Keir Mather MP: speeches

Speeches

• 27 Jan 2026 · Railways Bill (Fifth sitting) · Hansard source

  More

  Clause 9 provides a power for the Secretary of State to issue non-binding guidance to Great British Railways, which GBR must have regard to. Clause 10 provides Scottish Ministers, as funders of the railways, with the same power. Guidance provides the Secretary of State with a proactive lever to hold GBR to account, while preserving its operational independence as the directing mind. Scottish Ministers will be able to issue guidance to GBR on the exercise of its statutory functions in Scotland, in so far as they relate to Scottish railway activities. These powers will be used by the Secretary of State and Scottish Ministers to help to develop a better common understanding of an area or to encourage a strategic focus on a specific issue to support GBR in carrying out its functions in the interests of its customers, taxpayers and the public. To ensure appropriate transparency, the Secretary of State and Scottish Ministers will be required to publish any issued guidance, as well as any amendments or revocations. Further, where the guidance relates to functions that Scottish or Welsh Ministers have delegated to GBR or to services that they have contracted GBR to provide, the Secretary of State must secure their consent before the guidance is issued, reflecting devolved accountability for those services. This is a sensible and proportionate provision that allows for direct and unambiguous communication between Ministers and GBR, and is intended to support the proper management of the railway.

• 27 Jan 2026 · Railways Bill (Fifth sitting) · Hansard source

  More

  Clause 11 introduces schedule 1, which will amend part I of the Railways Act 1993 to set out GBR’s licensing regime in a way that broadly mirrors the existing licence provisions in the 1993 Act. I will deal with schedule 1 in more detail later, but for now I commend the clause to the Committee.

• 27 Jan 2026 · Railways Bill (Fifth sitting) · Hansard source

  More

  I thank the hon. Gentleman for the amendment, which is intended to prevent the Secretary of State from granting a licence to GBR unless the ORR gives a formal recommendation that licence obligations related to safety and standards are not compromised or undermined. The amendment does not specify what the ORR’s recommendations would need to contain or how it would operate in practice. The Government recognise the importance of effective regulation in the rail sector, particularly in relation to safety. The safety of our railways is a priority, and we will ensure that it is central to GBR, so that our railways continue to rank among the safest globally. The Bill makes no changes to the existing safety regime, which has proved to be exemplary. In practice, amendment 109 would give an approval role to the ORR on matters relating to safety and standards ahead of the GBR licence being granted by the Secretary of State. It would confuse the clear accountabilities that the Bill establishes, which place responsibility for drafting, consulting on and granting the GBR licence with the Secretary of State, with the ORR then enforcing against its provisions. That aligns with the Government’s approach to regulation: Ministers set policy and strategy, and regulators provide validation and reassurance to the industry. The Bill already requires a consultation on the contents of the GBR licence and specifies that the ORR and the passenger watchdog must be consulted as part of that. That will ensure that any concerns about safety and standards can be raised and considered appropriately ahead of the GBR licence being granted. The amendment would confuse accountabilities and add additional processes where they are not needed. I therefore urge the hon. Member to withdraw the amendment.

