Kieran Mullan MP: speeches

Speeches

• 16 Apr 2026 · Courts and Tribunals Bill (Sixth sitting) · Hansard source

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  Yes, but the question is not whether the six-year sentence is reasonable, it is whether the mode of trial in reaching that sentence was fair. The Government agree that the preferable mode of trial in all other scenarios that could lead to a sentence of six years is a trial with a jury. Yet we could have people expecting a three-year sentence and ending up with a six-year one, which is far from the Government’s test of reasonableness for the mode of trial. I understand the point about weighing probabilities with the smaller gap, but we are faced with the question of allowing either no gaps or very big gaps. If we are forced to choose, I will continue to say that we support amendment 42, because it is important that people do not end up in that situation. I do not know the limit; I have given an example of three to six years, but there could be even wider gaps among the offences that we are considering. That would not be reasonable, and, therefore this safeguard is important. Question put, That the amendment be made.

• 16 Apr 2026 · Courts and Tribunals Bill (Sixth sitting) · Hansard source

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  We are still no further forward on understanding the three-strikes cases that I talked about.

• 16 Apr 2026 · Courts and Tribunals Bill (Sixth sitting) · Hansard source

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  This is a great opportunity for me to learn and understand an element of the system that I did not understand—I know about it, rather than understand it. I will go back to the point that we have made repeatedly. We are designing a system from scratch here. We have the opportunity to do things exactly as we want to. We do not have to be forced into replicating other elements of the wider system; we can design this system as we best think it should operate. I think that the best thing in this scenario, in which we are starting from scratch, would be to say to somebody that they should be able to derive the benefit of having a jury trial if the case is of a nature that the Government themselves agree would typically enjoy the benefits of a jury trial. This is just inherently a fairness question. That is why we have replicated the process—in a positive way—in a magistrates court. The decision is the decision that has been made; the court cannot go above it. That is because we say that in a magistrates court, if someone seeks to go above that court, that is not the right place to do that; it would not be fair and reasonable. We are making a similar point here in relation to mode of trial, for jury trial. We think that the amendment is sensible, reasonable, balanced and does not prevent the Government from undertaking their reforms; it is not what could possibly be described as a wrecking amendment. I hope that the Government will reflect on that and accept the amendment.

• 16 Apr 2026 · Courts and Tribunals Bill (Sixth sitting) · Hansard source

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  That was not the point I was seeking to make, so I thank the hon. Lady for clarifying. I sometimes wonder what victims think. Do they sometimes follow a case, hear the evidence and then think it should be getting more than the magistrates’ limits? Do they question whether the magistrates, who have a preliminary view about whether the case will hit a certain maximum at the outset, have come to the trial with some degree of bias about what outcome might be? Do they think the magistrates would therefore have some reluctance, even having heard the evidence in full, to pass a sentence that is beyond their powers and send the case up? Of course, magistrates do reallocate sentencing. As we have said, just because I feel there is a risk of a perception of bias does not mean I think we should scrap the whole lot and never let magistrates pass a sentence, but seeing that things are not perfect on balance does not mean that we accept them. These proposals will add a degree of seriousness because of the potentially significant differences between possible sentence lengths. The sentencing guidelines for the offences are narrower than we will perhaps see with triable either-way cases, which have already been curtailed at a certain level of seriousness and might go up to an even greater level of seriousness. If the clause passes unamended, the scenario could be as follows. A Crown court judge will receive an outline of the case, and make an initial judgment on the likely sentence outcome. They will decide, for a triable either-way offence, whether a sentence is likely to be more than three years. That same judge could then hear that case. That is the same judge whom a victim or bereaved family member could reasonably—perhaps not correctly, but reasonably—perceive on some level had already made a decision about the case, because of course they have: they have taken an initial view of the case and on what the outcome was likely to be. Importantly, that is not something that happens in any way shape or form with the jury trial system, where the two things are separate. We all agree that perception as well as reality is important in our justice system. It is possible that some victims or bereaved family members might question whether the judge, who formed a view, is not best placed to then objectively and fairly decide what the actual sentence should be, if it should be longer than three years. They might even be concerned that passing a sentence of more than three years would suggest that they had got it wrong in their initial view. Again, we do not have to form a view about how likely or unlikely that is; we should form a view on what the perception of that will be. As politicians, we are very used to the concept that perception is important. Even if someone has not necessarily done something wrong, whether the public perceive that they might have done something wrong is important. All that can be readily and simply avoided through our amendment, which would introduce a separation of powers, as I have described it. This is a modest and narrow amendment. It will provide a greater degree of confidence in the new system; even if the Minister is happy to proceed with the system, I am sure she would accept that it has generated questions and debates about rights and impartiality. This amendment is a very simple and modest way in which the Minister can minimise that. I know she wants maximum possible confidence in the new system, so I hope our amendment achieves that and that she can support it. As we are still discussing allocations and who will or will not be allocated to different parts of the court, I would also be grateful if the Minister could provide clarity on triable either-way offences, such as drug dealing and burglary offences, where multiple versions go into the Crown court at the moment. What will happen to those cases in relation to allocation as part of the new division?

