Tim Roca MP: speeches

Speeches

• 3 Feb 2026 · Cyber Security and Resilience (Network and Information Systems) Bill (Second sitting) · Hansard source

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  Q Is there anything that you would have preferred to see in the primary legislation, or do you think secondary legislation affords industry and Government flexibility? Ian Hulme: There is a balance to be struck. When something is written on the face of the Bill and things change—and we know that this is a fast-moving sector—it makes it incredibly difficult to change things. There is a balance to be struck between primary and secondary, but what we are hearing and saying is that more precision around some of the definitions will be critical. Natalie Black: I strongly agree with Ian. A regulator is only as good as the rules that it enforces. If you want us to hold the companies to account, we need to be absolutely clear on what you are asking us to do. The balance is just about right in terms of primary and secondary, particularly because the secondary vehicle gives us the opportunity to ensure that there is a lot of consultation. The Committee will have heard throughout the day—as we do all the time from industry—that that is what industry is looking for. They are looking for periods of business adjustment—we hear that loud and clear—and they really want to be involved in the consultation period. We also want to be involved in looking at what we need to take from the secondary legislation into codes of practice and guidance.

• 3 Feb 2026 · Cyber Security and Resilience (Network and Information Systems) Bill (First sitting) · Hansard source

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  Q This question is mainly for Jen. Your colleague Jamie MacColl has made a series of forthright comments about the Bill and compared it to NIS2. How does the Bill compare to legislation worldwide? Jen Ellis: As a starting point, I will clarify that I am a fellow at RUSI. I work closely with Jamie, but I do not work for RUSI. I also take no responsibility for Jamie’s comments. On the comparisons, David alluded to the fact that Europe is a little bit ahead of us. NIS2, its update to NIS1, came into force three years ago with a dangling timeline: nations had until October 2024 to implement it. My understanding is that not everybody has implemented it amazingly effectively as yet. There is some lag across the member states. I do not think we are too out of scope of what NIS2 includes. However, we are talking about primary legislation now; a lot of the detail will be in the secondary legislation. We do not necessarily know exactly how those two things will line up against each other. The UK seems to be taking a bit of a different approach. The EU has very specifically tried to make the detail as clearly mandated as possible, because it wants all the member states to adopt the same basis of requirements, which is different from NIS1, whereas it seems as though the UK wants to provide a little bit of flexibility for the regulators to “choose their own adventure”. I am not sure that is the best approach. We might end up with a pretty disparate set of experiences. That might be really confusing for organisations that are covered by more than one competent authority. The main things that NIS2 and CSRB are looking at are pretty aligned. There is a lot of focus on the same things. It is about expanding scope to make sure that we keep up with what we believe “essential” now looks at, and there is a lot of focus on increased incident reporting and information sharing. Again, the devil will be in the detail in the secondary legislation. The other thing I would say goes back to the earlier question about what is happening internationally. The nations that David mentioned, like Australia or the jurisdiction around the EU, are really proactive on cyber policy—as is the UK. They are taking a really holistic view, which David alluded to in his introduction, and are really looking at how all the pieces fit together. I am not sure that it is always super clear that the UK is doing the same. I think there is an effort to do so, and UK policymakers are very proactive on cyber policy and are looking at different areas to work on, but the view of how it all goes together may not be as clear. One area where we are definitely behind is legislating around vendor behaviour and what we expect from the people who are making and selling technology.

• 29 Jan 2026 · Ukraine: Non-recognition of Russian-occupied Territories · Hansard source

