Sarah Sackman MP: speeches

Speeches

• 23 Apr 2026 · Courts and Tribunals Bill (Ninth sitting) · Hansard source

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  I am grateful to the hon. Gentleman for that clarification. I was pretty sure that that was what he must have meant and that it was not his intention to suggest that we should, essentially, allow and uphold all appeals as an automatic right. I understand, though, his intention to debate the merits of the permission test in the Bill. I should make one point about the consequence anticipated in the amendments, in terms of appeals being directed automatically to a jury trial. To be clear, that is not how appeals currently operate, whereby a judge sitting with magistrates rehears the case on appeal in the Crown court. The effect of the amendments together could mean that we would see large numbers of appeals of conviction being allowed and sent to the Crown court for a retrial by jury, absent any permission test or filter. That could mean, for example, that low-level summary-only offences, such as being drunk and disorderly, are added to the Crown court caseload and, by extension, the backlog, which would only increase the waiting times for the more serious offences, which we want to get on with more expeditiously. I am grateful for the hon. Gentleman’s correction, but we take issue with not just the effect of the amendment but the fact that it would mean that appeals would go to a jury trial, because that would extend the right to, or access to, a jury trial, which we do not want to encourage in this context. I anticipate that the intention was to expand the grounds for permission, so that instead of applying a test, any application for permission would be allowed. This would essentially remove the permission filter and return us to the status quo, where there is an automatic right to a rehearing on appeal, absent any filter for the merit of an appeal.

• 23 Apr 2026 · Courts and Tribunals Bill (Ninth sitting) · Hansard source

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  It is a pleasure to see you in your place, Dr Huq. I thank the hon. Members for Blackburn (Mr Hussain) and for Bexhill and Battle, and my hon. Friend the Member for York Central (Rachael Maskell), for tabling the amendments in this group. I will come to the amendments, but first I will take the opportunity to set out the rationale for the clause and schedule 2. The existing position for criminal appeals from the magistrates court is this: when an appellant wishes to appeal a conviction or sentence in the magistrates courts, they proceed to a full rehearing of their case in the Crown court. They do not have to state why they wish to challenge their conviction or sentence, nor produce any grounds for appeal. They simply lodge an appeal and obtain a full rehearing in the Crown court. In many cases, there is no justifiable reason for that, yet the impact on victims and witnesses, who are often required to go through the ordeal of a second trial, in the Crown court, can be significant. Indeed, we heard from victims in the Committee’s evidence sessions that going through a trial was so traumatic that they would have probably dropped out if the case had been appealed to the Crown court. Part of the evidence that persuaded Sir Brian Leveson to make recommendations 21 and 22 in his report, in respect of appeals, was that “many minor sexual assaults that were dealt with in the magistrates courts or the youth courts, which could include rape, almost automatically went to appeal to the Crown court, on the basis that the victim would not turn up the second time and be prepared to go through the whole process again.” –– [ Official Report, Courts and Tribunals Public Bill Committee, 25 March 2026; c. 9, Q11.] This situation is unique in our criminal justice system. Magistrates courts are the only criminal court in which there is an automatic right to appeal without filter. In every other criminal court, including the Crown court, the appellant must obtain permission to appeal, they must provide their grounds, and the court has the opportunity to review appeal applications to determine whether there are sufficient grounds to warrant reconsideration. The purpose of the clause and the provisions in schedule 2 is to bring magistrates courts appeals in line with other criminal appeals processes, and thereby reduce the number of unnecessary hearings that progress to the Crown court. That has the dual benefit of reducing the burden of appeals on victims and witnesses, and ensuring a sensible use of court resources, reserving Crown court time for the most serious cases. Let me be clear on the data. Of all the cases in the magistrates court, which we know can be hundreds of thousands, only 1% get appealed to the Crown court. This to me is indicative of a system that generally commands confidence. I understand the concerns about access to justice, but to be clear, the right to appeal in magistrates courts remains. Defendants will still be able to appeal a conviction or sentence in magistrates courts, but with a straightforward permission stage, as already exists elsewhere, so that appeals with arguable grounds continue to receive a full appeal hearing. Appellants will retain the ability to seek a judicial review of a refusal of permission in the High Court, and applications to the Criminal Cases Review Commission remain possible where there have been alleged miscarriages of justice. The clause also mandates the recording of trial and sentencing proceedings to support the evidential record for appeals. This is a significant step in making our courts more transparent and open to scrutiny, and it provides an opportunity to go further than in the current criminal procedure rules. The clause is proportionate and targeted. It will filter out unmeritorious, weak applications, helping to increase efficiency across the criminal courts and reduce the burden of appeals, which we know is born by witnesses and victims, while maintaining fairness and access to justice. Amendment 63 was tabled by the hon. Member for Blackburn; I seek your guidance, Dr Huq, on whether it has actually been moved.