• 16 Apr 2026 · Courts and Tribunals Bill (Sixth sitting) · Hansard source

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  Does the PPS want to intervene? No, I did not think so. As we have agreed, judicial review exists for an allocation decision by the magistrates. The Minister has quite rightly set out that that is a very high bar and is not a right of appeal. In that regard, the Minister is fair to say that our amendment is not directly comparable. I put it to the Minister, and I made this point earlier, that it would be the Crown court making an allocation decision. It is not allowed, as it is in a magistrates court, to use judicial review to challenge a decision made, like at the PTPH, on allocation. That is an incredibly important point that all Members must understand. If the Minister is going to say that people are not allowed a general right of appeal—we do not agree with that, but it is a legitimate argument—that is one thing. But if the Minister is saying that people are going to lose the high bar of challenge that exists at the magistrates court, that is incredibly important. We need to understand that because, as I have said, it is a high bar, but it exists for a reason.

• 16 Apr 2026 · Courts and Tribunals Bill (Sixth sitting) · Hansard source

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  Sorry—with confidence. The Minister says she is happy to go away and double-check. She should know for certain whether people have a right to a judicial review of an allocation decision in the Crown court, as in the magistrates court. She should be able to tell us that with absolute certainty. I have been the Parliamentary Private Secretary for a Minister, passing notes between officials and the Minister. That is why debates are structured in the way they are: earlier in the debate, someone raises a point of importance in their opening remarks, and that gives time to the Minister, working with their officials. I absolutely accept that the Minister will not always have things at the tips of their fingers, but that is why the officials are there, to liaise with the Department. I am not criticising the officials, but why have we not had a direct note so that the Minister can get up and say, clearly and confidently, with absolute certainty, that there is a right of appeal to a Crown court allocation decision?

• 15 Apr 2026 · Cost of Heating Oil · Hansard source

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  The Minister has made the point about wanting a simple scheme that he could get into place rapidly, but he did not put enough money into it, and there was no reason in terms of speed why he could not do that.

• 15 Apr 2026 · Cost of Heating Oil · Hansard source

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  On a point of order, Dr Allin-Khan. I should have declared an interest as a heating oil user and someone directly involved.

• 15 Apr 2026 · Cost of Heating Oil · Hansard source

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  I am grateful for this opportunity to talk about heating oil in my constituency. About 10% of its households are on heating oil and they have spoken directly to me, both by email and by filling in a survey—I am grateful to everyone who filled in that survey—telling me how much of an impact the issue is having. We are talking about hundreds and hundreds of pounds being added to household bills. One lady told me: “We usually pay around £200-£250 per fill up of our small tank, which we need to fill up 2-3” times “a year. We’re now at nearly empty and our recent quote has been £750” for a fill-up. She continues: “I’m 9 months pregnant, about to go onto a reduced wage and will not be able to afford an additional £1500 this year for oil. Our oil covers both heating and water which are both necessary for looking after a newborn and the rest of our family.” The challenge that constituents put to me and the challenge to the Government is about fairness, because at the same time as they are talking about further help for households, on all sorts of supplies, in a targeted manner, everyone is benefiting from the cap that is available to ordinary bill payers, and my constituents say to me, “We are not getting anything like that kind of help.” Although the amount of money that the Government have announced is welcome, it is a drop in the ocean. Per heating oil household, it is something like £30 or £35. If it is targeted, as it will be in my constituency, it is a few hundred pounds for certain households. As I have just illustrated with one example, that will not touch the sides of the additional bills that people are having to pay. We are talking about a huge increase in bills and a lack of Government responsiveness, and this has already happened to people. Future help is welcome, but already many people are forced to pay hundreds and hundreds of pounds that they had not anticipated and budgeted for. That means vulnerable people, people on median incomes, are sitting with their heating turned off and worried about whether they can afford their bills for the rest of the year, so it is vital that the Government listen much more strongly to the thousands and thousands of people across the south-east and the many more across the country who simply cannot afford to pay hundreds and hundreds of pounds in additional bills out of nowhere in the way they are having to.

