Rebecca Paul MP: speeches

Speeches

• 21 Apr 2026 · Courts and Tribunals Bill (Eighth sitting) · Hansard source

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  Thank you for that, Ms Jardine. I reassure you that I will not be speaking for very much longer, but I will cover the last of what I consider to be the important points. Thank you for your guidance and patience. The Law Society warns that the Bill’s proposals will increase the number of defendants in magistrates courts who are ineligible for legal aid, even though they would currently qualify if their case were heard in the Crown court, because the magistrates court means test is significantly stricter. It notes that duty solicitor numbers have dropped sharply between 2017 and 2025 and that the impact assessment does not properly address “the disparity between the magistrates’ and Crown Court means tests”. We know that individuals in full-time, minimum-wage employment may not qualify for legal aid in the magistrates court, and that unrepresented defendants often do not understand charges, and often enter inappropriate pleas, struggle with cross-examination and end up with harsher outcomes. Under the Bill, then, a defendant may face a much more serious case in a summary forum, with a possible sentence of 18 months or two years, yet be less likely to have publicly funded legal representation than they would be if the case were before the Crown court. That simply is not fair. Even if one were somehow persuaded that giving the magistrates courts the power to impose sentences of 18 or 24 months might in principle be acceptable, we would still have a major objection to how the clause is drafted. It does not simply set the limit and leave it there; it expands the regulation-making power so that the Government may increase the maximum to 18 or 24 months by statutory instrument. The delegated powers memorandum justifies that on the basis that magistrates’ sentencing limits may need to be adjusted swiftly “where operational pressures” require a “rebalancing of work”. Are we not, then, being asked to hand over a flexible tool that could be used to rebalance criminal jurisdiction by secondary legislation? I could not be more convinced that Parliament should retain oversight of increasing the powers of magistrates. At the very least, any such regulation should be made by affirmative resolution. This is not the sort of decision that should be casually adjustable at ministerial convenience. For all those reasons, I oppose clause 6 standing part of the Bill. Even Leveson did not recommend this change; on the contrary, he said his wider recommendations were “contingent upon magistrates’ sentencing powers remaining at…12 months” and recommended that the power to alter them by statutory instrument “should be repealed”. The move to 12 months has taken effect only recently and has not yet been properly evaluated. The clause will extend summary justice into cases carrying up to two years’ imprisonment, despite the fact that summary justice was designed for lower-level, swifter cases. It will push more serious cases into magistrates courts that are already under strain, and do so in a package that also weakens appeals and intensifies legal aid problems. It risks moving the backlog rather than solving it, and it does so by way of an over-broad delegated power that gives Ministers too much room to reshape criminal jurisdiction by regulation. The magistracy deserves respect, and nothing I say should be taken as criticism of the many magistrates who serve conscientiously and well, but having respect for magistrates is not the same thing as assuming that every structural burden should now be placed on the summary justice system. The Government have not even begun to make the case for the clause compellingly.

• 21 Apr 2026 · Courts and Tribunals Bill (Eighth sitting) · Hansard source

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  I agree with my hon. Friend, as I normally do. Finally, there is the obvious practical point that there are better answers available. The Law Society says that reform and investment must be strategic, not piecemeal, and warns against stand-alone measures such as changing from jury trials to judge-only trials without convincing evidence that they will significantly reduce the backlog. It says that Parliament should insist on “detailed modelling” and on understanding the Government’s intentions across the whole package of reform, not just on this isolated measure. The existence of pressure in the system does not prove that every proposed constitutional shortcut is justified. The question is whether the shortcut is necessary. With clause 4, the answer is plainly no. For all those reasons, I oppose clause 4 and schedule 1, and I support amendment 51. Clause 4 offers a constitutionally serious reduction in jury trials for a tiny claimed benefit of 200 sitting days. The evidence does not show that juries are the cause of delay, collapse or miscarriage in these cases. Fraud cases are not too technical for juries. The key issue is dishonesty, and ordinary citizens are uniquely well placed to judge that. The removal of juries in these cases would damage open justice and public confidence. Schedule 1 gives effect to that flawed principle and then goes further by creating a route to ministerial expansion. Amendment 51 is therefore a sensible and necessary safeguard, but in truth, the better course is simpler still: clause 4 and schedule 1 should not be included in the Bill at all.

• 21 Apr 2026 · Courts and Tribunals Bill (Eighth sitting) · Hansard source

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  As my hon. Friend was speaking, it suddenly occurred to me that under our current system, jurors can already make that argument—that if sitting on a jury would be particularly disruptive, they should not have to do so. How does that interact with this measure? It feels like this does not make sense.