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  I thank my hon. Friend the Member for Leeds Central and Headingley (Alex Sobel) for securing this debate and the right hon. Member for New Forest East (Sir Julian Lewis), who made some very powerful points about parallels with the Baltic states that I completely agree with. I think all Members in attendance are absolutely clear that if a state that invades its neighbour and holds territory by force gains political or territorial reward for that, it is not buying peace; it is simply queuing up the next war. Borders should not be changed at the barrel of a gun. At the same time, it must be said plainly that it is for Ukraine and Ukraine alone to decide what compromises, if any, it is prepared to make. It is not for us, not for allies and not for foreign politicians sitting far away from the frontline. That is why I am deeply concerned by suggestions that Ukraine is being asked to give up Ukrainian-controlled territory in the Donbas as a precondition for peace or even as the price of future security guarantees. Let us be honest about what that means. My hon. Friend made the point earlier. The frontline in the Donbas is among the most fortified places on earth. It was built at great cost and defended with extraordinary courage. Thousands of Ukrainians have given their lives defending it, and they did not do so lightly or on a whim. One must have solid grounds to do so, and it must come concurrently with solid security guarantees. History warns us where this road leads. In 1938, Czechoslovakia was forced to hand over the Sudetenland, where most of its defences were, in the name of peace, and that peace lasted months. By 1939, the country was occupied and its independence was destroyed. Concessions do not bring security; they can sometimes invite catastrophe. When we talk about security guarantees, let us not overlook the most real and effective guarantee Ukraine has right now: the brave men and women of Ukraine’s armed forces. They are the reason why Ukraine still exists as a sovereign state. Their courage, discipline and sacrifice are what stand between freedom and occupation, and any peace must allow those forces to be equipped and manned at a level that deters future attacks. I worry that parts of the international community are not doing their bit. In my view, the United States Administration has been leaning far too heavily towards accommodating the Kremlin. They are talking tough but failing to use the enormous economic, military and political levers they have to apply real pressure. I thank the Minister for the work he has been doing to make sure that British sanctions and support have been robust for Ukraine. I am very concerned by data showing that overall military aid to Ukraine actually fell last year, even though countries such as the US, France and Germany stepped up their support. At this stage of the war, any drop in assistance sends the wrong signal. We need to give the Ukrainians everything they need and avoid the drip, drip of capabilities and arms that we have seen since the war began. Finally, we need to be honest about how Russia has used frozen conflicts to its advantage. Across the post-Soviet space, including Transnistria, Abkhazia and the Donbas, Moscow has deliberately kept territorial disputes unresolved as a way of holding its neighbours in limbo. Those conflicts are not accidents; they are tools used to maintain influence, block stability and make it harder for countries to choose their own future or their own alliances. We should not kid ourselves about what these frozen conflicts really are. They are not peaceful compromises; they are pressure points. They allow aggression to fester, and they show us that peace built by accommodating an aggressor does not resolve the case; it simply locks injustice in place. If, to stop the bloodshed, we have to accept non-recognition of occupied territories but de facto control by Russia—a frozen conflict—that again is for Ukrainians alone to decide. We must support them in their decision, but ensure that in this country we do not recognise Russian claims for one minute. A just and lasting peace cannot be built on coercion or enforced surrender. It cannot be built by asking the victim to pay the price for the aggressor’s crimes. I stand with all my parliamentary colleagues today in standing firm for Ukraine’s territorial integrity, its right to choose its own future and a peace that is real and genuinely durable.

• 28 Jan 2026 · British Indian Ocean Territory · Hansard source

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  I am sure that has been set out already in several debates. The point that has not been set out adequately and cannot be set out in huge detail is that, in exchange for providing the United States with facilities on Diego Garcia, the in-kind support in terms of intelligence and other matters that we receive from the United States must run into the billions every single year. Although we cannot put a figure on that, it is a really important element in this debate. There is no prosperity without security, and there is no security without certainty. In an interconnected world, those are not abstract principles; they are strategic necessities. That is why, in my view, this is a sensible, hard-headed deal, and a confident assertion of the United Kingdom’s national interest.

• 28 Jan 2026 · British Indian Ocean Territory · Hansard source

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  I feel I should put on record at the beginning that I am not the Government’s trade envoy to Mauritius—[Hon. Members: “Yet!”] Hansard can record a diplomatic silence at this point. This debate ultimately turns on whether we understand the world as it is, not as we might wish it to be, much as some believe otherwise. We still live in an economically, militarily, politically and morally interconnected world, and that interconnectedness has not gone away. It has become more contested, more multipolar and certainly more strategic, but it has not ended. That matters, because this deal must be judged not on slogans or hyperbole but on whether it secures the United Kingdom’s security interests in that interconnected world. One of the central lessons of recent years is that uncertainty invites challenge. We see that every day in the South China sea. China has asserted expansive territorial claims that many countries do not recognise and that the international courts and tribunals do not recognise. What happens in response? Other states deliberately sail ships and fly aircraft through those waters and airspace to contest those claims and to test resolve. Uncertainty becomes a pressure point and ambiguity becomes an opportunity for interference. If we allow ambiguity to persist over the Chagos islands, and in particular over Diego Garcia, the same dynamic could apply. Our claims may be strong historically, but they are being increasingly contested in international courts. That does not make the base more secure; it makes it more vulnerable. It creates exactly the kind of grey zone in which hostile actors thrive, including an ever-expanding Chinese navy. This treaty removes that uncertainty. It closes off the space for challenge, rather than leaving it open.

• 28 Jan 2026 · British Indian Ocean Territory · Hansard source

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  I disagree with the hon. Member, because the two situations do have parallels. In the South China sea, people are challenging Chinese sovereignty, and it has been proved not to have standing in international courts. At the moment, ambiguity is starting to arrive in our position over the Chagos islands. This treaty would remove it and remove cause for the Chinese navy to take advantage. Against this backdrop, I want to restate the tests that I set out in an earlier debate on this deal. Does the agreement protect our national security? Does it command the support of our allies and professional security community? Are the costs proportionate to the benefits? On each of these tests, the answer remains yes. Diego Garcia is a keystone of our joint security architecture in the Indo-Pacific. It is where UK and US forces operate together against terrorist threats. It is a logistics, communications and intelligence hub, and it is central to safeguarding the global trade routes on which our economy depends. Without a secure base, all of that is placed at risk. Our Five Eyes allies in Canada, Australia and New Zealand support this deal, and our strategic partner India supports this deal. I want to address briefly the noise around President Trump’s social media posts, which the Minister dealt with very well earlier. Social media is not statecraft. What matters is the settled position of the United States, its military leadership and its security agencies. On that, there has been clarity for some time. The Pentagon, the State Department and successive US Defence Secretaries—Republican and Democrat—have supported this agreement. As I said at the beginning, interconnectedness is incredibly important and we cannot ignore the fact that international opinion matters. Yes, the world has changed. Power today is exercised through force—hard power has become incredibly important—but it is also still exercised through legitimacy, alliances and rules. If we expect others to respect international rules where it suits us, whether in Ukraine or the South China sea, we cannot be seen to apply them selectively elsewhere, except in the supreme national interest.

