Rebecca Smith MP: speeches

Speeches

• 5 Feb 2026 · Railways Bill (Twelfth sitting) · Hansard source

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  I think he probably would have said it, to be perfectly honest. Clause 73 marks the end of a very significant chapter in the Bill, with many poorly drafted or simply ill thought through clauses. I am sure the drafting has been done with the greatest attention to detail; it is just the “thought-through-ness” that we are struggling with. But we end on a positive note, with no objections to clause 73.

• 5 Feb 2026 · Railways Bill (Twelfth sitting) · Hansard source

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  The Minister just said that the amendments are completely unnecessary, because the stated concerns are not real, effectively. That does not answer the very real concerns put forward time and again in the Transport Select Committee and in this Committee’s evidence session—the written and oral evidence—by businesses that are experts in the field. They are not reassured by the Bill as it stands. How can the Minister go back and say, “No, we’re right and you’re wrong,” to those experts in the industry?

• 5 Feb 2026 · Railways Bill (Twelfth sitting) · Hansard source

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  Clause 74 amends the Railways Act 1993. It gives the ORR a new function to monitor GBR’s delivery of its statutory functions and carry out investigations where appropriate to fulfil that monitoring. In particular, the ORR must consider how and whether GBR is carrying out the activities listed in its approved business plan, how the cost of carrying out those activities compares with the estimates in the business plan, and whether GBR is carrying out railway activities in a way that furthers railway safety. The ORR may advise the Secretary of State in relation to that monitoring function and publish its advice. Amendments 99 to 101 “would require the ORR to monitor and audit GBR’s statutory functions.” The amendments address the relationship between GBR and the ORR, making it clear that the ORR remains an independent regulator with powers associated with audit, for example in relation to the release of documents. None of that applies to a woolly duty to monitor. Legally, the term “monitoring” is weak. It does not imply an ability to take action to demand improvement. That is particularly concerning when combined with clause 75, which removes the ORR’s ability to impose a financial penalty in the event of poor performance. Amendment 97 “ensures that Great British Railways in furtherance of railway safety actively engages with the industry bodies such as the Rail Safety and Standards Board and implements where reasonably practicable, the cross-sector recommendations of safety improvements and standards emerging from any cross-sector work.” That provides the Office of Rail and Road a clear mechanism to hold Great British Railways to account in safety matters. It also highlights an expectation of relevant industry bodies to recommend improvements to Great British Railways. We will not divide the Committee on amendment 97, but we ask the Government to think about what we are proposing in it. We all want the Bill to make the railways safer, and anything we can do to ensure that that happens will be for the good. I think we have already debated amendment 98, but I want to put it in context we will vote on it at this point, so I want to mention why it is relevant. It “would require the ORR to consider whether GBR procuring services from the private sector would be a more efficient use of public funds.” That echoes previous amendments that we tabled, but we will be dividing on amendment 98 as part of this group, I believe. Amendment 222 “requires the Office of Rail and Road to consider Great British Railways’ performance against its KPIs, as set out in” new clause 2. As amendment 222 is consequential on new clause 2, we will not press it to a Division, given that the new clause is likely to be rejected. It is a probing amendment that we wanted on record. We also have amendment 236, which is not part of the group, but my hon. Friend the Member for Broadland and Fakenham told me not to forget it because we will have a vote on it. Are we debating group 73?

• 5 Feb 2026 · Railways Bill (Twelfth sitting) · Hansard source

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  I will speak to clauses 72 and 73, and the grouped amendments. Clause 72 is another controversial clause. It sets out that the Secretary of State may make regulations about the management and operation of non-GBR infrastructure, which means any network, station or track not operated by or on behalf of GBR; about the rights to operate trains that use non-GBR infrastructure; and about competition in the market for the provision and supply of such operations. Subsection (2)(c) allows the Secretary of State to set access terms and charges for non-GBR infrastructure, overriding commercial negotiation and bypassing the ORR. That cuts directly against the stated principle that the publicly owned operator must not regulate its competitors. It is an extraordinary clause that cuts up contract law and throws it out of the window. The Rail Freight Group is concerned. It states: “Clause 72 enables the Secretary of State by regulation to intervene in privately owned rail freight terminals, setting conditions of access and charges amongst other matters. Again, we understand that this is not the intention of the clause (which exists to enable GBR to take over other infrastructure such as HS1, Heathrow Branch or the Core Valley Lines) but nonetheless it is an extant risk to rail freight as presently worded, and we believe freight terminals should be explicitly out of scope for this clause.”