• 21 Apr 2026 · Courts and Tribunals Bill (Eighth sitting) · Hansard source

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  Thank you for that guidance, Ms Jardine, but that seems to suggest that we are not allowed ever again in this Bill Committee to bring up the fact that the right to elect for jury trial and rights to legal aid are being removed. Surely we need to be able to talk about that as we go through the Bill.

• 21 Apr 2026 · Courts and Tribunals Bill (Eighth sitting) · Hansard source

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  If we are increasing the sentence in the magistrates court, I would imagine the Minister will agree that, in some situations, we are increasing the complexity of the case. For example, a sexual assault case could be quite complicated and require, in order to look after the alleged victim and make sure their wellbeing is managed, four consecutive days of sitting to get that over with. How will the magistrates court do that? They are all volunteers, and quite often they are working. How will this help address the backlog if we are in a situation where those volunteer magistrates are not able to commit to the four consecutive days needed to deal with a complex and sensitive case such as a sexual assault?

• 21 Apr 2026 · Courts and Tribunals Bill (Eighth sitting) · Hansard source

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  I completely agree with my hon. Friend. What is considered complex and lengthy could be quite subjective. We all know that we are potentially going to end up in the courts over defining exactly what is complex and lengthy. It feels like the Bill is not written clearly enough for us to understand exactly how it will work in reality. Amendment 51 is an important safeguard against those risks. In his written evidence, His Honour Geoffrey Rivlin KC notes that the schedule 1 list already “appears to be arbitrary, perhaps the work of a moment; and it goes beyond anything suggested before. But even that is not the end of it.” That is because part 2 of the schedule gives the Secretary of State the power by order to add or remove offences. He quotes the explanatory notes to show that offences not related to fraud or financial crime could easily be added in the future. He describes this as “a mighty step along the way to the end of jury trials.” That does not strike me as overstatement. The Secretary of State will indeed have this untrammelled power, and we should carefully heed this sober warning from a senior judge. For similar reasons, the Opposition oppose schedule 1 standing part of the Bill. Schedule 1 is the list that gives clause 4 its reach, and the list is already troubling. It is not confined to a tiny, tightly defined category of unusual mega-fraud; it covers a wider class of economic and financial offences, including money laundering and terrorist funding, and can then be expanded later. If we think the core principle of clause 4 is wrong, then the schedule that operationalises it is wrong too. Rivlin’s description of the list as “arbitrary” is worth keeping in mind. One of the reasons that schedule 1 is objectionable is that once Parliament accepts the principle that a whole category of serious Crown court cases can be singled out for juryless trial on grounds of length and complexity, the argument for confining the list to that category becomes very hard to sustain. The logic of the thing pushes outward. That is why schedule 1 is dangerous: for not only what it contains now but what it invites later. I am particularly concerned that there is an ideological push away from jury trials. My concern is that this is only the start, not the end of where the Government want to get to. I urge the Committee to think about this carefully. We are taking important decisions for the future.

• 21 Apr 2026 · Courts and Tribunals Bill (Eighth sitting) · Hansard source

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  I agree with my hon. Friend. Frankly, I am shocked that a Labour Government would do that. It is the last thing I expected of a Labour Government.

