Kanishka Narayan MP: speeches

Speeches

• 10 Feb 2026 · Cyber Security and Resilience (Network and Information Systems) Bill (Fifth sitting) · Hansard source

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  Clause 19 sets out that regulators must provide guidance on specific issues, including security requirements and incident reporting notifications. Guidance already plays an important role in supporting the implementation of the NIS regime. We have, however, identified some areas where regulated entities would benefit from additional clarity. The clause ensures that every regulated sector has the guidance they need from their sectoral regulators to help them to comply. To ensure consistency across regulators, the clause also requires regulators to co-ordinate with each other when preparing guidance relating to designating critical suppliers. The clause also requires regulators to consider guidance published by the Secretary of State such as the code of practice when preparing guidance on the security and resilience requirements. That will ensure that regulators consider good practice recommendations and take more consistent approaches to preparing guidance.

• 10 Feb 2026 · Cyber Security and Resilience (Network and Information Systems) Bill (Fifth sitting) · Hansard source

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  I am reminded of the hon. Member’s point last week. I am happy to write to him on the basis of the precise figure in the impact assessment, which I understand to be based on not just an extensive survey but the application of subsequent uplifts. I am more than happy to continue that conversation in correspondence. On factors that ought to be considered in setting up charging schemes, I mentioned some, such as size and turnover, but I will flag that those are suggestive and indicative rather than exhaustive factors that regulators may consider. Regulators ought to be able to set different levels of fee for different types of organisations. There is also provision to exclude organisations from a charging scheme altogether if it would be disproportionate or counterproductive to include them. It is appropriate that regulators and competent authorities can vary their charging schemes in the light of that. On current regulatory performance and its correlation with charging schemes, I have not observed any direct correlation. What I have seen, simply, is that some regulators are clearly doing well. We heard in evidence from a range of participants that in some cases things are working particularly well and that, in others, there is more scope for improvement. That is precisely why the Bill sets no fundamental lowest common denominator for how regulators ought to approach either charging or their enforcement duties; instead, it ensures that we are conducting oversight of each regulator as robustly as possible. I assure hon. Members that the question of regulatory enforcement is central and that the motivation behind the charging scheme is precisely to ensure that regulators are well resourced to implement the Bill. Question put and agreed to. Clause 17 accordingly ordered to stand part of the Bill. Clause 18 Sharing and use of information under the NIS regulations etc

• 10 Feb 2026 · Cyber Security and Resilience (Network and Information Systems) Bill (Fifth sitting) · Hansard source

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  I hope this does offer the clarity that the hon. Member seeks. While I will not refer to specific businesses, broadly speaking the sector of food supply is not within the scope of the Bill; the obligations on operators of essential services or direct entities that are within the scope of the Bill will not apply. However, if—in a hypothetical situation—a managed service provider within the scope of the Bill supplies to that business, the managed service provider would be within the scope of the Bill’s requirements. The customer—in this case, the food supply business—may, if the severity applies, be in receipt of reports from the relevant MSP, in this particular context. They will not be caught up in the full set of obligations in the Bill, but we would expect customers to be notified of incidents where the severity thresholds are met. I hope that gives the hon. Member some clarity.

• 10 Feb 2026 · Cyber Security and Resilience (Network and Information Systems) Bill (Fifth sitting) · Hansard source

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  I would not want to imply that every organisation has a business continuity plan, but the simple point is that the framework for assessing critical third-party suppliers is established in business and other regulatory regimes, as I have mentioned. The novelty or ambiguity that the shadow Minister suggests simply does not apply. That is not to say that there will not be cases in which new critical third-party suppliers will be designated—that is the point of the provisions of the Bill. The practice will of course need rigour, efficiency and proportionality, but it will be grounded in existing, widely understood frameworks. I need the hon. Member for Spelthorne to remind me of his question, if I might ask him to do that.

• 10 Feb 2026 · Cyber Security and Resilience (Network and Information Systems) Bill (Fifth sitting) · Hansard source

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  Clause 24 defines key terms for this part of the Bill, and in doing so introduces two delegated powers. Those powers enable the Government to bring new sectors into the scope of the NIS regime and to designate regulators to oversee them. The power will be used only in relation to activities that are truly essential to our society and economy—in other words, where disruption could pose risks to life or the economic stability of the UK. The powers are essential in the rapidly changing world we occupy. As we have seen with data centres and managed service providers, our society and economy can quickly become reliant on new services that are acutely vulnerable to cyber-attacks and system outages. Our legislation must be able to keep up with those changes and protect the services that matter most to our country.