• 28 Jan 2026 · British Indian Ocean Territory · Hansard source

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  I cannot clear up that point for the right hon. Member, but I have great confidence that ministerial colleagues would be able to. We have been told at all points that this treaty would ensure the continued effectiveness of the base in the way that it is run now. There was an Ohio class submarine there in 2022, and I hope those arrangements continue under this treaty. From what I have heard from Ministers, there is no reason that they would not. Let us turn to the costs of the deal. It will cost a fraction of the defence budget for an irreplaceable asset—

• 28 Jan 2026 · British Indian Ocean Territory · Hansard source

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  We have heard from chief Ministers and leaders of the other British overseas territories how disappointed they have been in the rhetoric used by the Conservatives in trying to drag them into the situation. There is no question about our commitment to the British overseas territories. This deal is a completely separate matter.

• 15 Jan 2026 · New Towns · Hansard source

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  In Macclesfield, one topic has dominated conversation for several months: the proposed new town at Adlington. It has been talked about on every street corner, in every coffee shop and at every parish meeting. Well, almost—for one glorious weekend, Adlington was briefly knocked off the top spot by the small matter of Macclesfield beating Crystal Palace in the FA cup. I am on dangerous ground, because I think the Minister was brought up in south London, so I will leave the football at that. Jokes aside, this is an important debate, and I am grateful to my hon. Friend the Member for Cumbernauld and Kirkintilloch (Katrina Murray) for securing it. I am not a nimby. I support house building and development, and I support the principle of new towns, done well, in the right places, with proper planning, and in the right manner with proper infrastructure. This country needs homes, especially genuinely affordable ones, and new towns have a proud history of delivering them, when they are carefully planned and sensibly located. I do not oppose that ambition; I welcome it. But supporting the principle of new towns does not mean signing a blank cheque for every proposed site, and it certainly does not mean abandoning the basics of good planning—which brings me to Adlington. Adlington is not an empty space on the map. It is a small rural community of about 1,000 people, first recorded in the Domesday Book. It is a place shaped by continuity, with fields and farms; its working farmland is still producing food, supporting local jobs and sustaining wildlife. The proposal before Macclesfield would place up to 20,000 homes on 1,000 hectares of strategic green belt, wiping out 15 working farms, ancient hedgerows and bluebell woodlands, and fragmenting some of the most environmentally sensitive land in Cheshire. That matters, because the green belt is not an accident. It exists for a reason: to stop urban sprawl, protect countryside and make sure that we regenerate brownfield land. Once green belt on this scale is gone, it is gone forever. I want to make a broader point about the new towns taskforce and its shortlist, because it is quite telling. Among all the sites recommended, Adlington stands out, not as the most suitable, but as the one that has faced the greatest opposition. That opposition has come not from one group, one parish or one campaign, but from across the community, across political lines and across civic society. I am grateful to the Minister for meeting me before Christmas to discuss those concerns. It is particularly striking that the Campaign to Protect Rural England, which has not opposed a number of the other new town sites recommended by the taskforce, has taken a clear and firm position against Adlington. When it singles out one site among many, it is because something genuinely does not stack up. If that were not enough, Cheshire East council has voted unanimously against the proposal. That almost never happens in local government, and that alone should tell us that this is not a narrow ideological objection, but a considered judgment by the democratically elected planning authority for the area. I want to talk a little more about Cheshire East, because it really matters. It is not a council that avoids building homes. It has met its housing targets consistently in the past, it has adopted a sound local plan, and it has delivered thousands of homes and continues to do so. It is not a planning authority that is dragging its feet or shirking its responsibilities. It is now preparing a new local plan, which will set out how housing need will be met in years ahead—transparently, democratically and with proper public engagement. That is how planning should work. The council has delivered before, and with its new plan it will deliver again—but without dropping 20,000 homes into the open countryside, against the opposition of local communities. Opposing the Adlington site does not mean opposing housing; it means respecting the plan-led system rather than bypassing it. I mentioned brownfield land, and there are brownfield sites across Cheshire, Greater Manchester and the wider region that are crying out for regeneration, many of them close to jobs, transport, schools and services. Building there first is not anti-growth; it is sustainable planning. Indeed, there are alternative new town sites in the north-west that could be considered. Let us not jump straight into one of the most sensitive stretches of green belt in the region, next to a national park. Let us think again. Powerful points have been made already this afternoon about infrastructure. Those concerns have not been convincingly addressed in the case of Adlington, which has limited rail services, constrained road capacity and utilities that were never designed to support a town 20 times its current size. Fixing that would take decades, not years, and there remains no clear answer about who would pay, who would deliver or when any of it would realistically be in place. That has been compounded by the way that we have gone about this. We need engagement with residents, but there has been only one engagement session with local residents by the company Belport. Communities have been left scrambling for information about the proposal. That is not how to build confidence in a major national project. Before I finish, I want to thank local campaigners and activists—people who never expected to become planning experts, transport analysts or ecology specialists, but who have given up their evenings, weekends, and indeed savings, to engage constructively, responsibly and in good faith. They have not shouted from the sidelines; they have done the hard work of evidence, scrutiny and civic engagement. That is democracy at its best. They deserve recognition. Let me be absolutely clear once more that this is not about saying no to development; it is about saying, “Not like this, and not here.” We should be building homes where infrastructure already exists, where growth can be absorbed sustainably, where local authorities are partners rather than bystanders, and where the environmental cost is justified by an overwhelming and proven need. Adlington does not meet that test. I will end with a bit of history, because this House likes its history. In the Minister’s office hangs a picture of Clement Attlee, who I think is a hero to both of us. It was Attlee’s Government that created the green belt, precisely to protect landscapes like this from unchecked development. It was not anti-housing; it was pro-planning. It is about balance, foresight and stewardship. We owe it to that legacy and to future generations to show the same care now, so let us support new towns, let us build the homes our country needs, but let us also say calmly and clearly, in the Attlee spirit, that Adlington is the wrong place.

