and it sets out the functions for the proposed office holder. I acknowledge the sentiment behind the new clause, which is to ensure that those who have served receive the recognition and support they deserve. The Veterans Commissioners for Scotland, Northern Ireland and Wales are not statutory offices, so such a role would not in itself require legislation. We are putting in place the Valour programme, which will first look at digital. There will be a Valour lead and a digital headquarters, and there will then be Valour officers and centres. Once that is in place, we will need to consider whether we need a veterans commissioner for England, how that docks into the Valour programme, and how it docks into the Veterans Commissioners in Northern Ireland, Wales and Scotland. We will update the House in due course once that is in place.

• 2 Jun 2026 · Armed Forces Bill · Hansard source

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  I commend that fantastic question. Yes, I have seen the defence investment plan. Importantly, we are primarily focused on learning the lessons from Ukraine and acting upon them—something that the last Government failed to do at the right scale, hence why I left the military. New clauses 1 and 6 seek to exempt members of the reserve forces deployed on operations from the ECHR, and would require any future Secretary of State to consider whether to make a derogation under article 15. The UK has binding international obligations under the ECHR, including in limited extraterritorial circumstances where we exercise control over individuals or areas. Those obligations have implications for the way UK forces, including reserve forces, conduct UK operations. I will not shy away from the fact that we hold our armed forces to the very highest legal standards, and time and again they deliver. New clause 1 seeks to change domestic law, but it would not remove our international obligations. The UK cannot opt out on a case-by-case basis; doing so would simply shift cases to Strasbourg. New clause 6 is also unnecessary as the Secretary of State can already derogate under article 15 of the ECHR. I will read that again: new clause 6 is also unnecessary as the Secretary of State can already derogate under article 15 of the ECHR, meaning that the provision does not provide them with any additional powers. I do not want to be in the same club as Belarus or Russia.

• 2 Jun 2026 · Armed Forces Bill · Hansard source

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  I will make some progress. New clause 2 would require the Secretary of State to lay a defence investment plan before both Houses of Parliament. The Prime Minister has been very clear that the defence investment plan will be published before the NATO summit, and we are working hard to finalise it. I recommend that the right hon. Member for Rayleigh and Wickford (Mr Francois) reads the NAO report which says that when we came into government, we were left a huge deficit and 47 out of 49 major programmes were not on budget or on time.

• 2 Jun 2026 · Armed Forces Bill · Hansard source

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  That is one of the reasons for these amendments and other provisions in the Bill. In the past, personnel had to leave the regular forces to join the reserves and leave the reserves to join the regular forces. We want to create a seamless transition, which will reduce the 60 pages of administrative burden that my hon. Friend had to fill in to a much more seamless transition between regular and reserve services, mirroring other nations across the world that do it quite well. We need a system that is fair and equitable and that does not discriminate against anyone who wishes to exercise that flexibility. It is worth noting what that will provide for the UK in the current geostrategic environment. It will likely take us from a strategic reserve of 95,000 that could be mobilised up to 150,000 over the next 10 years, which is a significant step forward. All the other Government amendments tabled in my name are either consequential to the amendments I have just covered or are minor and technical, simply to improve the drafting of the Bill. I turn to the Opposition amendments. On amendments 2, 3 and 4, I am aware that the Minister for Veterans and People recently met the right hon. Member for Rayleigh and Wickford (Mr Francois) and the hon. Member for Solihull West and Shirley (Dr Shastri-Hurst) to discuss the concerns behind them. We continue to work across Government on the best way to address those issues in practice. The better route is not a rigid statutory fix but practical improvements through existing systems. The statutory guidance on the covenant legal duty already gives public bodies a flexible framework to take account of the particular challenges service families face when on the move. Let me be clear: considering the statutory guidance supporting the duty is not optional; once it is in force, public bodies that are subject to the duty must have regard to it in their decision making and policy development. Special educational needs, adoption and fostering, and NHS continuity are exceptionally important issues, but they are not well addressed through rigid legislation. The systems are different, the legal frameworks are different and the decisions involved often depend on professional judgment, safeguarding or clinical need. A blanket duty to transfer plans, arrangements or treatment automatically could create confusion, cut across devolved responsibilities and in some cases delay the support families need. Instead, our focus is on improving continuity in delivery so that service families get better support without unintended consequences. Amendment 88 would require the Secretary of State to review current practices for communicating with former service personnel about their armed forces pension entitlements. The MOD maintains a comprehensive and ongoing programme of communication with both serving and former personnel, supported by established governance, regular data analysis and targeted engagement activity. The Department already monitors take-up and traces unclaimed entitlements 60 working days after pension due date. When a positive address is identified, individuals are contacted. That approach has resulted in over 10,000 pensions being brought into payment. Mandating a further statutory assessment would add process without delivering meaningful additional insight, diverting resource from delivery at a time when the focus is rightly on implementing pension remedies and strengthening frontline pension support. Amendment 89 would require the Secretary of State to review current practices regarding the transfer of the medical records of armed forces personnel upon their transfer to the reserve forces. I reassure the Committee that no transfer of military healthcare records is needed when transferring from regular to reserve service because Defence continues to hold and manage healthcare records for reservists in the same electronic system, which will also be simplified by some of the reserve forces amendments I mentioned earlier. It is worth noting that we send out 425,000 quarterly digests to those receiving pensions across the system. Amendment 90 seeks to make sure that all investigations and prosecutions of service persons for sexual offences and domestic abuse in the UK take place in a criminal justice system. Since the prosecutors’ protocols were published in 2023, there have been no cases where a victim wanted trial in the criminal justice system but the case was instead prosecuted in the service justice system. The amendment would, however, override the victim’s preference in cases where they would prefer the service justice system. That risks increasing the victim withdrawal rate in civilian police investigations which, for adult rape-flagged cases in 2024, was 59%, while the withdrawal rate for the Defence Serious Crime Command was 24%. Furthermore, the amendment could lead to the loss or erosion of golden hour evidence and the safeguarding of victims, as there is no duty on civilian police to accept the case. A case-by-case approach that takes into account the views of the victim is better. Clause 25 therefore strengthens the provision of information to victims when asked for their preferred jurisdiction. That will help prosecutors take into account the victim’s view when making a decision on jurisdiction. Amendment 5 would extend eligibility to sit on a court martial board to retired officers. The Government do not consider the amendment to be necessary, nor do we believe that it would improve the current arrangements. First, there is no shortage of eligible board members. The court martial already draws from a broad and sufficient pool of eligible personnel. In 2025, for example, 447 service personnel were sworn for 263 trials, and there has been no difficulty in constituting boards. Secondly, it is important that board members bring current knowledge and practical experience of the latest single service policies, procedures, values and standards. An individual who has left service, even relatively recently, may no longer be sufficiently connected to the pace of change across the service. I recognise the valuable contribution that veterans continue to make, but service on a court martial board is not the appropriate means of drawing on that experience. It is also worth noting that, when we are court-martialling higher rank, there are over 331 one stars in the British military and therefore ample opportunity to sit on court martial boards. Amendment 1 would ensure that persons undertaking vital civilian work are exempt from a recall order under new section 69A of the Reserve Forces Act 1996. Section 73 of the Reserve Forces Act already provides powers of exemption to recall. That existing provision allows the Defence Council, by regulations, to exempt individuals from or relax recall liability in total. Amendment 6 aims to increase the readiness requirement for reservists in Army reserve group A from 180 days to 90 days. I reassure the Committee that all Army readiness levels are subject to annual review, and to effectively fulfil its obligations the Army must review and adjust readiness levels across all elements of its force, responding to the evolving demands of the nation. It is essential that defence maintains the necessary flexibility to respond swiftly and appropriately to changing threat levels. Embedding such provisions in primary legislation would impose rigid constraints, creating an obstacle rather than a suitable mechanism for setting and reviewing readiness levels. Hopefully, I have given the necessary assurances, and I ask that the Opposition amendments be withdrawn.