• 5 Feb 2026 · Railways Bill (Twelfth sitting) · Hansard source

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  Clause 69 amends the Railways Act 1993 to except GBR or a subsidiary of GBR from the sections outlining the ORR’s powers on access and its corresponding duties. That change would prevent the ORR from making access decisions on infrastructure operated by GBR. The clause removes GBR from the normal ORR supervised access regime, giving it a special exemption that no other operator has. Since GBR is both operator and infrastructure manager, we believe that this creates an uneven playing field and risks unfair treatment of competing operators. If the Government insist on the current drafting, they must come clean and admit that their intention is to treat competitors unfairly in comparison, and that they are not in favour of competition and reject private investment as a driver of innovation and improvement on the railway. Given the destruction of the current independently managed fair and level playing field, it is no surprise that the industry has major concerns. Eurostar’s written evidence to the Transport Committee explains: “The Railways Bill consolidates strategic and operational authority in Great British Railways. While centralising network management offers efficiency gains, it is essential that ORR’s independent regulatory function is preserved, especially for open access and international services. In future Government will have the overarching interest in the Infrastructure Concession (let to LSPH), the Maintainer Operator (Network Rail) and the largest operator on the route (SET). There needs to be an independent referee to balance these interests with those of open access operators. ORR provides impartial oversight of track access, station allocation, depot facilities, charging, and timetabling. Its independence provides transparent decision-making and safeguards competition, while giving investors confidence in the long-term stability of services. Decisions such as the allocation of depot access at Temple Mills demonstrate the importance of ORR in balancing competing demands for constrained resources. Without statutory protection, GBR could constrain competition and impede international service growth. In addition, it could reduce transparency in access allocation. Eurostar recommends that the Bill explicitly preserves the ORR’s independent role in regulating access, charges, and depot allocation for international services. This statutory protection is essential to provide fair treatment for operators and give certainty for the future of UK international rail services. In international rail terms, the ORR’s role is more important than ever before, given the recent ruling enabling a new entrant to the market to access Temple Mills depot. The regulator will need to perform a strong, independent and objective role in ruling on cost sharing, compatibility and rolling stock issues. The ORR can also play a role in track access charges – costs for accessing the London-to-Calais stretch of rail are nine times higher per kilometre than the cost of accessing equivalent infrastructure in Belgium, France or the Netherlands.” Written evidence to the Transport Committee from Lumo and Hull Trains outlines their concerns: “The ORR plays an essential role in maintaining a fair, transparent, and competitive rail network. Its independence supports confidence among passengers, freight operators, and private investors. Lumo and Hull Trains believe the Railways Bill should preserve this role to help GBR succeed. To maintain balance across the system, the ORR must retain meaningful regulatory powers to ensure decisions made by GBR on access and charging are fair, evidence-based, and consistent with the Government’s growth objectives. The current drafting of the Bill, however, limits the ORR’s capacity to intervene proactively, restricting its powers primarily to appeals after decisions have been made. Enhancing the ORR’s decision-making and enforcement capability would help ensure that GBR’s commercial and operational decisions remain aligned with the wider interests of passengers and the market. This approach would reinforce the Government’s ambition for a collaborative, competitive, and accountable rail system. A strong regulator also provides stability for investors, ensuring that GBR operates within a framework that fosters long-term confidence and fair treatment for all market participants. While the Government desires to create a ‘directing mind’ in GBR, coordinating rail with a whole network view, for private operators to have confidence in the system there must be appropriate protections guaranteeing fair access and charging. The ORR is well-positioned to perform that role as an essential backstop, but the correct framework must be built around it to enable it to operate as such.” Finally, Angel Trains also provided written evidence to the Transport Committee: “Angel Trains believes that the new access framework must provide equitable access to all parts of the railway, whether operators are GBR-led, Open Access, or freight. As a lessor of rolling stock to both GBR-led and Open Access operators we believe parity among operators is crucial and would welcome greater clarity from the Government on how access and charging decisions will be made and prioritised. As an independent regulator, the Office of Rail and Road (ORR) should be responsible for ensuring a level playing field by intervening if concerns are raised that GBR could have taken a discriminatory decision, for example, around preferential access rights and charging for GBR operators over Open Access competitors. Beyond access arrangements, we would welcome further detail from the Government about how GBR will be held to account. In its current form, GBR possesses a high concentration of power in its role in setting both strategy and delivery. In order to provide adequate scrutiny and accountability, there must be sufficient checks and balances to ensure that financial, economic, and safety objectives are met. Angel Trains believes that there should be clear divisions between different parts of the rail system to ensure adequate accountability…As outlined above, it is vital that there is a fully independent regulator to hold GBR to account, for which the ORR could be best-placed. Beyond acting as an arbiter on access and charging decisions, the ORR should be empowered to report on GBR’s performance and issue performance improvements notices to GBR, in addition to other regulatory duties. The ORR must maintain a regulatory function to provide fairness and stability for the rail industry, which encourages investment and ensures financial sustainability by creating a level playing field across the sector and eliminating subjectivity from decision-making.” We therefore seek to leave out clause 69 and will vote against it. This would keep GBR under the normal access regime supervised by the ORR and ensure a fair system. We have no objections to Government amendments 175 to 183 but, as mentioned, we are less happy with clause 69 as a whole. Clause 70 amends the 2016 regulations to exempt GBR from the provisions of those regulations that would otherwise apply to its infrastructure. The 2016 regulations will continue to apply to other infrastructure managers. We do not object to the clause.