• 10 Feb 2026 · Cyber Security and Resilience (Network and Information Systems) Bill (Fifth sitting) · Hansard source

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  I thank the hon. Member on both fronts. On the penalty bands, clearly defined parameters are set out in the Bill, and my hope is that that increases the effectiveness, the clarity and—at the heart of it, to his question—the consistency of application we expect across regulatory regimes. As I mentioned, the 4% figure for the maximum penalty in part referenced existing UK regulatory regimes and legislation that were felt to be the most comparable. In part, it was judged to be an appropriate, proportionate maximum, based on relevant concerns around the appropriate level of deterrent effect, the proportionate level of fine, the regulatory precedent and the broader impact on investment and the economy as a whole, notwithstanding the significant cyber-security costs businesses already experience. The second change in the clause is intended to eliminate the confusion surrounding the definition of a “material contravention” in the current regulations. Finally, the clause ensures that regulators can consider a wider range of factors when determining what constitutes an appropriate penalty. Where mitigating steps have been taken to address a breach, that should be acknowledged, but so too should the impacts of the breach and any history of compliance or non-compliance. To conclude, an effective regulatory regime must be backed by fair but effective penalties to ensure that it is followed.

• 10 Feb 2026 · Cyber Security and Resilience (Network and Information Systems) Bill (Fifth sitting) · Hansard source

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  Clause 17 introduces new charging powers for NIS regulators, enabling them to recover the full costs of their regulatory functions under the NIS regime. This is an important reform that will help to ensure that regulators are effectively funded as they take on their expanded responsibilities under the Bill. It will allow them to move away from a funding model that relies on ad hoc invoicing or Government grants, and to approach their duties with greater confidence and certainty. The clause sets out detailed procedural requirements that determine how and when the charging powers can be used. These will ensure that regulated organisations know what to expect from regulators; fees will be set proportionately and regulators will provide satisfactory accounting for the sums they have charged. The first requirement is that regulators consult and publish a charging scheme. It must specify what functions the fees are covering, the amount of fees being charged or how those fees will be calculated, and the charging period they cover. Crucially, regulators will be able to set different levels of fee for different types of organisations—for example, varying charges according to size or turnover, or excluding organisations from the charging scheme if it would be disproportionate or counter-productive to include them.

• 10 Feb 2026 · Cyber Security and Resilience (Network and Information Systems) Bill (Fifth sitting) · Hansard source

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  In response to the shadow Minister’s first question about ensuring sensitive handling of shared information and proportionality, all information handled by regulators ought to be treated carefully and with awareness of its importance. The regulators have to act reasonably, and the NIS regulations specifically require information obtained from inspections to be held securely. Of course, data protection laws apply to regulators as well. Alongside that, regulators will be required to consider the relevance and proportionality of sharing their information to the purposes set out in the Bill; as I have mentioned, the Bill includes specific purposes for why information might be shared.

• 10 Feb 2026 · Cyber Security and Resilience (Network and Information Systems) Bill (Fifth sitting) · Hansard source

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  Clause 23, through schedule 2, introduces a number of minor and consequential amendments to the NIS regulations, necessitated by the more substantive changes introduced by the Bill. Among other technical changes, the schedule revokes assimilated EU legislation, removes the requirement for an NIS national strategy to be published once a statement of strategic priorities has been designed in its place, and updates references in the regulations to reflect the new clause numbering. Government amendments 20 and 21 make minor drafting corrections. Government amendment 22 aligns the process for issuing documents, notices and directions under the NIS regulations with the Bill. As it stands, regulators will be required to follow two different procedures for issuing documents, notices and directions under the NIS regulations and under the national security powers in part 4 of the Bill, which is unnecessarily confusing for regulators and regulated entities. Amendment 22 resolves the issue by aligning regulation 24 with clause 57, as amended by Government amendments 23 and 24. I commend amendments 20 to 22, clause 23 and schedule 2 to the Committee. Question put and agreed to. Clause 23 accordingly ordered to stand part of the Bill. Schedule 2 Minor and consequential amendments etc Amendments made: 20, in schedule 2, page 89, line 35, at end insert— “(ia) omit the ‘and’ at the end of the definition of ‘relevant law-enforcement authority’;”. This amendment would make a minor drafting correction to regulation 1(2) of the Network and Information Systems Regulations 2018. Amendment 21, in schedule 2, page 89, line 37, at end insert— “(iia) omit the ‘and’ at the end of the definition of ‘representative’;”. This amendment would make a minor drafting correction to regulation 1(2) of the Network and Information Systems Regulations 2018. Amendment 22, in schedule 2, page 91, line 4, at end insert— “11A (1) Regulation 24 (service of documents) is amended as follows. (2) In paragraph (1)— (a) in the words before sub-paragraph (a)— (i) for ‘or notice’ substitute ‘, notice or direction’; (ii) after ‘served on’ insert ‘or given to’; (iii) after ‘served’, in the second place it occurs, insert ‘or given’; (b) omit the ‘or’ at the end of sub-paragraph (b); (c) for sub-paragraph (c) substitute— ‘(c) sending it by post to the person’s proper address or by email to the person’s email address.’ (3) In each of paragraphs (2) and (3)— (a) after ‘document’ insert ‘, notice or direction’; (b) after ‘served on’ insert ‘or given to’. (4) In paragraph (4), for ‘service’ substitute ‘documents, notices and directions’. (5) For paragraph (5) substitute— ‘(5) For the purposes of this regulation, a person’s “proper address” is— (a) in a case where the person is a body corporate with a registered office in the United Kingdom, that office; (b) in a case where paragraph (a) does not apply and the person is a body corporate, partnership or unincorporated body with a principal office in the United Kingdom, that office; (c) in any other case, an address in the United Kingdom at which the person serving or giving the document, notice or direction believes, on reasonable grounds, that it will come to the attention of the person on whom it is to be served or to whom it is to be given. (5A) For the purposes of this regulation, a person’s email address is— (a) an email address provided to a NIS enforcement authority as an address for contacting that person, (b) an email address published for the time being by that person as an address for contacting that person, or (c) if no email address has been so provided or published, an email address by means of which the person serving or giving the document, notice or direction believes, on reasonable grounds, that it will come to the attention of that person.’ (6) After paragraph (5A) (inserted by sub-paragraph (5)) insert— ‘(5B) A document, notice or direction sent to a person by email is, unless the contrary is proved, to be treated as having been served or given at 9am on the working day immediately following the day on which it was sent. (5C) In paragraph (5B) “working day” means a day other than a Saturday, a Sunday, Christmas Day, Good Friday or a bank holiday under the Banking and Financial Dealings Act 1971 in any part of the United Kingdom.’”— (Kanishka Narayan.) This amendment would align regulation 24 of the NIS Regulations with the provisions about giving of directions and notices in clause 57 of the Bill, as amended by Amendments 23 and 24. Schedule 2, as amended, agreed to. Clause 24 Key definitions in Part 3 Question proposed, That the clause stand part of the Bill.

