Sarah Sackman MP: speeches

Speeches

• 28 Apr 2026 · Courts and Tribunals Bill (Twelfth sitting) · Hansard source

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  Our understanding is that the new clause seeks to improve efficiency by requiring cases to be trial-ready before they are sent to the Crown court. I will explain very briefly how a case is currently prepared for trial in the Crown court and why it is important that that preparation takes place before a judge in the Crown court, as early as possible. All criminal cases begin in the magistrates court, and indictable offences such as murder must, by law, be sent to the Crown court at the first hearing, after the magistrates have dealt with matters such as identification and bail or remand. At the plea and trial preparation hearing in the Crown court, a professional judge examines the issues between the parties, such as evidence and disclosure issues, and sets a timeline for trial preparation, as well as the trial date. It is also at that point that a formal plea is entered in the Crown court. There are clear statutory expectations on parties, set out in the criminal procedure rules, to be proactive in case management, and judges are experienced in managing timeliness through enforcement action. However, we recognise that there is always more that can be done, which is why we have effected the roll-out of case co-ordinators in our Crown court to drive case progression. Magistrates are not similarly trained in managing trials on indictment, and we do not think they would be an effective equivalent to a Crown court judge in determining these matters before they reach the Crown court. Requiring cases to be held back until they are considered “ready” prior to being sent to the Crown court would, we believe, risk introducing further delay for the most serious offences. In addition, retaining such serious cases for longer in the magistrates court could have several unintended consequences, including additional pressures on custody time limits and delays in accessing special measures—measures that enable vulnerable and intimidated witnesses to give pre-recorded evidence at an early stage. Those protections are available across the Crown court but are not all available in the magistrates court, so delaying transfer to the Crown court would delay access to them for some victims and witnesses, potentially undermining the quality of their evidence. The new clause would, in practice, introduce delays into the court system and delay the progression of the most serious cases. For that reason, I urge my hon. Friend to withdraw it.

• 28 Apr 2026 · Courts and Tribunals Bill (Twelfth sitting) · Hansard source

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  The hon. Member for Chichester rightly acknowledges the significant amount of work that the Government are currently undertaking in this space, and we had an opportunity to debate that in Committee earlier. In relation to the new clause, it might be worth briefly explaining why such an extension would not provide significant benefits compared with the systems already in place. In relation to bail decisions, a transcript of the hearing is rarely informative for victims. What victims need and want to know, and what the victims code already requires, is for victims to be informed of the outcome of the bail hearing and any conditions imposed. Those updates are already provided to victims by victim witness care units within five working days. We are currently exploring how responsibilities under the code are being met by the relevant service providers and how to better support them in the delivery of the code. To strengthen that further, once commenced, the Victims and Prisoners Act 2024 will introduce a compliance framework, requiring criminal justice bodies to keep their performance against the code under review. Transcripts of judicial summings-up are unlikely to add significant value for many victims. Those remarks are given before the jury begins to deliberate and are intended to guide them by summarising the evidence and setting out the relevant law. They are not, and cannot be, a reflection of the jury’s decision. Without the full context of the trial, they may risk causing confusion rather than providing clarity. Before being released, summings-up must be manually reviewed to ensure that they are accurate. That, too, is resource intensive. In looking at where we can roll out making transcripts available at either low or no cost, we must target those areas that add value for the public and victims. As I said when we discussed this last Thursday, we are focused on driving improvement for the longer term. That is why we are undertaking a study in the use of AI to transcribe court hearings. The findings will identify what is possible from AI transcription in a Crown court setting, in considering how to make the provision of transcripts more cost-effective. I think we are in a good place. As the hon. Member for Chichester says, there is more to do, and the Government would be grateful for work across the House to see how we can drive greater transparency in transcription in our Crown courts, but I urge her to withdraw her new clause.

• 28 Apr 2026 · Courts and Tribunals Bill (Twelfth sitting) · Hansard source

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  This group contains a number of new clauses, and I want to make sure that I address all the principal themes. New clause 5, tabled by the hon. Member for Chichester, relates to publishing targets for reducing court backlogs. It would require the Lord Chancellor to set and publish targets for reducing court backlogs, and to report annually to Parliament on progress. It is important to note that the Ministry of Justice and His Majesty’s Courts and Tribunals Service are downstream Departments, by which I mean that we are subject to demand pressures that are not fully within our control as they are driven by additional arrests and charging decisions. We have published our central demand forecasts, on which the Department’s impact assessment and modelling is based, but the fluctuation and uncertainty in demand makes it particularly challenging for us to set a fixed, specific target. In the absence of credible reforms, targets will not achieve much. I can tell the hon. Member for Chichester in general terms that we want to get back to a sustainable position. Some Members have referred to reverting to our position before the covid pandemic, which was when we saw the exponential rise in the backlogs. However, I do not want to put a figure on it, because that would simply not be achievable, and having targets that we know we cannot achieve is setting ourselves up to fail, and it lacks credibility. In the independent review of the criminal courts, Sir Brian Leveson made a series of recommendations related to how performance management and accountability across the criminal justice system could be strengthened. We are looking carefully at those recommendations, particularly in respect of whether we ought to establish a performance oversight board, in addition to the governance forum that already exists. Sir Brian recommends that such a board should monitor and report on the performance of local criminal justice boards and publish a shared set of performance measures. As I have said, we will be publishing our response to the second part of Sir Brian’s review shortly. Performance management, and monitoring our success in reducing the court backlogs, is essential. Within Parliament, we have the scrutiny provided not only by shadow Justice Ministers, as well as all parliamentarians, but by the Justice Committee, which provides rigorous scrutiny on a cross-party basis. Of course, we also have the regular, frequent publication of Crown court data. Although those targets are not specified, no one is pushing at them harder than the Ministry of Justice and myself, and that is what the Bill primarily targets. However, we do not think that it is necessary to publish specific targets in the legislation, and I ask the hon. Member for Chichester not to press new clause 5 to a vote. New clause 17, and to some extent new clause 13, touches on efficiencies. It suggests that we ought to review efficiencies before we embark on reform. Indeed, the hon. Member for Reigate and others have made this argument during the debate: do the efficiency first, and see whether it works, before engaging in reform. I want to address that argument head on. We have been clear from the start that there is no silver bullet or simple panacea to the backlog. The insight of the independent review of the criminal courts is that we need investment, efficiencies and reform, and we are not ducking the need to drive efficiencies. One of the areas where I think we all agree is the fact that the system is incredibly inefficient, and the backlog itself compounds that inefficiency, but we are not waiting for legislation to drive at that efficiency reform. A number of other Members and I have mentioned relevant measures, and I want to touch on a few. For example, the blitz courts have been in operation in London since April, and I am going to visit one in a couple of weeks. That highly effective model of very aggressive listing has had success in the past, and it is being used to drive down certain case types in the backlog, such as assault against an emergency worker. We also need a consistent and clear approach to national listing, such as using the AI listing assistant that I referred to earlier. We are gripping the issue of prisoner delivery right across the country. Lord Timpson and I have established an oversight board, bringing together representatives of His Majesty’s Prison and Probation Service, His Majesty’s Courts and Tribunals Service, and the prisoner escort and custody service. It is a year-long project—a sprint, as it were—to look at how we can drive improved performance under the existing contract, and how we can imbed digital solutions to make that run much more efficiently.