• 5 Feb 2026 · Railways Bill (Twelfth sitting) · Hansard source

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  Clause 66 sets out who GBR must consult before issuing, revising or replacing the access and use policy under clause 59. The ORR and the Scottish and Welsh Ministers must be consulted as well as other persons GBR considers appropriate. Subsection (2) requires GBR to consult the persons it considers appropriate before issuing the infrastructure capacity planning document under clause 60, including any revisions and replacements; before issuing a working timetable under clause 61; and before making, altering or replacing a charging scheme under clause 64 or a performance scheme under clause 65. Subsection (3) provides that a requirement in this clause for consultation may be satisfied by a consultation before or after the commencement of the clause. There is currently no express requirement to consult existing open access operators. Clause 67, on appeals against access, charging and performance decisions, provides that a person who is aggrieved may appeal to the ORR against a GBR decision as to their train operations’ access to and use of the infrastructure, or a decision under the charging scheme or performance scheme. That sounds okay, until we realise that it is on judicial review terms, so there is no actual right of appeal at all. Clause 68, on the appeals procedure, sets out that the ORR, when determining appeals under this chapter, must apply the principles that the High Court would apply on an application for a judicial review, or the principles that the Court of Session would apply in exercise of its supervisory jurisdiction for appeals in Scotland. Subsections (2) and (3) provide for the ORR to allow an appeal or dismiss it, and, if it allows an appeal, to use the following remedies. For appeals made against the GBR policies, plans, and schemes themselves—under clause 59(6), on access and use; clause 60(6), on infra-structure capacity; clause 64(8), on charging; or clause 65(7), on the performance scheme—the ORR can only require GBR to reconsider the decision. For appeals made against a specific decision under clause 61(5) or clause 62(7), on the working timetable, or under clause 67, on GBR’s policies, plans and schemes, the ORR can quash the decision that is appealed against. Then, however, all it can do is to send it back to GBR to reconsider, or it may substitute the decision with its own if quashing the decision is on the basis of an error of law and without the error there is only one decision that GBR could have reached. Clause 68(1) means that because appeals must be assessed using judicial review principles, operators can challenge GBR decisions only on procedural grounds and not on the substance or commercial merits. That means that GBR will be judge and jury in its decisions affecting its direct competition, which is obviously wildly unfair. Clause 68(3)(a) sets out that even where an appeal succeeds, the ORR can only remit the matter back to GBR for reconsideration, which means that GBR can often reach the same outcome again without revising its reasoning. That offers little to no real corrective power. Clause 68(4)(b) says that the ORR may substitute its own decision only where there is an error of law and where only one lawful outcome was possible. That is a very high bar and as a result this remedy will be rare. These concerns have been echoed by the industry. During one of the oral evidence sessions for the Transport Committee, Maggie Simpson of the Rail Freight Group said: “There are a number of problems with that appeal function. First, it will be incredibly hard to ever get to it. We are told that the appeal will have to meet the standards of a judicial review—illegality, irrationality or procedural unfairness—so there will be a very high bar to meet to even get there. On top of that, the law allows the Secretary of State by regulation to set out some steps you would have to take in advance of going to the ORR. We do not know what those are. There is also a fee, and we do not know what that is. Even getting to the ORR will be very much more difficult than it is today. If we do get up there, in most cases, the ORR will be able to ask GBR to have another look at its decision. It has another look, and it reaches the same view—so what? Only in a minority of cases can it quash a decision and only if there was an error of law…Passengers are going to get a very powerful watchdog when, conversely, we feel that in freight, we are having those rights of access watered down.” Steve Montgomery from FirstRail said: “Considering other large public sector organisations—like GBR is going to be—you have to ask, ‘Why would you not have an independent regulator of it?’ Why is rail going to be different from other large public sector organisations where there are regulators looking at them?” Nick Brooks from ALLRAIL said: “A strong independent rail regulator has two roles. The ORR, by the way, is part of the European group of independent rail regulators called IRG. Ideally, those roles are to protect passengers and other parts of the sector from monopolistic behaviour, and to ensure the best use of taxpayer money. Their role is also, in other countries, to ensure competition and non-discriminatory behaviour. We are worried that that might be watered down in this country and needs to be improved still.” That prompts some questions that I hope the Minister can answer. Why is GBR being set up in such contradiction to its European neighbours? Is there anything that we could have learned? Will the Government reconsider any element of GBR as a result? These concerns were also set out in the Rail Freight Group’s written evidence to the Transport Committee: “GBR will by nature be a very powerful monopoly of track and GBR trains, and the overarching changes in the Bill reduce significantly the independent oversight of ORR, leaving the Secretary of State holding GBR to account. By comparison, the ORR currently has a duty to promote the use of the rail network and thus has a track record”— ha, ha— “of creating growth by approving new access applications previously rejected by Network Rail. Although we welcome the provisions for freight outlined above, there is still a significant risk that GBR could act in a way which favours its own trains, restricting growth for freight. As such, we believe it is essential that non-GBR operators have an independent appeals function that is powerful, easy to use and able to take action effectively.” It continued: “In essence, the provisions in the Bill mean that freight operators and customers have a very limited right of independent appeal against GBR. It is also of note that GBR may replace the current Access Disputes Committee (also independent of Network Rail) who hear lower level timetabling disputes with their own internal process, albeit we do not yet have full details of this.” I would be interested to hear the Minister’s response to that. FirstGroup wrote in a similar vein, saying that it was concerned “about the ORR’s responsibility for track access decisions being transferred to GBR…The Bill removes the ORR’s powers to independently adjudicate on whether applications for access best meet the needs of all railway users. Under Clause 68 the ORR is an appeals body but with no ability to uphold appeals if they are discriminatory or anticompetitive. There need to be more checks and balances to maintain confidence in fair access, independent regulatory oversight and to protect the interests of passengers…As a broader point, independent regulation is vital to all large comparable bodies—consider for example the CQC’s role in healthcare or the Civil Aviation Authority in airlines and airports.” The pushback against this grossly unfair clause is overwhelming, and the Government can surely no longer turn a deaf ear. Amendment 88 would remove the requirement that appeals may be made only under judicial review principles. We think that it is an obvious improvement. At the Transport Committee on 7 January, the Department for Transport’s official, Lucy Ryan, stated that the requirement is deliberate: “The reasoning for the JR threshold is to be absolutely clear that GBR needs to remain the directing mind, able to take decisions about optimising the use of the network.” That is an insufficient safeguard against monopolistic behaviour by GBR. Large monopolies with structural conflicts of interest need effective decision-making oversight. It cannot be done by the Secretary of State, because this is operational, so it has to be the ORR. Amendment 89 would enable the ORR to determine appeals on the facts and the law. It builds on amendment 88, and we think it is the only way to create a fair and non-discriminatory process. Amendment 90 would allow the ORR, when agreeing an appeal, either to remit to GBR for reconsideration or to quash and/or substitute its own decision for all or part of the decision appealed against. An independent appellate body applying the rules to GBR and its decisions would not challenge the role of GBR, but make sure that it was applying its rules fairly and correctly. Amendment 91, which I believe the hon. Member for Didcot and Wantage supports, would allow the ORR to substitute its own decision for that of GBR when allowing appeals, without there needing to have been an error of law, resulting in only one possible outcome. It would remove a ridiculously closely drafted requirement, and it is obviously fair. It is a test to see if the Government actually want a fair and level playing field. Amendment 92 would require the Secretary of State to consult open access operators before making regulations about steps that must be taken before an appeal can be brought, to make provision about the procedure and to set time limits and fees for the appeals brought under this chapter. Operators clearly have skin in the game, and should be consulted by right. Amendment 93 would require the ORR to consult open access operators before publishing its document on the practice and procedure for appeals under this chapter. The argument for that is very similar to the one behind amendment 92, which I just set out. Will the Minister stand up for the open access and freight sector, and support our amendments to create a fair appeals process?