• 27 Jan 2026 · Railways Bill (Fifth sitting) · Hansard source

  More

  The amendments will improve clarity and ensure that the Railways Bill works as intended. Clauses 7 and 9, as drafted, set out that the Secretary of State must obtain consent from Scottish or Welsh Ministers when issuing a direction and guidance to GBR “in a manner that directly affects the operation of” a GBR-provided Scottish or Welsh service. That definition could unintentionally exclude scenarios where Great British Railways is exercising functions delegated by Scottish or Welsh Ministers that do not directly affect operation of railway passenger service functions, such as in relation to branding. The amendments provide a clearer and more precise approach. Consent will now be required whenever GBR is acting on behalf of Scottish or Welsh Ministers under formal arrangements enabled by clause 4, or contracts awarded under clause 31. That is a better way of defining where consent is needed as it reflects the responsibilities devolved to Scottish and Welsh Ministers under the Bill. The amendments remove ambiguity from the Bill without changing its core purpose. They ensure that devolved Governments have a clear and consistent role in decisions affecting services devolved to them, while maintaining the Secretary of State’s ability to protect the network as a whole. That approach has the support of both Scottish and Welsh Ministers because it provides certainty and transparency. I therefore urge the Committee to support the amendments. Clause 7, to which the amendments apply, provides the Secretary of State with the power to issue legally binding directions to Great British Railways. Clause 8 replicates that power for Scottish Ministers when GBR is exercising functions relating to Scottish railway services in Scotland. Such powers are common in relationships between Government and arm’s length bodies and used only when absolutely justified and in a proportionate way. For example, the Oil and Gas Authority has received only one ministerial direction in its 10-year history. Clause 7 is a normal, standard accountability provision that follows established precedent. It is a type of power that is always used sparingly. It is not a new and extraordinary means of interfering with the railway that the Government are trying to decentralise to GBR. The powers are necessary to reflect the overall democratic accountability of the Secretary of State and Scottish Ministers for the performance of GBR within the areas of the country that they are responsible for and fund. To protect GBR’s day-to-day operational independence as the directing mind, the powers will be used only where there is strong justification, in consultation with the ORR and after agreed processes have been followed. For Scotland, those processes include following a series of procedures and controls that will be set out in the memorandum of understanding between the Secretary of State and Scottish Ministers that is required under clause 23 of the Bill. They also include consulting the Secretary of State before using the power. To ensure appropriate transparency, the clauses require that the Secretary of State and Scottish Ministers must publish any issued directions, including when they are amended or revoked. As GBR may also provide services on behalf of Scottish or Welsh Ministers, clause 7 requires the Secretary of State to secure the consent of Scottish or Welsh Ministers to issue directions to GBR relating to areas that fall under the devolved responsibilities of Scotland or Wales. Finally, to avoid a scenario where GBR receives contradictory directions from Ministers or where directions issued by Scottish Ministers appear to go beyond their responsibilities, clause 8 provides the power for the Secretary of State to revoke Scottish Ministers’ directions. We have agreed with Scottish Ministers that that provision is necessary to protect the overall network as a whole. The clauses are essential to provide a clear and proportionate route for intervention while still enabling GBR to deliver as the directing mind in the interests of its customers, taxpayers and the public. I commend the clauses to the Committee.

• 27 Jan 2026 · Railways Bill (Fifth sitting) · Hansard source

  More

  May I begin by addressing the point about backseat driving? Following the shadow Minister’s remarks, I identified that this is something that we want to avoid not only in future but because it is the existing scenario that we inherited. Right now, under the old system, the Secretary of State is the only person who is really accountable for driving the system forward, and private operators spent more time employing people to decide who was to blame for failures on the railway than ensuring that the railway actually ran in the interest of passengers. Interference in access and timetabling is another issue that has been raised. The reason why we have diffuse responsibility and muddled accountability in that space is because Network Rail and the ORR, which are two separate organisations, both have responsibility there but they cannot do it in a unified way, and therefore they cannot serve the interests of passengers. That is exactly what the creation of GBR as a directing mind for the railway seeks to avoid, and guidance within that system plays a very important role in removing one of the shadow Minister’s key concerns: an overbearing Secretary of State issuing direction to GBR. Guidance has been designed to create an iterative process by which GBR can enter into a dialogue with the Secretary of State to talk through and deal with common challenges. The amendments seek to limit the ability of the Secretary of State and Scottish Ministers to issue guidance to GBR under clauses 9 and 10. I am clear that the new system established by the Bill does not intend to involve the Secretary of State or Scottish Ministers in ongoing or individual operational decisions. That is for GBR’s board and the thousands of employees working on the railway. Instead, the guidance power provides a mechanism through which Ministers can respond to overarching issues that might emerge. For example, if the ORR identified persistent failures in GBR’s performance against its business plan, it may suggest guidance from the Secretary of State that could help to support GBR to course correct, and to clarify the desired outcome without requiring more stringent action, such as a direction. Further, it is not all one-directional guidance. Guidance will be a flexible tool designed to support Great British Railways. For example, there may be instances where guidance is requested by GBR and is issued in a collaborative manner to provide clarity on the policy direction or shared objectives. I also remind members of the Committee that GBR must have regard to the guidance—in other words, it must consider the guidance and weigh it against its other duties and obligations. It is not required to blindly follow the guidance in all cases. Let me turn to the specifics of each amendment. Amendment 143 would limit the issuing of guidance to solely financial or strategic matters. In seeking to establish a hard line between types of decision making, the amendment would create a false dichotomy. Strategic and financial decisions are likely to have operational implications. The amendment could therefore inadvertently prevent the Secretary of State from being able to issue guidance where there is any operational impact at all, which is clearly disproportionate, given the potentially collaborative and helpful nature of the guidance. Similarly, amendments 19 and 21 seek to prevent the Secretary of State and Scottish Ministers from issuing guidance unless GBR is not meeting a key performance indicator under the Opposition’s proposed new clause 2. I have already explained why that proposed new clause is nonsensical. I reiterate that KPIs would be better designed and included as part of GBR’s business plan.

