Rebecca Paul MP: speeches

Speeches

• 7 Mar 2025 · Protection of Children (Digital Safety and Data Protection) Bill · Hansard source

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  I concur with everything my right hon. Friend says. It is completely accessible to all our children, so it is very hard for one child to be kept separate from it. That is why it is important that we address it. However, increasing the digital age of consent is just the first step—we have so much more to do. We also need to ban smartphones in schools for children under the age of 16. On a typical workday, 42% of older teenagers say their smartphone is distracting them from schoolwork, and half say that social media has distracted them enough to impact their grades. Notably, only 11% of schools are genuinely smartphone free, and children at these schools get GCSE results one to two grades higher, so there is clearly a big upside to banning smartphones in schools. I urge the Government to seriously consider implementing this much needed restriction, which would be a game changer, protecting children and improving educational outcomes in one fell swoop. Our schools need this ban in statute, not just in guidance, in order to be able to effectively police and enforce it. I pay tribute to Smartphone Free Childhood for all its work to raise awareness on this important issue. In closing, I hope that Members will support the Bill today, which would move us forward in our mission to protect our children from an increasingly insidious online realm that they are simply not equipped to navigate. I also hope that this is just the beginning, and that in moving forward we will see the digital age of consent raised to 16 and a ban on smartphones in school. The value of those two changes alone would be huge for our society, and would safeguard the wellbeing of this and future generations of children. I cannot think of anything more important.

• 7 Mar 2025 · Protection of Children (Digital Safety and Data Protection) Bill · Hansard source

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  I am pleased to speak in support of the Bill. I must start by declaring an interest: I am a mother of three children who enjoy nothing more than staring at their screens day in, day out—if they could, they would be on them 24/7. No longer are our children clamouring to go out and play or to see their friends; instead, they want to do everything through a screen. They want to watch endless YouTube videos. I never realised that the unpacking of a toy or slime making could hold such interest. It seems that they take their joy in watching others do things online—even, rather bizarrely, playing computer games—instead of actually doing them in the real world. I would be a hypocrite if I did not call out my own behaviour on this front. I, too, am addicted to my phone. Yes, I need it for this job, so I can justify some of my use, but I often find myself endlessly doomscrolling, and I am too embarrassed to tell the House how many hours I spend staring at it every week. At least my addiction started when I was a fully developed adult, after a childhood of play and socialisation when I learned much-needed life skills. This generation of children is not so lucky. The huge amount of time spent online is incredibly damaging in so many ways. It is no coincidence that we see a mental health crisis in our young people at the same time as mass adoption of smartphones and access to social media. Some may underplay the importance of social media and screens in the challenges we face as a society, and indeed it can be difficult to conclusively prove the role of one particular factor in the effects we are seeing, but I suggest that when it comes to our children, we should always err on the side of caution and protect them from potentially harmful influences. In a recent survey, social media and excessive screen time was ranked as the top issue affecting children’s mental wellbeing. To put that in context, it was ranked higher than alcohol and bullying. Another significant risk to mental health is exposure to harmful online content. I am incredibly concerned about that, especially given the proliferation of extreme pornography, harmful content and unrealistic body images. If children spend all their time in this fantasy world that is completely disjointed from reality, of course it will change how they view people, relationships and the world in general. That is supported by Ofcom’s 2024 research, which showed that older teens are finding it harder to distinguish the real from the fake online. The more mundane things in life that do not trigger a dopamine hit seem an even less appealing way to spend time to a child jacked up on likes and shares. Children’s attention spans are getting shorter, and they have an ever-increasing need for higher levels of stimulation. Is it any wonder that our children seem less interested in reading a book or baking a cake nowadays? The evidence from Health Professionals for Safer Screens shows that children who routinely spend extended periods on their smartphones have poorer eyesight, inhibited speech and language development, interrupted sleep, and rising rates of anxiety. We are allowing our children to become addicts. Social media is designed with exactly that in mind. It is meant to be addictive and compelling. It wants users to stay online for prolonged periods and to keep engaging with content. Those of us who use it ourselves know this all to be true, so how on earth do we expect our children to manage and moderate appropriately? Ofcom’s 2024 research showed that the overall use of social media sites or apps among five to seven-year-olds had increased year on year. Online gaming among that group had also increased significantly, as had the watching of livestreamed content. Under current data protection law, the age at which children can access information society services—ISS—is 13. ISS includes most social media platforms and content streaming services. It is important to acknowledge that the Online Safety Act 2023 introduced protections for children by ensuring that online platforms will have to remove illegal content such as child sexual abuse material, prevent children from accessing harmful content—for example, that encouraging suicide, self-harm or bullying—and introduce age-checking measures to restrict access to pornographic material. Those are all very welcome improvements, but they need to be put in place at pace and be effectively enforced. I commend the hon. Member for Whitehaven and Workington (Josh MacAlister) for all his work on this important topic. I will do all I can to support him in making the online world safer for our children. The Bill is an important precursor to the myriad changes needed in this area, and I know that many parents will support him in calling for the digital age of consent to be looked at again. While the Bill does not call for the age limit to be raised to 16, it does call for the UK’s chief medical officer to look at this important issue in detail and, ultimately, issue a statement on whether it should be raised. Some 75% of Brits now back raising the minimum age from 13 to 16, as per a recent survey by More in Common, for all the reasons that have been raised today, and 129,000 people signed an e-petition calling for social media companies to be banned from letting children under 16 create social media accounts. It is past time for tech companies—and Members of this House—to take responsibility for keeping our children and young people safe. I am not normally in favour of blanket bans, and I often talk about the importance of parents and carers taking responsibility for their children. However, in this instance, I deviate a little. As a parent who is wrangling with this exact issue myself, I know how difficult it is to tell a child that they cannot do something that every single other child in their class is doing. If their group of friends interacts only online, what are the consequences for my child if I prohibit them from joining in? Isolation? Loneliness? Loss of self-esteem? There are very real costs that should not be underestimated, which is why the state needs to step in. Members will not often hear me say this, but the state needs to step in and remove the option for all, helping parents across the country who want the best for their children without the downsides.