• 4 Feb 2026 · Construction Industry Training Board: Funding · Hansard source

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  Does the hon. Member agree that losing the skills and expertise of local training groups, such as the Plymouth Construction Training Group, which was formed in 1977 and has been funded by the CITB, and instead having centralised delivery from CITB in London, would be a retrograde step that risks us losing local construction skills?

• 4 Feb 2026 · Construction Industry Training Board: Funding · Hansard source

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  I welcome the funding that the Minister has just outlined. Reference has been made to mayoral strategic authorities, but vast parts of the country do not have one yet and are unlikely to have one for some time. Indeed, my constituency and that of the hon. Member for Exeter (Steve Race) are in one of those regions. I am interested in how the funding will be delivered to where it is really needed in those smaller communities. At the moment, we have 124 training groups doing that, and ultimately they are best placed to know the workforce in their local areas. In those smaller communities that have not yet seen that devolution, how can we ensure that we do not see those skills just drop out of the bottom of the sector?

• 3 Feb 2026 · Railways Bill (Ninth sitting) · Hansard source

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  I echo what my hon. Friend the Member for Broadland and Fakenham said on amendments 46 to 50. I too am surprised that the Government are not seeking to enshrine the right to a veterans railcard on the face of the Bill. While it is laudable that they want to ensure that those long-fought-for discount fare schemes remain for young, elderly or disabled people, I believe that not making the veterans railcard a statutory discount is a backward step and will send a particularly strong message to that community, who we know are quite agitated by a lot of what is being done by this Government, particularly around the prosecution of veterans for previous conduct. Not to use this Bill as an opportunity to put this provision on the statute book is a retrograde step. I want to pay tribute to the former Member for Plymouth Moor View, Johnny Mercer, who drove putting the veterans railcard in place in the first place through the work of the Office for Veterans’ Affairs. He said at the time that it underlined the “debt of gratitude” that we owe to our veterans. They are ultimately men and women who have fought hard for our country, and the opportunity to receive that discount in perpetuity—whether they have served one day or 100—is something that we should be proud of as a country and should seek to enshrine in legislation. The same goes for the opportunity for serving personnel to travel with their families. I will be very surprised if the Government vote against the amendment: that would send a very clear message to our veterans community that they are valued more greatly by the Conservatives than by Labour. Although I am sure there is no ill intent behind the omission of the veterans railcard in the Bill, we have to think about the messaging and the political point that is being made. It would be relatively easy to put the veterans railcard in law so that it cannot be changed in the future, and I would support that. As has been said, the Bill does not prevent it from being added later, but I wonder why we are not seeking to enshrine it in law now.