• 14 Apr 2026 · Courts and Tribunals Bill (Third sitting) · Hansard source

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  Indeed. I hope that the Minister can start to address the figures from the Criminal Bar Association, in particular, and to articulate whether she agrees or disagrees with them. If she disagrees, why? As the Criminal Bar Association makes clear, if the Government had sight of that data—they would have known ahead of the Committee’s evidence sessions, and potentially some of the earlier stages of the Bill, that those figures were coming down—why did they choose not to make such potentially important information available to those of us considering the Bill? It is not helpful for Members to quote waits of four or five years for people to get to trial when, in fact, those figures can relate to the delay between the alleged offence and sentencing. Yes, waits for trial from the point of charge are too long, but that is just part of the picture. Of course, the obvious weakness in the Government’s arguments that this is a measure to tackle what we should all consider to be a temporary problem—getting back to our historical court waiting times—is that these measures are permanent, without any plan to reverse them when the backlog is down to pre-pandemic levels. As I have said, we have precedent for that. During world war two, when we made changes to the number of people sitting on juries, we reversed those changes when the crisis was resolved. The Government have announced an intention to recruit and train a further 2,000 magistrates in the next financial year. That is welcome, but recruiting and training magistrates takes time, and, in fact, the delays in the magistrates courts themselves loom over us. On the other hand, the Bar Council rightly points out how many barristers have left the profession. Those are trained, ready-to-go professionals, choosing not to practise criminal law, who could quite easily return to criminal practice, compared with having to train a magistrate from scratch. What is missing from the Government’s approach is any serious attempt to make the most of the capacity that we already have. Court sitting days are still being wasted. Yesterday alone, 58 out of 515 Crown courtrooms sat empty—that is 11%. I am sure that, as we go through the day and proceedings move forward, we will get the figures for today. I imagine that those will be in line with every other day that the Idle Courts X account, which I think those of us following this debate have become great admirers of, shows day in, day out: Crown courtrooms sitting empty. Trials also still collapse due to basic administrative failures. None of the problems are solved by curtailing the right to elect. As I have said, only a few years ago the Justice Secretary described jury trials as fundamental to our democracy—a sentiment that every Member of this House must share—yet now, in office, he appears willing to curtail them in the name of expediency. This proposal also was not in the Labour manifesto at the election. A change of this nature—an unprecedented erosion of a fundamental right that we have all enjoyed for hundreds and hundreds of years—was not in that manifesto. I think that makes it extremely difficult for the Government to insist, particularly in the Lords, where I am sure very many Members will have serious concerns, that they have any kind of democratic mandate to push through these reforms. Of course, we have been here before. In what will come as little surprise to many Members, just as with Labour’s current proposals to fatally weaken the punitive elements of our justice system by letting serious violent and sexual offenders out of prison earlier, Jack Straw, the then Justice Secretary, also proposed removing the right to a jury trial in either-way offences when Labour was last in office. As is the case today, Members across the House and stakeholders fought against, and successfully defeated, those proposals. We can therefore do away with the pretence that this is entirely the workings of an independent figure in Sir Brian Leveson. Although I have no doubt that he came to his conclusions independently, I imagine that those old proposals had been sat in the Ministry of Justice, waiting for the right Minister for civil servants to press this idea on, and they found that in our Justice Secretary and our Prime Minister. We would be right to fear that it is the thin end of the wedge. Often such arguments are hypothetical: we say, “Well, we think this is the thin end of the wedge; some future Government or future Minister will want to go further.” Thanks to the plans being leaked, we know what the current Justice Secretary wanted to do. He wanted to go much further than even the proposals we see before us by removing jury trials for offences carrying sentences of up to five years—five years! Where will the Government go next if they succeed with these proposals? Sir Brian Leveson’s review made clear that the estimate of a 20% reduction in trial times is subject to what he described as “very high levels of uncertainty”. That uncertainty reads across to the other measures, including clause 1, which we are considering today. He said that it was very important that the Government undertook further detailed analysis before moving ahead with those proposals. When I put that to him during evidence, he simply said—I am paraphrasing but I think it is a fair and accurate description—that that is now a matter for the Government, and he was not willing to be drawn on whether they had actually done that further detailed analysis. I brought up the main additional piece of analysis that the Ministry undertook, which was a stakeholder engagement exercise—not a typical one that seeks to measure and come up with firm outcomes. It found that the time saving was between 10% and 30%, so there is a huge variation in what the Government may or may not achieve, and, fundamentally, it is potentially very different from what even Sir Brian recommended. Jury trials are not an obstacle to justice; they are a safeguard against its abuse. They ensure that the most serious power that the state holds—the power to convict and imprison—is exercised, where possible, with the consent and involvement of the public. If we allow that safeguard to be weakened, we should not be surprised when public trust in the justice system continues to erode. The answer to a justice system in crisis is not to strip away centuries-old protections; it is to make the system work as it should. That is why the proposals are wrong and should be opposed. If the Government are serious about reducing backlogs, there are obvious steps they could take that do not involve weakening constitutional safeguards. I will come back to those at further stages, but I draw Members’ attention to the evidence given by the operations director in His Majesty’s Courts and Tribunals Service—the civil servant in charge of making our courts run more smoothly, efficiently and productively. I asked him what he thought were the priorities for bringing down the Crown court backlog. He mentioned lifting the cap on sitting days. He welcomed that and said it made a big difference. The other examples he gave were improvements to prison transport and to listing. None of those priorities had anything to do with jury trials. The man charged with making our system run more efficiently, when asked to list his key priorities, did not say anything to do with jury trials in his first four points. As I have said, a second report from Sir Brian goes through a whole range of measures that will improve the efficiency and productivity of our courts. We have some further amendments for later stages to tease out some of those, and I look forward to considering them. Let us be clear. The burden on this Government is extremely high, as it should be, to make the case for unprecedented changes to halve the number of individuals able to have a jury trial. The Government could have spent time—two or three years—hammering the uncontroversial things that have political consensus and are able to make a difference. They could have looked at Liverpool Crown court, which does not have a historical backlog. As Sir Brian said in his evidence, to some extent, every court has a backlog of cases waiting to be heard, which is helpful for managing those cases, but there are normal levels of waiting time that are accepted without people having to go back to the judge and ask for more time. As I understand it, the Minister has not visited Liverpool Crown court in the last 12 to 18 months. She can correct me if I am wrong. I do not think the Deputy Prime Minister has visited Liverpool Crown court either.

