Samantha Dixon MP: speeches

Speeches

• 16 Apr 2026 · Representation of the People Bill (Eighth sitting) · Hansard source

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  New clause 4 seeks to make donations made to a registered political party, candidate or agent impermissible if the donation is made wholly or in part with cryptoassets. New clause 12 purports to take a power so that the Secretary of State may make regulations, drafted by the Electoral Commission, mandating various requirements relating to the political donation of cryptoassets. It seeks to establish that political donations made via cryptoassets would be deemed impermissible unless those regulations were met. It intends to create an effective moratorium on cryptoasset donations until those regulations would be in force. On 25 March, the Secretary of State published the report of the independent review by Sir Philip Rycroft—sorry, I keep knighting him.

• 16 Apr 2026 · Representation of the People Bill (Eighth sitting) · Hansard source

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  It is not true that the Government do not have an eagerness to resolve issues for overseas voters. They are legitimate voters who should be able to exercise their right to vote without unnecessary barriers, and we recognise the difficulties that they face in trying to participate. Many choose to vote by post, and improvements are being made in the Bill to the postal voting system, which should be beneficial to overseas voters. The purpose of new clause 6 is to allow for overseas electors to print their own ballot paper. They would then be able to deliver their completed ballot to the relevant consulate, embassy or high commission, to then be delivered to the relevant returning officers via diplomatic mail. That process could allow overseas ballot papers to be posted earlier and reduce the chance that they arrive too late to be counted. I have already put forward a range of measures in the Bill to improve the resilience and responsiveness of the postal voting system, including changes to deadlines to allow swifter printing and delivery of postal vote packs. The Government welcome suggestions on further improvements that we could make to our postal voting system, but unfortunately we cannot support this new clause. All ballot papers must be uniformly printed and contain security markings to ensure the secrecy of the ballot and prevent fraud. It would not be possible to replicate that consistently if ballot papers were printed on home printers. New clause 7 relates to using engagement with the UK Passport Office as a means of encouraging UK citizens living overseas to register to vote. It would require the Secretary of State to lay a report before Parliament within six months of the passing of the Bill. The report would cover proposals requiring the UK Passport Office to provide UK citizens living overseas with information on voter registration for UK elections when they apply for a passport or renew their passport. The Government are committed to improving electoral registration and are actively exploring ways to do so. We intend to explore and test a range of new, automated approaches that make better use of data and make the process easier and quicker for citizens. Separately to the Bill, we are exploring making better use of data that eligible citizens are already providing for other services, and helping to encourage people to register, vote or update their entries on the register. Our focus is on delivering on automated registration approaches, including those set out in the Bill, which allow us to improve voter registration for a greater range of electors. The purpose of new clause 8 and amendment 3 is to require the Secretary of State to publish a report assessing a range of options to support postal voting for overseas electors. We always welcome feedback and new ideas about how we can improve any aspect of our electoral system, and I welcome the interest of the hon. Member for Guildford in this topic. As we have said, the Government recognise the challenges for those who live in remote areas overseas. However, I am afraid I do not believe that the costs of drafting and publishing this report could be justified. Many of the proposals are frequently suggested and have been thoroughly considered already. Though it is possible that they could support the timely delivery of postal votes, they may come with considerable risks. For example, the use of online or telephone voting, or the digital transmission of ballot papers, would create unacceptable risks to the security and secrecy of those ballots. I note that the Bill already contains a number of measures specifically aimed at tackling those issues and improving the resilience and reliability of the postal voting system. In particular, on the suggestion set out in subsection 2(e) of the new clause—that we should review deadlines and practices relating to the dispatching of postal ballots—the Government have already conducted a review on precisely that matter. The Bill will make a number of changes to improve the system, such as bringing forward the postal vote application deadline and formalising a postal vote determination date. I hope that Members will welcome and support those changes. I now turn to new clauses 42 and 43 tabled by the Opposition. The purpose of new clause 42 is to require the Secretary of State to make a provision to enable overseas voters to vote in person at UK embassies, high commissions or consulates for parliamentary elections. The Government have considered the suggestion and feel it would be a significant logistical undertaking that would not yield sufficient benefits to overseas electors. For example, embassies could need to run polling stations covering all 650 constituencies, and every returning officer would need to oversee the activity in every embassy. Each embassy would need to be equipped with all the relevant ballot papers, registers and other materials needed—and could need up to 650 variations of these. Any benefits of embassy voting would be limited to electors living close to diplomatic premises, and it is therefore difficult to justify the additional costs that would arise from the suggestion. We have no plans to introduce such a system of voting. Instead, we are focused on improving the current systems for overseas electors—such as postal and proxy voting—so that they remain secure, reliable and accessible for everyone. There are a number of measures on postal and proxy voting in the Bill, and I hope Members will be supportive of them. New clause 43 would introduce a power for the Secretary of State to make regulations to introduce a system to give overseas electors the option to register to vote when they renew their British passport online. The Government are committed to improving electoral registration and are actively exploring ways to do so. There are already existing powers that will allow us to explore and test a range of more automated approaches that involve integrating registering to vote with government services. They will make the process of voter registration easier and quicker for citizens. Our focus is on more automated registration methods that will benefit a greater range of electors.

• 16 Apr 2026 · Representation of the People Bill (Eighth sitting) · Hansard source

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  I beg to move, That the clause be read a Second time. The new clause removes provisions allowing the designation of a strategy and policy statement for the Electoral Commission. For the health of our democracy, it is essential that the Electoral Commission is fearlessly independent, commands trust across the political spectrum and the public, and is seen to operate free from political influence. We have listened to stakeholders and recognise that re-establishing the principle of independence for our elections regulator is vital for public confidence in our electoral system. That move is a response to the recommendations of the Ethics and Integrity Commission, parliamentary Committees, the Electoral Commission itself as well as civil society organisations such as Transparency International and Spotlight on Corruption, all of whom emphasised that Government powers to designate a statement are incompatible with the commission’s independence. That is why we have taken clear action by tabling this new clause. Ministers will no longer have the power to designate a strategy and policy statement, and the Electoral Commission will no longer be required to have regard to one. The Electoral Commission will rightly remain accountable to Parliament through the Speaker’s Committee. The new clause would reinforce the foundational principles of the Electoral Commission’s independence, and it would restore confidence in its ability to oversee elections and regulate political finance, without fear or favour, into the future. For that reason, I urge Members to accept the new clause.