• 3 Feb 2026 · Railways Bill (Ninth sitting) · Hansard source

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  I appreciate what the Minister is saying but, if that is the case, surely we should just remove the whole clause. If the Government do not seek to remove any discount schemes, why do they need three discount schemes, and none of the others, on the face of the Bill? It seems to me that there is a bit of a contradiction there.

• 3 Feb 2026 · Railways Bill (Ninth sitting) · Hansard source

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  My hon. Friend’s comments provoke the question, is it a concern that the lack of flexibility for the Secretary of State will mean that there is no space for private sector companies in this role in the future? Ultimately, given the measures set out in the Bill, and that the opportunity to give access to other private businesses is entirely in the hands of the Secretary of State, it is potentially foreseeable that there could be no private involvement in the future, which would be a problem.

• 3 Feb 2026 · Railways Bill (Ninth sitting) · Hansard source

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  It was Plymouth gin!

• 3 Feb 2026 · Railways Bill (Ninth sitting) · Hansard source

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  I appreciate the Minister’s reassurance that there will still be opportunities for people taking part in remembrance events. However, there are additional matters such as the poppy train, which comes up through the south-west with Great Western Railway. While such things may be worked through in conjunction with the Secretary of State, they are put on by a privately owned franchise rail company. Is the Minister effectively saying that it will be down to the individual business units to decide what happens within their railway scope, or will it be in guidance through the licence or something else? There are many things that have been provided by privately owned franchises that the Bill does not confirm will take place once the railways are state owned.

• 3 Feb 2026 · Railways Bill (Ninth sitting) · Hansard source

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  It is worth reminding the Committee that the idea has also been used on a domestic route. Not that long ago GWR had a scheme with Nectar, and the points I accrued while travelling up and down to London for various engagements used to service me with a bottle of gin once a year. I am not necessarily saying that I support the hon. Gentleman’s new clause, but it is worth putting on the record the fact that it is not so farfetched an idea. It certainly made me use GWR’s app, even if I did not use anything else.

• 3 Feb 2026 · Universal Credit (Removal of Two Child Limit) Bill · Hansard source

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  No one has ever told me that they would adore to hear me speak in this place! I completely appreciate the point that the hon. Gentleman is making, but I too have been doing some research while this debate has been going on. It is worth noting that those food bank numbers have increased because they only count Trussell Trust food banks, so the more food banks join the Trussell Trust network, the more those numbers go up. In my city, where, as I may have mentioned, I held the cost of living portfolio during the pandemic— [ Interruption. ] There’s no need to yawn! My city did not need the additional food bank that was set up, and it ended up having to send food away. If that food bank had joined the Trussell Trust, it would have added to those numbers and distorted the figures. While I am not saying that there might not have been an increase, I believe it is worth recognising that particular point.

• 3 Feb 2026 · Universal Credit (Removal of Two Child Limit) Bill · Hansard source

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  Will the hon. Member give way?

• 3 Feb 2026 · Universal Credit (Removal of Two Child Limit) Bill · Hansard source

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  I will start by repeating something that the Secretary of State said at the start of the debate. He made much of the need to set against anger and division, so I am going to appeal to everyone’s better nature. Ultimately, the removal of the two-child limit was not in the Labour party’s manifesto, so until recently it was not something to which the Government had committed—in fact, it was ruled out by the Chancellor. I have sat through the entire debate and I have to say that it is a bit rich of Government Members to lecture us today, when in 2024 the limit was clearly good enough for the Labour party, including the current Prime Minister and the Chancellor. It is also worth pointing out that we keep hearing the figures 4.5 million and half a million. It seems that the removal of the two-child limit will reduce the 4.5 million people who the Government say are in poverty by just half a million. It will be interesting to hear the Minister comment on that. The debate has been caricatured as being rich Conservatives versus everyone else, but nothing could be further from the truth. We believe in a safety net, but we also believe in personal responsibility. Many of us on the Opposition Benches grew up on benefits. I am one of those people, and I was in fact worse off when the Labour Government came into power in 1997; they scrapped the child benefit and replaced it with working tax credit, and my mum supported my dad’s business and did not go to work in her own right while she raised her four children. [ Official Report , 4 February 2026; Vol. 780, c. 4WC.] (Correction) When I am asked why I am a Conservative, that is what I say—and I have checked that this afternoon to ensure that I am factually accurate. We are speaking up for those who work hard and have high bills, as well as housing and food costs, but who are paying tax because they do not qualify for universal credit. I want to make one final point before I come to the body of my speech. Lots has been said about free school meals this afternoon, but when I recently questioned the Department for Education on whether it has any record of the number of councils making the most of the auto-enrolment for free school meals, I was told that the Government do not have the figure. They might wish to go away and look at that. I absolutely appreciate that auto-enrolment helps the most vulnerable, but if the Government are not taking account of the levers in their hands to improve that system, then they need to do some work. Having done my bit of ad-libbing, I will make some progress with my speech. Fundamentally, maintaining the two-child limit is about fairness—fairness to working parents who do the right thing, fairness to working parents who make difficult choices and fairness for families who live within their means.