• 27 Apr 2026 · Draft First-tier Tribunal (Property Chamber) Fees (Amendment) Order 2026 · Hansard source

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  I will endeavour to answer as many of the right hon. Gentleman’s questions as possible. Any that I do not answer—

• 27 Apr 2026 · Draft First-tier Tribunal (Property Chamber) Fees (Amendment) Order 2026 · Hansard source

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  I was just coming to that. The cost of delivering the service that the property tribunal provides far exceeds the fees we are talking about today, and that cost is borne by the taxpayer. We think that it is right and fair that, provided that fees are set at a level that does not impede access to justice, we recover some of the cost of providing this essential service from the users of the court. As I say, the current system has created a patchwork, inconsistent system that neither reflects the cost of administering proceedings nor supports a fair and proportionate contribution from all its users. The new framework will consist of a £47 application fee for applications to appeal a rent increase and to challenge terms of a successor tenancy, with no hearing fees applicable; fees of £114 for applications and £227 for hearings in cases where access to justice is paramount; and a standard fee of £200 to bring an application to the tribunal and £300 for hearings. Alongside this framework, fee exemptions apply for urgent issues such as seeking a remedial order for an unsafe residential building, as well as for potential low-value claims, including cases where tenants are recovering unlawful fees charged by their landlords. The estimated cost to the taxpayer of an average case brought to the property chamber is more than £900. Even after this framework is fully implemented, the property chamber will continue to be heavily subsidised by the taxpayer. A standard application fee of up to £200 therefore represents an important but modest contribution, and illustrates our commitment to access to justice, which has been the guiding principle in developing the framework. The property chamber deals with a wide range of cases involving users with varying financial circumstances, so it is simply not possible for a single fee to accurately reflect every type of application. Instead, the work that we undertook reviewed every type of application individually to identify the types of users and barriers they may face when seeking to bring a case to the tribunal. That led us to introduce a tiered framework that best reflects the varied work of the property tribunal. The new framework will create consistency in the charging of fees for applications that can be brought to the property chamber, increase levels of cost recovery and reduce the burden on the taxpayer, all while maintaining our commitment to ensuring that access for justice is protected for all. This instrument will introduce fees for applications in the residential property division of the property chamber that arise from, or are amended by, the Renters’ Rights Act. It is made under the powers provided by section 42(1)(a), section 42(2) and section 49(3) of the Tribunals, Courts and Enforcement Act 2007. First, the Renters’ Rights Act 2025 will extend the right to apply to the property chamber to challenge a proposed rent increase to all private rented sector tenants. Tenants will also be able to apply to the property chamber within the first six months of a tenancy to request a termination if they believe that the starting rent is above the open market rent. The Renters’ Rights Act also includes the right of tenants to challenge the validity of a notice proposing a rent increase in the tribunal. Under the instrument, those applications will attract a £47 application fee and no hearing fees will apply. Secondly, the Renters’ Rights Act introduces a new route to the tribunal to challenge the terms of a tenancy that arises on succession from a tenancy that was previously made under the Rent Act 1977. Under the instrument, those applications will also attract a fee of £47. If the application proceeds to a hearing, no hearing fee will apply. Thirdly, the instrument applies our proposed standard £200 application fee and £300 hearing fee to appeals against the new financial penalties that local authorities can impose on landlords under the Renters’ Rights Act. It is reasonable and proportionate for landlords who choose to appeal to contribute to the cost of that process. Finally, the instrument brings new rent repayment order routes, created by the Renters’ Rights Act, into the existing fees regime. Applications will incur a £114 application fee and a £227 hearing fee, matching the fees that already apply to comparable applications. Turning to the impacts of the instrument, it is important to be clear about what it will mean in practice. As many of the measures in the instrument relate to the introduction of new or amended rights implemented by the Renters’ Rights Act, some users will be required to pay fees where none have previously been payable. That reflects the move, as I have said, towards a more consistent fees framework across the property chamber. Fees have been set at varying levels below cost to balance the principles of cost recovery with the principle of access to justice. It is important to note that, in the case of rent appeals, the balance between cost recovery and access to justice is more acute. I reassure Members that the introduction of a fee for those cases has been carefully considered and calibrated. In those cases, the consequence of being unable to bring an appeal makes an applicant potentially more vulnerable to housing instability and economic hardship, especially as tenants are often in a vulnerable financial position, given cost of living pressures. Given those considerations, a considerably lower fee of £47 has been applied. The fee is one of the lowest payable across the courts and tribunals system, and ensures that tenants will not be deterred from exercising their right to appeal a rent increase by the fee. In addition, there are other mitigations for rent appeals that ensure that fees do not deter or disadvantage tenants. The help with fees remission scheme will remain available to eligible applicants on lower incomes or in receipt of qualifying benefits who cannot afford to pay a fee. In the last year, we remitted £91 million pounds’ worth of fee income. Furthermore, under the Renters’ Rights Act, any rent increase will ordinarily take effect from the start of the first rent period following the date of the tribunal’s decision, rather than being backdated. In cases of undue hardship, the tribunal will be able to delay the date on which the rent increase takes effect by up to two months after the date of determination. That helps to ensure that tenants feel safe to challenge excessive proposed increases without fear of incurring additional financial pressures. Finally, where tenants are successful in appealing their rent increase, they may be able to recover the tribunal fee from their landlord in the end. Without these measures, we would not be able to keep the tribunal service running, and the taxpayer would be required to shoulder a far greater proportion of the cost of the courts and tribunals systems. Thus, this instrument provides the necessary framework for a sustainable courts and tribunals system that is there for all those who need it while ensuring that access to justice is protected. I believe that the measures are fair and necessary, and I hope that the Committee will support them.