• 14 Apr 2026 · Courts and Tribunals Bill (Third sitting) · Hansard source

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  Absolutely. I have been very careful in writing my speech to not say that and to be clear about that. Again, when we have had debates about people causing the backlog and holding up justice for other victims, there is an inherent assumption that everybody who has been accused is guilty. Of course, we know that is not the case. As I said, Members should think about the two cases I cited and decide whether it would be fair and just for the individual who has so much more to lose to lose their ability to seek the mode of trial that we have articulated—the mode that Members of the Government are articulating is the fairest way of deciding things—when the person with the repeat record, who does not have a reputation or job to lose, gets to continue doing all the things that the Government have said are wrong, such as holding up trials in other, more serious cases. Members who have read ahead may think that there is some overlap between our amendment and the way in which I have articulated it and amendment 24, tabled in the name of the hon. Member for Bolton South and Walkden, and they would be right. Our thinking is the same. Our intention and the issues we are trying to elucidate are the same. Of course, we know that we are joined politically in our views on this issue, not by the Ministers in their former articulation of what is important to them, but by 37 Labour MPs who signed a letter in opposition to the erosion of our jury trial rights by clause 1 and other similar clauses. I will name just a few of them: the Mother of the House and the hon. Members for Leeds East (Richard Burgon), for Walthamstow (Ms Creasy), for Liverpool Riverside (Kim Johnson), for Salford (Rebecca Long Bailey), for Liverpool Wavertree (Paula Barker) and for Norwich North (Alice Macdonald). They are very far away from me on the political spectrum—some of them could not be further away—but, along with their other colleagues, they are clear that the proposals are wrong, and I wholeheartedly agree with them on that. Those Members—Labour Members—rightly say that these proposals are “madness” and will cause more problems than they solve and that the public will not stand for this erosion of a fundamental right, particularly given that there are numerous other things that the Government can do more effectively to reduce the backlog. I guess that where there are 37 Labour MPs willing to put their name to a letter, there are many more concerned in private, and I am sure that various Members were allowed to be absent from the estate for some of our earlier votes. I ask Government Members to think about their colleagues and the difficult position that they will put them in if clause 1 and associated clauses are passed. The Government have quite simply failed to articulate why these proposals are the only way forward. The Government might have received a more sympathetic reception had they truly exhausted all the other options—if they had stretched every sinew since their election to tackle this issue.