• 21 Apr 2026 · Courts and Tribunals Bill (Eighth sitting) · Hansard source

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  It will no doubt be a relief to Members to hear that I am not going to talk for quite as long as I did this morning. I oppose clause 4 and schedule 1 standing part, and I support amendment 51, tabled in the name of my hon. Friend the Member for Bexhill and Battle. As is becoming habit, I will begin with a very brief overview of what we are considering. Clause 4 and schedule 1 create a new framework for judge-only trials in certain complex or lengthy cases. The listed offences include fraud, tax evasion, false accounting, insider dealing, money laundering, terrorist funding, bribery and related offences. The court may order trial without a jury if it is satisfied that the likely complexity and/or length makes that appropriate, that it is not in the public interest for the trial to be conducted with a jury, and that there are no other reasons why it would be more appropriate for the trial to be with a jury. There would be no right of appeal against that decision. That is a serious and constitutionally significant change in its own right, but what makes it even more troubling is that it has been justified on the strength of a paper-thin theoretical benefit. The House of Commons Library states that the Government estimate clause 4 will save 200 Crown court sitting days. That is around 0.18% of current Crown court capacity, which indicates just how small the potential gain is—if there is that gain at all. That is the first and most obvious point I want to make. The Government are proposing a very serious encroachment on jury trials in return for a saving that amounts to just 200 sitting days. JUSTICE describes the change as “unnecessary,” says that it “will not impact the backlog in any meaningful way” and warns that it risks opening the door to restricting jury trials in other categories of case too. The Law Society is similarly clear: “Removing jury trials for serious fraud cases is unlikely to have a significant effect on the backlogs, but would significantly erode the fundamental principle of open justice.” That should be the frame for the whole debate on clause 4. We are not being asked to approve some modest efficiency measure; we are being asked to displace the jury in some of the most important and contested criminal cases for an alleged benefit so small that, even in the Government’s own case, it barely registers against total Crown court demand. That trade-off is so poor that I refuse to believe the Minister, in her heart of hearts, believes it is the right way to proceed. The second point is that the case against juries being used in serious fraud and related cases has never really been made. In written evidence, the Law Society tells us: “Serious cases of any complexity, including serious allegations of fraud, must be presented by the prosecution in a way that is understandable, not only to the judge and jury…but also, in line with the principle of open justice, to the public.” It goes on to say: “They should be subject to effective case management to ensure they take only a reasonable length of time, if necessary, by reducing the number of charges”. In other words, the answer to complexity is to manage it properly, not to remove the jury. It is worth reminding ourselves that the issues juries decide on in fraud trials are factual, not technical—in particular, whether the defendant was dishonest. That is judged by reference to the standards of ordinary decent people. Twelve ordinary jurors are far better placed to decide that than a single judge alone. That goes to the very nature of fraud. Fraud is not merely an accounting or regulatory puzzle; it is an allegation of dishonesty, and dishonesty, by definition, is exactly the sort of question on which the community’s judgment matters. Who should decide dishonesty: a single professional judge, or 12 citizens applying the standards of ordinary life? In a democratic criminal justice system, the answer should remain: the jury. The evidence that we have does not support the idea that juries are what make these cases collapse, drag on or miscarry. JUSTICE’s written evidence points to the Southwark Crown court data gathered by His Honour Geoffrey Rivlin KC, showing that the vast majority of fraud cases lasted less than three months, with only one or two per year lasting over three months and only two cases in total lasting over six months. That is important, because it rather punches the myth that these are all endless epics that juries simply cannot understand or follow. Rivlin’s evidence also says that jury trials compose a discipline that helps to keep fraud trials shorter. Without that discipline, judge-alone trials may end up running as long as, or even longer than, jury trials. More to the point, delays, collapses and miscarriages of justice in fraud are not caused by juries, as shown by R v . Hayes where convictions were quashed because of judicial misdirection, not because of anything the jury did wrong. That strongly refutes the suggestion that juries are the weak link in these cases. The Government have two problems here: first, they have not shown that such cases are generally too long for juries; secondly, they have not shown that juries are what is causing the failures when these cases go wrong. Unfortunately, that leaves the Government looking rather like they are indulging in ideological hostility to jury trials rather than evidence-based reform. There is also a wider constitutional point. The Law Society says, and I very much agree, that removing jury trials for serious fraud cases “would significantly erode the fundamental principle of open justice.” These are often cases involving major companies, financial institutions, public markets, public money, terrorism financing, bribery and corruption. They are exactly the sort of cases where the public must have confidence that justice has not simply been done inside a closed professional world by one member of that same world. Fraud and related financial cases often concern the conduct of powerful, well-resourced and sophisticated defendants. In those cases, public confidence matters immensely. A verdict reached by a jury of citizens commands a kind of legitimacy that a judgment by a single judge does not carry in the same way. That is not a criticism of judges, but a recognition of why juries exist in the first place. They are there to not just decide facts but connect the administration of criminal justice to the public itself.

• 21 Apr 2026 · Courts and Tribunals Bill (Eighth sitting) · Hansard source

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  Perhaps I am more optimistic about these things.

• 20 Apr 2026 · Security Vetting · Hansard source

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  Seven months ago, a national newspaper ran the story that Mandelson had failed security vetting, so how is it even possible that no one in No. 10 knew until last week?

• 16 Apr 2026 · Courts and Tribunals Bill (Fifth sitting) · Hansard source

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  My hon. Friend is making a powerful point about the existing backlog starting to go down, and why it is important that we look at that and understand the impact that other measures are having. Does he agree that the recent change to suspensions for three-year sentences, which went live only a few weeks ago on 22 March, will decrease receipts to court, as it will increase guilty pleas? Whether that is good or bad is a totally separate debate, but it will surely reduce the backlog further.

