Keir Starmer MP: speeches

Speeches

• 20 Apr 2026 · Security Vetting · Hansard source

  More

  In answer to the hon. Gentleman’s question, the Foreign, Commonwealth and Development Office was repeatedly asked, in the light of inquiries. The same answer came back, because a clear decision had been taken that this information was not going to be disclosed—and it was not disclosed to me, let alone anybody else. So, yes, repeatedly the FCDO was asked, and the same answer came back as the answer given to me—that the decision was that I was not to know and nobody else was to know. That was wrong.

• 20 Apr 2026 · Security Vetting · Hansard source

  More

  I understand that to be the case. Obviously— [ Interruption. ] No, I am only saying that it was not my decision to withhold it. I understand, if I have understood Sir Olly’s position correctly, that his argument is that he cannot share it, or he could not share it, with anyone. That is as I understand it. It certainly was not shared with the National Security Adviser and I do not think it was shared with anybody else. As far as I know, until it was seen by my officials—legal advice was taken—and then shown to me, it was not shared with anybody else.

• 20 Apr 2026 · Security Vetting · Hansard source

  More

  Yes, it was my decision. It was an error of judgment, and that is why I have apologised to the victims of Epstein. I have done that again today, and it is right to do so. In relation to the second point of the hon. Member’s question and any other political appointments, I will have to check on that and get back to him, because I am not across— [Interruption.] There are very many appointments made to senior positions, and I will just check that for him.

• 20 Apr 2026 · Security Vetting · Hansard source

  More

  I do not know the precise date, but I will endeavour to find out.

• 20 Apr 2026 · Security Vetting · Hansard source

  More

  The due diligence report.

• 20 Apr 2026 · Security Vetting · Hansard source

  More

  That is why I wanted to give the House all the relevant information, which I have given at some length this afternoon.

• 20 Apr 2026 · Security Vetting · Hansard source

  More

  I am not defending him behind process. I am setting out the process to the House.

• 20 Apr 2026 · Security Vetting · Hansard source

  More

  I assure the hon. Lady that I have ordered a review of any national security issues arising in relation to what I found out last Tuesday. I will obviously update the House when that review is complete.

• 20 Apr 2026 · Security Vetting · Hansard source

  More

  I say again that Sir Olly Robbins has had a distinguished career, and I have worked with him over a number of years. None the less, he could and should have shared this crucially relevant information with me before Peter Mandelson took up his post, and he should have done at various points after that. It was because of that that I lost confidence in him. That does not mean he has not got a distinguished career; he does have a distinguished career.

• 20 Apr 2026 · Security Vetting · Hansard source

  More

  No, I did not mislead the House of Commons. I accept that information that I should have had, and that the House should have had, should have been before the House, but I did not mislead the House, and that is why I have set out the account in full.

• 20 Apr 2026 · Security Vetting · Hansard source

  More

  Let me respond to those points. First, when I found out what had happened on Tuesday evening last, I wanted to have answers to the questions of who had made the decision to give clearance on developed vetting contrary to the advice, why that was done, and who knew about it, so that I could provide the information to the House. That is the exercise that has been conducted since Tuesday evening, so that I could come here today to give the full account to the House, which I have just set out. The right hon. Lady asks me about developed vetting security clearance after the appointment. What I set out was not my words; I read out the evidence of the former permanent secretary and the former Cabinet Secretary in relation to that. I think the quotes that I have given the House are clear enough. The right hon. Lady asks why Peter Mandelson failed. It is important to make a distinction between the information provided to the review and the recommendation. The information in the review must be, and has been, protected—otherwise, the integrity of the entire system would fall away—but the recommendation does not have to be, and should not have been, protected. In relation to the answer about full due process, that was the information that I had and which I put before the House, and it was confirmed to me by Sir Chris Wormald. In September, I asked him to conduct a review of the process to assure me that the process was correctly carried out. He did that and wrote to me on 16 September to give me his conclusions. In relation to reports in the media, No. 10 was repeatedly asked about the facts surrounding Peter Mandelson’s clearance, and was assured that the proper process was followed in that case. In relation to those in No. 10, let me give the answer. Nobody in No. 10 was informed about UKSV’s recommendation. To be clear, and for the record, the Cabinet Office permanent secretary received information recently, and then sought the necessary and legal advice. Once those checks were completed by the Cabinet Office permanent secretary, I was told. That is in the last two weeks or so, and that was entirely the right procedure—to get the legal advice, and then to bring it to my attention at the first opportunity. The right procedure was followed by my officials in the last few weeks. In relation to why I was furious about the process, it was for the very reason that I strongly believe I should have been given this information at the very outset. I strongly believe there were repeated times when I should have been told. I should have been told on appointment, and I should have been told when Peter Mandelson was sacked. The Cabinet Secretary should have been told when he reviewed the process. The Foreign Secretary should have been told before she was asked to sign a statement to the Select Committee, and I should have been told when I ordered a review of vetting. In relation to the point that the right hon. Member for North West Essex (Mrs Badenoch) makes about what I said in February, in answer to a question of hers, I make it very clear that I had not seen the security vetting file. I did not know that UKSV— [ Interruption. ] The question asked was about vetting. I knew about the due diligence, which is why I put before the House what I knew about the due diligence in relation to Epstein. I told the House what the due diligence had said. I did not tell it what security vetting had said, because I had not seen the file in relation to that. As for the particular details on Peter Mandelson, I acted on all the information I had available to me. The simple fact of the matter is that I should have had more information; I did not have that information. The House should have had that information, and I have now set it out in full to the House.