• 27 Jan 2026 · Railways Bill (Fifth sitting) · Hansard source

  More

  I will give way one final time, and then I really do want to make some progress.

• 27 Jan 2026 · Railways Bill (Fifth sitting) · Hansard source

  More

  I beg to move amendment 166, in clause 7, page 5, line 4, leave out “operation of a GBR-provided Scottish service” and insert “exercise by Great British Railways of functions— (i) on behalf of the Scottish Ministers in accordance with arrangements made under section 4, or (ii) under a contract awarded under section 31(3)(b)”. This amendment broadens the circumstances in which the Secretary of State must obtain the consent of the Scottish Ministers, where giving directions to GBR.

• 27 Jan 2026 · Railways Bill (Fifth sitting) · Hansard source

  More

  It is a pleasure to see you back in the Chair, Sir Alec. I thank the shadow Minister, the hon. Member for Broadland and Fakenham, for this group of amendments, which are primarily about the direction powers in the Bill. Amendments 11 and 12 would each limit the use of the Secretary of State’s direction power, requiring that the power can be used only as a last resort, after dismissing the head of GBR and if GBR has breached its functions. I understand the intention here, which is to ensure that these direction powers are used proportionately. I assure the hon. Member that the Government agree with that aim—we absolutely must empower GBR to be the directing mind of the railway—and I agree that the railway will not work if Ministers are forced to keep meddling in it in the way that they do today. That said, this power is not the problem that he thinks it is. The new direction power is common in relationships between the Secretary of State and arm’s length bodies. Other examples in the transport sector that are not limited to last resort use include the power in the Infrastructure Act 2015 for the Transport Secretary to direct National Highways. Hon. Members will note that these types of powers are not frequently used. These amendments would create restrictions that undermine the principle that the Secretary of State should retain the ability to respond to persistent, urgent or unforeseen issues where rapid intervention is required.

• 27 Jan 2026 · Railways Bill (Fifth sitting) · Hansard source

  More

  Although we have had an opportunity to discuss some of the provisions regarding the creation of the licence—it being enforced by the ORR with powers that include giving GBR directions to escalate issues to its board, requiring GBR to create and publish improvement plans and issuing enforcement orders— I have heard Opposition Members’ points that they would like an opportunity to discuss those matters more closely and in further detail. We believe that developing the licence in this way will ensure that what is published for statutory consultation is informed by the development of a stable legislative framework in which to scrutinise the licence—as we are doing now—and can be meaningfully refined and enhanced by a wide range of views. However, I take the point that the shadow Minister and other right hon. and hon. Members have made, and I am sure that we can have further discussions today. I commend the clause to the Committee. Question put and agreed to. Clause 11 accordingly ordered to stand part of the Bill. Schedule 1 Licensing of Great British Railways

• 27 Jan 2026 · Railways Bill (Fifth sitting) · Hansard source

  More

  I had not forgotten the shadow Minister’s request for me to provide specific examples. In a sense, though, I do not believe that it would be wise to do so. I do not think that the purpose of this Committee is to speculate about what GBR may or may not do in future; it is important that we develop a suite of measures that create the accountability that is required.