• 27 Apr 2026 · Draft First-tier Tribunal (Property Chamber) Fees (Amendment) Order 2026 · Hansard source

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  I beg to move, That the Committee has considered the draft First-tier Tribunal (Property Chamber) Fees (Amendment) Order 2026. This instrument, which was laid before the House on 19 March, marks the first stage of a wider programme of reform to introduce a fairer, more consistent and more sustainable fees framework in the property chamber, supporting the significant reforms to the private rented sector implemented by the Renters’ Rights Act 2025. Through that Act, the Government have delivered landmark change: we will abolish section 21 no-fault evictions, strengthen the rights of tenants to challenge unreasonable rent increases, and enhance local authority enforcement powers. Taken together, those measures represent the biggest expansion of renters’ rights in a generation. However, rights only matter, and are only meaningful, if people can enforce them. That depends on a tribunal system that is sufficiently resourced and is accessible for all. Currently, around 250 types of application can be brought to the property chamber, but only about half of them incur a fee. That is because they originate from various legislative provisions, some of which are not referenced in the current fees order. That has created an inconsistent system that neither reflects the cost of administering proceedings nor supports a fair and proportionate contribution from its users.

• 27 Apr 2026 · Draft First-tier Tribunal (Property Chamber) Fees (Amendment) Order 2026 · Hansard source

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  I am familiar with the argument raised by the Master of the Rolls; we discussed it during the passage of the Renters’ Rights Act, and I have discussed it with the relevant Minister. That is the subject of a whole series of policy choices that have been made to strike an appropriate balance between the rights of tenants and landlords. We do not expect that measure to be abused, and there are equities that go the other way. If someone backdates a payment, they will then be forced to pay arrears and additionality in one big lump sum, which can also create unfairness. That is the result of a policy choice that has been made in the Act, although it may be one that the Opposition take issue with. This is now all about ensuring that a tribunal is ready to receive any ensuing rent appeals as soon as possible after the order comes into force on 1 May—it is very exciting. I did jot down the right hon. Gentleman’s further question, but I am now struggling to read my handwriting, because we are at that point in the day.

• 27 Apr 2026 · Draft First-tier Tribunal (Property Chamber) Fees (Amendment) Order 2026 · Hansard source

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  Indeed. The other thing to say—this relates to both sets of questions—is that the new Renters’ Rights Act introduces a series of new rights that we want people to take advantage of. By the way, that is done not just in the purview of the tribunal system but in what some academics have called the shadow of the law. The Act enhances people’s bargaining rights with their landlords when discussing and negotiating rent. It does not necessarily mean that a case will end up in tribunal, although it may, and the fees are not a barrier to that. That is important because when we introduce an extension of rights with such a policy, we have to wait to see precisely how it alters the behaviours and the societal relationships that we are looking to rebalance. The Act is a big extension of renters’ rights, and a greater equalisation between the rights of tenant and landlord. The right hon. Gentleman is correct that we need to see how the demand coming into the chamber looks a year from now, and how the system is operating. Of course, we will need to keep that under review to ensure that the tribunal keeps up with demand. However, with the measures that we have introduced to anticipate the need for additional capacity, we are confident that we will be able to do so successfully. I will write to the right hon. Gentleman on the outstanding points that I have not been able to respond to, because I do not have the detail to hand, and I will ensure that he gets an answer on all of them. In short, the draft order strikes the right balance between cost recovery and access to justice. It is a necessary step that strengthens the sustainability and fairness of the property chamber. As a consequence, I urge members of the Committee to vote in favour of the draft order. Question put.

• 27 Apr 2026 · Draft First-tier Tribunal (Property Chamber) Fees (Amendment) Order 2026 · Hansard source

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  That was exactly what I was going to suggest: I shall write to the right hon. Gentleman. I will write to him on his first question, which was about RDEL and the exact running costs of the property chamber. We expect an increase in the volume of receipts that the property chamber will take, and some work is being done internally as to what that might look like. As the right hon. Gentleman would expect, this is an expansion of rights, and as I have said, we have set the fees not to impede the enforcement of those rights but to enable it, while achieving a measure of cost recovery. We want to reduce conflict in our society, but we do not shy away from the fact that the thrust of the policy behind the Renters’ Rights Act is that we welcome people enforcing their rights where rents that are set far outstrip what can be considered reasonable. That is why we have deliberately empowered people by giving them rights that can be enforced. The hon. Member for Bexhill and Battle made a point about the tribunal’s readiness. In anticipating additional pressures on the tribunal, we have been undertaking steps to increase capacity within it. Those have included the recruitment of additional administrative staff and the establishment of a centralised operating hub. We are also working with the Ministry of Housing, Communities and Local Government to develop a new digital system for rent appeals in the property tribunal, to maintain the efficiency of that. The fees, along with the Ministry of Justice’s operating budgets, will support that capacity, so that those who rely on the chamber, be they tenants or landlords, can expect the capacity of the tribunal to keep up with the demand.