• 5 Mar 2025 · Terminally Ill Adults (End of Life) Bill (Eighteenth sitting) · Hansard source

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  I thank the Minister for that useful explanation. Does he agree that the setting of the tariff will be key, because it could either incentivise or disincentivise the provision of the service?

• 5 Mar 2025 · Terminally Ill Adults (End of Life) Bill (Eighteenth sitting) · Hansard source

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  Does the Minister not think the word “remuneration” refers to the amount of income received specifically by the doctor, rather than by any organisation or company?

• 5 Mar 2025 · Terminally Ill Adults (End of Life) Bill (Nineteeth sitting) · Hansard source

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  That is a “may” rather than a “must”. I hope that we would move to “must” in that event.

• 5 Mar 2025 · Terminally Ill Adults (End of Life) Bill (Nineteeth sitting) · Hansard source

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  I thank the hon. Member for that point. There will absolutely be some occasions where that is the case, but assisted dying is a different pathway—and we have a whole Bill on it, so there will be other formalities and safeguards. We are all here to make sure that rigour is applied to that pathway. With the best will in the world, there will always be more work and pressure, especially time pressure, on doctors. That time pressure will be critical.

• 5 Mar 2025 · Terminally Ill Adults (End of Life) Bill (Nineteeth sitting) · Hansard source

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  I want to raise a question on photo ID. My apologies, I probably should have spoken sooner. Thinking this through as we have debated, I think photographic ID is important to avoid mistaken identity and fraud, and to make sure everything works as it should. With respect to this process, would the Minister normally expect photographic ID to be an acceptable or appropriate form of identification?

• 5 Mar 2025 · Terminally Ill Adults (End of Life) Bill (Nineteeth sitting) · Hansard source