• 16 Apr 2026 · Courts and Tribunals Bill (Fifth sitting) · Hansard source

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  It is clear that the Minister honestly believes this change will address the backlog. I do not doubt her sincerity—we believe differently, but I understand that that is what she believes. What concerns me is this: how many miscarriages of justice is she happy to accept in order to bring down the backlog? Why on earth, when miscarriages of justice are clearly going to happen as a result of these measures, are they not mentioned in the impact assessment? It makes no mention of one downside being a potential miscarriage of justice. I find that astonishing.

• 16 Apr 2026 · Courts and Tribunals Bill (Fifth sitting) · Hansard source

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  I completely agree with the hon. Lady. She has set out a good example of the type of things that happen in reality. Life is not tidy, and unexpected things happen. As we look at the Bill and whether a sentence is over or under three years, it is easy to think in simple terms but, in reality, people who work in the justice system—I have not done so, but I have spoken to people who do—understand the movement and flexibility that is required. That is why amendment 24 works really well by taking that into account. The hon. Member for Bolton South and Walkden, who drafted it, clearly has real-world experience of what actually happens in a courtroom. The Bill already recognises elsewhere that there can be a relevant change of circumstances requiring the court to revisit allocation, so the Government’s own drafting accepts that these matters are dynamic rather than static. If that is so, why would we not want to build in a bit more foresight at the front end as well? Paragraph (f) in amendment 24 is not some wild departure from the structure of the Bill; it sits comfortably with the Government’s own recognition that allocation decisions can become unsound as a case develops. It is simply a more prudent and realistic approach to cases in which the true seriousness may emerge only over time. Finally, the reference in amendment 24 to “other exceptional circumstances” is extremely important. No statute, however carefully drafted, can predict every factual scenario. That is especially true in criminal justice, where the facts and human consequences of a case can vary enormously. A residual exceptional circumstances test is therefore not a weakness; it is a mark of maturity in the law. It recognises that Parliament should not force judges into injustice. If the Government truly believe in justice rather than mere throughput, they should have no objection to preserving a narrow, exceptional route to jury trial where justice plainly demands it. Amendment 39, tabled by my hon. Friend the Member for Bexhill and Battle, deals with the alternative, broader approach to building flexibility into clause 3. It is an especially important amendment because it puts the issue in the clearest possible terms: those of natural justice. The amendment says that a trial should still be conducted with a jury where the defendant demonstrates that to be tried without one “would amount to a breach of the principles of natural justice.” That is an extremely modest safeguard. It would not wreck the clause; it would merely build in additional protection through allowing an element of judgment to decide the mode of trial. It would not restore the right to a jury trial in every either-way case; it simply says that where the injustice is plain, a jury trial must remain available. I struggle to see how any Government serious about fairness could object to that. This is an issue of paramount importance on our side, and I hope on the Government’s side too. My hon. Friend the Member for Bexhill and Battle tabled amendment 39, as well as amendments elsewhere in the Bill—in relation to clause 1, in relation to reallocation under clause 3, and in relation to clause 4—to seek to protect natural justice. We will keep making these points. If Ministers insist on creating judge-only routes, they must at the very least accept a residual safeguard based on natural justice. For all the reasons I have outlined, I support amendments 23, 39 and 24. They would deliver the additional safeguards needed, so I urge the Government to adopt either the Opposition’s amendment or the amendments tabled by the hon. Member for Bolton South and Walkden.