• 14 Apr 2026 · Courts and Tribunals Bill (Third sitting) · Hansard source

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  Will the Minister give way?

• 14 Apr 2026 · Courts and Tribunals Bill (Third sitting) · Hansard source

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  The hon. Gentleman’s question articulates the gap between what the Opposition and the Government think about these issues. Actually, for a case like the first example, the sentence passed will be almost irrelevant to the person. If they are found guilty and convicted of an offence, they will suffer all the consequences that I have talked about whatever sentence they are given. Such consequences do not exist for the individual in the second example; they do not have employment or a reputation to lose. The Government also often portray the assumption that people are guilty—if they are accused, they are guilty. The whole point of the jury trial system is to allow what we have all agreed, at some point and in some ways, is the fairest and most balanced way to determine guilt. The Justice Secretary himself has talked in detail about how it is the fairest way to determine guilt. When someone’s decision is going to have huge consequences for the accused’s life, it is perfectly reasonable for people to want the fairest mode of determining that guilt.

• 14 Apr 2026 · Courts and Tribunals Bill (Third sitting) · Hansard source

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  Will the Minister give way?

• 14 Apr 2026 · Courts and Tribunals Bill (Third sitting) · Hansard source

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  It is a pleasure to have you with us, Ms Jardine, and I look forward to this first of many Committee sittings. I am pleased to begin line-by-line scrutiny of the Bill, beginning with clause 1 and the Opposition amendment tabled in my name. The clause is a helpful place to start our considerations because it cuts straight to the core of our concerns and criticisms, many of which are similar and run through our opposition to many of the other clauses. The clause will amend subsections (2) and (9) of section 20 of the Magistrates’ Courts Act 1980 to remove the requirement for the defendant to consent to their case remaining in the magistrates court for summary trial. In effect, that will remove the ability of a defendant charged with an either-way offence to elect trial by jury in the Crown court. This is one of the key changes that add up to reforms that represent an unprecedented erosion of our right to trial by jury, which is, without doubt, one of our oldest and most important traditions. It has been with us for hundreds and hundreds of years, bordering on the amount of time one might typically consider to make it an ancient right, as some people refer to it. No wonder that right has become so valuable when we compare it to what went before. For about 500 years before the beginnings of what became the jury trial system, we had trial by ordeal. Guilt was determined by God through his unseen hand in the outcome of events, unrelated to considering in any way what happened or what we might consider evidence. The two main forms this took were trial by fire and trial by water. For trial by fire, the accused had to carry a red-hot iron bar and walk 9 feet. If the wound healed within three days, they were innocent, but if it festered, they were guilty. For trial by water, the accused was plunged into a pool of water on a rope with a knot tied in it a long hair’s length away from the defendant. If they sank to the depth of that knot, the water was deemed to have been accepting of them and their innocence, but if they floated, the water was rejecting them, rendering them guilty. There was of course also trial by combat, or wager of battle, a fight between the accused and the accuser, which was introduced by the Normans in 1066. Although they were invested in the wisdom of God and the Church, it was actually the gradual withdrawal and ultimate banning of the participation of the Church that brought an end to such practices. But that is not to say that even within those practices there was not some sense of allowing the views of others to play a role. Dr Will Eves, a research fellow at the University of St Andrews’ school of history, said that the key to the ordeal was the interpretation of the result. The community would probably have had some idea whether someone had actually committed the crime and would interpret accordingly. He said: “In trial by hot iron, the issue wasn’t if the iron had caused a wound but rather how it had healed. So that’s a much more nuanced issue, much more open to interpretation. Whether the wound was festering was a judgment which could be influenced by the community’s knowledge of the individual involved and their awareness of the broader circumstances of the case.” The wider involvement of the community then took the form of testaments to character, rather than a careful examination of the facts, as a basis for determining guilt. On 26 January 1219, King Henry III issued an edict, and trial by petty jury was born in England, but it was its precursor that introduced the idea of 12 individuals that is still with us today. In 997, King Æthelred issued the Wantage code, which determined that 12 noblemen—of course, it was just men—be tasked with the investigation of a crime. It is an extraordinary testament to the legacy and enduring nature of such proposals that a core element of that kernel of an idea, with 12 individuals at the heart of the system, remains more than 1,000 years later. Prior to the petty jury reforms, there were other forms of jury—for example, to investigate land disputes—but guilt was still determined by trial by ordeal. The reforms made