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  Thank you, Mrs Harris. I rise to speak in support of amendment 257 and the associated amendments in this group, tabled by my hon. Friend the Member for West Worcestershire. They require that the request for assisted dying will not go ahead if there is a real risk that the eligibility criteria are not met. In reality, I would much prefer that the many amendments proposed to clause 1, to broaden coercion and pressure safeguards, to clause 2, to tighten the definition of terminal illness, and to clause 3, to raise the bar for capacity assessments, had been incorporated. In my view, that would have been the best way to improve the safeguards in the Bill. But we are where we are, so I am supporting this amendment, which puts in place an additional safeguard at the point when the doctor has performed the first assessment and is about to make the statement. If this Bill passes, we will be asking doctors to take a truly momentous decision: is the person standing in front of them, or whose documents they are reading through, going to be approved for an assisted death? The decision is momentous for them and even more for the applicant themselves, so it should be made on the firmest foundation possible. What is that foundation? The Bill sets out a number of criteria, which we have discussed in detail over the last few weeks, but it does not explain how sure the assessors need to be about some of them. There is no clear, consistent evidential standard, and many of the areas considered come down to estimation at the end of the day. A series of boxes, essentially, must be ticked by a trusted professional to determine whether someone is eligible for an assisted death. Under the Bill currently, the schedules specify that the doctors must be satisfied that the patient has a clear, settled and informed wish to end their own life and has made the first declaration voluntarily and that, to the best of their knowledge, the patient has not been coerced or pressured. I note that amendments have been tabled to remove the schedules; if those are agreed to, that could have an impact on some of what I am saying. Let us look at how easy it is for the component decisions, which appear innocuous in isolation, to add up to something monumental. A patient has been diagnosed with a terminal cancer that will undoubtedly end their life at some point. It is notoriously difficult to say, at this point, whether they have 18 months or just six months left to live. The margin of error can be significant, as we have heard previously in oral and written evidence. However, in this case, the doctor decides that six months is appropriate. The first checkbox is ticked. When assessed for capacity, the patient is confused and inconsistent, anxious and depressed. However, there is no diagnosed disturbance or disorder of the mind or brain, so on the balance of probabilities—the “51% sure” test—the doctor, although he or she has reservations, has to assess the patient as capacious. Sadly, that is undoubtedly the correct approach under clause 3 currently. A second checkbox is ticked. The doctor needs to form a view as to whether the patient has a clear, settled and informed wish to end their own life. Without mind reading abilities, that is a difficult thing for a doctor to opine on—they will rely heavily on what the patient says, as that is all they can really go on. The patient is saying all the right things to reassure the doctor on this front. The doctor might have a niggle about something, but again, they have enough to check the box and to meet the threshold: to the best of their knowledge. Finally, there is an even more difficult check. In the doctor’s opinion, has the patient been coerced or pressured? Again, the doctor does not necessarily know the patient very well or have a good understanding of the circumstances, and they are really busy, but they have not seen any overt signs of coercion. Everyone around the patient seems so lovely, so to the best of the doctor’s knowledge they should be comfortable and the checkbox gets ticked. At the end of this process, in which each criterion has been individually considered, the patient is clearly eligible. All the boxes are ticked.

• 5 Mar 2025 · Terminally Ill Adults (End of Life) Bill (Nineteeth sitting) · Hansard source

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  This is a complex issue, and that is why I welcome the debate on this group. There are lots of things that need to be thought through to make sure that, if assisted dying is legalised, we manage it in the most effective way for patients.

• 5 Mar 2025 · Terminally Ill Adults (End of Life) Bill (Nineteeth sitting) · Hansard source

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  rose—

• 5 Mar 2025 · Terminally Ill Adults (End of Life) Bill (Nineteeth sitting) · Hansard source

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  I think most points have been covered, so I will be brief. The point of the amendment 296 is to recognise the challenges faced by medical practitioners in the NHS. It is really well intended. I suspect that there are different ways to do this, which we could discuss, but the amendment would recognise that medical practitioners will come under a lot of pressure. The very nature of the assisted dying process means there is pressure to move quickly—for obvious reasons. If someone is in pain and an assisted death is what they have chosen to do, they are going to want to move forward at pace. It cannot be as usual, with however long it can take in the NHS—often for a normal procedure. The point of the amendment is simply to be cognisant of the fact that other patients, too, require healthcare. This comes back to the debate we have had many times about what is healthcare and what is not. It is one of the issues that comes up when we have assisted dying amalgamated with general healthcare in the NHS. We are hearing concerns from doctors on the frontline. In written evidence, eight doctors, six of them GPs, say that the NHS lacks both the time and the capacity to create the new role of co-ordinating doctor with its grave responsibilities. The statistics bear out their concerns. In a 2024 survey by the Royal College of General Practitioners, over 40% of UK GPs who responded said that they were “unlikely” to be practising still in five years’ time; 40% feel stressed to the point of “not coping” at least once a week; and 79% are concerned about having fewer GPs at their practice and its impact on the quality of care that their practice can deliver. The reality of the matter is that we have to recognise that the introduction of assisted dying places another pressure on our health system, and to try to address that head on.