• 23 Apr 2026 · Courts and Tribunals Bill (Tenth sitting) · Hansard source

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  Clause 20 concerns the statutory title “Central Criminal Court”, which has been on the statute book since 1834 and refers, in practice, to the Old Bailey. Under existing legislation, the title applies to the Crown court sitting within the City of London. Historically, the only Crown court located within the City has been the Old Bailey, so the provision has operated without difficulty. From next year, however, I am absolutely delighted to say that the City of London Corporation’s new courts complex at Salisbury Square will open. It is fantastic; I have been to seen it—I had to do that politician’s thing of wearing high-vis and a hard hat. The complex is an amazing facility for London’s justice system, with modern courtrooms. It is a brilliant resource, providing much needed additional Crown court capacity following more than £600 million of investment. Without legislative clarification, however, both the Old Bailey and the new courts at Salisbury Square would automatically be designated as the Central Criminal Court. That would cause operational confusion for court users and practitioners. Clause 20 therefore clarifies that the statutory title will continue to apply only to the Old Bailey. The clause also maintains the long-standing statutory entitlement of the Lord Mayor and aldermen of the City of London to sit as judges when the Crown court sits within the City. In practice, and as a matter of convention, they do not assert that entitlement in order to sit in hearings in criminal cases. The clause does not alter how that entitlement is exercised in practice; it ensures that the historic statutory entitlement continues to apply consistently when the Crown court sits in more than one location within the City. The City’s historic relationship with the Central Criminal Court does not affect judicial independence or integrity, and all judicial business will continue to be conducted by independent, legally qualified judges. I commend clause 20 to the Committee.

• 23 Apr 2026 · Courts and Tribunals Bill (Tenth sitting) · Hansard source

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  On the hon. Gentleman’s last point about the reliability of the kit in courtrooms, that is critical not just for evidence via video. We have an ambition for greater use of video right across our criminal justice system, not just for vulnerable witnesses but in other ways that have been touched on. We have talked a lot about prisoner transportation being a challenge for the system; one way to address that is by having less demand for it, unless it is needed in the interests of justice and fairness. The increased use of video could be of real benefit but, of course, it has to be reliable. That is why the Government’s capital investment in increasing the budget for His Majesty’s Courts and Tribunals Service—I saw some of that equipment in action in Harrow court—will make such a difference. When we are talking about vulnerable witnesses, who are given the option of section 28, the quality of their evidence can be impacted if it is inconsistent or glitchy, or if the way it appears in a courtroom is somehow distorted because it is too big or too small, or whatever. All those things will be important, which is why the significant investment agreed with the judiciary through the concordat process over the next three years will make such a difference, and why all the court transformation and reform measures are being accompanied by significant inward investment, as announced by the Deputy Prime Minister. I should say that HMCTS, the performance of which I routinely review with the Deputy Prime Minister, conducts regular audits of facilities and brings that to our attention so that we can see where the roll-out is happening, which courts are lacking facilities and which need to be prioritised for investment.

• 23 Apr 2026 · Courts and Tribunals Bill (Tenth sitting) · Hansard source

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  The family justice strategy, which will be forthcoming in July, will address a lot of what the hon. Member asks for. It will set out where the Government think reform is needed, and it will bring together what we are already doing with our child-focused courts programme, which is accompanied by a £17 million investment. We believe in that model, which we think has huge merit. It will be available to people regardless of where in the country they live. More generally, we are introducing the funding that the Lord Chancellor has allocated to sitting days for family hearings, the targeted recruitment of more judges, more fee-paid judges, the greater use of virtual hearings—which can be a supportive measure for people giving evidence, not just an efficiency measure—and training. The hon. Member for Chichester will know that the Domestic Abuse Commissioner has also undertaken detailed work in this area through her “Everyday business” report, which talks to some of the resourcing constraints faced by the family court. That work forms part of the commissioner’s report on a family court reporting mechanism, which is designed to provide ongoing evidence-based scrutiny of the family court’s response to domestic abuse in particular, and to highlight where systemic improvements are needed, so we have other accountability measures shining that light. If the hon. Member for Chichester awaits the strategy—she will no doubt want to take a look and critique parts of it—I think a lot of it will address some of the concerns she raises. As I said, before proposing the repeal of the presumption, we carefully assessed the impact it would have. We do not overstate it, but it is important because the change affects the judicial process, not the underlying reasons why families come to court. Because we do not expect it to increase case volumes, case length or demand for legal aid, we think that the current arrangements can meet it, but there are so many other improvements that we want to drive.