by King Henry III are rightly considered one of our most important cultural, and we might even say civilisational, inheritances. The concept and approach has, in some form, been spread around the world to more than 50 countries. In 1956, the legal philosopher Patrick Devlin said: “For of all the institutions that have been created by English law, there is none other that has a better claim to be called…the privilege of the Common People of the United Kingdom”. Committee members may have noted that the 1219 edict came after the often quoted Magna Carta declaration of 1215. That declaration was a precursor to the fundamental idea behind what became jury trials and the 1219 edict: the idea that the judgment of an individual should be made by their peers. The barons had in mind the importance of protecting people from the heavy hand of the King, but their instincts are reflected neatly in all those who now have concerns about the power of the state in all its forms, including the judicial system that collectively holds the power that then sat with the King. The Bill asks us to consider reforms to ideals and protections hard fought and won for us, for very good reason, many hundreds of years ago. That fact alone should give us reason to tread carefully. Of course, as we have heard in earlier debates and the Committee’s evidence sessions, the use of jury trials is not absolute. The form a jury trial takes varies across the countries that adopted it, and our system has undergone reform. It is fair to say that the debate is not absolute or black and white. The majority of criminal cases in this country are decided by magistrates, whose role and importance were solidified in the modern era by the Magistrates’ Courts Act 1952 and the Magistrates’ Courts Act 1980. Although the Government and their supporters might say it, we are not arguing that we should turn back the clock, or that all those currently seen by magistrates should be seen by jury trials instead, but let us consider the nature and manner of the reforms made in the modern era that remain in place today. Changes were made during world war two. At a time when our nation faced one of its greatest threats, when our continued existence as a free state was uncertain and when every effort was turned toward winning the war, what did we do? Did we radically cut down on jury trials? No. The number of jury trials and what cases would or would not be considered by them remained completely unchanged. The change was made to the number of jurors, which was reduced from 12 to seven. What did the Government of the day do as soon as the Nazi threat was defeated? They put it back up to 12. In more recent memory we had the covid pandemic, a challenge sometimes equated in seriousness to world war two. When every aspect of our society, public life and freedoms were massively curtailed in a way that was completely unprecedented, did we permanently get rid of jury trials? No. There was cross-party consensus that we should do everything we could to maintain jury trials. We invested millions of pounds in Nightingale courts, alongside other measures, to allow jury trials to continue as soon as they could, without making any permanent change to the law and individuals’ right to access jury trials. Labour Members will no doubt point to the changes on triable either-way offences, similar to the proposals in clause 1, that were made in the 1980s, but done differently, via offence reclassification. The changes covered common assault where no one was injured, joyriding and lower-level criminal damage, and research shows that they led to a 5% drop in the number of cases that headed to the Crown court. These are questions of gradation, and the reforms in the Bill are unprecedented in their impact and completely incomparable with those changes. The Government’s own analysis says that they will result in a halving of the number of jury trials. Who else might we turn to in support of our view that labelling the erosion of a right as a reform and realigning the dial further and further away from where we are now cannot be seen as a minor act? We can turn to many members of the Government, and the Prime Minister himself, to support our view. On limiting jury trials, the Under-Secretary of State for Justice, the hon. Member for Rother Valley (Jake Richards) said: “Instead of weakening a key constitutional right, the government should do the hard work.” The Justice Secretary said: “The right of an individual to be punished only as a result of the “lawful judgement of his equals” was enshrined in Magna Carta of 1215. Yes, this right only extended to a certain group of men, but it laid the foundation of a principle which is now fundamental to the justice system of England and Wales.” He also said: “Jury trials are fundamental to our democracy. We must protect them.” Finally, he said: “Jury trials are a fundamental part of our democratic settlement. Criminal trials without juries are a bad idea.” That is what the Deputy Prime Minister, Justice Secretary and lead proponent of the reforms has said. Finally the Prime Minister has said that the “general and overriding presumption should be jury trial, with very, very limited exceptions”, and that “The right to trial by jury is an important factor in the delicate balance between the power of the state and the freedom of the individual. The further it is restricted, the greater the imbalance.” There we have it. They all understood that these are questions of balance. The Government are simply on the wrong side of that balance with the reforms in the Bill, including clause 1. That is not just because of the scale and gravity of the changes, but because of the other ways forward and other approaches, as yet untested but available to