• 23 Apr 2026 · Courts and Tribunals Bill (Ninth sitting) · Hansard source

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  Thank you, Dr Huq. Amendment 63 seeks to broaden the test for allowing an appeal from magistrates courts under the new reforms. The amendment expands the existing test so that permission will be granted where there is some other compelling reason. That is a test used in civil proceedings in the Court of Appeal civil division. There is not equivalent test for appeals in the Court of Appeal criminal division, which is what our new process for appeals in the magistrates courts is based on. One reason why a court might hear an appeal due to some other compelling reason is to seek an authoritative binding judgment on a particular issue. A Crown court cannot provide a binding decision as to the law on magistrates courts generally, whereas the High Court can. If the appellant wished to appeal for this reason—in other words, in order to seek a binding judgment on a point of law—they could achieve that by using the existing process of appeals by way of case stated to the High Court. In short, we do not think it would be appropriate for there to be appeals to the Crown court in this context. Instead, we have replicated the existing grounds for appeal in the Court of Appeal criminal division: whether it is reasonably arguable that an appeal will be allowed. An appeal of conviction will be allowed if it is unsafe, which can be the consequence of the incorrect application of the law, procedural irregularities, or the introduction of fresh evidence. An appeal against sentence will be allowed in the same circumstances as in the Court of Appeal: where a sentence is manifestly excessive or otherwise wrong in law or principle. These are well-established tests. We are committed to ensuring that we create a fair appeals system that provides adequate safeguards for summary justice. In the event that appellants feel an incorrect decision has been made in respect of their application for permission, they have the opportunity to seek a judicial review of that decision to the High Court. I remind the Committee that, as I said earlier, the introduction of recording equipment into magistrates courts to accompany the change in the appeals process will increase the ability to scrutinise the decisions of magistrates courts. I hope I have reassured the Committee of our commitment to a fair and accessible criminal appeals process, and I urge that amendment 63 not be pressed to a Division. Amendments 64 to 66, tabled by my hon. Friend the Member for York Central, relate to the right to renew an appeal for permission to appear at an oral hearing if the appeal has been refused on the papers. I will deal with these matters sequentially. The right to renew an application for permission at an oral hearing when it has been refused on the papers does exist in appeals from the Crown court to the Court of Appeal. We decided not to replicate the provision for appeals from the magistrates courts. There will be occasions when an oral hearing may be regarded as necessary in order for a Crown court judge to determine whether to grant permission to appeal. For that reason, we have included a provision in proposed new section 108A of the Magistrates’ Courts Act 1980, so that judges can hold an oral hearing if they feel it is necessary or for the purpose of making a determination more expeditiously. However, the key is whether an oral hearing is necessary in the context. We are keen to avoid an influx of applications to renew permission to appeal at an oral hearing where that is unnecessary. That is particularly important when we consider the high volume of cases that our magistrates courts already consider, and the higher volume of cases that we anticipate they will be considering after the other reforms in the Bill come into play. The volume of appeals from magistrates courts to the Crown court will therefore be higher, proportionally, than the volume of appeals from the Crown court to the Court of Appeal. If we include provision for appellants to renew an application for permission that has already been refused, we risk creating a higher volume of unnecessary oral hearings than in the Court of Appeal, thereby placing a significant and unnecessary strain on Crown court time. I understand that the amendment is driven by the desire to ensure that adequate safeguards are built into the process, and I hope my hon. Friend will be reassured that, as I have said, refusal of permission can still be challenged by applying to the High Court for judicial review. The second part of the amendment provides that the grounds of appeal may be based on issues of procedure and fact arising in the trial, as well as on points of law. I want to reassure my hon. Friend that the grounds for appeal as currently drafted in the Bill capture the points raised in the amendment. An appeal of conviction will be allowed if it is unsafe, which can be the consequence of an incorrect application of law, procedural irregularities or fresh evidence. Appeals of sentence could also be successful on the basis that the magistrates court has made a mistake as to the facts of the case or made a procedural error, as long as, by virtue of that mistake, the sentence was manifestly excessive or wrong in law or principle. The amendment would not change that position. For the reasons I have set out, I urge Members not to support amendments 64 to 66. In essence, they are already covered by the Bill. I thank the hon. Member for Bexhill and Battle for tabling amendments 54 and 57, which would provide that whenever an appeal against conviction or sentence is made from the magistrates court to the Crown court, the appeal must be allowed, irrespective of whether there is any merit in the appeal. I suspect that was not the intention behind the amendments. If I read them in the spirit that I imagine they were tabled, I think they were designed to remove the permission test, rather than indicating to the Court that it should allow all such appeals.