• 23 Apr 2026 · Courts and Tribunals Bill (Tenth sitting) · Hansard source

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  Let me start by thanking the hon. Member for Brighton Pavilion for tabling new clause 28. But before I come to that, I will set out the rationale for clause 15. The clause clarifies the Youth Justice and Criminal Evidence Act 1999 by confirming that courts have a statutory power to direct the editing of pre-recorded cross-examination recordings under section 28 of the 1999 Act when material is inadmissible or where including it would not be in the interests of justice. That clarification matters because section 28 recordings capture the natural flow of their recollection under the pressure of cross-examination. Inevitably, that can sometimes include long periods of silence where the witness needs a break or material turns out to be inadmissible or prejudicial to the fairness of the trial. Without an explicit power enabling the court to direct appropriate edits, there is a risk that either the edits are not made—potentially compromising the integrity of the trial and wasting court time—or that the edits made become a point of contention, requiring additional hearings or appeals to resolve. Additionally, in the event of a retrial, the pre-recorded evidence may require editing to ensure that it covers only the charges for which a retrial has been ordered. Although the current criminal procedure rules already allow for editing of section 28 recordings, the Law Commission has highlighted that the absence of a specific statutory provision has created uncertainty and, once again, inconsistency in practice. The clause addresses that by placing the power on a firm statutory footing, ensuring that practitioners have a clear and consistent understanding of the power of the courts in this respect. It is important to emphasise that the clause does not introduce a new process, nor does it expand judicial powers; it formalises the careful, limited editing that already occurs to ensure trial fairness and integrity. Witnesses can be assured that the substance of their evidence will remain intact. Only material that is legally inadmissible or wholly irrelevant to the issues in the case will be removed. I commend the clause to the Committee. I will now turn to new clause 28, tabled by the hon. Member for Brighton Pavilion. Before I come to the substance of the new clause, I want to begin by recognising the immense courage it takes for the vulnerable and intimidated witnesses we are talking about to come forward in the first place and give evidence. For many, recounting their experience is traumatic enough. Being asked to relive it by watching back their video-recorded police interview—known as their achieving best evidence interview—can be a great deal more challenging. It can bring distressing experiences flooding back. However, we must be careful not to reach for legislative change where it is not necessary or helpful. Prosecutors may suggest that a witness watches their ABE interview to refresh their memory before cross-examination, but there is no legal obligation to do so. For some, watching the recording is manageable; for others, it is not, and the law already accommodates that reality. Where a witness does not wish to watch the recording, a written transcript can be provided for them to read instead. For some, that is a more accessible way of engaging with the material. Prosecutors make decisions about how and when memory refreshing should take place on a case-by-case basis, taking into account practical considerations, such as the length of the transcript and the witness’s ability to read and process it. However, I recognise that the achieving best evidence guidance for interviewers does not explicitly reference that practice. That omission will be addressed. The Ministry of Justice owns that guidance and will ensure that clarification is included in the next revision. Any future clarification to the ABE guidance will also be reflected in the relevant Crown Prosecution Service guidance and communicated to all prosecutors. Let me now turn to the proposal to introduce a time limit for the defence to submit questions to the witness. I must be clear: cross-examination questions cannot, under any circumstances, be shared with witnesses before they give evidence. However well intentioned the proposal may be, it risks undermining the very integrity of the process it seeks to improve. Exposing a witness to questions in advance may influence, whether consciously or unconsciously, how they respond. Beyond that, it risks undermining the defendant’s right to a fair trial. If there is any suggestion that a witness’s evidence has been prepared or influenced in advance, the credibility of the whole process is jeopardised. There are also practical implications to consider. Requiring counsel to finalise all cross-examination questions within six months of the ABE being submitted to court, or 14 days before cross-examination—whichever is soonest—would be unworkable in many cases. Defence questions evolve as new material is disclosed. Such a process would undermine the fairness of proceedings and the effectiveness of case preparations. For those reasons, I urge the hon. Member not to press new clause 28 to a Division.

• 23 Apr 2026 · Courts and Tribunals Bill (Tenth sitting) · Hansard source

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  I thank all hon. Members for their contributions. I will set out the rationale for clause 17 and then address the central argument presented by Opposition Members about the repeal of the presumption —the Government do not overclaim for it; is not a silver bullet for the problems and challenges of child protection in this country and will not solve all the challenges in our family court—and why we nevertheless think that it is the right thing to do. I will then address the amendment and new clauses. The Government’s intention through clause 17 is to repeal the presumption of parental involvement from the Children Act 1989. The child’s welfare must always be the court’s paramount concern when making decisions about a child’s life, and that principle is enshrined in the 1989 Act. The Children and Families Act 2014 amended the 1989 Act to introduce a presumption that, in certain private law proceedings, the child’s welfare will be furthered by each parent’s involvement, unless evidence shows otherwise. We know that, in most families, both parents play a vital role in a child’s life. However, although the legislation clearly states that the presumption is rebuttable and does not apply where a parent poses a risk of harm to the child, it has none the less faced serious and sustained criticism. To echo what others have said about the testimony and campaigning work of Claire Throssell, ably supported by her MP, my hon. Friend the Member for Penistone and Stocksbridge (Dr Tidball), Women’s Aid and a whole host of survivors of domestic abuse and those who represent them, the presumption contributes to a pro-contact culture in the family courts that too often prioritises parental involvement over child welfare. We published our review of the presumption in full last October, and its conclusion was that unsupervised and face-to-face contact was the most common outcome in child arrangements cases, even where there were allegations or findings of domestic abuse. To give some context, the Domestic Abuse Commissioner has presented evidence of her own that proven allegations of domestic abuse arise in 80% of those cases. This is prevalent. Those cases come to the court in the way they do because, by definition, family relationships have broken down and there is conflict—that is the nature of these cases, and domestic abuse is already an issue in so many of them. The review demonstrates that, although the presumption is not the sole driver, it can be a contributory factor to a culture in family courts that prioritises parental involvement, even in cases of abuse, which means that, too often, decisions are putting children in harm’s way. I want to be really clear about that, because we are not overclaiming that the repeal of the presumption will change everything overnight, and we are certainly not saying that it will keep everybody safe. There has been a lot of criticism of the family court, but one thing I do know is that those tasked with making these decisions are trying, through their professionalism, empathy and training, to keep children safe. I do not doubt their good faith. I struggle to imagine the burden of having to make those decisions. We are talking about the devastation of loved ones who have lost children—but imagine being the judge who made that decision, and living with that. I do not think for one second that they would have intended that consequence, and I suspect that, where a child is harmed or even killed as a result of a child arrangement, they regret those decisions every single day. Through clause 17, we are seeking to ensure that judges approach the application of the law and the welfare checklist, which we regard as really important, with an open mind. The danger with the presumption is that they start with just that: a weighted approach to the consideration of the child’s best interests. We do not think that repealing the presumption is a silver bullet, but it will send a signal to the system—to the leadership of the family court and to everybody who sits within it— that the way to approach this is purely with an open mind, focused on the child.