• 27 Jan 2026 · Railways Bill (Fifth sitting) · Hansard source

  More

  It puzzles me that with all the other transport bodies that have been set up—National Highways is an interesting example—I do not recall a series of concerns having been outlined that one of the most robust systems of parliamentary democracy in the world was in some way, shape or form incapable of—

• 27 Jan 2026 · Railways Bill (Fifth sitting) · Hansard source

  More

  In a spirit of cross-party contrition, I agree with the shadow Minister’s point; it is a fair one, and perhaps that was a poor example. In the setting out of the long-term rail strategy, through the Secretary of State, there are myriad means of Parliamentary accountability to ensure that process is done in a way that reflects the long-term interests of the railway and of passengers. There are robust means of scrutiny through this House and other means of which Parliamentarians can avail themselves of, and of which the hon. Member for South West Devon has availed herself multiple times through the passage of this Bill. I would like to conclude on this grouping and so I want to speak to new clause 4. As the hon. Member for Broadland and Fakenham will be aware, with bodies of this nature the Government’s long-standing policy is that the Secretary of State of the sponsoring Department has responsibility for appointing the non-executive chair of the board. The executive team is then accountable in the first instance to the organisation’s non-executive board, and it is right that trust is given to the expertise and experience of the executive and that there is appropriate distance between the Secretary of States and those tasked with the day-to-day operational management of the organisation. That is one of the benefits of the GBR model. Legislating to dictate a process whereby the chief executive is dismissed directly by the Secretary of State for failure to meet a single KPI is not appropriate and it cuts across all guidance and understanding of effective partnership between Government Departments and their arm’s length bodies. For those reasons, I cannot accept these amendments and urge the hon. Members to withdraw them.

• 27 Jan 2026 · Railways Bill (Fifth sitting) · Hansard source

  More

  On a point of order, Sir Alec. Before turning to the clause, I would like to correct the record. My Department’s commitment has always been to publish the draft GBR licence during the Bill’s passage, rather than before the Bill leaves the Commons, as I had said in oral evidence on 20 January. Before publication in draft, my Department will undertake engagement with stakeholders to inform the draft. That engagement will start before the Bill leaves the Commons, and I will ensure that hon. Members are involved in it if they would find that beneficial. –– [ Official Report, Railways Public Bill Committee, 20 January 2026; c. 97, Q180.]

• 27 Jan 2026 · Railways Bill (Fifth sitting) · Hansard source

  More

  I will turn in a moment to the specific points that the shadow Minister raises around the chief executive, but I think I share his views on the importance of GBR’s compliance with its fundamental functions and with the law. That is why amendments 15 and 18 are peculiar—they do not recognise GBR needing to be able to have enforcement through that particular route. Amendments 14 and 16 both relate to the transparency of directions. Amendment 14 would require directions to be laid before Parliament, but we believe that is unnecessary as provisions in the Bill already require directions issued under this power to be published, and Parliament has the power to call the Secretary of State to account should it take the view that more information is required.