• 20 Apr 2026 · Security Vetting · Hansard source

  More

  I do not agree with the hon. Member’s point about vetting in relation to political appointments, but I do agree that the due diligence for direct ministerial appointments should be the same as for any other appointments. It clearly was not, and that is why in September I ordered that it be changed to make sure that it is the same process, whether it is a direct ministerial appointment or any other appointment. In relation to the country, it is important that we remain focused on the cost of living and on dealing with the war on two fronts that we face, and I intend to do that.

• 20 Apr 2026 · Security Vetting · Hansard source

  More

  I have set out the facts to the House this afternoon. I have ordered a review of security vetting by Sir Adrian Fulford, so that if any further changes are needed, we can put them in place.

• 20 Apr 2026 · Security Vetting · Hansard source

  More

  Peter Mandelson was given security clearance, and that was clear to everyone, including myself. [ Interruption. ] He was given clearance; he was cleared. He would not have started the role if he had not been given clearance. As soon as it came to my attention last week that that was against the recommendation of UKSV, I asked for the information that I have now put before the House.

• 20 Apr 2026 · Security Vetting · Hansard source

  More

  I have accepted the error of judgment on my behalf, but I was not provided with information. Had I been provided with it, I would not have made the appointment.

• 20 Apr 2026 · Security Vetting · Hansard source

  More

  It was at that point that I ordered the review of the security vetting, because I was concerned that it had failed. In fact, because of information I was not given, it had not failed; it had actually given the recommendation that clearance should be denied. The fact that when I ordered a review of UKSV, senior officials in the Foreign Office did not, at that stage if at no other stage, bring to my attention the information they had not told me is astonishing, because I was ordering a review of the process, which looked as though it had failed when in fact it had flagged the relevant concerns.