• 23 Apr 2026 · Courts and Tribunals Bill (Tenth sitting) · Hansard source

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  As with the previous debate, I will set out the rationale for clause 9 and then turn to the amendments tabled by my hon. Friend the Member for Easington (Grahame Morris). Clause 9 will create a high admissibility threshold for evidence about a complainant’s compensation claims in sexual offence prosecutions. That could include evidence that a victim has made a compensation claim in relation to the offence being tried, the amount of money awarded as compensation, details of the claim or the fact that compensation was refused. The Law Commission report made clear that compensation claim evidence is disproportionately requested in sexual offence cases, and that, in some instances, it is used by the defence to insinuate that a victim has fabricated an allegation for financial gain. That kind of reasoning lacks a legitimate basis and risks unfairly undermining victims. This measure will ensure that such evidence cannot be admitted when its sole purpose is to introduce or perpetuate misconceptions about why survivors come forward. Instead, a judge will be able to admit compensation claim evidence only when it has substantial probative value to a genuinely important issue in the case. These reforms therefore strengthen protections for claimants while maintaining the defendant’s right to a fair trial. I will respond to the questions from the hon. Member for Bexhill and Battle. He fairly raises the issue of how we can assess that these tests are being applied fairly and consistently. That will obviously take time as they bed in, but, in many ways, the precise rationale behind these changes is to codify, clarify and simplify tests that already exist for the treatment of evidence in these cases and to assist our judges to use them fairly. There is no doubt that future Ministers and others with responsibility for this issue will want to know that it is working as intended. No doubt studies can be undertaken in the future. I commend clause 9 to the Committee. I turn to amendment 68. The Law Commission’s review made clear that compensation claim evidence is disproportionately requested in sexual offences cases, as I have said. That is precisely why we have introduced the high admissibility threshold in the Bill. The amendment asks for a threshold of merely “relevance”, which is lower than the statutory threshold we propose. If we were to accept it, it would not give complainants any additional protections above the current status quo, despite the Law Commission identifying a clear issue with how this evidence is currently being requested and used. For those reasons, I urge my hon. Friend the Member for Bolton South and Walkden to withdraw the amendment. Amendment 69 focuses on the disclosure of evidence to the defence before an application is made to admit that evidence to the courtroom. However, the clause does not change the test that the prosecution must currently apply when considering whether to disclose details of a complainant’s compensation claim to the defence. Instead, it focuses on the stage after the prosecution and defence have reviewed the evidence, and asks the judge to consider whether the evidence indeed has substantial probative value and can therefore be relied on in court. As the clause stands, the case will remain that the prosecutor must disclose to the defence any material that might be considered capable of undermining or assisting the case of the accused—that is only fair—and that includes the compensation claim evidence. The defence, in cases involving sexual offences, can then consider how they wish to bring that forward. For those reasons, I urge my hon. Friend the Member for Bolton South and Walkden not to press the amendment to a vote.

• 23 Apr 2026 · Courts and Tribunals Bill (Tenth sitting) · Hansard source

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  The clause will make it easier to make changes to the types of expenses that can be reimbursed so that we can more nimbly react to what the magistracy requires. It is right that our valued magistrates are reimbursed for reasonable expenses and should not feel out of pocket for serving their community. Section 15 of the Courts Act 2003 sets out three specific categories of reimbursable expenses: travel, subsistence and financial loss. However, those statutory categories are, in effect, over-prescriptive. The provisions in the Bill follow the recommendation of the independent review of the criminal courts to move the categories of magistrates’ expenses which may be reimbursed from primary to secondary legislation, which will provide the flexibility to update them more quickly and to respond to changes in the evolving needs of magistrates’ expenses. I turn now to the detail. Proposed new section 15(1) of the 2003 Act replaces the existing statutory categories of magistrates’ expenses with a delegated power enabling the Lord Chancellor to specify, in regulations, the categories of expenses or financial loss for which a magistrate can be reimbursed in connection with the performance of their duties. The power also enables regulations to provide for reimbursement of expenditure incurred or financial loss suffered as a result of those duties. Subsection (2) outlines what matters may be addressed in the regulations and sets out what is and is not to be treated as the performance of a magistrate’s official duties, the circumstances under which expenditure of financial loss can be considered to arise from the carrying out of those duties, and administrative arrangements for making and determining claims. I realise that the clause sounds a little dry, but it is really important. We have talked about the important role that our magistrates play in our criminal justice system. Whatever one’s view of the Government’s reforms, they are being given more responsibilities and work to do, and we will need to attract more people. I think that the hon. Member for Chichester raised the important issue of magistrate retention. For every magistrate we recruit and train up and who must gain experience, we are seeing people leave the magistracy, partly because we are not supporting the important role they provide society and supporting them to remain magistrates for longer. That is about expenses and recognising people’s service, which is why we are looking to provide rewards and outward recognition through a long service medal. Those are all important. Although the clause is technical, when I spoke to the Magistrates’ Leadership Executive and the Magistrates’ Association, they were delighted by it. They know that their members need to feel valued. Part of that is not making them feel undervalued by leaving them out of pocket. Even if the system were not reformed, this would be a good measure. If there is to be reform and we are to attract the magistrates we need, it is a really good thing.