• 16 Apr 2026 · Representation of the People Bill (Eighth sitting) · Hansard source

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  I thank the hon. Gentleman for giving me a breather. As he knows, the Rycroft review considered this matter and—I mean this sincerely; it is not simply a form of words for the Committee —the Government are carefully considering those recommendations and will respond in due course. To give him that assurance: this is part of that consideration. Alongside the measures I mentioned, enhanced company permissibility tests ensure that only organisations with a genuine and substantive UK connection can donate, closing off key vulnerabilities in our electoral framework. The Government are also committed to robust monitoring and evaluation of the Bill, and anticipate that this will include an impact evaluation assessing whether the policies introduced have achieved their intended aims. We have discussed the Rycroft review, and I sincerely mean it when I say that we will respond fully in due course to all the measures in it, including on improved co-ordination between the Electoral Commission, the Government, the security services and the police. For those reasons, while I fully understand the commitment of my hon. Friend the Member for Warwick and Leamington to strengthening our defences against foreign interference, the Government do not consider this amendment to be the right mechanism to achieve that end.

• 16 Apr 2026 · Representation of the People Bill (Eighth sitting) · Hansard source

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  I have said this before and I will say it again: the Bill is not designed to prevent specific individuals from participating in or undermining elections. It is about the general regulatory framework and criminal law that we intend to implement, uphold and shore up to prevent certain behaviours in the future. It is not about specific individuals, so I decline to respond the hon. Member’s comments, except to say simply that the legislation, in its entirety, aims to root out political violence, harassment and intimidation. New clause 15 proposes to require candidates at UK parliamentary elections, in order to be validly nominated, to complete a declaration on whether they have received any income or gifts from foreign nations or connected entities. A registered political party would be responsible for ensuring that such a declaration had been completed before allowing a candidate to be nominated as a candidate for that party. The Government are strengthening the rules around political finance to protect against foreign interference and have introduced several measures, which we have discussed, that will apply to candidates. The reforms will make it significantly more difficult for malign actors to interfere in our elections. As hon. Members know, and as I have said many times, the Rycroft review has recommended that the Government look further at enhancing rules for candidates to ensure that money received previously and then used in campaigns comes from permitted sources. The Government are carefully—and I underline that point—considering that recommendation, among all the others. The Government share the concern of the hon. Member for Hazel Grove but, in light of that ongoing work, I ask her not to move new clause 15. New clause 16 seeks to require registered parties to produce an annual risk mitigation statement relating to donations originating from foreign nations, and to commission an annual independent investigation into donations that they receive from foreign-owned UK entities. Foreign money has no place in the UK’s political system. We recognise the hon. Member’s concerns that the nature of foreign interference is evolving, with threats becoming increasingly sophisticated. That is precisely why the Government have introduced a package of measures that work together to close potential loopholes and address vulnerabilities to foreign interference. Via secondary legislation we will require donors to declare any benefits linked to their donations and we will strengthen donation rules to ensure that companies must demonstrate a genuine and substantive UK connection. Those changes will help to ensure that political donations genuinely reflect UK-based interests and will prevent the use of shell companies to channel impermissible donations. In practice, where behaviour is not already criminal, the new “know your donor” regime already addresses much of the issue that new clause 16 seeks to tackle. However, the new clause’s approach of annual risk mitigation statements and retrospective investigations of foreign nation donations is less proactive than the risk-based duty that the Bill introduces. As a reminder, rather than relying on parties to report annually about what they consider appropriate, the “know your donor” regime introduces risk-based due diligence on significant donations across the electoral regime. For the first time, recipients of donations will be required to adopt a risk-based framework for assessing the permissibility of donors, supported by Electoral Commission guidance, which will set out how donees can mitigate potential risks. That means that anyone receiving significant donations, not just parties, must carry out risk assessments, ensuring that the system as a whole is strengthened.

• 16 Apr 2026 · Representation of the People Bill (Eighth sitting) · Hansard source

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  He did. I invited him to come and talk to me about the Bill; other Members received their letters and came. Putting that to one side—I am being slightly flippant—this has been a very fast-moving environment, and policy has been formulated very quickly in response to Rycroft. I undertake to work collaboratively with the hon. Member for Hamble Valley and Members of all parties as we go forward with the Bill—this is not the end of its passage. I note the comment made by the hon. Member for North Herefordshire about having a longer Committee stage, but I am mindful that the implementation of other areas of policy needs to continue—so that we can, for example, introduce votes at 16 in time for the next general election. Although we want to go longer, we also want to go quicker. We will work collaboratively as we go forward.

• 16 Apr 2026 · Representation of the People Bill (Eighth sitting) · Hansard source