• 8 Jan 2026 · Human Rights Abuses: Magnitsky Sanctions · Hansard source

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  I thank the right hon. Member for Chingford and Woodford Green (Sir Iain Duncan Smith) for securing this debate and for being a doughty champion for British citizens unfairly imprisoned abroad. Colleagues have already made clear that Magnitsky sanctions are not an abstract policy instrument but a really powerful tool, so for me the debate is really about whether we are prepared to use that tool fully and consistently on behalf of our citizens. It is worth reminding ourselves of how this all began. We call these measures Magnitsky sanctions for a reason: a young man, Sergei Magnitsky, paid with his life for exposing corruption. He left behind an irrefutable paper trail that shows us exactly how authoritarian injustice works. Sergei was a Russian tax lawyer—not an activist or a dissident—but he uncovered fraud of extraordinary scale involving the theft of millions of dollars carried out by state officials in Russia using the very institutions meant to uphold the law. He did what the law demanded of him: he documented it, testified and trusted that evidence would matter. Instead, the state turned on him. He was arrested by the very officials he had implicated and placed in pre-trial detention, where punishment begins long before guilt is even alleged. What sets Sergei apart, and why we still speak his name, is what he did next. Even as his world narrowed to concrete walls and iron doors, he documented everything, with over 450 complaints, petitions and diary entries written by hand, often without a table, sometimes in freezing cells, under conditions designed to break the human spirit. In a letter to his lawyer in August 2009, he said: “Justice, under such conditions turns into the process of grinding human meat for prisons and camps.” That phrase was not rhetoric; it is a description of a system where detention itself becomes the punishment and where exhaustion, humiliation and neglect replace the rule of law. Sergei was moved repeatedly between cells—often at night—and deprived of sleep, but he still refused to withdraw his testimony or plead guilty, so his conditions worsened. He was placed in cells flooded with raw sewage. He slept in his coat because the windows had no glass. Rats ran freely at night across the prison. Fatally, Sergei was denied medical treatment. Despite a diagnosis of pancreatitis and escalating pain, and despite written pleas, verbal pleas and petitions to judges, prosecutors and officials, his requests were ignored. One official told him plainly that he would get help only after release and that nobody was obliged to provide it to him in detention. Sergei’s last note asked when the ultrasound prescribed months earlier would finally be done. It never was. On 16 November 2009 he died on a prison floor after being restrained, isolated and denied emergency care: clearly a gross breach of human rights. Even then in death, the system denied responsibility. That is why Magnitsky sanctions exist: because Sergei and the incredible campaign of Sir Bill Browder showed us that truth outlives prison walls and that accountability has to cross borders. Why does this matter today? We are seeing the same injustice applied to the case of Ryan Cornelius, not in Moscow but in Dubai. The right hon. Member for Chingford and Woodford Green talked a little about Ryan’s case. He was arrested in 2008 and convicted of fraud in 2010, but the sentence that he received—harsh as it was—had an end date, and he had served it. But just weeks before his scheduled release it was extended by a further 20 years using a law introduced after his original conviction, with no proper hearing and no meaningful right of appeal. That is not justice; that detention is leverage. The parallels with Sergei are stark. Like Sergei, Ryan was arbitrarily detained, according to the United Nations working group on arbitrary detention. Like Sergei, he has been denied due process. Like Sergei, he has been punished for refusing to concede or comply. Like Sergei, he has endured degrading prison conditions and inadequate medical care during a serious bout of tuberculosis. But unlike Sergei—this should trouble the House deeply—Ryan Cornelius is a British citizen. The UN has ruled his detention arbitrary, and experts have raised the alarm. His family, some of whom are in the Gallery, have campaigned for years; some of them have lost everything. Members from parties across the House have spoken up, yet Ryan remains in prison. If Magnitsky sanctions are not relevant in this case, we must really ask ourselves: what are they for? I am grateful that we have heard some of the names relating to Dubai Islamic bank. I hope that the Government will take them away and think carefully about use of the powers that we have, which seem wholly appropriate in this instance. What does the House want from the Magnitsky sanctions regime? I am grateful that several hon. Members have made these points. We want them to be more than just symbolic; we want them to be consistent, ambitious and principled. We have been honest about where our use of these sanctions has fallen short. On that, I am grateful in particular to my hon. Friend the Member for South Dorset (Lloyd Hatton). Since we introduced the regime, we have designated 229 individuals and entities under it. While these measures have had a meaningful impact in some cases, overall we have applied them in a limited and inconsistent way. We know that the FCDO has received dossiers and evidence from civil society organisations in their hundreds—potentially thousands—implicating perpetrators, but only a small number have been sanctioned. The contrast