• 23 Apr 2026 · Courts and Tribunals Bill (Ninth sitting) · Hansard source

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  I am grateful to my hon. Friend the Member for Easington (Grahame Morris) for tabling amendment 67. The speech that the hon. Member for Reigate just made was not only helpful and constructive, as is so often the case, but really compelling. At a societal level, we have been on a journey with regard to how we approach rape and serious sexual violence. There is a recognition that for far too long not only has the court been in danger of becoming a site for re-traumatisation, but frankly the response of our entire criminal justice system has been inadequate to meet what is now widely recognised to be an epidemic of violence against women and girls in our society. Unless we send a message at the very pinnacle of the criminal justice system that that is unacceptable and we cannot tolerate it, and get serious about conviction rates, the amount of charging decisions and the number of cases that come to court, we will not deter people from this kind of behaviour. Her speech setting that out, and some of the work that was done before this Parliament to get here, was very valuable. Let me begin by setting out the rationale for clause 8, and then turn to amendment 67. Far too many victims of rape are dropping out of the justice system because they feel that they are the ones on trial. That needs to stop. Following the Law Commission’s careful consultation, the Bill will stop rape myths and misconceptions entering our court rooms. Clauses 8 to 11 will raise the threshold so that a victim’s past sexual history or previous allegations can be used only when necessary and relevant. The reforms will also prevent the defence from insinuating that victims are lying or motivated only by money just because they claimed compensation or reported a previous offence. We will also allow patterns of domestic abuse, of any type and against any victim, to be shown to the court in cases where they indicate a propensity for further offending. All those measures sit alongside the Government’s wider efforts to improve the victim experience of the justice system. This Government have already implemented special protections for victims’ counselling records. We have commissioned a new project led by Professor Katrin Hohl to bring Operation Soteria into the courtroom. We are rolling out trauma-informed training for not just judges but all court staff, and we have dedicated £6 million, to be invested over the next two years, to deliver independent legal advice for rape victims. Taken together, these measures are transformative. Clause 8 reforms the framework that governs when sexual behaviour evidence about a complainant may be introduced in criminal proceedings. Section 41 of the Youth Justice and Criminal Evidence Act 1999 sets out important protections intended to prevent irrelevant or prejudicial material about a complainant’s previous sexual behaviour from being placed before the court. The Law Commission’s consultation found that the current provisions are complex and difficult to navigate, and that they are not being applied consistently across cases. That speaks to the point made by the hon. Member for Bexhill and Battle about monitoring the new framework, but some of this has been driven by the monitoring of the existing framework, and ensuring, by codifying the test, greater consistency of practice. As a result of that complexity and inconsistency, there are some instances where sexual behaviour evidence about a victim’s previous sexual behaviour is admitted to a court and heard by a jury, despite it having no real bearing on the case. Simplifying the law will help judges to apply a clearer and more coherent test. Clause 8 replaces the existing statutory gateways with a clearer admissibility test. It will continue to be the case that sexual behaviour evidence should not be admitted into the court unless approval is granted by the judge. Judges must consider whether the evidence has substantial probative value. The clause also requires judges to consider a series of statutory factors, including whether the evidence relies on improper inferences, rape myths or misconceptions. These reforms clarify the law, rather than altering the threshold per se. They reflect principles that are already applied by courts but set them out in a more structured way, which will improve consistency and transparency. We will also extend the new threshold to all offence types, not only sexual offences. This is because issues relating to a victim’s past sexual behaviour may occasionally arise in other trials, and complainants in those cases should benefit from the same safeguards and be treated equally. The purpose of the clause is not to prevent a defendant from having a fair trial or to exclude evidence that is genuinely relevant; it is to ensure that decisions about admissibility are based on proper evidential reasoning and not on prejudicial assumptions. For that reason, I commend the clause to the Committee. Amendment 67, which was tabled by my hon. Friend the Member for Easington, seeks to exclude from the proposed admissibility threshold any sexual behaviour evidence that took place prior to the charge, but that is connected to the offence. That goes against the purpose of the clause, which as I have said is to ensure that sexual behaviour from a victim’s past is admitted only when it has clear relevance to a significant issue in the case or is important explanatory evidence. That is to prevent evidence that relies solely on perpetuating rape myths and misconceptions from being used against a victim. The amendment, which as we have heard has support from across the combating violence against women and girls sector, would significantly broaden the amount of sexual behaviour evidence that the defence could bring to court without any consideration from the judge, including evidence that neither has substantial probative value nor is important explanatory evidence. Sexual behaviour evidence connected to the event itself could, for example, include any previous sexual behaviour between the same two parties, even though we know that the majority of sexual violence occurs within a relationship. That would allow a huge amount of sexual behaviour evidence to be brought into court entirely unscrutinised and unfiltered by the judge. Insinuating that because a victim has previously engaged in sexual behaviour of the same kind or with the same defendant they are somehow more likely to have consented to the events on trial is a well-known misconception. Whether or not that was the intention of my hon. Friend the Member for Easington in tabling the amendment, the effect would be to perpetuate this narrative, and we cannot accept it. I therefore urge my hon. Friend the Member for Bolton South and Walkden to withdraw the amendment.