• 16 Apr 2026 · Courts and Tribunals Bill (Fifth sitting) · Hansard source

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  It is an honour to serve under your chairmanship, Dr Huq. I speak in support of amendments 23, 39 and 24 which, taken together, would do something simple but important: they would build a measure of flexibility back into the clause, so that jury trial is still available where the cause of justice requires it. The Minister should think carefully. As drafted, the clause creates a very blunt regime: unless the court predicts a sentence of more than three years, the trial is to be conducted without a jury. The amendments would go a small way towards softening that rigidity and making the system less arbitrary, more proportionate and hence more just. With the amendments, two different Committee members take two different approaches to delivering the same outcome of additional flexibility in the clause. Amendment 39, tabled by my hon. Friend the Member for Bexhill and Battle, is broad in nature, setting out an additional condition for jury trial when needed to ensure natural justice, whereas the hon. Member for Bolton South and Walkden takes a more granular approach to the problem by listing the specific circumstances that might warrant the need for jury trial, again to ensure fairness. Both approaches seek to achieve the same thing. I will speak to each amendment in a little more detail, starting with amendment 23. Clause 3 is currently built on one single condition for preserving jury trial in relevant cases: whether the defendant is likely to receive a sentence of more than three years if convicted. Amendment 23 would change the wording from “the condition” to “one or more of the conditions”. This is the gateway to allow amendment 24, which lists various conditions, to work. The amendment matters because it opens the door to a more sensible approach, in which sentence is not the only thing that counts. That is exactly the right approach. When we deal with a constitutional safeguard as important as jury trial, the Committee should be wary of a system that turns entirely on a single mechanistic threshold. Human beings and criminal cases are not that neat, and Parliament should not pretend that they are. The amendment is therefore modest, tidy, entirely sensible and the necessary first step to add judgment, flexibility and common sense to a clause that has far too little of all three. On amendment 24 and its list of conditions, the Government’s model under the clause is to ask the court at an early stage to forecast the sentence that would likely be imposed if the defendant were convicted. If the forecast is more than three years, there is a jury; if it is not, there is none. That is far too crude a test to bear the full constitutional weight that the Government want to place on it. The Bill itself exposes the weakness in the logic, because although the allocation decision turns on a prediction about a sentence above or below three years, the Bill also expressly states that nothing prevents a court sitting without a jury from later imposing a sentence of more than three years. In other words, even the Bill recognises that the initial prediction may not tell the whole story; if that is so, why should that prediction be the sole basis on which a person loses the right to jury trial? Amendment 24 is so worth while because it states that in deciding whether a defendant should still have a jury, the court should not only look at the likely sentence but be able to consider whether: the defendant is of good character; they have previously been convicted of an imprisonable offence; they are treated as rehabilitated; conviction would cause significant reputational or professional harm; the gravity or complexity of the case might increase; and other exceptional circumstances. That does not strike me as radical. It is simply an attempt to make the law reflect reality and be less prescriptive. Additional flexibility makes for better outcomes. One of the strongest parts of amendment 24 is the recognition it gives to good character and to those who have not previously been convicted of an imprisonable offence. I raise this because the Government’s crude threshold risks producing perverse results. The people who may be hit hardest by clause 3 are precisely those who are newer to the justice system, those of previous good character and those for whom a conviction would be utterly life-changing. The Bar Council illustrated the point starkly in written evidence with the example of a 19-year-old student charged with possession with intent to supply after a small amount of Spice was found in their room—I am sure Members will remember my reciting that specific example in Committee on Tuesday. Because they are of good character, the likely sentence under the guidelines may be low enough that they lose jury trial altogether, even though the charge could destroy their future. Meanwhile, someone with previous convictions may be more likely to cross the sentencing threshold and so keep the right to a jury. That is exactly the sort of absurdity that amendment 24 tries to avoid. That is wholly consistent with the broader critique of the Bill. Conservative Members have repeatedly argued that the Government are treating this as an administrative exercise, when in fact people’s lives are at stake. The shadow Justice Secretary, my hon. Friend the Member for West Suffolk (Nick Timothy), put it clearly on Second Reading when he said that the Government were proposing to remove fundamental rights “without a mandate, without a case and without any evidence”. —[ Official Report , 10 March 2026; Vol. 782, c. 207.] The Opposition also challenged Ministers on taking away jury trial for offences that cost defendants their jobs, their homes and their families. Amendment 24 responds precisely to that point. I note the inclusion in amendment 24 of cases in which the defendant would likely suffer significant reputational damage or have their employment or professional qualifications adversely affected. That is important because the seriousness of a case cannot be measured by custody alone. A sentence of under three years can still destroy a person’s livelihood, strip them of professional standing, end a career built over decades and permanently alter family life. The Government keep speaking as though anything beneath their threshold is somehow low level. The Opposition have rightly made the point that even where a sentence is below three years, the consequences can be catastrophic. Amendment 24 simply recognises that reality. There is an obvious point of fairness here, too. If the state wishes to prosecute a person in circumstances where conviction may ruin their livelihood or reputation for life, it is hardly excessive to say that jury trials should at least remain available. That is an ancient constitutional right and the Government should, even now, think very hard before removing it. I also support paragraph (f) in amendment 24, which deals with cases where there are reasonable grounds to believe that the gravity or complexity might increase. Again, this is simply common sense. Criminal cases often evolve, evidence changes, witnesses come forward, and issues that initially looked straightforward become anything but in the crucible that is the courtroom.