• 3 Feb 2026 · Universal Credit (Removal of Two Child Limit) Bill · Hansard source

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  No, I am going to make some progress. We are talking about men and women who are working long hours in shops, schools, offices, construction sites and care homes right across the country. Why should families in receipt of universal credit have to avoid the difficult decisions about how many children they can afford, unlike those who are not in receipt of it? Compassion is often framed in terms of supporting the most vulnerable, and rightly so—indeed, I have highlighted my own personal conviction on this in previous debates—but as one a colleague in my previous council career told me, “The left has no monopoly on compassion, Rebecca.” Compassion cuts both ways. We must remember the millions of hard-working families across the UK who are not on large salaries yet fall outside any thresholds for universal credit—the families who earn the same for going to work as their neighbours do on universal credit. It is unfair to these parents to make them bear a double cost: raising their own children and subsidising other people’s.

• 3 Feb 2026 · Universal Credit (Removal of Two Child Limit) Bill · Hansard source

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  Is the hon. Gentleman aware that the Trussell Trust was founded in this country in 2000, under a Labour Government, and that the Department for Work and Pensions did not recommend that it be offered as a solution to families in need at the time? It is one thing to talk about food banks, but it is important to ensure that we acknowledge when they were first set up in this country.

• 3 Feb 2026 · Universal Credit (Removal of Two Child Limit) Bill · Hansard source

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  I also speak for the 60% of the population who do not think we should be scrapping the cap. No doubt a large proportion of those people are also in my constituency. As Conservatives, we believe in personal responsibility and living within our means. Our welfare system should be a safety net for the most vulnerable, not a lifestyle choice, as my hon. Friend the Member for Faversham and Mid Kent (Helen Whately) has argued so powerfully. As I have alluded to, it seems that we are not alone; that principle of fairness is echoed across the country, with a recent YouGov poll finding that 57% of respondents believe that the cap should be retained. The situation is particularly stark for self-employed mothers, who can only access statutory maternity allowance —a flat rate that falls far below what their peers can receive via their employer. I recently met one self-employed mother who told me that she is seriously weighing up whether to have a second child because she and her husband simply cannot afford it right now. This is a deeply personal dilemma, fraught with conflicting emotions. Equally, those not on benefits who have more children do not get paid more wages—they just have to absorb the extra costs within their budgets—so this idea that we need to give people more money because they have more children does not always make sense. However, this Government are determined to give families on universal credit a free pass; as a result, those families will not have to make those kinds of hard choices. According to the Institute for Fiscal Studies, for 70% of the poorest households currently subject to the two-child limit, any money they stand to gain from the scrapping of the limit will get partially or fully wiped out by the household benefit cap. How do the Government square that circle when they have been quoting the headline figures for poverty? As has been raised numerous times today by Opposition Members, if Labour truly followed its own logic on child poverty, it would also need to scrap the household benefit cap, at even greater cost to the taxpayer. Conversely, 40% of those affected by the two-child limit will be exempt from the overall household benefit cap, because they have at least one claimant or child receiving health and disability benefits. This means that households with six children will get an additional £14,000 every single year. For larger families in particular, the financial gap between going to work and being out of work will shrink significantly. We are trapping good people in a bad system. Shockingly, one in four full-time workers would be better off on benefits than in work—that is 6 million workers across the UK whose neighbours on combined benefits are receiving more income than they are. It is no wonder that every day 5,000 people sign on to long-term sickness benefits. According to the Centre for Social Justice, a claimant who is receiving universal credit for ill health plus the average housing element and personal independence payment could receive the equivalent of a pre-tax salary of £30,100, and a family with three children receiving full benefits could get the equivalent of £71,000 pre-tax. How is this fairness? At best, scrapping the cap is a sticking plaster that does not tackle the root causes of poverty. We know that work is the best route out of poverty—in fact, if this Government hit their ambitious target of increasing employment rates by 80%, that could lift approximately the same number of children out of poverty as scrapping the two-child limit. Instead, this Bill will be yet another strain on our ballooning benefits budget. If it had been retained, the two-child limit would have saved the taxpayer £2.4 billion in 2026-27, rising to £3.2 billion in 2030-31. Instead, the bill is being passed on to all those families I have spoken about already.