has already been made with the UK’s response to Russia’s invasion. I do not want to denigrate that response, because the Minister in particular and his colleagues have worked incredibly hard on that, and I give credit where credit is due. However, it demonstrates that where there is a political will, we do act at scale. That is what we want to see in other cases as well. The inconsistency is particularly evident in cases involving UK strategic partners or trade allies, and in relation to conflict-related sexual violence, despite the UK's preventing sexual violence in conflict initiative. There is also a clear failure to use the regime robustly in response to British nationals arbitrarily detained abroad, such as Ryan Conelius. Beyond designation decisions, weak enforcement is further undermining the regime. To date, no fines have been imposed for breaches of Magnitsky sanctions. Reports indicate widespread evasion involving professional enablers, opaque corporate structures and overseas territories, as has been capably pointed out. In addition, there is no obligation for the Government to report to Parliament on the use of these sanctions. I believe that should change. The UK lacks a strategy for managing frozen assets and ensuring that sanctions contribute to justice for victims and survivors. Funds can remain untouched for years, losing value while survivors receive no reparations. I think here particularly of the family of Ryan Cornelius; his wife Heather is effectively homeless as a result of the circumstances she faces. At present, all the proceeds flow back to the Treasury rather than to those harmed by the underlying violations. Let us use these sanctions ambitiously, consistently and appropriately in combination with other mechanisms if they are effective in upholding human rights, tackling illicit finance and preventing this country from becoming a haven for war criminals and kleptocrats. Sergei Magnitsky showed us what courage looks like when the law collapses. Ryan Cornelius reminds us what happens when we hesitate to act. Sanctions are not about vengeance; they are about drawing a line and saying that no official, no banker and no judge is beyond accountability when they participate in grave injustice. If we honour Sergei’s legacy, we must be prepared to act with the same clarity he showed even when it is uncomfortable or inconvenient, especially when one of our own is still paying the price.

• 8 Jan 2026 · Post Offices: Cheshire · Hansard source

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  Disley in my constituency saw its post office close in July last year in slightly dubious circumstances. The hon. Member for Chester South and Eddisbury (Aphra Brandreth) made the powerful case that post offices are really important in rural and semi-rural areas. Will the Minister join me in asking the Post Office to redouble its efforts to reopen the post office in Disley?

• 17 Dec 2025 · Proposed new town in Adlington, Cheshire · Hansard source

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  I begin by offering my deepest sympathy to the family of Ethan McLeod, who died tragically in a car accident yesterday. He was a brilliant footballer and an inspiration to young people across Macclesfield. I am proud to present to the House a petition signed by 7,200 residents on paper, complemented by a further 11,714 online—totalling nearly 19,000 people—who express their clear opposition to this proposal. That is a view I wholeheartedly share. Residents and local councils are united in concern about the loss of green-belt and agricultural land; the strain on already stretched roads, schools and services; and the impact on local wildlife and the rural character of our communities. I thank the volunteers who worked tirelessly to raise awareness, collect signatures and make their voices heard. The petitioners therefore request “that the House of Commons urge the Government to abandon the proposal for a new town in Adlington”. Following is the full text of the petition: [The petition of residents of the constituency of Macclesfield and neighbouring boroughs, Declares that the small village of Adlington, Cheshire (with a population of approximately 1,250) has been highlighted by the New Towns Taskforce as a potential site for large-scale development; further declares that, while the plans are only in the early stage of consideration, the scheme would risk inflicting significant, large-scale and irreversible harm to a cherished area of Green Belt on the edge of a National Park; further declares that the construction of the indicated minimum of 14,000 homes there would completely change the nature of Adlington village and the surrounding area, and put immense strain on already stretched local services; and further declares that Cheshire East Council has met its housing targets in the past and would do so again under a democratically agreed local development plan, which would ensure that development happens in the right places, with the right infrastructure. The petitioners therefore request that the House of Commons urge the Government to abandon the proposal for a new town in Adlington, Cheshire. And the petitioners remain, etc.] [P003154]

• 16 Dec 2025 · Victim Support: Funding · Hansard source

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  I welcome the increased funding. Victim support and the commissioning of those services is incredibly important, and the operational independence of police and crime commissioners has been invaluable in that regard. What assurances can Ministers provide that, with the abolition of PCCs, victim support will not be led by forces themselves and that we will keep the important progress we have made over recent years?