• 16 Apr 2026 · Courts and Tribunals Bill (Sixth sitting) · Hansard source

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  Why not?

• 16 Apr 2026 · Courts and Tribunals Bill (Sixth sitting) · Hansard source

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  The hon. Lady is absolutely right that magistrates are doing that now, frequently and—as far as I am aware—fairly well, but we have to remember that they are doing it for low-level cases. In fact, their sentencing powers have increased only recently. The key point is that we will have an additional process. The magistrates do it, but now we will have this additional process at the Crown court level to decide between judge only and jury. Obviously, the sentencing guidelines and all the things we have just set out would be entirely relevant to that process and will factor in. I will go through a that in a bit more detail, so I hope the hon. Lady will bear with me. I will of course let her intervene—that would be really helpful. She clearly has a huge amount of experience in this area, and I want everyone to feed in. I am asking questions about how this will work in reality, so it would be really good to draw on everyone’s experience. The Crown court deals with sexual assault and other more complex cases and, as she knows, the sentencing has to take into account things such as victim impact, so it is lot more difficult to estimate the sentence. Let us continue the debate, because it is very helpful to have this discussion. To suggest that a judge in the plea and trial preparation hearing can undertake that assessment accurately and quickly off the back of the information that they have at that point, potentially on a paper determination without a hearing, is unrealistic. That could be very difficult for them. I will give a few examples, and again I am very happy for people to intervene or give their views, because we need to work through the nitty-gritty of how the measure will work in reality. For category 2 sexual assault, the achieving best evidence full transcripts of the complainants’ evidence are often not available. Instead, the court has to rely on a written summary, but my understanding is that that information is needed to provide an accurate and realistic estimate of the likely sentence. How is it proposed that that will be done in practice for allocation? Will the judge watch the videos of the complainants’ evidence for an hour or two before deciding? If the case hinges on CCTV footage, is it proposed that the judge watch that before making the allocation decision? Those practical points do not appear to have been considered in preparation for the Bill, although the Minister may have all the answers and I obviously look forward to hearing how she thinks the process will work in practice. It is not sufficient just to say that the judge will decide the likely sentence length without ensuring that they have the information they need to do that properly, particularly given the magnitude of the impact of the allocation decision. I therefore ask the Minister whether anyone has calculated how long it might take for the judge to go through the various videos and footage before the PTPH to get the information they need to make an allocation decision. It is important to remember that victim impact is often a significant factor in sentencing. Is it proposed that victim impact statements will be relied upon at the point of determining an allocation? What happens if, at that point, the impact is not yet known? For example, the complainant might still be in hospital, medical evidence might remain outstanding or the psychological impact might not be known for many weeks or months. On the face of it, we probably all thought that a judge deciding whether the likely sentence will be more than three years sounded straightforward. We would think that they just look at the sentencing guidelines, but I am not sure it is that straightforward. Once we start thinking it through and listening to those working in the justice system—I have spoken to people about this—we soon realise that it is far from simple, especially for complex cases such as sexual assault. The judge does not magically know the likely sentence; they need to understand the facts, the detail of the alleged offence and the impact on the victim before they can even begin to do that accurately. If they get it wrong, which is increasingly likely if insufficient information is available to them, that could result in defendants being denied a jury trial when they should have had one. That brings me on to my next concern. How long will it take on average for the judge to do all this? Has that been factored into the Crown court saving of 27,000 sitting days? Has the increased time that the magistrates will need to spend on this, due to the complexity of cases, been factored into the increased demand of 8,500 sitting days? We also need to bear in mind that the allocation process that the magistrates undertake under the current rules will also get more complex once the sentencing powers increase up to two years. There will have to be allocation decisions for more complex offences such as sexual assault and death by careless driving. Do magistrates have the expertise to accurately assess the likely sentence in those types of cases to adequately assess victim impact? The Government’s approach sounds simpler on paper, but I hope I have demonstrated that in reality I am not sure it is once we delve into it. These proposals add a not insubstantial amount of work simply to decide where to allocate the trial, essentially undertaking almost a mini trial to review the evidence before the allocation can even be decided. That does not sound time saving to me. It is the wrong way round. We expect the judge to make a judgment on sentence before the trial has even happened, which could change the type of trial the defendant is entitled to. That is fundamentally wrong. It is a flawed approach that will lead to bad outcomes for defendants and complainants.