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  It is a pleasure to serve under your chairship, Dame Siobhain. I will speak to clauses 70 to 74 first, and we will come to the amendments tabled by the Liberal Democrats later. Harassment and intimidation of voters, electoral staff and campaigners, both online and in person, is unacceptable and has a profoundly detrimental impact on the UK’s democratic processes. We know that electoral staff faced unacceptable abuse and intimidation during the 2024 general election. That is why we are extending the scope of the disqualification order to ensure that electoral staff are provided with the same protection as candidates, campaigners and elective office holders. Clause 70 will enhance the disqualification order’s ability to protect those who participate in public life, and those who play a crucial part in the administration and delivery of elections. It will also act as a deterrent, signalling that intimidatory behaviour is a serious matter that must not be allowed to damage our democracy. It is clear that more must be done to tackle the abuse and intimidation directed at those who participate in elections and political debate. While disqualification orders are a key part of tackling the unacceptable harassment and intimidation of those in public life, they do nothing to prevent those who have no interest in standing as a candidate from engaging in intimidatory or abusive behaviour. Clause 71 introduces a new statutory aggravating factor, which will empower courts to apply an uplift when passing sentence for an offence linked to intimidation. This is where the offender was motivated by hostility towards candidates, campaigners, elective office holders and electoral officials and their staff. Clause 72 introduces this new statutory aggravating factor in Northern Ireland, and amends the location of the pre-existing Scottish aggravating factor. This is a significant new deterrent for those who seek to damage the UK’s democracy or intimidate those who uphold it, and will ensure that anyone who does so will be subject to appropriate criminal justice penalties. Let us turn to clause 73. Disqualification orders were introduced in the Elections Act 2022, to be imposed on offenders throughout the UK who commit crimes of hostility against electoral candidates, campaigners and officer holders. Scotland introduced Scottish disqualification orders in the Scottish Elections (Representation and Reform) Act 2025, which gave similar protection to a fourth category: Scottish electoral officials. The Bill extends the scope of the disqualification order in the Elections Act 2022 to protect electoral officials throughout the UK, but Scottish electoral officials will continue to be covered by the Scottish legislation. To ensure that there is a fully reciprocal relationship between disqualification orders in Scotland and the rest of the UK, the Bill also applies the effect of Scottish disqualification orders to relevant elective offices throughout the UK. That ensures that if someone is disqualified from standing for or holding office in Scotland, they will also be unable to stand for or hold office in the rest of the UK, and vice versa. That will ensure a consistent approach throughout the UK for intimidatory behaviour towards those who participate in public life. If a person is convicted of specific criminal offences, motivated by hostility towards candidates, future candidates, substitutes, nominees, campaigners, holders of relevant elective office or electoral officials, they will be prohibited from standing for or holding office for five years across the UK. Clause 74 builds on the measures introduced in clause73, and makes amendments to various pieces of legislation to apply the Scottish disqualification order to relevant elected offices across the UK.

• 16 Apr 2026 · Representation of the People Bill (Eighth sitting) · Hansard source

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  Those who are convicted of relevant offences motivated by hostility against a candidate, campaigner or elective office holder can be banned from standing for or holding elective office for five years. As I have set out, the Bill will also introduce a new aggravating factor for those same offences and extend the regime to include relevant offences motivated by hostility against electoral staff. Amendment 38 and new clause 55 would extend the list of relevant persons to include candidates’ staff and their relatives. I am pleased to inform the Committee that the regime already covers those circumstances. The application of the existing disqualification order and new aggravating factor is based on the motivation behind the offence committed, regardless of precisely who the offence was committed against. For example, if it were found that a relevant offence was committed against a candidate’s relative for the purpose of intimidating the candidate, ultimately the offence was motivated by hostility towards the candidate, and thus a disqualification order or aggravating factor could be applied. Regarding employees of candidates specifically, I draw the attention of the hon. Member for Guildford to the fact that campaigners employed by candidates are already directly protected under the regime by section 34 of the Elections Act 2022. Other employees would be covered indirectly in the same way that I have outlined for a candidate’s relatives. I hope the hon. Member is reassured by that and will consider not pressing the amendment.

• 16 Apr 2026 · Representation of the People Bill (Eighth sitting) · Hansard source

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  The Government fully recognise the seriousness of the threat posed by foreign interference in our democracy. Protecting the integrity of UK elections is essential, which is why it is a criminal offence to accept or facilitate donations from foreign sources, and why the Bill seeks to strengthen the system further. However, while I can understand and appreciate the intention behind new clause 2, we do not believe that it is the right way to address this threat. First, new clause 2 takes a broad and untargeted approach that would permanently bar any individual who “is, or has been…a member of, or…adviser to a foreign administration” from making political donations, regardless of how long ago that role was held, its nature or whether there is any ongoing connection to a foreign state. That risks excluding individuals who are entitled to participate in UK political life, and who pose no credible risk of foreign interference. Secondly, there would be issues of enforceability. I will not spend much time on this particular point, because it is important that I set out our arguments on the principle, and what I think the right answer to this is, but following the approach of new clause 2 would mean relying on definitions of persons that are difficult to get right and can be unenforceable in practice. The amendment relies on concepts such as a “politically-appointed adviser”, which is opaque, legally speaking, and risks creating legal uncertainty for campaigners and regulators. Thirdly, and more fundamentally, where the concern is hostile activity by, or on behalf of, foreign states, we already have robust and targeted tools in our national security legislation, which is complemented by safeguards in electoral law that we are seeking to enhance through the Bill. The National Security Act 2023 provides a clear criminal framework for tackling hostile state activity, including the foreign interference offence, which is specifically designed to capture conduct carried out on behalf of a foreign power to influence the UK’s political system. Existing electoral law is designed to ensure that money can only come from permissible sources and criminalises the acceptance or facilitation of donations from impermissible foreign sources. The Bill significantly strengthens the existing rules so that in future even donations that are potentially risky are identified earlier, scrutinised more closely, and returned where necessary. By introducing robust “know your donor” checks and requiring all donors to declare any benefits they have received in connection with their donation, we are reducing the space in which individuals who pose a real risk, or their proxies, can operate under the radar. Our new measures directly respond to the concerns raised by the hon. Member for Hazel Grove, as well as those of other key stakeholders, such as the Electoral Commission, the Committee on Standards in Public Life and the National Crime Agency. With that, I hope she feels she can withdraw her amendment. New clause 3 seeks to prevent those convicted of a prescribed offence relating to the promotion, incitement, or use of political violence from making political donations. Currently, if an individual is convicted of such an offence, that conduct rightly affects their democratic rights, including their ability to stand for election or to hold elected office. This helps to deter those who would undermine the democratic rights of others, such as candidates contesting an election. The Government are absolutely aligned with the intention behind this proposal. Political violence and its promotion or incitement have no place in our democracy, and we are clear that those who seek to undermine democratic participation through violence or intimidation should face serious consequences. The question, however, is not whether this behaviour is unacceptable—it plainly is—but whether this is the right legal mechanism to address it. If this amendment were to be accepted, it would represent a significant shift in the purpose of political finance law, which is about ensuring only those individuals who have a legitimate interest in our elections can support candidates and campaigns through their vote, volunteering their time or offering financial support. Although I share the hon. Member’s concern, the Government believe that this amendment does not address a regulatory gap and would not further our shared aim of reducing harassment and intimidation in politics. The harassment and intimidation of voters, electoral staff and campaigners is unacceptable and has a profoundly detrimental impact on our democracy. That is why we are taking forward several interventions in the Bill to tackle this issue, which we have already discussed in great detail, and are doing so through criminal law, electoral offences and disqualification, rather than through political finance rules, which are not designed to address conduct. With those reassurances, I hope the hon. Member will withdraw her amendment.