• 21 Apr 2026 · Courts and Tribunals Bill (Seventh sitting) · Hansard source

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  It is a pleasure to see you in the Chair once again, Ms Jardine. As Members will have heard me say on countless occasions, the pressures on our criminal courts are unprecedented. I do not intend to rehearse arguments that have been made many times in the House. There is a broad consensus that urgent action is required, and it is in that context that I turn to clause 3, which provides for trial by judge alone in cases likely to attract a custodial sentence of three years or less. Clause 3 introduces a new judge-only division of the Crown court—the so-called bench division—to hear less serious cases without a jury. This does not create a separate jurisdiction; one’s case will still be heard in the Crown court if assigned to the bench division. The same appeal route that is currently available from the Crown court will still be available. The clause operates to provide that certain either-way cases defined by the seriousness threshold in the legislation will be tried by a judge sitting alone in a Crown court. The evidence we heard in Committee is that sitting with judge alone saves time. A former Lord Chief Justice, Lord Burnett of Maldon, told us he was convinced that “the time saving will be enormous if the relatively low-level cases are tried by a new constitution.” –– [ Official Report, Courts and Tribunals Public Bill Committee, 25 March 2026; c. 76, Q161.] Similarly, Doug Downey, Attorney General of Ontario, said in evidence to us that there is “no question” but that judge-alone cases are “faster”, and that that is borne out by the data there. Let me be clear, as I have tried to be clear a number of times: jury trials will remain in place for the most serious crimes. Indictable-only offences such as murder, rape, armed robbery, grievous bodily harm with intent and arson endangering life will never be heard without a jury. But it remains the case that while jury trials are not at fault for the delays, although jury trials only account for 3% of all criminal trial cases they take up approximately 60% of Crown court hearing time, and the independent review’s findings show that jury trials take twice as long now as they did in 2000. As Sir Brian Leveson told the Committee, trials have become longer and more complex for many reasons, due to the high volume of digital evidence now central to many prosecutions, and the consequence is clear that the delays are rising, and victims and defendants alike are waiting longer for justice. The independent review of the criminal courts estimates that judge-only trials can reduce hearing time by at least 20% and save Crown court time—a figure that Sir Brian himself describes in his review as “conservative”—and those savings will generate more capacity for jury trials where they are most needed. Critics have said that this measure would produce no time saving at all, but the Committee heard from respected members of the judiciary that that is not the case, and that judge-only trials would save time in practical and important ways, by encouraging more realistic guilty pleas, by avoiding the delays inherent in empanelling and managing a jury, by allowing evidence to begin earlier in the day, and by reducing the disruption caused by juror absence or delay. As I have set out, the application of these changes would apply to cases in the existing backlog where a trial has not already commenced. It is because we must tackle the mounting caseload in the Crown court as soon as we can that we are implementing the measures in this way. The clause allows cases in the current open Crown court caseload where a trial has not yet begun to be considered under the new allocation test. Trials should take place in accordance with the law as it stands, and applying the new regime to cases in the open caseload will help us begin to reduce delay from the outset. This is a practical step to ensure that the courts can make the best use of available capacity. The clause also provides safeguards in the form of reallocation provisions, as we have debated. Cases can, and sometimes do, evolve as they progress through the courts, and the clause makes clear provision for cases to be reallocated to a jury trial where the seriousness increases, even after a judge-only trial has begun. The intention of the clause is not to remove jury trials for the most serious cases in our justice system, and where an indictable-only offence is added to a bench division case, it will always be reallocated to a jury trial. The Government have been clear: we have made the investment in courts that people have been calling for, by uncapping sitting days as well as investment in our workforce through legal aid, but investment alone is not enough. The pressures on the system require structural reform, because it was not designed to withstand the challenges of both the present backlog and the profile of modern criminal trials. We are seeing a growing number of remand cases entering the system, and those cases must be prioritised for hearing in order to meet statutory custody time limits. That in turn pushes other serious cases where the defendant is on bail, including rape and serious sexual offences, further down the list. The consequences of those delays are not abstract. Longer waits mean longer periods in which the accused may remain on bail, which places greater pressure on policing and monitoring, while victims and complainants endure prolonged uncertainty and distress. Persistent delay, as we have learned, also distorts behaviour across the system, encouraging defendants to postpone guilty pleas in the hope that witnesses, and sometimes victims, will lose confidence as cases drift further into the future. That cannot be right. That is not justice, and it is not sustainable. The failings of our system were laid bare, not just by the independent review but by the Committee, when we heard most powerfully from victims of crime themselves. We need a more modern model of criminal justice that serves those affected by these failings, and clause 3 is an important part of delivering that change. I would like to hear from my hon. Friend the Member for Birmingham Erdington, and hear the debate in Committee, before I set out the Government’s position on new clause 29. It may be convenient, therefore, Ms Jardine, to hear from my hon. Friend at this juncture.

• 21 Apr 2026 · Courts and Tribunals Bill (Eighth sitting) · Hansard source

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  I am not going to second-guess how the judges will apply this. As I say, that is for the judiciary and the courts. I am not going to put an arbitrary time length on it; I do not think that is needed. The second point that hon. Members made was that the provision risks becoming too wide-ranging if a future Parliament or Secretary of State wishes to add to the offences. I addressed that point in my earlier remarks. I do not think that that is a real risk. Another point that has been made is that none of this will have much of an impact, because we are talking only about a narrowly defined set of cases. I fully anticipate that while the system gets to grips with the use of this legislation, there will be a very small number of cases to begin with, but these are by definition the lengthiest cases and they take up a large amount of the courts’ time. The savings that we are talking about, which are set out in the impact assessment, may sound modest, but in a system under extreme pressure those small shifts matter. Every case heard by a judge sitting alone—as was deemed appropriate in these sorts of case not just by Sir Brian but by Lord Justice Auld and others—saves valuable Crown Court and jury time that can be deployed to serious cases that need a jury. In the context of the emergency in which we find ourselves, I make no apologies for seeking every little impact. For all those reasons, I commend the clause to the Committee.

• 21 Apr 2026 · Courts and Tribunals Bill (Eighth sitting) · Hansard source

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  Will the hon. Member acknowledge that one of the first things this Government did when we came into power was invest £92 million, focusing primarily on duty solicitors who deal with cases at the coalface, including those involving unrepresented defendants? That money is in play. It is in their pockets. Will he acknowledge that?