• 16 Dec 2025 · Victim Support: Funding · Hansard source

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  10. What steps his Department is taking to provide adequate funding for victim support services.

• 4 Dec 2025 · War in Ukraine · Hansard source

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  I completely agree. As the hon. Member for Harwich and North Essex (Sir Bernard Jenkin) raised earlier, it is the Baltic countries—Poland, Finland, those that have had direct experience of Russian aggression—that are most clear-eyed about the Russian threat. We do not want a wishy-washy peace that does not deliver genuine security. There has to be genuine security as the basis of any peace. We in this House must not dodge. We are building a coalition of the willing, and in any peace agreement we may potentially be asked to agree to put British troops on the ground and contribute to maintaining ceasefire lines or to deter Russian aggression. We have to be honest about where the British public are at, and I am not convinced that the British public are yet psychologically in the place they need to be in for that commitment. We all have a duty to contribute to the understanding of the threat that Russia faces to our security here at home. We must speak honestly with the country about the risks that we face, the commitments we may be asked to make, and the moral and strategic imperative of ensuring that Russian aggression does not succeed. If Ukraine falls or is coerced into a settlement that gives the Kremlin what it could not win on the battlefield, Europe will not be safer. An essential truth that has been revealed in recent months is that Ukrainian resilience is not infinite. Its morale depends on it knowing that the world has not forgotten it. Every air defence system, shell, economic sanction on Russia and measure to support Ukraine and its statehood matters—not just materially but psychologically. Every equivocation, delay and wavering signal emboldens Putin and his gang of thugs. We are clear that Ukraine is fighting not only for its freedom but for the principle that aggression should not be rewarded. I believe that Members of this House agree with those principles. Therefore, we must act with urgency, clarity and resolve. I think there have been two references by hon. Members this afternoon to Munich. We are 87 years on from what was described as a “total and unmitigated defeat”. Today, I do worry that the Trump Administration’s push for peace, shaped by Putin’s interest, risks making the same mistake in pressuring Ukraine to accept a settlement that serves the aggressor rather than justice or security. Let us be clear in this place that we stand with Ukraine to uphold its sovereignty and security, because we do not want to repeat the errors of the past.