• 16 Apr 2026 · Representation of the People Bill (Eighth sitting) · Hansard source

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  The Government’s view is that the Electoral Commission is working hard, and that to prescribe timetables would place a restriction on it that we do not feel is required. Given the good, proactive work that it already does in this area, with the Government working alongside it, we do not feel it necessary to place a statutory duty on the Electoral Commission. With JESP, the Department and the Electoral Commission working hard across the electoral landscape, we do not feel that the amendment and the new clause are necessary, so I respectfully ask the hon. Member not to push them to a vote. Question put and agreed to. Clause 70 accordingly ordered to stand part of the Bill. Clauses 71 to 74 ordered to stand part of the Bill. New Clause 14 Removal of strategy and policy statement “(1) In Part 1 of PPERA 2000 (the Electoral Commission) omit— (a) sections 4A to 4E and the italic heading before those sections (strategy and policy statement); (b) section 13ZA and the italic heading before that section (examination by the Speaker’s Committee of the Electoral Commission’s performance of duty to have regard to strategy and policy statement). (2) Omit sections 16 and 17(1) of the Elections Act 2022 (which inserted the sections repealed by subsection (1)). (3) The Electoral Commission is not required to publish a report under section 4B(4) of PPERA 2000 in relation to any 12-month period ending on or after the day on which this section comes into force.”— (Samantha Dixon.) This new clause removes provision about the designation of a strategy and policy statement for the Electoral Commission. Brought up, and read the First time.

• 16 Apr 2026 · Representation of the People Bill (Eighth sitting) · Hansard source

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  I thank the hon. Lady very much. Question put and agreed to. New clause 14 accordingly read a Second time, and added to the Bill. New Clause 60 Power of Scottish Ministers to vary sums in Schedule 7 to PPERA 2000 “In section 155 of PPERA 2000 (power to vary specified sums or percentages), in subsection (1A)— (a) after ‘vary’ insert ‘— (a) ’; (b) at the end insert ‘, or (b) any sum for the time being specified in Schedule 7 so far as that sum applies in relation to a donation to a member of a local authority in Scotland who is not also a member of a registered party.’”— (Samantha Dixon.) This new clause, which would be inserted after clause 62, amends section 155(1A) of the Political Parties, Elections and Referendums Act 2000 to provide a power for the Scottish Ministers to vary the sums in Schedule 7 (control of donations to individuals and member associations), so far as they relate to areas of devolved competence. Brought up, read the First and Second time, and added to the Bill. New Clause 2 Permissible donors not to include individuals serving a foreign administration “(1) Section 54 of PPERA 2000 (permissible donors) is amended as follows. (2) After subsection (2) insert— ‘(2A) An individual who would otherwise fall within subsection (2)(a) is not a permissible donor if that individual is, or has been— (a) a member of, or (b) a politically-appointed adviser to a foreign administration.’ (3) After subsection (8) insert— ‘(9) In subsection (2A)— “foreign administration” means the government or state apparatus of any country or territory outside the United Kingdom; “member” includes elected and appointed members.’”— (Lisa Smart.) This new clause would ban those who are or have been members of a foreign administration, or advisers to a foreign administration, from donating money to a political party, think tank or campaigning body. Brought up, and read the First time.

• 14 Apr 2026 · Representation of the People Bill (Seventh sitting) · Hansard source

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  It is a pleasure to serve under your chairmanship, Sir Desmond. I will be guided by you, but I do not intend to speak to new clauses 13, 32 and 52 at this stage. However, to respond to a number of points made during the debate, particularly by the hon. Member for North Herefordshire—

• 14 Apr 2026 · Representation of the People Bill (Seventh sitting) · Hansard source

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  We will consider those points. The Rycroft recommendations are being considered very carefully. We will respond to them in due course and we will come back to Parliament with our recommendations as they come forward. I hope that gives the hon. Lady the assurance she is seeking.

• 14 Apr 2026 · Representation of the People Bill (Seventh sitting) · Hansard source

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  In the interests of time, I will continue. On the other remarks made by the hon. Member for North Herefordshire, I hear her point about profit and revenue, and it is highlighted in the Rycroft review. As I said many times this morning, we will carefully consider the Rycroft review and respond to it appropriately. The hon. Members for North Herefordshire and for Hazel Grove both highlighted the Government’s view that the responsibility rests with the donor. The Government strongly believe that. The onus is on the person or organisation receiving the donation to consider its origins very carefully. They can and should decline donations if they cannot satisfy themselves that those have come through the proper and legitimate channels. Let me turn to the issue of why we should not ban donations from companies altogether. Political parties and other campaigners will remain able to raise sufficient funds because they need to communicate their views to the electorate about protecting our democracy better against those who seek to covertly undermine it. The hon. Member for North Herefordshire referenced the Canadian model. I have had the pleasure of meeting the Leader of the House from Canada. While it is tempting to suggest that there should be a ban on corporate donations, I remind the hon. Lady that 60% of their political campaigning is funded by the taxpayer—and it is a brave politician who would enter that particular plea to the British electorate at this time.

• 14 Apr 2026 · Representation of the People Bill (Seventh sitting) · Hansard source

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  This clause strengthens the electoral regime by restoring a clear, objective test for forfeiture: if an individual donor was not actually on an electoral register at the time of the donation, the donation is impermissible and liable to forfeiture. It responds directly to long-standing concerns from the Electoral Commission that the current framework is open to inconsistency. In particular, the 2010 Supreme Court ruling, which allowed courts to consider whether a donor was eligible, rather than actually registered, when assessing impermissible donations and their forfeiture, introduced uncertainty and risked discouraging thorough permissibility checks by campaigners. The clause removes the ambiguity in electoral law, ensuring that permissibility of an individual is determined on actual electoral registration. It reinstates a simple and objective test that supports consistent enforcement and reinforces the integrity of the electoral regime. Campaigners already must take reasonable steps to verify donor permissibility. The clause simply removes the scope for subjective interpretation of permissibility and strengthens deterrence by ensuring that impermissible donations cannot be retained by campaigners due to ambiguity in the law. By reinforcing the principle that only permissible donors may fund UK politics, the clause provides a clear deterrent for impermissible donations and supports compliance by political parties and campaigners.