• 21 Apr 2026 · Courts and Tribunals Bill (Eighth sitting) · Hansard source

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  I beg to move amendment 10, in clause 6, page 16, line 2, at end insert— “( ) in subsection (1)— (i) after ‘imposes’ insert ‘, in respect of two or more offences,’; (ii) for the words from ‘exceed’ to the end substitute ‘exceed— (a) where each of the offences is a summary offence, 6 months; (b) in any other case, the longest term that could be imposed in respect of any one of the offences’;” The effect of this amendment is that, where a magistrates’ court imposes two or more terms of imprisonment or detention in a young offender institution to run consecutively, and the offences in question are all summary offences, the aggregate of the terms may not exceed 6 months.

• 21 Apr 2026 · Courts and Tribunals Bill (Eighth sitting) · Hansard source

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  In that case I will deal with amendments 30 to 32 once I have addressed amendments 29 and 61, because they all touch on similar issues in relation to clause 4. Much has been said about the policy rationale behind this provision, and whether juries are somehow incapable of following complex trials involving fraud or financial matters. That is not the Government’s contention, although some of the cases that are routinely dealt with in Southwark Crown court, particularly in a modern environment with crypto and complex financial instruments, are indeed highly complex. The primary issue is jury burden, which is a theme that emerged from the independent review of criminal courts, and it has long been identified as a significant issue. As long ago as 2001, Lord Justice Robin Auld said that the “increase in the length of such trials over recent years has become a severe intrusion on jurors’ working and private lives. It cannot be good for them or for justice.” Sir Brian Leveson picked up that theme in part 1 of his review, in which he said that “the personal and financial burden placed on jurors, particularly those involved in lengthy trials, is significant.” He also said that “serious and complex fraud trials…place more significant burdens on court resources and jurors’ time.” There is evidence of the financial strain on jurors who sit in lengthy trials, particularly those who are self-employed or who have caring responsibilities. In addition, under the current system, the companies that jurors work for cannot claim back losses incurred while their employee is on jury service. As I have said before, we commend the participation in jury service of people from across society and from all backgrounds, which is why we are seeking to preserve jury trials for our most serious cases—those pertaining to matters that are not only serious for individuals but are in the public interest.

• 21 Apr 2026 · Courts and Tribunals Bill (Eighth sitting) · Hansard source

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  I thank the hon. Member for his amendment, which would require cases to be eligible for an order under proposed new section 42A of the Criminal Justice Act 2003 only where all offences listed are schedule offences. We consider that such a method would be overly rigid and would limit the application of clause 4. In reality, most complex and lengthy cases involving fraud and financial crime often prosecute a mix of principal and ancillary offences, some of which would not appear on the schedule of eligible offences. For example, sometimes theft offences, which are not included in the schedule, are prosecuted alongside fraud or money laundering crimes. Imagine a large-scale conspiracy to defraud and false accounting, perhaps involving multiple offenders operating through a network of shell companies. The prosecution case relies on hundred, perhaps thousands, of pages of electronic banking records, company accounts, internal emails, encrypted messaging data, and expert accounting evidence that traces the movement of funds through dozens of linked corporate entities across multiple jurisdictions. This is in every sense a highly technical and inherently complex case, which is likely to last several months. But there are counts of theft-adjacent offences of, say, handling stolen goods on the indictment. Those counts are not incidental: they are related to the fraud. They provide the fact finder with a holistic picture of the alleged offending. The judge considers the counts to be clearly related and properly joined for trial. If clause 4 were constrained in the way proposed by the amendment, that plainly suitable case—long and exceptionally complex—would be excluded even from consideration for judge-only trial, because those additional connected counts are not listed in the schedule. Requiring every offence to fall within the schedule would exclude cases that meet the policy intent of clause 4, thereby preventing the court from applying the provision precisely where it is most needed, solely because of the presence of additional non-schedule counts.

• 21 Apr 2026 · Courts and Tribunals Bill (Eighth sitting) · Hansard source

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  I thank the shadow Minister for tabling amendment 51. I will first set out the rationale for clause 4 and schedule 1 and then address the amendment. Clause 4 and schedule 1 will allow for particularly complex or lengthy fraud and financial offences to be tried by a judge sitting alone. Cases involving fraud and serious financial crime are some of the longest and most demanding trials in the Crown court. They routinely run for weeks or even months, and there are examples of the most complex cases running for over a year. That is an incredibly substantial burden for jurors—lay members going about their lives—to bear, particularly as the compensation for those they work for is non-existent and their own compensation covers expenses but no more. Let me give a real-world example. A Crown court fraud trial was listed to run for 13 weeks—already a substantial commitment for any jury. Partial verdicts were returned by the jury four months later, with further verdicts provided the following month. The case finally concluded five months after it started. By that point the jury had dwindled from 12 to nine, worn down by delay after delay in such a long-running and complex trial. As I said, this is the primary rationale behind what we consider will also be a time-saving measure. This is a significant challenge. In fraud cases, marathon trials can drag on for months—at times, well beyond the original estimate—as jurors fall away, delays compound and the system ends up bending around the logistics of keeping 12 ordinary men and women available for an extraordinary length of time. Sir Brian Leveson was clear, as was Lord Justice Auld, that trial by jury is not always the most sensible and proportionate approach to the resolution of these types of lengthy and complex cases.