• 2 Jun 2026 · Armed Forces Bill · Hansard source

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  I thank all Members who have spoken today for their contributions and for upholding cross-party support for our armed forces. The Bill takes significant steps to improve the conditions of service life, and renews the contract between our nation and those who serve. It delivers on a manifesto promise to extend the armed forces covenant to every area of Government—from three to 12 policy areas. We will go further, backed by a £9 billion defence housing strategy, to build, renew and repair tens of thousands of military homes. We are modernising and improving victim support and ensuring that the service justice system can protect the victims of the most serious offences from further harm. We will expand the reserve pool by changing the maximum age limit at which some personnel can be recalled, so that we would, if needed, be able to call on some of the most experienced volunteer reservists. These are significant but necessary changes to boost preparedness in an era of ever-increasing threat. I will now address some of the major issues highlighted in the debate, starting with new clause 5. I have served all over the world with Gurkhas, Fijians and broader Commonwealth troops. They serve our country, and they serve it with honour and courage. The very least we can do is help them and their dependants by scrapping visa fees after four years of service. This is not about politics or a difference of opinion; it is about language and bounding the commitment in legislation in the correct way. There is already a settlement fee waiver in place for serving personnel, introduced in 2022, to recognise the burden of settlement fees at the point of discharge for those who have served for six or more years or been medically discharged due to their service. However, that fee waiver did not extend to dependants or recognise serving personnel who become eligible for settlement after four years of service. That is why this Government have committed to scrap visa fees for non UK veterans who have served for four years or more and their dependants, and Home Office and Ministry of Defence Ministers are working closely together to deliver it; my hon. Friend the Minister for Veterans and People met the relevant Home Office Minister just recently. We remain firmly committed to this manifesto pledge and will deliver it fully. I understand the intention behind new clause 5 and the desire to make progress quickly. However, as drafted, it would not clearly achieve the intent set out in the explanatory statement, which appears to be narrower. While the explanatory statement refers to “spouses or children”, the new clause itself appears to waive fees for serving personnel, previously serving personnel and “their family members”, using broad and undefined categories that would create significant uncertainty and a lack of clarity about who precisely was within scope. It also contains no clear link to length of service or a time limit after discharge. Taken together, that risks creating a broader and unclear statutory entitlement with unintended consequences, rather than a targeted and coherent measure that families and dependants can easily understand. In addition, section 68 of the Immigration Act 2014 provides that fee exceptions should be set out in secondary legislation. By introducing a fee exception into the 2014 Act, new clause 5 would cut across that existing statutory framework and reduce clarity in the fee structure by creating an alternative mechanism for controlling fees. The Government are committed to delivering the manifesto commitment in full, and it is important that Ministers retain the ability to determine the appropriate scope, eligibility and delivery approach so that it is implemented fairly.