• 14 Apr 2026 · Representation of the People Bill (Seventh sitting) · Hansard source

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  I will speak now to clause 62 and Government amendments 79 to 87, which were tabled in my name. I will come to the other amendments later. The clause introduces measures that have long been called for by the Electoral Commission, the National Crime Agency and the Committee on Standards in Public Life, which is now known as the Ethics and Integrity Commission, to tighten the rules around unincorporated associations. Under the current framework, unincorporated associations are permitted to make political contributions provided their main office and activities are based in the UK, but there are no restrictions on the sources of the funds behind those contributions. Existing rules therefore do not provide sufficient transparency or assurance about who is ultimately funding the political contributions made through such bodies. The clause introduces a strengthened framework to ensure that political contributions from unincorporated associations come from permissible sources and are subject to stricter and more consistent transparency requirements. The clause lowers the thresholds at which UAs must register with the Electoral Commission and report the gifts they receive, ensuring that significant contributors provide the same level of transparency as other regulated campaigners. It also extends transparency rules so that contributions to candidates count towards the registration threshold, and it requires UAs to appoint a responsible person, improving clarity about who stands behind such associations. Finally, clause 62 introduces new controls to ensure that funds used for political contributions come from permissible sources. UAs will be required to verify political gifts they rely on, and they will be prohibited from using unverifiable or impermissible funds for political activity. I commend clause 62 to the Committee.

• 14 Apr 2026 · Representation of the People Bill (Seventh sitting) · Hansard source

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  New clause 18 seeks to require digital campaigning material, in scope of the digital imprint regime, that contains images, audio or video generated or materially altered to include a statement that such artificial intelligence has been used. The Government fully recognise the challenges posed by AI-generated content, including deepfakes, and the risks they present to democratic processes and public trust in the online information environment. We agree that helping voters understand the authenticity of digital campaigning material is an important objective. However, AI technologies are developing at pace, and there is not yet a reliable or widely adopted technical basis for determining when content has been generated or materially altered by AI. That would make enforcement by the Electoral Commission and the police difficult in practice, and it would risk undermining campaigners’ compliance with the rules. The new clause, as drafted, would also create uncertainty and disproportionate legal risks for campaigners. For example, it would create a new criminal offence for failing to include a statement about AI use, even where the AI involvement may be trivial, automated or outside the campaigner’s knowledge or control. Further consideration would also be needed on how liability for offences should apply to those who republish material. There would also be a considerable chance of the new clause quickly becoming obsolete. AI is evolving rapidly, so adopting a definition of “generative artificial intelligence” in primary legislation might struggle to keep pace with technological developments and it could quickly become outdated. Although we share the intention to strengthen transparency in digital campaigning, the Government do not believe that the new clause is currently workable or proportionate. The Secretary of State for Science, Innovation and Technology recently announced that the Government will establish a taskforce to put forward proposals for Government on best practice for labelling AI-generated content, with an interim report to be published in the autumn. I urge Members to follow the progress of that taskforce. I turn to new clause 10 and amendment 4. I thank my hon. Friend the Member for Milton Keynes Central for those and for her commitment to strengthening online protections. I know Members feel strongly about that area. I share the objective of seeing the powers of the Online Safety Act 2023 being fully and effectively utilised. With that in mind, the Government have carefully considered new clause 10, which would require the Government to publish guidance on the operation of certain offences relating to digital communications, as they relate to candidates and elected officials. Under the Online Safety Act, in-scope service providers are already required to have effective systems and processes in place to identify and remove illegal content. That includes content that amounts to the two offences identified in new clause 10: the “false statements about candidates” offence and the offence of undue influence. Those duties apply equally to AI-generated and manipulated content where such material meets the threshold of either offence. As the independent regulator, Ofcom issues codes of practice that provide clear guidance on what action providers should take to manage and mitigate illegal content. The codes recommend various measures across risk management, user reporting and content moderation. Ofcom has already produced guidance to assist providers in making judgments about whether certain content is illegal, and such guidance includes usage examples where possible. As the independent and expert online safety regulator, Ofcom, not the Government, is best placed to offer such guidance. The Government have no plans to widen their role within the Online Safety Act regulatory regime by issuing guidance on matters within Ofcom’s remit. Introducing a new duty for Government to publish parallel guidance on two specific offences, and committing to regularly updating that guidance, would blur the lines between Government and the independent regulator, undermining the model for which Parliament has only recently legislated. The Government remain firmly committed to ensuring that protections keep pace with evolving threats to democracy, and I welcome continued engagement with parliamentarians on that important issue. As Members will know, Rycroft made recommendations in his review supporting the principle of advertising libraries and suggested that the Government could use their convening power to work with social media companies to extend the practice of advert libraries to achieve consistency in how they are presented. That is not the same as setting a legal requirement for a repository of digital political advertising, as intended by new clause 10. None the less, we are carefully considering all of the recommendations in the Rycroft review and will issue a response in due course. New clause 24 seeks to establish a repository for paid-for digital political advertising. Digital political advertising plays an important role in supporting democratic engagement. It remains one of the most accessible and cost-effective ways for political parties and campaigners to connect with the public and have their message heard. However, the Committee will be aware that the European Commission introduced similar requirements to new clause 24 in 2024, including mandatory transparency notices containing information such as spending and targeting, and the requirement for platforms to upload all political adverts to a European repository. In response, major platforms such as Meta and Google chose to cease hosting paid political advertising entirely in the EU, citing operational complexity and uncertainty as to whether compliance by platforms and campaigners was realistically achievable. If the UK were to adopt comparable measures without fully understanding their operational impact, we could see similar unintended outcomes here. The potential removal of political advertising from major platforms in the UK could risk reducing political pluralism online by restricting the ability of political parties, civil society organisations and candidates, many of whom rely on digital platforms to engage effectively with the public. Smaller, newer parties and independent candidates may be disproportionately impacted by such an outcome, losing an affordable channel to reach voters, while larger, well-followed parties and campaigning groups would likely be less affected. That would make campaigning more challenging for newcomers, potentially undermining the level playing field. The Government agree that transparency in digital campaigning is important, but any reforms must be carefully balanced to protect freedom of expression and avoid placing undue burdens on campaigners and platforms. This is a complex area, and the implications need detailed consideration to avoid replicating the unintended consequences seen in other jurisdictions. In the meantime, we welcome the steps already taken by platforms such as Meta and Google, which have created publicly accessible political advert libraries. We encourage other platforms to do the same. The measures in the Bill will extend the scope of digital imprint rules and place enforcement on a clearer and more proportionate footing, ensuring that voters can continue to make informed decisions on digital material in elections and referenda. We will continue to keep wider policy relating to electoral campaigning under review. I turn to new clause 25. The Government absolutely recognise the importance of protecting our elections from online interference, including concerns about how algorithms, such as recommender systems, can amplify harmful or misleading content. The current legal framework to tackle online electoral mis and disinformation has the Online Safety Act 2023 as its core pillar. New clause 25 would risk creating overlap and confusion with Ofcom’s responsibilities under the Online Safety Act. Under the Online Safety Act, in-scope services must take action in relation to any content that amounts to existing election offences during an election period. The Online Safety Act already provides Ofcom with extensive powers to gather information from services and scrutinise how algorithms operate as well as a mandate to require services to conduct illegal content risk assessments. That includes assessing the likelihood of users encountering illegal content through algorithms, how systems may exacerbate or mitigate those risks, and what safeguards are required. From 2027, categorised services will also be required to report information about their algorithms, including how they influence the display, promotion or recommendation of content. Creating overlap or confusion with Ofcom’s responsibilities under the Online Safety Act also increases the risk of regulatory uncertainty. For those reasons, we cannot accept the new clause. That said, the Government fully recognise the importance of ensuring that the commission has the tools it needs to enforce compliance with the regulatory framework it is responsible for enforcing. That is why we commissioned the Rycroft review to consider whether political finance rules and their enforcement can be strengthened in the light of emerging risks, including covert funding and foreign interference. As Members know, we are carefully considering relevant recommendations from the Rycroft review to ensure that political finance rules and their enforcement remain robust and fit for purpose, including recommendations relating to the Electoral Commission’s investigatory powers. We will revert with a full Government response to the review and consider whether to make further amendments to the Bill in the light of that work. New clause 27 would require the Government to establish a review to consider the adequacy of regulated periods of elections and referendums. More specifically, it would consider whether they are of sufficient length to combat mis and disinformation, and the impact of digital campaigning outside regulated periods.