• 16 Apr 2026 · Courts and Tribunals Bill (Sixth sitting) · Hansard source

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  I will speak in support of amendment 40, tabled in the name of my hon. Friend the Member for Bexhill and Battle, amendment 18, tabled in the name of the hon. Member for Chichester, and amendment 28, tabled in the name of the hon. Member for Bolton South and Walkden. Before I get into my speech, I think that the hon. Member for Chichester raised a really interesting point about whether we will ever really talk about “triable either-way offences” going forward, if these changes go ahead. In effect, we will have the rather strange situation—to take the example of category 2 sexual assault or death by careless driving—of either summary offences or those with a full Crown court and jury. It will be interesting to see how that all flows through in the definitions. That is an interesting debate, but probably not one that everyone wants to have right now. I will move on from such interesting questions, and I can tell that the Minister is delighted that I have decided to do so.

• 16 Apr 2026 · Courts and Tribunals Bill (Sixth sitting) · Hansard source

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  It is really helpful to hear the hon. Member’s perspective from her in-depth knowledge and experience, but I would challenge one aspect of her point: I might argue for a longer sentence if it meant I was more likely to get a jury trial and be found not guilty. Allow me to give an example. If I had created an offensive social media post, I would know that, if I could make my case to a jury, they would be much more likely to use their discretion and compassion and accept the human foibles that we have. They might well say, “This person did not intend to cause any harm—not guilty”. I therefore disagree with the hon. Member; I think she will find herself in a situation where—it sounds bizarre—people will argue that they should get a longer sentence in order to go to jury, so that they have a chance of being found not guilty and clearing their name.

• 16 Apr 2026 · Courts and Tribunals Bill (Sixth sitting) · Hansard source

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  That is not the case. The hon. Lady has just set out that it is about setting out the worst possible cases with respect to the sentence—so they absolutely could do that. It is exactly what will happen. They will always be looking to achieve the best for their client—particularly if their client is not guilty. Let us remember that we are talking about some people who will not be guilty. Again, they know that if they have done a social media post—and we have seen that people have gone to prison for these things—they are much more likely to not go to prison if they end up in front of a jury. However, if they end up in front of a judge—my goodness me—there is a much higher chance that they will go to prison.

• 16 Apr 2026 · Courts and Tribunals Bill (Sixth sitting) · Hansard source

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  I apologise if the Minister is about to come to this, but is she saying that she does not expect this process to take very long?

• 16 Apr 2026 · Courts and Tribunals Bill (Sixth sitting) · Hansard source

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  Is the Minister saying that judges will not be required to review CCTV footage or understand the impact on the victim? Is she saying that that is not required in this process?