• 5 Mar 2025 · Terminally Ill Adults (End of Life) Bill (Nineteeth sitting) · Hansard source

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  Different situations will give a different result. It is a complex situation. We could have a patient who, if they did not have an assisted death, would be on a palliative care pathway, which might not involve as much time from their GP—the assessing doctor, in that instance. If they moved on to the assisted dying pathway, however, the assessment process would need to start, and it has to happen quickly for all the reasons that I have set out. The Bill relies on doctors being highly conscientious and hard-working, but it also risks taking them for granted if it makes no allowance for the present realities that they face in our healthcare system. This amendment tries to reflect and recognise that. In November, the hon. Member for Stroud said, “I have watched with horror as our NHS has gone from being the best health service in the world…to being a service on its knees.” —[ Official Report , 6 November 2024; Vol. 756, c. 358.] If the NHS is to get off its knees, surely we cannot afford for assisted suicide to jeopardise the care of patients who already struggle to get an appointment. We must recognise that there are people out there who cannot get an appointment to see their GP, and reflect that in the Bill.

• 5 Mar 2025 · Terminally Ill Adults (End of Life) Bill (Nineteeth sitting) · Hansard source

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  Obviously, I am speaking to the Bill as is. I do not want to presume the result of any vote. I assume none of us here knows how a vote may go. All boxes checked, yet it is entirely possible that the margin of error could add up to the point where a doctor, when standing back and looking holistically at the situation, might feel there is sufficient risk to warrant not signing off. It is that niggle again—sometimes the sum of the parts is not the right answer. That is what amendment 257 seeks to do: to allow that the doctor that element of override discretion where there is a real risk that any of the eligibility requirements are not met. My understanding is that the “real risk” test is taken from the jurisprudence of the European Court of Human Rights. That Court has held that states are under a duty to protect an individual from suicide if they are aware of a real and immediate risk of suicide. Doctors are already required under the Human Rights Act to assess of when there is a real risk of suicide, so it is a familiar legal test, I believe. Ensuring that it applies to the eligibility criteria, in particular those dealing with autonomy and voluntariness, may strengthen the Bill, make it safer and help ensure compliance. I will welcome the Minister’s views, however, on whether the test is the right one legally given the spirit of what the amendment seeks to do. I appreciate that this is a technical legal point, and I am not a lawyer. I am also open to the argument that “real risk” might not be the appropriate test for every one of the eligibility criteria, so again a view from the Minister would be helpful. If the Government and the promoter of the Bill accept that this test should apply to the issues of capacity, clear and settled will, voluntariness, and absence of coercion or pressure, I will be happy for the Government to table a tidying amendment on Report to limit the test to those matters. My intention is to press the amendment to a vote and I hope that the Committee will join me in supporting it.

• 4 Mar 2025 · Terminally Ill Adults (End of Life) Bill (Seventeenth sitting) · Hansard source

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  I rise to speak in support of amendment 341 in the name of my hon. Friend the Member for Sleaford and North Hykeham. It would provide that a registered medical practitioner who is unable or unwilling to have the preliminary discussion must provide information to the patient about where they can have that discussion, but that need not take the form of a referral. One of the messages that we heard loud and clear in the evidence sessions was that medical practitioners do not wish to be put under an obligation to refer a patient to another registered medical practitioner by the Bill. “Referral” has a very specific meaning in medicine, and it is that word and the corresponding action required of it that many doctors have an issue with. A referral puts a patient on a pathway, whereas the provision of information merely indicates where such a pathway can be found. During oral evidence, Dr Green said: “The word ‘referral’, to a doctor, means writing a letter or communicating with another doctor to see, but some doctors would find themselves not able to do that. For that reason, we believe that there should be an information service for the doctor to direct to.” –– [ Official Report, Terminally Ill Adults (End of Life) Public Bill Committee, 28 January 2025; c. 48, Q41.] We are well aware that assisted dying is a complex issue and a matter of conscience for many. It is therefore important that we respect the personal views of medical practitioners. One of the points that I have made several times in these proceedings is that assisted dying affects not just the patient but other people participating and supporting. Some medical practitioners will be comfortable with it, but many others will not. It is therefore vital that we recognise their rights and needs, not just the patients’, when formulating this law. If for whatever reason a doctor does not want to refer a patient, they should not have to. Their legal responsibility should be limited to directing the patient to where they can find the relevant information that they need. Doctors should have no further obligation.