• 21 Apr 2026 · Courts and Tribunals Bill (Eighth sitting) · Hansard source

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  I was about to get to the essential position, which is that what I said on Thursday is twofold. What we were debating was in the context of whether there was an appeal route in relation to the mode of trial decision—the allocation decision. I have been absolutely clear that nowhere in this Bill is there any specific route to appeal, and I have never sought to suggest otherwise. Taking a step further, the law points against there being a jurisdictional power for judicial review on an allocation decision. Where the Bar Council’s letter discusses the availability of judicial review, it sets out that section 29(3) of the Senior Courts Act significantly limits the circumstances in which judicial review will be available for decisions affecting the conduct of a Crown court trial. That is the point that is raised in its letter, and to which I will provide a line-by-line response, but the Government essentially agree with that position. As I have said in Committee—if any of this was not clear, let me be clear about it now—there is a very high bar. There might be exceptional circumstances, which might well be tested when this legislation, if it comes forward, comes into force. For example, if a Crown court judge clearly acts outside the parameters of the legislation by allocating a case that is clearly excluded under these provisions from being judge-only—because it is, say, complex and lengthy or indictable-only—that may fall outside of this rule, but it is certainly going to be only an exceptional case. The best thing for me to do is write, so that Members can see what those reasons are and see what the Government’s position is. Essentially, we think that what is set out in the Bar Council’s letter as regards the availability of judicial review—there is no appeal route, and I have never suggested otherwise—correctly states the law.

• 21 Apr 2026 · Courts and Tribunals Bill (Eighth sitting) · Hansard source

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  Clause 6 introduces a measure to extend the Secretary of State’s regulation-making power to enable the general limit on magistrates court sentencing powers to be set at 18 or 24 months of maximum imprisonment for single and multiple triable either-way offences. Currently, magistrates court sentencing powers are set at 12 months. The Government can already vary magistrates’ sentencing powers between six and 12 months by secondary legislation using the negative resolution procedure. That has been done twice, and used to good effect, since July 2022. However, the Crown court is now facing significant pressures, and many triable either-way offences currently heard and sentenced there can, as we know, be fairly and expeditiously dealt with in the magistrates court. Increasing magistrates court sentencing powers is one of the ways in which we will increase the range of cases that magistrates courts can hear and sentence, freeing up valuable Crown court capacity for the most serious and complex cases. By enabling the powers to be increased in that way, the clause will help us to free up capacity in the Crown court to the tune of 8,000 Crown court sitting days in the 2028-29 financial year, making a significant dent in the backlog. Magistrates are well prepared to take on that responsibility. They are dedicated and highly trained volunteers who give back to their community, working alongside highly trained legal advisers and an impressive cadre of district judges. The magistrates undergo an extensive selection process and work tirelessly to ensure that justice is delivered swiftly and fairly, currently assuming responsibility for 90% of all criminal cases. The clause does not increase magistrates court sentencing powers; instead, it enables the Secretary of State to set the general limit in the future at 18 or 24 months. As I have said, any such change would be made through a statutory instrument under the negative resolution procedure, when necessary, to respond to changing circumstances and manage unsustainable pressures across the criminal justice system. Importantly, the clause also ensures that the aggregate maximum term available for consecutive sentences will track the general limit. It also provides a safeguard that magistrates courts cannot impose a sentence exceeding the offence-specific maximum available on indictment, even if the general limit is set at 18 or 24 months. As such, I commend clause 6 to the Committee.

• 21 Apr 2026 · Courts and Tribunals Bill (Eighth sitting) · Hansard source

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  I thank the hon. Member for her point, which has been raised by others. Those terms are well understood in their ordinary meaning and can be applied in a clear and straightforward way by judges.

• 21 Apr 2026 · Courts and Tribunals Bill (Eighth sitting) · Hansard source

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  We consider it to be set out in clause 4 as drafted. It is sufficiently flexible and will no doubt be subjected to interpretation. We think that, as drafted—with all the carefully prescribed exceptions to what could be included, in addition to the public interest exclusion—it is sufficiently clear, and that there is a clear understanding of the sorts of offences that would come within the provision. I am also keen to work together constructively to ensure public confidence, particularly in cases involving loss of life, while still providing the courts with the flexibility they need for the clause to work appropriately. In the case of amendment 31, given the high bar already set in the clause and the cautious way that we expect judges will exercise these powers, we consider the statutory exclusion of these additional offences unnecessary. Again, I urge my hon. Friend the Member for Bolton South and Walkden not to press her amendment. Finally, the placement of amendment 32 in proposed new section 42B(4) of the Criminal Justice Act 2003 means that it would not, in fact, exclude any offences beyond the indictable-only sexual offences that are expressly excluded by proposed new section 42B(2)(b). As I have said previously, we set up the clause so that jury trial is the default. Judges apply the test, and there are safeguards for case suitability and public interest. It would be very rare for sexual offences to be tried alongside the kinds of complex or lengthy fraud and financial cases that clause 4 is designed to capture. For those reasons, once again, I urge my hon. Friend not to press the amendment.