• 3 Feb 2026 · Universal Credit (Removal of Two Child Limit) Bill · Hansard source

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  No, because I believe the hon. Gentleman’s Minister will want to have a fair share of time as well. When it comes to reforming welfare spending, the Prime Minister has shown extraordinary weakness of resolve. Scrapping the two-child cap is simply a political decision to placate his Back Benchers, costing taxpayers billions. It is unaffordable for a welfare system that is already on its knees, and damaging to the very work incentives his party promotes. Indeed, no one voted for it at the general election. As the Leader of the Opposition has said, “28 million people in Britain are now working to pay the wages and benefits of 28 million others. The rider is as big as the horse.” Let us look at this through the eyes of hard-working parents and individuals. Many of their businesses and workplaces are already being hit by Labour’s damaging tax rises. These are people with a work ethic—they willingly shoulder the burden of supporting their families without relying on the state—but their commitment to doing the right thing is being thrown back in their face. The Conservatives are the only party truly standing by hard-working families. We are the only party serious about bringing the welfare bill under control and protecting taxpayers from yet more unavoidable costs. Keeping the cap is about fairness, responsibility and respect for the sacrifices that parents make every single day. To scrap it flies in the face of that.

• 3 Feb 2026 · Universal Credit (Removal of Two Child Limit) Bill · Hansard source

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  Well, without having the statistics in front of me right this second— [ Interruption. ] No, let me finish. We had the global pandemic, when there was a huge need for food banks. In fact, it was the Conservative Government who invested hundreds of thousands of pounds in food banks to ensure that nobody went without. The council for which I was a cabinet member at the time used the funding from the Conservative Government directly to ensure that poverty did not increase over the covid pandemic. If numbers went up, we have to ensure that that fact is reflected.

• 3 Feb 2026 · Universal Credit (Removal of Two Child Limit) Bill · Hansard source

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  No, I will not give way; I am going to make some progress. These mums and dads are the backbone of our economy, and we cannot afford to let them down. Scrapping the cap reduces incentives for parents to look for a job or work longer hours. Why would they bother going to work, or working more, when they could get more in benefits? A strong economy must provide incentive structures that help people to do the right thing, and we tamper with these fundamental structures at our own peril.

• 2 Feb 2026 · Topical Questions · Hansard source

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  Ministers stress how keen they are to remove obstacles hampering defence innovation, and nowhere is that more important than in my South West Devon constituency, which is home to the majority of Plymouth’s national centre for marine autonomy. The Maritime and Coastguard Agency has spent the past 12 months or more looking into how to remove licensing obstacles for autonomous vessels such as underwater drones. Given that Plymouth’s marine autonomy sector is set to receive a share of the £250 million defence growth deal, will the Secretary of State commit to putting further pressure on the Government Legal Service—or whoever else it will take—to get the legislation in place to update the MCA’s workboat code 3 as a matter of urgency?

• 2 Feb 2026 · Topical Questions · Hansard source

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  T1. If he will make a statement on his departmental responsibilities.