• 27 Jan 2026 · Railways Bill (Fifth sitting) · Hansard source

  More

  The Government have made it clear what the provisions within these clauses are designed to implement. I ask the shadow Minister to look at legislation passed under his own Government that contain direction powers that are remarkably consistent with those found in the Bill, and at the directions provided in other pieces of legislation. Does he feel that they represent mission creep when it comes to Secretary of State responsibilities? He will note that these type of powers are not used frequently. We believe that these amendments would create restrictions that undermine the principle that the Secretary of State should retain the ability to respond as required. Critically, a direction should come before there has been a serious impact. The removal of an executive or the ORR deeming GBR to be in breach of its statutory functions would suggest that a serious failure has already occurred. In the latter case, it is unclear in what situation the hon. Member would consider a breach of a statutory function to have occurred, which would introduce ambiguity into the system. Restricting the direction powers by limiting their use to only the most serious of instances would mean that any directions were more likely to be more prescriptive and severe. I am sure that the shadow Minister would not wish to see the public or industry seriously impacted before the Secretary of State acted. The new powers also recognise the GBR board as the railway’s directing mind while enabling Ministers to intervene to support GBR to deliver or correct course. Amendments 13 and 17 would remove the ability for the Secretary of State and Scottish Ministers, respectively, to say that GBR can exercise unspecified functions only after consultation or with their consent. I do not think that these amendments are helpful. They would effectively remove the clarity on the directions power, but would not restrict the legal scope of it. They would simply lessen the legal transparency around the use of the direction. There are circumstances where requiring GBR to consult the Secretary of State or Scottish Ministers before taking a specific action would be entirely reasonable, and maybe even desirable for GBR. For example, where GBR needs to address a specific risk or situation as part of a wider national co-ordination or cross-industry response, the Secretary of State may need to ensure that actions are in line with national responses. The ability to revoke a direction allows Ministers to ensure that they operate in a proportionate and rational way in response to time-sensitive issues. Amendments 15 and 18 would prevent the Secretary of State and Scottish Ministers, respectively, from enforcing GBR’s failure to comply with a direction through the civil courts. The Government need to retain the right to independent enforcement with fixed remedies that compel GBR to act across a range of mechanisms, to ensure a pathway to protecting taxpayers’ money and the delivery of the Government’s objectives. I hope the hon. Member would agree that it is completely undesirable to remove any ability for Ministers to hold the executive to account. I also politely say that the hon. Member cannot have it both ways: either GBR is an organisation that could exercise mission creep and is too independent of scrutiny, whether from Parliament or anywhere else, or the powers in the Bill place too many strictures on it from the perspective of Government. That point of clarity is required in the Opposition’s overall perspective on the Bill.

• 27 Jan 2026 · Railways Bill (Fifth sitting) · Hansard source

  More

  I will, but very briefly, and this is the final time.

• 27 Jan 2026 · Railways Bill (Fifth sitting) · Hansard source

  More

  I will give way one final time and then I want to make some progress.

• 27 Jan 2026 · Railways Bill (Fifth sitting) · Hansard source

  More

  I agree with my hon. Friend’s sentiment that it is unwise to hypothesise about what potential eventualities could befall GBR in specific instances, as the shadow Minister encourages me to do. What is important—my hon. Friend made an important point around consistency, both in our legislative work and the work of the Government more broadly—is to ensure that the bedrock upon which GBR sits is legally sound, and that all eventualities that may arise are catered for through provisions within the legislation that offer sufficient breadth. That is why amendments 15 and 18 do not serve the legal accountability purposes that the shadow Minister seems to want to stress.