• 21 Apr 2026 · Courts and Tribunals Bill (Eighth sitting) · Hansard source

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  On amendment 49, consistent with our approach to the allocation of cases within the existing caseload but where trials are not yet commenced in relation to allocation to a Crown court bench division, we follow the same approach in relation to questions of allocation with the creation of a judge-only forum for cases of the nature we have been discussing in relation to clause 4—namely those of a lengthy and complex nature. We follow the same rationale and principles that trials should be treated and heard in accordance with the law as it stands at the commencement of trial. As I said earlier in the debate, applying the measures in the Bill to cases in the open caseload will enable us to bring forward and thereby accelerate caseload reduction, which is one of the main—if not the primary—objectives of the Bill. That approach to the application of the law to the existing caseload is consistent with precedent. For example, Parliament previously legislated in 2003 for judge-only trials in cases involving jury tampering and that applied to trials begun after commencement, regardless of when the case first entered the system. I grant that what we are seeking to do here is bolder and more extensive, but it is the principle of whether trials should be heard in accordance with the law as it stands when the Bill is brought into force. That also means that we avoid a situation where there are two different procedures running in parallel in the Crown court as a result of arbitrary cut-off dates. Although I do not seek to overstate the impact that that application of the legislation will have on the relatively small number of cases that we are talking about in this context, it is important that we derive, in the delay reduction, every little benefit that we can from the measures that we are bringing forward as soon as we can, because of the extent of the delays. For those reasons, I urge the shadow Minister to withdraw his amendment.

• 21 Apr 2026 · Courts and Tribunals Bill (Eighth sitting) · Hansard source

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  I think we are maybe dancing on the head of a pin. Whether it is a concession or not, I accept that there is no right of appeal of the allocation decision. I also accept that there is no obvious route to judicial review, because of the operation of section 29 of the Senior Courts Act. If I might say so, the hon. Member and I are agreeing. Whether he or the hon. Member for Bexhill and Battle wants to categorise that as a concession, as a reduction of rights, that is a matter for them; but we are agreeing as to the legal position. What I wanted to do was set that out formally in writing, in response to that and to the various other questions that the Bar Council asked in their letter, because I thought that would be useful. However, we are in agreement, and I think that is why we can proceed to a vote, because we have a shared understanding of the law.

• 21 Apr 2026 · Courts and Tribunals Bill (Eighth sitting) · Hansard source

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  To be clear, I intend to address amendment 29, albeit that it is not being put to a vote, and amendment 46, which was grouped with it. My hon. Friend the Member for Bolton South and Walkden referred to other amendments further ahead, but it may be convenient to deal with those when we get to them, unless you want me to deal with them now, Ms Butler. I am in your hands; I am happy to deal with them either way.

• 21 Apr 2026 · Courts and Tribunals Bill (Eighth sitting) · Hansard source

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  On that final point, we are all delighted to be here and perform the function of Government properly. [Hon. Members: “Hear, hear.”] Exactly, and the company of all Members is a delight, as always. On a serious point, there is some suggestion that the Government are rushing the legislation through. I do not think that is right. Yes, the Government have a sense of urgency about gripping this problem. I make no apologies for that. The depth of the problem and the shameful delays demands that urgency, but it is not true to say that this is rushed legislation. We commissioned a two-part independent review of hundreds of pages. We took our time to consider how we would bring that forward in a pragmatic way that vindicated the evidence base that the IRCC had put together. Now we are scrutinising it in the usual and proper way, and it will take as long as it takes. I do not want the public to think that the integrity of the process is somehow compromised. I know it would not be under your chairship, Ms Butler.

• 21 Apr 2026 · Courts and Tribunals Bill (Eighth sitting) · Hansard source

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  My hon. Friend is right. Flexibility is not a weaking of the safeguards; it is what actually allows the statutory test in clause 4 to operate properly and in appropriate scenarios. Judges will already be required to consider the technicality and length of the case when making an order as to whether to allocate to a judge-only trial. Cases including indictable-only homicide and sexual offences are excluded from the outset because we regard those as cases where a jury trial is in the public interest. For those reasons, I urge the shadow Minister to withdraw his amendment.

• 21 Apr 2026 · Courts and Tribunals Bill (Eighth sitting) · Hansard source

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  I am not going to give way. For all those reasons, I commend the clause to the Committee. Question put, That the clause, as amended, stand part of the Bill.

• 21 Apr 2026 · Courts and Tribunals Bill (Eighth sitting) · Hansard source

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  As regards the last point, Ms Butler, I am ultimately in your hands as to how you want to deal with it. I have said how I am going to deal with it, and what I consider the position to be vis-à-vis the operation of section 29 of the Senior Courts Act 1981 and the availability, or lack thereof, of a judicial review route. There is no appeal route. An allocation decision in this context is final, and deliberately so, because we want to speed up the system. There are other appeal routes when one gets to questions of verdict. I have said that I will set that out. I do not want to rush Members or not provide them with the full information, and I am seeking to be as transparent as I can be. As I said, we will write to the Committee, so that everyone can have the full information. I do not think the issue radically changes the substance of our debate, but given the position the shadow Minister has taken, I will not force the point. I would rather that we ventilate the issues fully, Members get the letter and we then vote accordingly. Ultimately, I have made it clear that there is no specific appeal right or route to challenge the mode of trial allocation. There are, however, a number of safeguards, including a judge hearing from both parties and giving reasons for the decision. Those all safeguard the allocation process, but if there is any lack of clarity that I have contributed to, albeit inadvertently, in relation to how JR interacts with the Senior Courts Act, let me set the information out, and Members can have it before we proceed.