• 14 Apr 2026 · Representation of the People Bill (Seventh sitting) · Hansard source

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  I will speak to each of the new clauses, beginning with new clause 41, which seeks to place the Macrory principles on a statutory footing in relation to the Electoral Commission’s use of civil sanctioning powers. We fully recognise the importance of the Macrory principles and agree that regulatory enforcement should always be flexible, transparent and proportionate. These principles were designed to guide the construction of regulatory systems and sanction regimes. As such, the Macrory principles directed the development of the Electoral Commission’s regime of civil sanctions, which was introduced by the Political Parties and Elections Act 2009 and therefore is already embedded in the commission’s regulatory practices. That includes the ability to issue fines for a wide range of offences, the use of stop notices and enforcement undertakings, and provision for representations and appeals. The Electoral Commission is also required to publish guidance on its use of such powers, which it must have regard to when exercising its functions. It does this through its enforcement policy. Therefore, fairness and proportionality are already central to how the Electoral Commission operates. Indeed, the commission’s enforcement policy explicitly states that it will impose sanctions where appropriate, proportionate and in the public interest. For that reason, we do not consider it necessary or appropriate to apply the Macrory principles as the new clause proposes. The Electoral Commission is, and must remain, an independent regulator. It is vital that it retains the flexibility it needs to decide how best to use its enforcement powers, rather than being tied to a rigid statutory checklist for individual enforcement decisions. The Government have been clear in our commitment to strengthening the Electoral Commission’s independence, including through the repeal of the strategy and policy statement, which the commission was previously required to consider in the exercise of its functions. Introducing further statutory requirements of this kind risks cutting across that principle and altering the balance of the commission’s operational autonomy. There is a very real risk that amending PPERA to codify these principles in this way is unnecessarily duplicative and could lead to legal uncertainty. Enforcement decisions could become a quagmire of legal challenge, which would delay action and weaken the commission’s overall effectiveness as a regulator. Having given these assurances, I hope that the hon. Member for Hamble Valley will not press new clause 41. I turn now to new clause 53, which seeks to provide the Electoral Commission with powers to request information from any person where such information is relevant to determining whether to open an investigation. The Government recognise the importance of ensuring that the commission has the right tools it needs to make informed decisions about potential breaches of political finance rules. The commission already has substantial information-gathering powers to support its regulatory functions, including the enforcement of political finance and imprint rules. That said, the Government recognise that we cannot be complacent, which is why we commissioned the Rycroft review to consider whether political finance rules and their enforcement can be strengthened in the light of emerging risks, including covert funding and foreign interference. Although we do not support the amendment, we are carefully considering relevant recommendations from the Rycroft review that reinforce measures already included in the Bill to ensure political finance rules and their enforcement remain robust and fit for purpose. There will be a full Government response to the review, and we will consider whether further amendments to the Bill are appropriate in the light of that work. With those reassurances, I hope the hon. Member will withdraw her amendment. New clause 57 seeks to increase the Electoral Commission’s maximum fine from £20,000 per offence to a new maximum of £500,000 or 4% of campaign expenditure, whichever is greater. It also requires that any order seeking to amend the suggested percentage can be made only if recommended by the Electoral Commission following consultation with the Ethics and Integrity Commission. The Government fully recognise the importance of ensuring that the commission has robust enforcement powers. A strong and proportionate civil sanctions regime is essential for securing compliance with the rules and upholding trust in our democracy. The current maximum fine of £20,000 does not provide a meaningful deterrent against rule breaking. The Electoral Commission has argued for a long time that it risks becoming a mere cost of doing business for the largest political parties and campaigners. The Government agree that increasing the maximum fine is essential, so that sanctions reflect the scale of modern political campaigning and ensure that all campaigners, no matter how large, face significant repercussions when the rules are broken. That is why we intend, through secondary legislation, to increase the commission’s maximum fine significantly to up to £500,000 per offence. The reason why the change will be made through secondary legislation is that Parliament has already provided the Secretary of State with the power to make supplementary orders in relation to the Electoral Commission’s civil sanction regime. Any such order is subject to parliamentary approval under the affirmative procedure. It was through the exercise of that power, and through that process, that the existing maximum fine was established in the Political Parties, Elections and Referendums (Civil Sanctions) Order 2010, which is referenced in the new clause. It is therefore appropriate to follow the same process for making changes to the commission’s regime of civil sanctions where it is already provided for in legislation. In terms of adding statutory requirements that must be met before the Secretary of State can make a supplementary order, the Government have seen no evidence that such conditions are necessary. We have worked closely with the Electoral Commission through the development of the measures in the Bill, and we will continue to work collaboratively as we develop the detail of proposals for increasing the maximum fine that it can impose. Those details will be set out in secondary legislation in due course, and at that time Parliament will rightly have the opportunity to scrutinise and debate the Government’s approach and consider whether to approve the legislation. For those reasons, and with those reassurances in place, I hope the hon. Member will withdraw her amendment.