them. The Opposition’s approach in Committee, on this clause and others, is therefore straightforward. We will test whether the Government have correctly diagnosed the problem, whether the evidence supports the proposed solution, whether the safeguards being removed are proportionate to the gains claimed, and whether other options are available. Those are the fundamental questions. Of course, we will not forget that, despite everything else Government Members said previously, the reforms were born of necessity and that the Minister believes they are positive improvements to our justice system regardless. The Government have estimated that clause 1 and other clauses will reduce Crown court sitting days by 27,000 a year while increasing magistrates court sitting days by 8,500. They think the provisions will reduce the open Crown court caseload by around 14,000 cases, and cost £338 million between 2024-25 and 2034-35. However, several stakeholders have criticised the assumptions and models that the Government used to produce the estimates, particularly in respect of how much time jury-only trials would save. Cassia Rowland of the Institute for Government has said that the total impact of the Government’s proposals on court demand is “likely to be around a 7-10% reduction in total time taken in the courtroom”. She therefore considered that improving court efficiency, “an alternative which enjoys broad support across the sector and which could begin much faster”, provided “opportunities for meaningful improvements”. She said that implementing such efficiencies “alongside more moderate proposals to handle some more cases in magistrates’ courts…would be less likely to provoke backlash.” I could not agree with her more. The Criminal Bar Association has criticised the “over-optimism” of the impact assessment, describing the Government statement that the Bill would only increase magistrates court demand by 8,500 days as “astonishing”. It says: “The assumptions are that magistrates will complete each of these trials within four hours and guilty pleas/sentences within 30 minutes. Is there is an expectation that magistrates will be dispensing rough justice when they have these more complex, more serious cases allocated to them? Or are the assumptions in the Impact Assessment simply wrong?” I think they are. Let us be clear: the Government would have us believe that 27,000 crown court sitting days can simply be converted into just 8,500 magistrates sitting days. Clause 1 represents a fundamental shift in the balance between the citizen and the state. At present, a defendant in an either-way case has the right to elect trial by jury. The clause removes that right entirely, with the decision resting solely with the magistrates court, depending on likely sentence length. We object to the clause in its entirety, but we have also sought to put forward meaningful changes through amendment 38, which would simply allow the defendant to demonstrate that, in the particular circumstances of their case, trial without a jury would breach the principles of natural justice. What current examples of violations of natural justice do we envision and hope this safeguard can protect against? Let us consider two theoretical cases of offenders, both facing trial for theft. This may be an opportune moment to point out that some of the examples used by Government Members to demonstrate the irrationality of Crown court time being frequently taken up by theft offences betray a lack of understanding of what happens in terms of the likely disposals in such cases. Nevertheless, as it seems such a popular example, I am happy to use it. In the first example, we have an accused who has never been in trouble with the law before. He or she has a clean record and the offence was not aggravated in any way. In fact, he or she gives an account of a misunderstanding. No harm came to the victim, and the value of the goods they are said to have stolen was considered to be medium—between £500 and £10,000. But the impact of a guilty finding on his or her life would be enormous, because the accused is a practising solicitor. It would almost certainly lead to the loss of their employment and significant damage to their reputation. The sentencing guidelines suggest that if the accused is found guilty, they might expect just over a year in prison. They are determined to have their case heard by a jury, because they believe their account of events would be believed by a jury, but under clause 1 as it stands, that would be denied them. Because they are clear of their innocence, they will not take a police caution, an out of court disposal, or make an early guilty plea. Let us consider another accused. They are very far from being a person with a clean record. They have been convicted of multiple offences of theft, and other offences alongside those in the past—for example, criminal damage and common assault. They have been convicted of theft more than a dozen times. Those of us who have had an interest in criminal justice for some time will know that those sorts of offenders regularly appear before the courts. The accusation the second person faces is of another order of seriousness. They are accused of having stolen a piece of jewellery worth more than £100,000. In fact, the loss of that item led to the collapse of a small business, as the owner was an elderly lone female, who is now living in constant fear and simply cannot face customers again. She trusted the accused on their visit to the business, and does not feel that she can trust anyone else. The accused faces up to six years in custody, so they will retain their right to a jury trial. They have no reputation to lose as a serial and convicted offender, and no employment to lose either.