• 21 Apr 2026 · Courts and Tribunals Bill (Eighth sitting) · Hansard source

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  Members have asked about the intended impact of the clause. As I explained earlier, the reason why we are making this change is that we have confidence in our magistrates and because it would save a significant number of Crown court sitting days. This is a tried-and-tested approach: the sentencing power of magistrates courts was raised from six months to 12 months for a single triable either-way offence in May 2022, under the previous Government—Conservatives can look to their own record to see the evidence for what we should do—and a review of the impact between May 2022 and March 2023 confirmed that increasing magistrates sentencing powers had helped to reduce to pressure on the Crown court. In that context, there was a 21% reduction in the number of defendants sent by magistrates courts to the Crown court for sentencing, and a further 6% reduction in the number of theft offences sent for trial to the Crown court by March 2023. That shows how recalibrating sentencing powers— [Laughter . ] I did not realise it was that funny, but we are getting into the witching hour, so I am going to be kind to everybody. That reduction is just one of the ways in which we think the clause can assist with the backlogs. I addressed the points about legal aid in my remarks on amendment 22, tabled by the hon. Member for Chichester. I have set out the justifications both for extending the powers and for the flexible, agile mechanism that the negative procedure affords us.

• 21 Apr 2026 · Courts and Tribunals Bill (Eighth sitting) · Hansard source

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  I refer the hon. Gentleman to pages 243 and 245 of the independent review. If we want to come back on the detail, we can, but I am going to make progress. I have dealt with retrospectivity. I want to spend a bit of time on new clause 29, which my hon. Friend the Member for Birmingham Erdington spoke powerfully about. She is absolutely right to highlight the disparities in outcomes across our criminal justice system. This is not something new. The problem was not created by our reforms, but it is something that we seek to transform in the transformation of our courts. We know that, for too long, there have been lower levels of trust and confidence among many minoritised communities. I am keenly aware that those groups experience disproportionality in our criminal justice system. That comes across not just in our courts but in remand decisions, sentencing outcomes and the fact that people who are black or of mixed ethnicity are statistically more likely to be a victim of crime than people who are white. I welcome the new clause and the intent behind it, as laid out by my hon. Friend. As I said on the first day in Committee, the Deputy Prime Minister committed to an independent review to properly monitor the impacts of not just judge-only trials but all the court reform measures in the Bill on precisely the communities that my hon. Friend is concerned about. I welcome the opportunity we have had to debate the scope of the review. What I will take away is the fact that some deep thinking needs to be done about having good baseline data, about the scope of the review and whether it could perhaps go even further than what is proposed in new clause 29, about timing to make sure that the datasets can tell us something meaningful about the impacts of the reforms, and about the appropriate feedback mechanism so that Parliament, and future Parliaments, can consider the disproportionality that exists within our system. It will be important to benchmark the impacts of reforms against the current system. The Ministry of Justice already publishes extensive operational metrics, including on case timeliness, conviction rates and sentencing outcomes, and they provide the insight that we have been debating into the performance of criminal courts today. We have to ensure that we are looking at the right things. My hon. Friend the Member for Birmingham Erdington and I have been discussing an important point. It is about ensuring not just that justice is done, but that it is seen to be done and people can have confidence in the system.

• 21 Apr 2026 · Courts and Tribunals Bill (Eighth sitting) · Hansard source

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  I am not sure that is right. I think we have all agreed—even those Opposition Members who were responsible for the justice system and deprived it of the resources that were needed—that more investment is needed, and the Government are making that. I make these points about capacity partly to meet the question that was asked, but also to meet the concern expressed. It is a legitimate concern: by following the thrust of the IRCC recommendations, are we diverting some cases into our magistrates court and creating a risk for that court? People have pointed to the size of the caseload; we need to distinguish between open caseload and backlog. The magistrates court currently has a caseload, which it needs to operate efficiently, but we obviously do not want that to become a backlog, or to simply divert the problem from one place to another, which is why I talk about resources. I am trying to reassure the Committee and the wider public that by empowering magistrates to assume greater sentencing powers, which means dealing with more serious cases, we are equipping them with the resources they need to do that responsibly. Extending magistrates courts sentencing powers will retain more cases in the magistrates courts, thereby freeing up valuable Crown court capacity. A sentencing increase of up to 18 months is estimated to save 8,000 Crown court sitting days in the 2028-29 financial year. When magistrates court sentencing powers were raised from six to 12 months in May 2022, a review of the impact confirmed that it helped to reduce the pressure on the Crown court at the time, with fewer cases sent for sentencing and trial. In November 2024, the extension of magistrates court sentencing powers was estimated to free up the equivalent of 2,000 Crown court sitting days a year—so it is proven to work. By increasing magistrates courts sentencing powers, offences such as common assault, the theft of lower-value items and lower-level fraud could be heard in the magistrates court. This will ensure that Crown court resources are rightly focused on the most serious and complex cases. We have confidence in magistrates to exercise higher sentencing powers accurately and fairly. As others have pointed out, in the youth court magistrates already have the power to impose detention and training orders of up to two years in cases concerning serious violence. It cheers me that the change was welcomed by the Magistrates’ Association and that magistrates are willing to take on the additional challenge with greater powers, aligning with the youth courts. The Magistrates’ Association has stated that this is “the most effective and straightforward way for magistrates’ courts to further assist in reducing the Crown Court backlog”. The introduction of the ability to increase magistrates’ sentencing powers to 18 or 24 months will address the open case law and provide the flexibility to enable a more proportionate allocation of resources. For the reasons I have set out, I urge my hon. Friend the Member for Bolton South and Walkden to seek to withdraw her amendment.