• 14 Apr 2026 · Representation of the People Bill (Seventh sitting) · Hansard source

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  It is our intention to increase the maximum fine level in secondary legislation, as I stated earlier. Its level will be debated at that time. We will debate it in secondary legislation, but it needs to remain proportionate, and we need to move towards it in a considered way and debate it then.

• 14 Apr 2026 · Representation of the People Bill (Seventh sitting) · Hansard source

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  The hon. Gentleman makes a really important point. As I mentioned earlier, the Secretary of State for Science, Innovation and Technology announced that the Government have established a taskforce to take forward proposals for Government on best practice for labelling AI-generated material. With the interim report due to be published in the autumn, I think it is timely that I should write to the Secretary of State for Science, Innovation and Technology to outline the concerns that have been debated in the Committee—I am looking to my officials to ensure that we pick this up—because I think it will be very informative for the taskforce’s work. If the hon. Gentleman is happy for me to do that, I will do so. Finally, the Government recognise that there are potential issues with section 106 of the Representation of the People Act 1983, which the hon. Member for North Herefordshire mentioned. We are reviewing how that legislation should apply in a modern electoral setting and, where necessary, we will take appropriate action to clarify the scope of the section, particularly to make sure that it captures emerging technologies such as deepfakes and other AI technologies and is future-proofed. Question put and agreed to. Clause 63 accordingly ordered to stand part of the Bill. Clause 64 ordered to stand part of the Bill. Clause 65 Decriminalisation of certain requirements Question proposed, That the clause stand part of the Bill.

• 14 Apr 2026 · Representation of the People Bill (Seventh sitting) · Hansard source

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  I will speak to clauses 65 to 69 before turning to the new clauses tabled by hon. Members. Under the current enforcement framework, most political finance offences, regardless of their severity, are treated as possible criminal offences, even when they amount to minor administrative breaches, such as the late submission of campaign expenditure reports. While criminal investigation and prosecution for such offences is rare, key stakeholders, including the Electoral Commission and the Ethics and Integrity Commission, have expressed concerns that the possibility of criminal prosecution for minor errors can deter participation in campaigning. Clause 65 and subsequent secondary legislation will address this by decriminalising administrative offences under the Political Parties, Elections and Referendums Act 2000, so that they will be punishable only through civil sanctions by the Electoral Commission rather than criminal prosecution. We have worked closely with the Electoral Commission to determine which offences under PPERA should be decriminalised. Broadly, they relate to failures to comply with reporting requirements, such as failing to deliver a campaign expenditure return within the statutory time limit or failing to deliver a proper statement of accounts. Serious breaches, including intentional or reckless misreporting, will remain criminal offences and will continue to be investigated by the police and subject to criminal prosecution. This will provide much-needed clarity that the Electoral Commission is responsible for enforcing such administrative breaches, allowing police resources to be directed towards tackling more serious criminal offences and clamping down on foreign money entering politics. In addition, by removing the threat of criminal prosecution for minor infractions, the clause will encourage participation by individuals and organisations that wish to campaign, while ensuring more proportionate enforcement of the rules. Turning to clause 66, robust and proportionate enforcement of political finance law is essential for sustaining trust in our democracy. However, there is currently an enforcement gap in electoral regulation. Since 2010, to provide for more flexible and encompassing enforcement, the Electoral Commission has been able to impose civil sanctions for certain offences committed by political parties, third-party campaigners and referendum participants. In contrast, offences committed in relation to candidates and recall petition campaigners are subject only to criminal sanctions and enforcement by the police. Practically speaking, this means that breaches of the rules can be addressed only through police investigation and criminal prosecution, even where a breach is minor or unintentional. Yet criminal prosecution for minor infractions is frequently considered disproportionate to the offence and not in the public interest, which means that breaches of the rules often go unaddressed and unsanctioned. This enforcement gap risks undermining public trust in the integrity of the electoral system by creating the perception that the rules are not being enforced and that campaigners are not complying with them. At the same time, it can create a fear of criminal prosecution for candidates, election agents and recall petition campaigners, who could face police investigation for relatively minor breaches of the law. Clause 66 is intended to close that gap by extending the Electoral Commission’s enforcement remit, including its investigatory and civil sanctioning powers, to cover offences in relation to candidates and recall petition campaigners. Criminal prosecution will remain available for the most serious offences involving intentional or reckless breaches of the rules, but the EC will also now be able to apply its considerable knowledge and expertise to the enforcement of breaches across the political finance framework, providing for a more encompassing, proportionate and robust regime. Clause 67 removes the statutory cap on the maximum fine that the Electoral Commission can impose for certain offences. Currently, where an offence is punishable on summary conviction by a fine, the penalty imposed by the EC may not exceed that which can be imposed by the court. The maximum fine that can be imposed by a court in such instances is unlimited in England and Wales, but £10,000 in Scotland and £5,000 in Northern Ireland. The purpose of removing these restrictions is to ensure that the Electoral Commission’s maximum fine can be applied uniformly across all relevant offences around the UK. We will be increasing the maximum fine level in secondary legislation. This will ensure that the Electoral Commission’s new maximum fine provides a meaningful deterrent against violations of the rules across the UK, no matter where the offence is committed. As the regulator, the Electoral Commission is invaluable in upholding trust in our democracy. That is why we are expanding the commission’s role and powers, including extending its enforcement remit and increasing its maximum fine. We intend for the Electoral Commission’s expanded role and powers to apply UK-wide at all elections, including parliamentary and local government elections.