• 16 Apr 2026 · Courts and Tribunals Bill (Sixth sitting) · Hansard source

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  It is a pleasure to serve under your chairmanship, Ms Jardine. I am pleased to speak in support of amendments 25 and 12, and particularly in support of amendment 43, tabled in the name of my hon. Friend the Member for Bexhill and Battle. The amendments all engage with a simple point of fairness. Whatever one’s view of the Government’s wider proposals, it cannot be right to change the rules after a defendant has already elected for a Crown court trial. Such defendants made their choice under the current rules. They did not opt for Crown court for any reason other than the fact they would get a jury trial, so for the court to remove that choice from them without any hearing would frankly be shocking. Let us keep in mind that some of these people will be innocent, and remember that some may have chosen the magistrates route if they had known that going to the Crown court would not give them the jury trial they seek. The retrospective application of new rules is deeply unfair. Whatever side of the jury trial argument we are on, surely we can all agree that those who have already opted for jury trial should have that decision respected. The amendments differ slightly in drafting but all try to achieve the same thing: to ensure that where somebody has already elected for jury trial, that choice is respected and the new regime does not operate retrospectively. Amendment 25 would disapply the new allocation rules where a defendant has already elected Crown court trial before commencement. Amendment 12 would strip out the retrospective commencement provisions. Amendment 43 would instead tie the new regime to cases in which the first hearing in the magistrates court takes place after the change in the law. Those are different routes with the same fair and sensible objective. This should not be controversial. If the state tells a defendant that they have a right to elect for a jury trial and they exercise that right, it is manifestly unfair to turn around later and say that the right has vanished and that their case will now be dealt with under a wholly different system. In fact, to call it unfair fails to make the point seriously enough. It would amount to a violation of one of the most foundational principles of our legal system: that retrospective legislation of this kind runs contrary to basic rule-of-law principles and requires the strongest possible justification. As JUSTICE, the cross-party law reform and human rights organisation put it in written evidence: “The retrospective application of the provisions is contrary to the rule of law.” It went on to state: “It is deeply unfair for defendants who elected Crown Court trial in expectation of a jury to have their cases heard by a judge alone under a process that did not…exist when they made that choice.” I always endeavour to see all sides of a given issue, but in this case I honestly struggle to see any argument against those statements. I hope the Minister will agree that retrospective application is fundamentally unfair. If the Government are not moved by appeals to basic fairness, they should at least be moved by their own stated objective of reducing delay. The Bar Council is unmistakeable in warning us: “The retrospective provisions may also be subject to numerous legal challenges.” That is exactly the opposite of what Ministers say they are trying to achieve. If the Government push ahead with retrospective application, they risk drawn-out legal challenge, more hearings and more uncertainty in cases that are already in the system. Measures explicitly brought in to help to reduce the court backlog will, perversely, multiply it. This is exactly the sort of illogical thinking that Committee stage is intended to weed out. I very much hope that the Minister will engage on this point. Our concern is echoed elsewhere in the written evidence we received. Dr Samantha Fairclough’s detailed submission to the Justice Committee states clearly that the Government’s plan to give the Bill retrospective effect is “unfair…will create significant additional work in allocating those cases…and likely result in appeals.” JUSTICE makes a similar point, saying: “Reallocation of cases already in the Crown Court caseload” could lead to judicial review challenges, further hearings and additional “burdens on both defendants and the prosecution”. Even on a practical level, the amendments are eminently sensible. They seek to diffuse the legal landmine that the Government are in danger of stepping on, and would avoid yet more work for a system that is already under intense strain. As I have stated, the amendments are nothing other than fair and reasonable—in fact, they are a minimal safeguard. My colleagues and I have been clear that we should not be going ahead with these reforms, but if Ministers insist, the very least they can do is to ensure that they operate prospectively rather than retrospectively. People should be judged and dealt with under the rules in force when they made their election, not have the rug pulled from beneath them halfway through proceedings. That is why I support amendments 25, 12 and 43, and I urge the Government and the Minister to accept at least one of them.

• 16 Apr 2026 · Courts and Tribunals Bill (Sixth sitting) · Hansard source

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  I thank my hon. Friend for making that important point. Returning to this debate, we are going to see real problems from this approach to allocation. I am glad that the hon. Member for Amber Valley thinks that it is not an issue—it sounds as if she thinks that all the issues I am raising are not issues. However, she will find that there are some KCs out there that will say that some of the things I have raised are actually very much going to be issues. I ask the Minister in her summing up to go into some of the detail about how this would work in practice. As I said, it sounds really straightforward—“Oh, we just decide whether it is more or less than three years”. However, it is just not that straightforward. We also have to bear in mind that sometimes, as a case develops, the prosecution might substitute a lesser charge for trial, as sometimes happens—for example, a section 20 grievous bodily harm instead of a section 18 GBH, an affray instead of a violent disorder, or handling instead of robbery—and that changes everything. What happens when they do that? Will it go back through the reallocation procedure every time? If so, has that been factored into the estimates on sitting day savings? I am sure that the Minister is very much enjoying me constantly going back to the estimates and impact assessment, but it is really important that we are clear about what has been factored in and what has not. In the light of the number of questions about how this will work in practice, it is surely plain to see why it is so important that the defendant has, as a bare minimum, a right to appeal any such allocation decision by a judge. There is so much scope for error in having a judge perform a sentence estimate at a point before all the facts and evidence are known, or without giving them sufficient time to digest the information, that it would be completely unfair to not include an appeal route. Even better still, I would urge the Government to rethink the whole Bill and not do away with the right to elect for a jury trial at all; then we would not really have to worry about any of what I have just raised.

• 15 Apr 2026 · Energy Profits Levy · Hansard source

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  7. What discussions he has had with Cabinet colleagues on the potential impact of the energy profits levy on the oil and gas sector in Scotland.

• 15 Apr 2026 · Energy Profits Levy · Hansard source

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  The oil and gas sector is a vital industry, not just in Scotland but for the whole UK. Does the Secretary of State share the disappointment of the Conservatives that the Chancellor deterred a reported £17.5 billion of private investment into the oil and gas sector by choosing to retain the energy profits levy last month? That money would have supported thousands of Scottish jobs, and delivered growth and energy security for the UK.