• 4 Mar 2025 · Terminally Ill Adults (End of Life) Bill (Seventeenth sitting) · Hansard source

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  I thank the hon. Lady for that intervention, which I welcome.

• 4 Mar 2025 · Terminally Ill Adults (End of Life) Bill (Seventeenth sitting) · Hansard source

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  I very much appreciate the opportunity, Mr Dowd. I will attempt to be brief. First, I welcome the acceptance of amendment 414, in the name of the hon. Member for Ipswich; of amendment 108, in the name of the hon. Member for East Thanet; of amendment 275, in the name of the hon. Member for Sunderland Central; and of amendment 341, in the name of my hon. Friend the Member for Sleaford and North Hykeham. The amendments strengthen the clause, so I thank Committee members for accepting them. I have one pertinent point to put on the record about clause 4. The clause deals with what is and is not included in the initial discussion with registered medical practitioners, so the definition of assisted dying, as well as what it actually is, becomes relevant to understanding what guidance does and does not come into play. During these proceedings, there has been a tendency to speak as if assisted dying were another type of treatment or healthcare option being offered by medical practitioners, rather than a completely different and separate offering. It has been said many times that assisted dying should be treated in the same way as any other treatment and that the existing guidance from the GMC sets out appropriate best practice and should applicable and relied on. I have some concerns about that, which I wish to put on the record. The legal norm, and GMC guidance, is that patients should be offered all reasonable medical treatments. A medical treatment can be defined as something that combats disease or disorder. It is fundamentally about healing, relief of symptoms, recovery and cure, so straightaway we have a conflict. Assisted dying ends the life of a person; it is not a treatment in the normal sense of the word. It is important that it is not a treatment, so that doctors are not obliged to offer it in the same way that they would offer another, more normal, medical treatment. The Association for Palliative Medicine’s written evidence covers the point: “A crucial question is whether or not assisted death by lethal medication is considered to be a medical treatment. Given that doctors are required to assess eligibility for, prescribe, and be present at the administration of the medication, AD might be considered to be a ‘medical treatment’. If this is the case then either assisted dying should be offered to all people meeting the eligibility criteria, or doctors need to behave differently towards this medical treatment than to all other treatments. Both of these approaches are contrary to all prior medical practice and public expectation, and laden with risks of unintended consequences. The APM recommends that if AD is implemented in England & Wales it is done outside of ‘usual medical practice’ and is not regarded as medical treatment.” This is because there are detrimental consequences from classifying assisted dying as treatment and relying on guidance. First, it could undermine the doctor-patient relationship by confusing the distinction between healing and ending life. Patients who are used to looking to their caregivers for help may worry that they will instead be put on a pathway to an assisted death. That could deter them from seeking medical help when they need it. Dr Jamilla Hussain spoke powerfully on that point, so I will not repeat it. Secondly, the word “treatment” currently has largely positive connotations. If the word starts to be used for assisted dying, its meaning will change entirely. I wonder about the intersection with other pieces of guidance and law that refer to treatment, for example where treatment can legally be given without the consent of the patient. We all agree that assisted dying should never be administered without consent, but that is why we must be careful with our language and definitions. In certain situations, treatment can lawfully be given without consent, so it must follow that, to protect against the risk of unintended consequences, assisted dying is not deemed to be a treatment. I ask the Minister’s view on that risk—I note that there is no reference in the Bill to assisted dying being a treatment, which is really good news—and his advice on how best to ensure that assisted dying is not and will never be considered a treatment as a consequence of the Bill or of any other statute or guidance. I also ask his view on the appropriateness of relying so heavily on GMC guidance for best practice, as I imagine that that guidance could change at any point without the consent of Parliament.

• 4 Mar 2025 · Terminally Ill Adults (End of Life) Bill (Seventeenth sitting) · Hansard source