• 14 Apr 2026 · Representation of the People Bill (Seventh sitting) · Hansard source

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  My officials work very closely with the Electoral Commission and would not have acted without consideration and with consultation with it. I remind the Committee that decisions about the resourcing of the Electoral Commission fall to the Speaker’s Committee on the Electoral Commission. That is the route by which it is funded. We would not want to make regulation too burdensome, but correspondingly, the Electoral Commission reports to the Speaker’s Committee regularly about its resourcing needs. Indeed, mostly recently, it returned money to the Speaker’s Committee that it did not feel it needed. To reassure Members, officials work closely with it to ensure there is sufficient resource. Our policy ambition is for these legislative changes to be consistent across reserved and devolved elections and to be commenced in a way that provides clarity to campaigners on how the rules will be enforced across all elections. Clause 68 provides for that, as it allows the Secretary of State to make provisions that could otherwise be made by Scottish or Welsh Ministers, but only with the consent of Scottish or Welsh Ministers. In practice, subject to the agreement of the devolved Governments, that will enable us to introduce a uniform set of changes to the role and power of the Electoral Commission in relation to local government elections in Scotland and Wales. I turn to clause 69. The Electoral Commission currently lacks an explicit statutory gateway to disclose information to other regulators and law enforcement bodies. The lack of an explicit legal basis for information sharing forces the commission to rely on incidental powers or bespoke memorandums of understanding to disclose information. Those arrangements create unnecessary complexity and delays, and make information sharing more burdensome than it ought to be. They have embedded unnecessary friction into the system, slowing co-operation between regulators on important cross-cutting regulatory issues, and frustrating the very bodies charged with upholding the integrity of our democratic processes. To underpin our wider reforms to strengthen enforcement, the clause provides a clear legal basis for information sharing, enabling the commission to disclose information to specified regulators and enforcement bodies. It will nurture an environment of collaboration between relevant bodies on cross-cutting issues such as foreign interference, data protection and digital campaigning. To ensure that the information-sharing gateway remains effective as the regulatory landscape evolves, the list of bodies can be amended by the Secretary of State, following consultation with the Electoral Commission and subject to parliamentary approval via the affirmative procedure. The Government note that one of the recommendations of the Rycroft report is to build on this measure and make the information-sharing gateway reciprocal, to provide clarity that the Electoral Commission can also receive information from relevant bodies. We are carefully considering all the recommendations from the Rycroft review. We will issue a full Government response in due course, and, where appropriate, we will introduce new amendments to the Bill. With those assurances, I commend clause 69 to the Committee. I will allow other Members to speak to the new clauses and I will respond to them in due course.

• 14 Apr 2026 · Representation of the People Bill (Seventh sitting) · Hansard source

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  As I understand it, we will be setting the maximum fine in secondary legislation, but I will confirm that, because I have almost lost the thread of what I was saying.

• 14 Apr 2026 · Representation of the People Bill (Seventh sitting) · Hansard source

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  The hon. Member has made her point. The Government believe that there is a place for company donations from UK companies. We just feel that we should be much stricter about the arrangements by which they do these things. We have set that out in the legislation, which is what we are discussing this afternoon. Turning briefly to the points raised by my hon. Friend the Member for South Dorset, I remind all Members that these measures are not designed to prevent a specific individual or company from donating. Those who follow and meet the three tests and successfully meet the “know your donor” and section 54A requirements should be able to enrich our democracy by donating as they do. I therefore commend clause 60 to the Committee—

• 14 Apr 2026 · Representation of the People Bill (Seventh sitting) · Hansard source

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  Any campaigner wishing to influence the electorate should be prepared to be transparent. Imprint rules play an important role in upholding trust in UK democratic processes by ensuring that voters can see clearly who is behind political campaigning material. Under existing rules, third-party campaigners who spend under a certain threshold are not required to include imprints on their organic digital campaigning material. That creates a loophole allows third-party campaigning groups to disseminate potentially influential content without disclosing its origin, which is concerning when such material is designed to be shared virally, especially if the material is misleading, controversial or intended to manipulate public opinion without accountability. Clause 63 strengthens the transparency of digital imprint rules by ensuring that third-party campaigning groups spending under a certain threshold are also required to include imprints on their organic digital campaigning material. This requirement will ensure that the rules promote transparency and public trust, while protecting free expression and avoiding undue burdens on individuals simply expressing their political opinions online. Following consultation with the Scottish Government, it was agreed that applying a single UK-wide regime uniformly will enable voters from across the UK to benefit from a level of transparency and will avoid confusion. The clause therefore also repeals part 8 of the Scottish Elections (Representation and Reform) Act 2025 consequentially upon the extension of the UK-wide digital imprint regime. Turning to clause 64, it is important that campaigners have access to clear and up-to-date guidelines. The Electoral Commission’s guidance on digital imprints plays an important role in helping campaigners to understand and comply with the rules and supports enforcement authorities in maintaining transparency and public trust in UK democratic processes.