• 14 Apr 2026 · Courts and Tribunals Bill (Third sitting) · Hansard source

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  Could the Minister remind the Committee how many months passed and how many requests were made for the increase in sitting days that has taken place under this Government?

• 14 Apr 2026 · Courts and Tribunals Bill (Third sitting) · Hansard source

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  It seems that my hon. Friend has been reading the same reports from the Criminal Bar Association as I have. They were reported in the press last weekend or the weekend before, I think, and identified a number of regions, according to their analysis, where the backlogs were coming down as a result of the changes that were already being made. Let us be clear, we are sympathetic to every single victim who is waiting longer than they should for a jury trial. As the Minister kindly accepted in the evidence sessions, it would be totally wrong to say that those of us across all the elements of the political spectrum who oppose the changes do so with any kind of disregard or lack of sympathy or care for victims and what they are going through. Some of the ways in which those long waits have been articulated and framed as caused by jury trials is not helpful, because less than 10% of drop-outs occur post charge. That figure is coming down this year, so the number of people who are dropping out post charge is reducing.

• 14 Apr 2026 · Courts and Tribunals Bill (Third sitting) · Hansard source

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  rose —

• 14 Apr 2026 · Courts and Tribunals Bill (Third sitting) · Hansard source

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  Will the Minister give way?

• 14 Apr 2026 · Courts and Tribunals Bill (Third sitting) · Hansard source

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  I wish to pick up on a point the Minister made earlier, as interventions from other Members hampered me from doing so at the time. She hinted in her earlier remarks that although the total backlog is rising, there have been some improvements. I wonder whether she was attempting to address my questions around the Criminal Bar Association saying that the backlogs are falling in a number of areas. Could the Minister clarify whether the MOJ accepts that the backlogs are already falling in a number of courts? If it does not, what is the gap between what the CBA says and the Government’s position?

• 14 Apr 2026 · Courts and Tribunals Bill (Third sitting) · Hansard source

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  The Minister is an extremely articulate individual. Will she just confirm that she agrees that, as the hon. Member for Brighton Pavilion pointed out, the Government are abolishing the right to elect, so it is perfectly reasonable for individuals to use the term “abolish” in relation to some of these reforms—because they are abolishing the right to elect?

• 14 Apr 2026 · Courts and Tribunals Bill (Third sitting) · Hansard source

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  The point I made in my remarks was that I imagine that is a very conservative estimate of the number of additional days. We know that, by definition, we are sending more complex and serious cases than have been traditionally and historically heard in magistrates courts.

• 14 Apr 2026 · Courts and Tribunals Bill (Third sitting) · Hansard source

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  I beg to move amendment 38, in clause 1, page 3, lines 20, at end insert— “, but see subsection (10). (10) Notwithstanding the preceding subsections, the accused may elect to be tried on indictment if he demonstrates to the court that the circumstances of his case are such that to be tried on summary would amount to a breach of the principles of natural justice.”

• 14 Apr 2026 · Courts and Tribunals Bill (Third sitting) · Hansard source

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  Will the Minister give way?

• 14 Apr 2026 · Courts and Tribunals Bill (Third sitting) · Hansard source

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  As I said, it is actually the position of the Justice Secretary, in his own report, where he said that the fairest and most balanced element of the justice system is jury trials. If the hon. Member thinks it is odd for me to hold that view, perhaps she should have a conversation with the Justice Secretary.