• 20 Apr 2026 · Security Vetting · Hansard source

  More

  With permission, Mr Speaker, I would like to provide the House with information that I now have about the appointment of Peter Mandelson as our ambassador to the United States. Before I go into the details, I want to be very clear with this House that while this statement will focus on the process surrounding Peter Mandelson’s vetting and appointment, at the heart of this there is also a judgment I made that was wrong. I should not have appointed Peter Mandelson. I take responsibility for that decision, and I apologise again to the victims of the paedophile Jeffrey Epstein, who were clearly failed by my decision. Last Tuesday evening, 14 April, I found out for the first time that on 29 January 2025, before Peter Mandelson took up his position as ambassador, Foreign Office officials granted him developed vetting clearance, against the specific recommendation of the United Kingdom Security Vetting that developed vetting clearance should be denied. Not only that, but the Foreign Office officials who made that decision did not pass this information to me, to the Foreign Secretary, to her predecessor, now the Deputy Prime Minister, to any other Minister, or even to the former Cabinet Secretary, Sir Chris Wormald. I found this staggering. Therefore, last Tuesday I immediately instructed officials in Downing Street and the Cabinet Office to urgently establish the facts on my authority. I wanted to know who made the decision, on what basis, and who knew. I wanted that information for the precise and explicit purpose of updating this House, because this is information I should have had a long time ago, and that this House should have had a long time ago. It is information that I and the House had a right to know. I will now set out a full timeline of the events in the Peter Mandelson process, including from the fact-finding exercise that I instructed last Tuesday. Before doing so, I want to remind and reassure the House that the Government will comply fully with the Humble Address motion of 4 February. In December 2024, I was in the process of appointing a new ambassador for Washington. A due diligence exercise was conducted by the Cabinet Office into Peter Mandelson’s suitability, including questions put to him by my staff in No. 10. Peter Mandelson answered those questions on 10 December, and I received final advice on the due diligence process on 11 December. I made the decision to appoint him on 18 December. The appointment was announced on 20 December. The security vetting process began on 23 December 2024. I want to make it clear to the House that, for a direct ministerial appointment, it was usual for security vetting to happen after the appointment but before the individual starting in post. That was the process in place at the time. This was confirmed by the former Cabinet Secretary, Sir Chris Wormald, when he gave evidence to the Foreign Affairs Committee on 3 November 2025. Sir Chris made it clear that “when we are making appointments from outside the civil service…the normal thing is for the security clearance to happen after appointment but before the person signs a contract and takes up post.” At the same hearing of the same Select Committee, the former permanent secretary to the Foreign Office, Sir Olly Robbins, said that Peter Mandelson “did not hold national security vetting when he was appointed, but, as is normally the case with external appointments to my Department and the wider civil service, the appointment was made subject to obtaining security clearance.” After I sacked Peter Mandelson, I changed that process so that an appointment now cannot be announced until after security vetting is passed. The security vetting was carried out by UK Security Vetting—UKSV—between 23 December 2024 and 28 January 2025. UKSV conducted vetting in the normal way, collecting relevant information, as well as interviewing the applicant, in this case on two occasions. Then, on 28 January 2025, UKSV recommended to the Foreign Office that developed vetting clearance should be denied to Peter Mandelson. The following day, 29 January 2025, notwithstanding the UKSV recommendation that developed vetting clearance should be denied, Foreign Office officials made the decision to grant developed vetting clearance for Peter Mandelson. To be clear, for many Departments a decision from UKSV is binding, but for the Foreign Office the final decision on developed vetting clearance is made by Foreign Office officials, not UKSV. However, once the decision in this case came to light, the Foreign Office’s power to make the final decision on developed vetting clearance was immediately suspended by my Chief Secretary last week. I accept that the sensitive personal information provided by an individual being vetted must be protected from disclosure. If that were not the case, the integrity of the whole process would be compromised. What I do not accept is that the appointing Minister cannot be told of the recommendation by UKSV. Indeed, given the seriousness of these issues and the significance of the appointment, I simply do not accept that Foreign Office officials could not have informed me of UKSV’s recommendations while maintaining the necessary confidentiality that vetting requires. There is no law that stops civil servants from sensibly flagging UKSV recommendations while protecting detailed, sensitive vetting information, to allow Ministers to make judgments on appointments or on explaining matters to Parliament. Let me be very clear: the recommendation in the Peter Mandelson case could and should have been shared with me before he took up his post. Let me make a second point: if I had known before Peter Mandelson took up his post that the UKSV recommendation was that developed vetting clearance should be denied, I would not have gone ahead with the appointment. Let me now move to September 2025, because events then, and subsequently, show with even starker clarity the opportunities missed by Foreign Office officials to make the position clear. On 10 September, Bloomberg reported fresh details of Mandelson’s history with Epstein. It was then clear to me that Peter Mandelson’s answers to my staff in the due diligence exercise were not truthful, and I sacked him. I also changed the direct ministerial appointments process so that full due diligence is now required as standard. Where risks are identified, an interview must be taken pre-appointment to discuss any risks and conflicts of interest. A summary of that should be provided to the appointing Minister. I also made it clear that public announcements should not now be made until security vetting has been completed. In the light of the revelations in September last year, I also agreed with the then Cabinet Secretary, Sir Chris Wormald, that he would carry out a review of the appointment process in the Peter Madelson case, including the vetting. He set out his findings and conclusions in a letter to me on 16 September. In that letter, he advised me: “The evidence I have reviewed leads me to conclude that appropriate processes were followed in both the appointment and withdrawal of the former HMA Washington”. When the then Cabinet Secretary was asked about that last week, he was clear that when he carried out his review, the Foreign Office did not tell him about the UKSV recommendation that developed vetting clearance should be denied for Peter Mandelson. I find that astonishing. As I set out earlier, I do not accept that I could not have been told about the recommendation before Peter Mandelson took up his post. I absolutely do not accept that the then Cabinet Secretary—an official, not a politician—when carrying out his review could not have been told that UKSV recommended that Peter Mandelson should be denied developed vetting clearance. It was a vital part of the process that I had asked him to review. Clearly, he could have been told, and he should have been told. On the same day that the then Cabinet Secretary wrote to me, 16 September 2025, the Foreign Secretary and the then permanent secretary of the Foreign Office, Sir Olly Robbins, provided a signed statement to the Foreign Affairs Committee. The statement says: “The vetting process was undertaken by UK Security Vetting on behalf of the FCDO and concluded with DV clearance being granted by the FCDO in advance of Lord Mandelson taking up post in February.” It went on to say: “Peter Mandelson’s security vetting was conducted to the usual standard set for Developed Vetting in line with established Cabinet Office policy”. Let me be very clear to the House. This was in response to questions that included whether concerns were raised, what the Foreign Office’s response was and whether they were dismissed. That the Foreign Secretary was advised on, and allowed to sign, this statement by Foreign Office officials without being told that UKSV had recommended Peter Mandelson be denied developed vetting clearance is absolutely unforgivable. This is a senior Cabinet Member giving evidence to Parliament on the very issue in question. In the light of further revelations about Peter Mandelson in February of this year, I was very concerned about the fact that developed vetting clearance had been granted to him. Not knowing that, in fact, UKSV had recommended denial of developed vetting clearance, I instructed my officials to carry out a review of the national security vetting process. But, as I have set out, I do not accept that I could not have been told about UKSV’s denial of security vetting before Peter Mandelson took up his post in January 2025, I do not accept that the then Cabinet Secretary could not have been told in September 2025 when he carried out his review of the process, and I do not accept that the Foreign Secretary could not have been told when making statements to the Select Committee, again in 2025. On top of that, the fact that I was also not told, even when I ordered a review of the UKSV process, is frankly staggering. I can tell the House that I have now updated the terms of reference for the review into security vetting to make sure it covers the means by which all decisions are made in relation to national security vetting. I have appointed Sir Adrian Fulford to lead the review. Separately, I have asked the Government Security Group in the Cabinet Office to look at any security concerns raised during Peter Mandelson’s tenure. I know that many Members across this House will find these facts to be incredible. To that, I can only say that they are right. It beggars belief that throughout this whole timeline of events, officials in the Foreign Office saw fit to withhold this information from the most senior Ministers in our system of government. That is not how the vast majority of people in this country expect politics, government or accountability to work, and I do not think it is how most public servants think it should work either. I work with hundreds of civil servants—thousands, even—all of whom act with the utmost integrity, dedication and pride to serve this country, including officials from the Foreign Office who, as we speak, are doing a phenomenal job representing our national interest in a dangerous world—in Ukraine, the middle east and all around the world. This is not about them, yet it is surely beyond doubt that the recommendation from UKSV that Peter Mandelson should be denied developed vetting clearance was information that could and should have been shared with me on repeated occasions and, therefore, should have been available to this House and ultimately to the British people. I commend this statement to the House.