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  I rise to speak briefly to amendments 413 and 414, which are very thoughtful and well-considered amendments. I thank the right hon. Member for Dwyfor Meirionnydd for setting out powerfully and persuasively the importance of the subject. I support the amendments, but in reality we probably need to go further by specifying exactly who would be interpreting and making sure that it is regulated reliably. We do not want just anyone coming in off the street and doing that. That would not be appropriate, so we need to think about whether we need to go further. However, the amendments are a great starting point and would move us closer to where we need to be. There is much subtlety in this debate. We talked a little in the first week of this Committee about the importance of language and the words that are used. We always need to be cognisant that when we are imparting information to people, particularly in a healthcare context, it is vital that we use language that people understand so that the ramifications of what is being discussed are clear. That is where these amendments become really important, because for those for whom English is not their first language, some of the subtlety and nuance around what a term means could be lost. Interpreters could be an important part of adding the clarity required to ensure that everyone going through the process understands exactly what it involves. A 2024 Nuffield Council on Bioethics survey found that 39% of people think that assisted dying means withdrawing life support, 19% think that it means providing people who are dying with drugs that relieve symptoms of pain or suffering, and 13% think that it means providing hospice care. That echoes our debate a couple of weeks ago about how assisted dying can be interpreted in quite a few different ways. It is really important that we are clear in the language we use and what we mean by it. We also find that among ethnic minorities there is sometimes a greater misunderstanding about palliative care. A 2024 King’s College London survey found that 6% of people believe that it is accurate that palliative care involves giving people medicines in order to shorten their life, but 18% of ethnic minority groups think that. We need to be cognisant of that. While 18% of people trust healthcare providers “not very much” or “not at all” to provide high-quality care towards the end of life, that figure increases to 30% for ethnic minority groups. While 6% of people say they have not heard of palliative care, that increases to 22% of people in ethnic minority groups. It is important to recognise that the text of the amendment is much less stringent than that of section 7 of South Australia’s Voluntary Assisted Dying Act 2021, which strictly regulates interpreters. That goes back to my initial point. Under the South Australian law, they must be “accredited by a prescribed body”. They cannot be a family member, cannot stand to benefit from the will and cannot be involved in the patient’s healthcare. It is really important to ensure that a recognised professional is involved in this most important of processes and information sharing. I support the amendments, although I think they need to go a little further. I look forward to hearing what other hon. Members have to say.

• 4 Mar 2025 · Terminally Ill Adults (End of Life) Bill (Sixteenth sitting) · Hansard source

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  I appreciate the opportunity to speak briefly, Mr Efford. Many other speakers have already made excellent points in support of the amendments, so I will not repeat them, but I would like to put on record one pertinent point. During these proceedings, there has been a tendency by some to speak as though assisted dying were another type of treatment or healthcare option being offered by medical practitioners, rather than a completely different and separate offering. I have grave concerns about that. The legal norm, and GMC guidance, is that patients should be offered all reasonable medical treatments. A medical treatment can be defined as something that combats disease or disorder. It is fundamentally about healing, relief of symptoms, recovery and cure. Straightaway, we have a conflict. Assisted dying ends the life of a person. It is not a treatment in the normal sense—

• 4 Mar 2025 · Terminally Ill Adults (End of Life) Bill (Sixteenth sitting) · Hansard source

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  Okay. I will just put it on the record that whether or not something is a medical treatment is vital. It is possible to give medical treatments without consent, so we need to have that debate.

• 4 Mar 2025 · Terminally Ill Adults (End of Life) Bill (Sixteenth sitting) · Hansard source

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  I can wait until the stand part debate.

• 4 Mar 2025 · Terminally Ill Adults (End of Life) Bill (Sixteenth sitting) · Hansard source

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  We are talking about what a medical practitioner can and cannot say. During the debate, there was a lot of talk about whether it was a medical treatment or not. If so, guidance indicates how it should be treated, so whether it is a medical treatment or not is relevant and pertinent to the clause. I have an important point that I would like to put on the record; I am happy to raise it at a different point, but I honestly believe that clause 4 is the right place.

• 4 Mar 2025 · Terminally Ill Adults (End of Life) Bill (Sixteenth sitting) · Hansard source

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  I am. It is relevant, because we are talking—

• 26 Feb 2025 · Terminally Ill Adults (End of Life) Bill (Fifteenth sitting) · Hansard source

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  The Minister has used the word “new” several times, and that is the crux of our argument: this is a new approach and a new process. Does the Minister agree that it warrants a different, more robust approach to looking at capacity?

• 26 Feb 2025 · Terminally Ill Adults (End of Life) Bill (Fifteenth sitting) · Hansard source

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  Should the Government not be neutral on what framework for capacity the Committee might like to apply?

• 26 Feb 2025 · Terminally Ill Adults (End of Life) Bill (Fifteenth sitting) · Hansard source

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  I am so sorry, Mrs Harris.