• 4 Dec 2025 · War in Ukraine · Hansard source

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  I add my commendation to the hon. Member for Harwich and North Essex (Sir Bernard Jenkin) for securing this important debate. Hearing the right hon. Member for Chingford and Woodford Green (Sir Iain Duncan Smith) speak reminded me of our trip to Ukraine earlier in the year. Thinking of surreal moments, it cannot be more surreal than being on a road outside Kharkiv watching him try to fix a car that was not working properly. In recent weeks, it has become painfully clear that many of us underestimated the sophistication and intent behind the Trump Administration’s manoeuvres regarding Ukraine, Europe and Russia. What at first seemed like a genuine pivot towards supporting Ukraine now appears, in retrospect, to have been a carefully orchestrated performance designed to protect Russian assets, pave the way for future business dealings and shape a narrative in which Ukraine’s defeat was treated as inevitable. At the heart of that strategy lies the $300 billion in frozen Russian sovereign assets that hon. Members have mentioned repeatedly this afternoon. For many years, including in this place, we have debated whether those assets should be used to help Ukraine defend itself and rebuild. But we now know from reports that US officials have been placing intense pressure on European Governments to leave those assets untouched, and indeed insisting it is their view that they be returned to Russia after any peace deal, while feigning, for months, a willingness to ramp up support for Ukraine. That illusion was crucial, because the more Europeans believed that Washington might still back Ukraine, the less likely European Governments were to take unilateral steps, including seizing or repurposing those Russian assets. It was a calculated sleight of hand, and it succeeded. Even now, European leaders remain hesitant, while Washington has now made its position unmistakably clear that Ukraine is expected to accept a settlement that has been shaped by Russian interests—because, I believe, it is Trump’s assessment that Russia will ultimately prevail. We have to face the facts: the September-October pivot, when Trump and Vance claimed that Russia was losing and Ukraine could win, was most likely theatre. Trump has always accepted the Russian narrative of inevitable Ukrainian defeat, and once the pretence ended, US officials made their message clear to the Ukrainians: “Accept a deal now or face a worse one later. Russia can fight indefinitely; Ukraine cannot.” In my view, this is not diplomacy; it is coercive pressure on Ukraine, and it carries an unmistakable message that the United States Administration are now structuring their policy around the assumption of a Russian victory in the long term. Many of us will be incredibly worried that Trump will pressure Ukraine into giving up territory and ultimately fail to give any meaningful security guarantees. It is for Ukrainians who have paid a price in blood to decide for themselves what price they are prepared to pay for peace. What does this mean for Europe and for Britain? First, it means that we must accept the truth that if Ukraine is to resist Russian maximalist aims, we must step up now, not in six months or in two years. Secondly, it means that the fate of Russian sovereign assets is not a technical financial matter but a strategic one, and every delay, hesitation and concession on this issue weakens Ukraine and emboldens the Kremlin. Thirdly, it means we must recognise that 2026 will likely be the decisive year in this war. Yes, Russia faces mounting economic difficulties, fuel shortages and internal discontent, and the Kremlin still insists on its war aims, but its capacity to sustain the war is not limitless, and a sense of futility in Moscow is a necessary condition for peace. Ukraine’s ability to hold the line, supported through European unity, is central to bringing that moment closer. I do not think that we have touched this afternoon on the fact that Ukrainian resilience is not endless either. There are hundreds of thousands of cases of desertion—a stark measure of exhaustion and eroding morale among frontline soldiers. Many units are under-strength and increasingly reliant on poorly trained conscripts rather than experienced volunteers. Some brigades operate without adequate rest, rotation or munitions. Commanders describe troops who are physically depleted, mentally exhausted and losing confidence in the strategic direction of the war. The result is a brittle front, with units stretched to breaking point, lacking resilience and vulnerable to sudden local collapses. Without substantial support, I really worry that the Ukrainian military could face a cascading breakdown as Russia continues to pile on the pressure. The strain on Ukraine’s civilian population is equally acute. After three years of missile and drone attacks, millions of Ukrainians endure repeated power outages, damaged infrastructure, deep psychological trauma and limited access to heating, electricity and clean water. Mental health support has deteriorated sharply, especially as winter approaches. Displaced families have exhausted their savings, livelihoods have vanished, and the cumulative stress of air raids, mourning for the dead and uncertainty has driven a marked rise in depression, anxiety and long-term trauma. Communities live in a cycle of destruction and partial recovery, eroding resilience with each passing month. We should be clear-eyed about our own position. We had warning after warning, but we never did enough—the invasion of Georgia in 2008, the annexation of Crimea in 2014, and the full-scale invasion several years ago, yet still we did not ramp up defence spending. The British armed forces have experienced years of hollowing out, cuts to troop numbers and chronic under-investment. Only now are we finally beginning to reverse some of that decline, but can we honestly say that the pace is adequate to the threat we face?

• 2 Dec 2025 · Alaa Abd el-Fattah · Hansard source

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  Ryan Cornelius, a British citizen, has been unfairly incarcerated in Dubai for the past 17 years. His son was six when he went to prison; he is now 23 years old. Some 150 parliamentarians from both Houses wrote to the Dubai authorities asking for Mr Cornelius’s release on the UAE’s national day—today—to no avail. Can the Foreign Secretary use her good offices to bring some urgency to the issue of freeing this British citizen from unfair detention?

• 9 Sept 2025 · Diego Garcia Military Base and British Indian Ocean Territory Bill · Hansard source

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  No, I am afraid that I will not. In closing, I believe that the three tests have been met: the treaty meets our national security requirements, it has the backing of our allies, and it comes at a reasonable cost. It would be very dangerous for us to dither or delay any longer in view of the potential threat to that base.

• 9 Sept 2025 · Diego Garcia Military Base and British Indian Ocean Territory Bill · Hansard source

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  I thank the hon. Member for raising that important aspect. We should all be honest that, as was put powerfully by my hon. Friend the Member for Crawley (Peter Lamb), our country’s history with the Chagossians has been very poor—if we look at some of the diplomatic cables from the 1960s, we see that disgraceful language was used—but I was reassured by what Ministers said about the preamble of the treaty and some of the provisions put in place. It is a matter of fact that the previous Government were in negotiations with Mauritius over this issue. That was the case, and there will have been motivations for their doing that. I am worried about how our other overseas territories are being dragged into this. A couple of months ago, I was in Gibraltar with colleagues who privately told me they were horrified that party politics were being played with their communities. I am glad to see that Gibraltar’s Chief Minister was clear on the record that there was “no possible read across” to Gibraltar, and the Governor of the Falklands said that the “historical contexts…are very different.” I am confident that we meet the three tests.

• 9 Sept 2025 · Diego Garcia Military Base and British Indian Ocean Territory Bill · Hansard source

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  I will not. I experienced the right hon. Gentleman defending the hereditary principle last week, and I do not think I have the strength in me this week to listen to another argument. The final test was on costs and obligations. Again, Ministers have talked powerfully about the deal being less than 0.2% of the defence budget. Comparisons have been made with what the French are paying in Djibouti, and I am glad that we are getting a better deal than the French. Of course, Diego Garcia is 15 times larger than those bases and in a more strategic location. The treaty gives us immense operational freedom. It therefore seems to me that this is a modest investment for an irreplaceable asset. The risks from delay or abandonment—in this argument, we have to balance the treaty with the risks of what could happen—are vastly greater.