• 23 Apr 2026 · Courts and Tribunals Bill (Tenth sitting) · Hansard source

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  Clause 13 introduces an important new special measure, which will make a real and tangible difference to vulnerable or intimidated witnesses who come before our courts. It enables them to be accompanied by a supporter when giving evidence to reassure them and help them to give their best evidence. Crucially, it creates a rebuttable presumption that a trained professional such as an IDVA or ISVA will be allowed to accompany the witness. These specialists play a vital role in helping witnesses navigate an often stressful and emotionally demanding experience. A presumption helps ensure that this is consistently accessible across our criminal courts. While section 24 of the Youth Justice and Criminal Evidence Act 1999 already permits witnesses giving evidence via a live link to be supported in this way, and the Criminal Procedure Rules 2025 create a presumption in favour of support from IDVAs or ISVAs, the Law Commission has highlighted that practice on the ground remains inconsistent. Despite existing provisions, some witnesses who would benefit from the presence of a supporter are still unable to access that assistance. Such inconsistency both undermines witnesses’ confidence and risks adversely affecting the quality of the evidence that they can provide. By improving access to supporters, clause 13 improves the experience of vulnerable complainants and witnesses, while helping to maximise the quality of the evidence that they can give. I commend clause 13 to the Committee.

• 23 Apr 2026 · Courts and Tribunals Bill (Tenth sitting) · Hansard source

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  We now come to a series of clauses that deal with what happens during the course of trials and the use of special measures—the architecture, so to speak, of what takes place to ensure fairness for all participants. Clause 12 makes an important clarification to the operation of screens in our criminal courts. At present, section 23 of the Youth Justice and Criminal Evidence Act 1999 allows for screens to prevent a witness from seeing the defendant. However, it does not make it explicit that the defendant should be unable to see the witness. In practice, that is almost always how screens are used. When I visited Harrow court, which I am pleased to say recently reopened after three years, I saw that in operation. However, the Law Commission has highlighted that the absence of clear statutory wording has, at times, led to confusion among complainants and practitioners as to who is entitled to what.

• 23 Apr 2026 · Courts and Tribunals Bill (Tenth sitting) · Hansard source

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  I think we all agree that the victim impact statement, and that moment when victims read or speak aloud about the ways in which they have been impacted, is critical. Their ability to speak at all may depend on the consistent provision of the special measures in clause 16. All that can be done without compromising the fairness of what is to follow, which is the sentencing exercise in which a judge must engage in respect of the defendant. Clause 16 seeks to enable that, because there may be victims who simply cannot bring themselves to do it absent those special measures. That is why it is a really important clause. Question put and agreed to. Clause 16 accordingly ordered to stand part of the Bill . Clause 17 Welfare of the child: repeal of presumption of parental involvement

• 23 Apr 2026 · Courts and Tribunals Bill (Tenth sitting) · Hansard source

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  This clause represents an important and balanced step forward in strengthening the support available to intimidated complainants in our justice system. It will make it easier for courts to exclude individuals who may be causing distress or intimidation from the public gallery, while fully preserving the principle of open justice. Section 25 of the Youth Justice and Criminal Evidence Act 1999 already permits the exclusion of the public from the courtroom while a complainant gives evidence, yet the Law Commission has observed that the power is rarely used in practice. Concerns about its perceived impact on open justice, particularly the requirement that only a single member of the press can remain, means that courts are often reluctant to apply it. At the same time, we know that individuals present in the gallery, including supporters of the defendant, can on occasion create an atmosphere that is distressing for intimidated witnesses. My hon. Friend the Member for Lowestoft (Jess Asato), who has huge amounts of experience in this area, told me of an egregious example affecting a constituent of hers who was giving evidence while friends of the defendant were creating an intimidatory atmosphere in the gallery, yet nothing was done about it. The clause offers a practical and proportionate solution to that sort of situation. It will broaden the categories of individuals who may remain in the courtroom when the public gallery is cleared, allowing accredited members of the press, approved academic researchers and one supporter for the complainant to stay. It directly addresses concerns about transparency and open justice by allowing those reporting or researching the case in the public interest to remain. That is not a novel approach: comparable provisions already operate in Scotland and Northern Ireland, where courts can restrict public attendance while members of the press and a limited number of individuals remain in their place. Their experience demonstrates that it is entirely possible to restrict public access during particularly sensitive evidence without compromising the integrity or openness of the proceedings. The clause will encourage courts to take a more flexible approach, excluding only those likely to intimidate the witness, where it is not necessary to clear the public gallery entirely. This will increase the likelihood that the measure can be used where appropriate, while maintaining open justice. I commend the clause to the Committee.

• 23 Apr 2026 · Courts and Tribunals Bill (Tenth sitting) · Hansard source

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  The hon. Gentleman makes a good point. Obviously, we have appeal systems and, in some family proceedings, the nature of them can be iterative; as family circumstances and the facts change, it might be that there are provisions in directions to come back and relitigate some of those child arrangements. In other cases, they are final. Accountability is really important to us as a ministerial team, and the Secretary of State does not shy away from it. While of course respecting separation of powers, the judicial complaints process must be important as well, not just in family courts, but right across the piece. Where judges fall short of the standards we require of them, they should be held accountable. I want to make a point about transparency and the publication of family court judgments. That is happening more and more, and it is important because it holds it up and says, “That is what a good judgment looks like”. It also exposes where there is decision making that is either faulty, poorly reasoned or simply not justified, so that that cannot happen. The other thing happening is not just the publication of those judgments, with all the support that transcription allows, but also opening up—again, where appropriate—to journalists and the public to come and see how those hearings operate.

• 23 Apr 2026 · Courts and Tribunals Bill (Tenth sitting) · Hansard source

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  I think all of that is right, but I would prefer to take the matter back to the Department and check that we have a common understanding. I do not want to do this on the hoof if I do not have the full information before me. I think that is the intention—the presumption is that it applies only to professional supporters. I suppose it is ultimately up to the court if a family member sits with the person, if that is deemed necessary in the interests of justice.