• 20 Apr 2026 · Security Vetting · Hansard source

  More

  That is why I have asked for a review to be carried out in relation to material that could have caused any national security issues.

• 20 Apr 2026 · Security Vetting · Hansard source

  More

  In September it became clear to me that in relation to the due diligence that had been carried out by the Cabinet Office, Peter Mandelson had been asked questions by my staff and given answers which were not truthful. That was exposed by the Bloomberg emails. At that point, I became concerned about the entire process. I asked for the review of the process by Sir Chris Wormald, which he carried out, but I also made it immediately clear that I would change the due process so that, whether in the case of direct ministerial appointments or that of any other appointments, the same process was gone through. I also wanted to make it clear that I did not think it right that appointments should be announced before security vetting was gone through in any circumstances, and therefore I changed it straight away.

• 20 Apr 2026 · Security Vetting · Hansard source

  More

  At various points questions were asked, and questions were put to the FCDO. The answer back was the same, because it took the view that it was not information it could share with anyone, including myself.

• 20 Apr 2026 · Security Vetting · Hansard source

  More

  I think that needs to be subject to the review, and that is among the reasons why I put the review in place.

• 20 Apr 2026 · Security Vetting · Hansard source

  More

  May I address that head-on? What happened was that the information came to the attention of senior civil servants who were, in fact, doing the compliance work on the Humble Address. When they saw the information about developed vetting they took legal advice straight away, asking whether it was legal to disclose that to me. They got that advice, and as soon as the advice was given they disclosed it to me straight away, last Tuesday. That was the right and appropriate thing for them to do. There is no criticism of what they did.

• 20 Apr 2026 · Security Vetting · Hansard source

  More

  I thank the right hon. and learned Gentleman for his question. The answer is yes, it would have been provided to the Committee, and as I think he acknowledged, it has now been provided to the Committee. The reason for the delay is that on Tuesday night, I found out simply that the recommendation had been made to deny clearance, and yet clearance had been given. I wanted to understand who gave that clearance, on what basis and who knew about it, so that I could update the House and obviously make the information available to the Committee. That is what I asked on Tuesday night my officials to do urgently, so that the full picture could be put before both the House and the Committee, and I will make sure that the full picture is put before the Committee.

• 20 Apr 2026 · Security Vetting · Hansard source

  More

  I simply do not accept that there is any good reason why I could not have been provided with the information that was withheld from me. Had it been provided to me, I would not have proceeded with the appointment.

• 20 Apr 2026 · Security Vetting · Hansard source

  More

  The right hon. Member reads out the passage from Mr Case’s advice. The process that was followed was what I understood to be the usual process—in other words, the appointment was subject to security vetting. It is why, when Sir Chris Wormald looked at it in September, he addressed the question by reference back to Simon Case’s letter, because I wanted to know that the process that had been followed was the right process. That is what Sir Chris Wormald looked at. He looked at it expressly by reference to the Simon Case letter that has just been read out, and assured me that the right process was followed when he reviewed it.