• 9 Sept 2025 · Diego Garcia Military Base and British Indian Ocean Territory Bill · Hansard source

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  I believe that the hon. Member has had quite a lot of turns today, and I have been waiting a long time without intervening, so I will proceed. If we allowed a vacuum to be created, it would be filled by China or others in a region that is vital to our security. I will come back to China in a moment, because what China thinks about this treaty is important as well. Turning to the first test, the treaty secures 99 years of guaranteed access, with the option to extend it by a further 40 years; 99 years was good enough for Lord Salisbury, so it is good enough for me. It gives us full operational control over installations, logistics, communications and the electromagnetic spectrum. It establishes a 24-nautical-mile buffer zone and bans any foreign military presence on the outer islands. We have talked about how it protects a unique maritime environment and provides tangible support through the trust fund for Chagossian communities. On the first test I am satisfied. On the second test—whether the agreement commands the backing of allies and experts—other colleagues have spoken powerfully about this, but Lord Goldsmith, a former Attorney General, said it was “consistent with our national security interests and with our respect for international law”. The international support is equally strong. Australia’s Kevin Rudd called it a “good outcome for Mauritius, for Australia, for the UK and for our collective security interests”. Canada’s foreign ministry said that it ensures “the long-term, secure and effective operation” of the joint base, strengthening a free and open Indo-Pacific. In the United States, where there is not much that gets bipartisan support, it is a bipartisan matter. Antony Blinken said that America “strongly supported” the negotiations. Secretary of State Marco Rubio commended the “leadership and vision” shown. The Democratic former Defence Secretary Lloyd Austin said that the agreement will “safeguard strategic security interests into the next century.” I believe an hon. Member has already quoted President Trump, who described it as an amazing deal, a beautiful deal or whatever kind of deal—but a good deal, that is the main point. The international consensus is clear. Our allies, partners and experts back the deal. I was very taken by the comments of Professor Benjamin Sacks of the RAND school of public policy in the United States. He said: “I contend that Beijing privately views the agreement, even if modified to ameliorate some Chagossians’ outstanding demands, somewhat as a setback. In practical terms, it gains little if any advantage from it.” He added: “The Chagos issue constituted a perennial problem for British foreign policy; one that China could simultaneously exploit to demonstrate its supposed adherence to existing RBOs”— rule-based orders— “and undermine the UK’s traditionally important role in maintaining it.” He also said that the deal deters Port Louis—Mauritius—from becoming an effective client state of Beijing. On the point of whether our allies support it, I believe that the treaty meets the test.

• 9 Sept 2025 · Diego Garcia Military Base and British Indian Ocean Territory Bill · Hansard source

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  It has been a long afternoon, but I should say from the start that I genuinely believe that the motivation of all of us is the national interest of the United Kingdom. Whatever differences of opinion there might be, I think it is important that we try to avoid hyperbole in this matter and think coolly and calmly about what is in the UK national interest. There are tests we need to apply to what we are discussing: first, does it protect UK national security; secondly, do our allies and the professional military and security establishment support it; and thirdly, are the costs and obligations reasonable and proportionate? We also need to have a weather eye to our responsibility to the Chagossians, and I pay tribute to my hon. Friend the Member for Crawley (Peter Lamb) for speaking passionately on behalf of his constituents. I believe the answer to those three tests is yes, and I will address them in turn. Diego Garcia is not just another overseas facility; it is fundamental to our security. It is where our forces and US forces have launched operations against high-value terrorist groups. It is a communications and logistics hub, and it is where we monitor hostile states and safeguard global trade routes that underpin our economy. Without this treaty, all that is at risk. Ministers have outlined that international rulings could make the base inoperable. I spoke earlier to Dr Marco Longobardo, a specialist in international law, and it is clear that even the non-binding ICJ judgment is nevertheless a matter of international law and potentially gives hostile countries the opening that they need to contemplate interference in the islands—in the same way that Chinese claims in the South China sea are not recognised by many countries. That is all at risk. Our ability to berth submarines, patrol waters or launch operations would be compromised, and a vacuum would be created.

• 9 Sept 2025 · Topical Questions · Hansard source

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  T8. In Macclesfield we are lucky to have a thriving life sciences sector. At AstraZeneca, we have 5,000 people employed in well-paid jobs across the pharmaceutical value chain. What are the Treasury and the Government doing to ensure that we take advantage of the innovation we produce here in the UK for the benefit of our local life sciences economies?

• 3 Sept 2025 · Property Taxes · Hansard source

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  Will the hon. Gentleman give way?

• 3 Sept 2025 · Property Taxes · Hansard source

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  Thank God.