• 27 Jan 2026 · Railways Bill (Fifth sitting) · Hansard source

  More

  On memorandums of understanding, I point the shadow Minister to the fact that the heads of terms for the memorandum of understanding with the Welsh Government have already been published. On the overall principle on the development of memorandums of understanding, the stakeholders who gave evidence to the Committee were very clear that the process is being carried out in close consultation with devolved Governments and that it is very common for such operational documents to be developed in consultation in this way. We are creating an operational framework by which GBR can function as an organisation. It is very important that that platform exists before the devolved settlements that will dictate the operational reality of how the railway works are layered on top. On the shadow Minister’s point about direction powers, these are the same direction powers that exist, almost like for like, with Great British Energy, Great British Nuclear and the North Sea Transition Authority. They are there to respond to urgent and pressing matters. His points on overreach should have applied to the creation of those organisations as much as to the creation of GBR. The factual reality of how the direction power has been used in the case of oil is that only one direction has been issued in 10 years. It is the Government’s intent—we have been very clear in saying so—that this direction power must operate in a similar way and only respond to urgent, pressing and persistent matters. On the issue of direction from Scottish Ministers, the Secretary of State cannot revoke a direction if it pertains purely to a devolved matter, but Scottish Ministers did agree that revocation powers are necessary when there are conflicts in directions. Speaking from my perspective on how this Bill puts the devolved settlement at the centre of how the railway functions, there are sufficient methods to create accountability, mutual working and shared recognition of priorities and ambitions across devolved Governments, the UK Government and GBR, so that I do not envisage a revocation of a direction being used regularly. It is only there to ensure the smooth function of the railway. Amendment 166 agreed to. Amendment made: 167, in clause 7, page 5, line 8, leave out “operation of a GBR-provided Welsh service” and insert— “exercise by Great British Railways of functions— (i) on behalf of the Welsh Ministers in accordance with arrangements made under section 4, or (ii) under a contract awarded under section 31(4)(b).”.— (Keir Mather.) This amendment broadens the circumstances in which the Secretary of State must obtain the consent of the Welsh Ministers, where giving directions to GBR. Amendment proposed : 14, in clause 7, page 5, line 9, after “publish” insert “and lay before Parliament”.— (Jerome Mayhew.) This amendment would require the Secretary of State to lay any directions given to Great British Railways before Parliament. Question put , That the amendment be made.

• 22 Jan 2026 · Railways Bill (Third sitting) · Hansard source

  More

  May I draw the hon. Member’s attention to the fact that so far I have not made a single rail pun in the course of this debate—and I intend to keep it that way? The hon. Member made a really important point about both parliamentary accountability and the general public being able to understand more about how GBR works and what it constitutes. Throughout the establishment of GBR, there are concurrent process that will allow the Secretary to State to outline more properly the long-term future of the railway and GBR’s role in it, including the long-term rail strategy, as well as work that we are already advancing on the accessibility road map and the rolling stock and infrastructure strategy. Existing parliamentary structures in our Westminster democracy provide ample room for us to hold Government Ministers and the Secretary of State to account on the establishment of GBR. We have oral questions for Transport, as well as the ability to ask urgent questions on GBR’s establishment. Through both Lord Hendy in the other place and Ministers in this House, we have a real ambition to explain GBR’s provisions and ways of working to the general public, because we are confident in its ability to revolutionise how the railway runs on behalf of passengers, but I take the hon. Lady’s point. Establishing GBR is the primary purpose of the Bill, and clause 1 provides the Secretary of State with the power, by regulations, to designate a body corporate as GBR. The clause enables wider provisions in the Bill relating to GBR to apply to a body corporate, such as the statutory functions and general duties set out in it. Following Royal Assent, a company will be designated as GBR, and it will consolidate Network Rail Infrastructure Ltd, DfT Operator, train operators and parts of the Rail Delivery Group into one organisation to ensure that GBR can be mobilised as quickly as is practicable. The clause is essential for the Government to deliver our manifesto commitment to reform the railways by establishing GBR as the directing mind, bringing track and train together. I commend clause 1 to the Committee.

• 22 Jan 2026 · Railways Bill (Third sitting) · Hansard source

  More

  I thank all the hon. Members for the amendments, which relate to GBR’s ticket retailing functions. I will turn first to amendments 2 and 117 and new clause 3. The amendments and new clause seek to amend GBR’s retail function and code of practice to promote a level playing field for third-party retailers, with parity of access to fares, products, systems and data. Once GBR is established, it will have a retail function, as provided for by clause 3. Crucially, that function will be accessible via all channels—at station ticket offices, ticket vending machines, onboard trains and online—ensuring that it serves passengers however they buy their tickets. GBR’s future online retailer—its website and app—will operate in a fair, open and competitive market. The Government have consistently recognised the significant value of independent retailers, as they help to innovate and drive up standards for passengers. Therefore, I recognise and agree with the motivation behind amendment 2. Nevertheless, the Government do not believe that the amendment is necessary. Significant safeguards have already been announced to ensure that our shared vision for the future of the rail retail market is realised—not least a code of practice, which will be owned and enforced by the Office of Rail and Road. The provisions in the code of practice will ensure that GBR cannot abuse its position or self-prefer as it also operates vital cross-industry functions that independent retailers rely on. The incentives to comply could not be stronger: if GBR fails to adhere to the code of practice, that constitutes a breach of its licence, and the ORR will take enforcement action. It is as simple as that.