• 23 Apr 2026 · Courts and Tribunals Bill (Tenth sitting) · Hansard source

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  I will begin by addressing clause 18 and schedule 3 together before moving to Government amendments 72 to 96. Clause 18 makes significant reforms to the leadership of tribunals, a change strongly supported by the senior judiciary. This is a key step in the One Judiciary programme, which was set up to achieve the long-standing shared ambition of the judiciary and the Ministry of Justice to have a single, unified judiciary across the courts and tribunals of England and Wales. As the Lady Chief Justice recently noted, the reforms recognise the unity of judicial work across jurisdictions and will support more flexible deployment of judges, common standards and a more inclusive culture. Lord Justice Dingemans, the Senior President of Tribunals, endorsed this legislation in his annual report. Clause 18 reforms the role of the Senior President of Tribunals and brings tribunals and their judiciary in England and Wales within the Lady Chief Justice’s leadership responsibilities. It gives effect to schedule 3, which reallocates the SPT’s existing England and Wales functions to the Lady Chief Justice. The SPT will continue to exercise statutory responsibility for some tribunals in Scotland and Northern Ireland, and the territorial extent of tribunals will remain as now. The reformed office will retain the title of Senior President of Tribunals and will be equivalent to a head of division role. The provisions also bring the SPT role into line with heads of division by mandating a transparent appointment process, removing the option of a fixed-term appointment and providing for the SPT to be an ex officio member of the Court of Appeal of England and Wales. The Bill also creates a new statutory post of deputy head of tribunals justice, similar to the statutory deputy head roles that exist in respect of criminal justice and family justice. The LCJ will become the statutory owner of the SPT’s current functions relating to tribunals operating under the Tribunals, Courts and Enforcement Act 2007 in England and Wales. There are powers for the Lady Chief Justice to delegate those functions and, in practice, it is expected that most of them will be delegated to the SPT. The provisions amend the Tribunals, Courts and Enforcement Act to set out how the territorial split will operate for different statutory functions. Generally, they will reallocate functions by territory, so that the SPT will retain the functions in relation to judiciary or staff working primarily in Scotland and Northern Ireland, or to cases to be heard there, while the Lady Chief Justice will assume the functions in the same way for England and Wales. However, there are some nuances to this approach to safeguard operational flexibility and to support consistency across pan-UK tribunals. For some functions—for example, appointing chamber presidents for cross-UK chambers or approving practice directions—the Bill enables shared decision making. The schedule makes similar changes in respect of the employment tribunals, where required. The reforms will provide a modernised, unified leadership structure for our tribunals, which will encourage morale, recruitment and career development for the tribunals judiciary, and will support better use of flexible deployment and consistent practice. I should say that since I have been the Minister for Courts, I have had the privilege and pleasure of working with two remarkable Senior Presidents of Tribunals, Lord Justice Lindblom and Lord Justice Dingemans. I have responsibility for tribunals, which form a huge part of where many of our citizens interact with our legal system, whether that is the employment tribunal, the special educational needs and disability tribunal, the social security tribunal or the property tribunal—I hope I have not forgotten one. I therefore welcome the introduction of this modernised structure to enable the best possible leadership, and to support our tribunal judges working within it. I commend clause 18 and schedule 3 to the Committee.

• 23 Apr 2026 · Courts and Tribunals Bill (Tenth sitting) · Hansard source

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  The hon. Gentleman is making a fair point. I have no doubt that, not just in the context of this clause—where we are talking about family law—but more generally in other conversations that we have had around the criminal justice system, the Judicial Office and judicial leadership will be following these proceedings quite closely and will be hearing these exchanges. That is why—in a different context—the discussion that we had regarding the amendment tabled by my hon. Friend the Member for Birmingham Erdington is so important, with that specific mischief in mind. Judicial performance is something that the judicial leadership ought to want to scrutinise and evaluate, and—where it falls short of the high standards that our judiciary so often deliver— remedy. This measure, not in and of itself, but through clause 17 and alongside our wider reforms, such as the national roll-out of child-focused courts—the new name for what some hon. Members might know as Pathfinder—over the next three years will signal a step change in putting children’s safety and welfare back where it belongs, at the heart of every family court decision. I do not want to digress, and this is not in the script but, for those unfamiliar with the Pathfinder programme—I am now told that I have to call them child-focused courts, and that is quite right, because that name describes exactly what they are—having been to observe those courts and spoken to judges, practitioners, social workers and families who have been through them, they are a really good model. They require the production up front of all the expert reports and all the assessments of the children, and there is much less conflict in the way that they operate. Judges like them; practitioners like them; families like them. They also go a whole lot faster. Of course, we must get to the bottom of things and make sure children are protected—but, if they are in an unsafe situation, we want them out of that unsafe situation sooner rather than later. We think that Pathfinder, coupled with the effects of clause 17, will be really important and I commend the clause to the Committee. Amendment 14, tabled by the hon. Member for Chichester, would require the Lord Chancellor to lay a report before Parliament within six months setting out the level of legal aid provision, judicial capacity, specialist training and investment in the family court estate and in the technology needed to support the repeal of the presumption. Although all those things are essential, fundamental blocks of a well-functioning family court—the availability of legal aid, the judicial training, the specialism and the quality of the estate are all going to be important to producing better decisions and supporting families through an inherently difficult process—the Government do not consider the amendment necessary because the repeal of the presumption does not, in and of itself, alter what is going on within the courtroom. It alters the weighting that a judge gives in his or her decision making, but our endeavours to ensure that family courts are adequately resourced to make sure that children and victims are protected have to happen regardless. We do not need the amendment to achieve that. As I said, we are already taking forward significant reforms to ensure that the family court system supports survivors of domestic abuse and delivers the right outcomes for survivors and their children. We have existing processes in place to monitor family court resourcing. All that work is led by my colleague Baroness Levitt.

• 23 Apr 2026 · Courts and Tribunals Bill (Tenth sitting) · Hansard source

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  I could not agree more. That is precisely why we are doing this, and it is why I commend the clause to the Committee.