• 22 Jan 2026 · Railways Bill (Third sitting) · Hansard source

  More

  I thank the hon. Member for his constructive engagement on the amendment and the clause. Amendment 164 agreed to. Clause 2, as amended, ordered to stand part of the Bill. Clause 3 Functions

• 22 Jan 2026 · Railways Bill (Third sitting) · Hansard source

  More

  I beg to move amendment 164, in clause 2, page 2, line 3, at end insert— “(5A) This section is not to be read as preventing the exercise of functions by Great British Railways on behalf of the Secretary of State, the Scottish Ministers or the Welsh Ministers under arrangements made by the Secretary of State, the Scottish Ministers or the Welsh Ministers.” This amendment clarifies that the Secretary of State and Scottish and Welsh Ministers may enter into agency agreements for the performance of functions on their behalf. For example, this may be required to assist with winding up of ongoing franchises, as they transition to GBR.

• 22 Jan 2026 · Railways Bill (Third sitting) · Hansard source

  More

  It is my understanding that the process of appointing non-executive directors on GBR’s board will be followed in the normal way. I expect departmental processes to find a range of candidates with experience of both the private sector and public institutions, to ensure that GBR is an agile organisation that provides value for money for those who fund the railway and, most importantly, accountability through the Secretary of State, as well as having a mind to furthering the interests of both open access operators and the freight sector within the operation of GBR.

• 22 Jan 2026 · Railways Bill (Third sitting) · Hansard source

  More

  It is a pleasure to serve under your chairmanship, Mrs Hobhouse. May I begin by saying how much I look forward to working with all members of the Committee as we advance the priorities in the Bill and hopefully have a robust debate as we do so? First, I turn to amendment 257 tabled by my hon. Friend the Member for Birmingham Northfield. I also want to reciprocate his warm words about the conversations he has been able to have with me and the Rail Minister Lord Hendy on this provision. Let me reassure him that public ownership of our railways is what the Government are delivering, as set out in our manifesto, and that we are steadfast in our commitment to it. We are already seeing the benefits of bringing train operators into public ownership, with passengers being put back at the heart of the rail network. Passengers can now use their tickets on another public sector operator at no extra cost during disruption. Through working with Network Rail, Southeastern increased capacity to popular seaside spots in the summer months. Since moving into public ownership, South Western Railway has more than quadrupled the number of new Arterio trains in service, directly benefiting passengers. Public ownership sits at the heart of the Bill, as my hon. Friend notes is the case in other legislation passed by this Government, to ensure that we gradually take our railways back into public ownership in the interests of passengers. However, I take his point that it is important to safeguard the legacy of these essential reforms for generations to come. I will take that thought away. In the meantime I encourage him to withdraw his amendment. New clause 24 would require the Secretary of State to appoint a Great British Railways board to advise the Secretary of State on decisions taken in respect of Great British Railways, with representation from various industry groups. I feel that is unnecessary and would distort the clear accountability framework established in the Bill. To be clear, a highly skilled board that can hold to account the executive of Great British Railways will be crucial to delivering an improved railway. The GBR board will be made up of experienced people with diverse backgrounds who can be the voice of railway users. Where the Secretary of State is concerned about the performance of GBR, she will be able to raise these matters with the chair of the board. The chair will be able to advise both the Secretary of State and GBR’s chief executive officer on options for resolution and will be expected to ensure they are acted on, all without the need for a direction.