• 10 Feb 2026 · Cyber Security and Resilience (Network and Information Systems) Bill (Fifth sitting) · Hansard source

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  I will take each of those three questions in order. The hon. Member for Bromsgrove raised a very important point—shared, I think, in sentiment across the House—about ensuring that regulators have the capacity to deal with the volume and quality of information they might receive under the provisions of this clause. Precisely for that reason, we have set out a charging scheme possibility here that allows regulators to equip themselves. Of course, that is initially a question of resourcing, rather than the quality or capability of that resourcing. We will therefore continue to ensure, through our oversight of regulators in appropriate ways, that we are pressing home the importance of enforcement quality and regulatory capability. To the shadow Minister’s point on proportionality, I share the focus on ensuring that designation and information requirements are proportionate, not least for critical suppliers. Like him, I will avoid repeating the previous debate, but the five-step test for the designation of critical suppliers, combined with the fact that the Bill allows for secondary legislation and guidance to specify more proportionate burdens on them, rather than on key regulated entities, alongside the fact that information notices ought to be proportionate and focus primarily on the purposes of the Bill, gives me—and, I hope, him—assurance about the proportionality embedded in the Bill.

• 10 Feb 2026 · Cyber Security and Resilience (Network and Information Systems) Bill (Fifth sitting) · Hansard source

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  Clause 20 introduces important updates to the information-gathering powers that regulators have under the NIS regime. It ensures that regulators are able to collect any information that they might reasonably require to exercise, or to decide whether to exercise, their functions under the regulations. While the clause sets out some of the purposes for which a regulator might particularly wish to collect information—for example, to determine whether an organisation should be designated as a critical supplier—this is an explicitly non-exhaustive list. The clause also allows regulators to collect information through the issuing of an information notice. It sets out the details that must be included in such a notice, and the form that it may take. An information notice must, for example, explain why the information is being sought and the form in which it must be provided. New regulation 15A, as introduced by the clause, makes clear that an information notice can be given to an organisation based outside the UK and can apply to information held outside the UK. An information notice may require the obtaining, generating, collecting or retaining of information or documents. Those changes are critical in ensuring that regulators can access the information they need properly to enforce the NIS regulations. I commend this clause to the Committee.

• 10 Feb 2026 · Cyber Security and Resilience (Network and Information Systems) Bill (Fifth sitting) · Hansard source

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  Under the provisions of this Bill alone, only the entities specified as critical suppliers or operators of essential services—the relevant digital providers and so on—would be caught up in obligations if an event occurred. Assuming neither of those is true of a food supply business, the Bill’s provisions would not apply. At the same time, in the sort of incident that the hon. Member describes, we would expect the NCSC to be deeply engaged, assuming severity thresholds and wider risks are applied. We would work closely on that operationally and I am sure we would look at how that business could be supported more widely. But the Bill’s provisions are really focused on the sectors, and entities within those sectors, that have an immediate threat to day-to-day operations such as a potential threat to life. There are reasons, which we can get into later, as we have done previously, why we set the sectoral scope in that way. New clause 6 seeks to clarify that a ransomware attack falls under the definition of “incident” within the NIS regulations. I share the concerns of the shadow Minister and the hon. Member for Bognor Regis and Littlehampton about the significant disruption that ransomware attacks can cause. Indeed, last year we saw the impact of the ransomware attack on Synnovis, a supplier to the NHS, which resulted in the delay of 11,000 out-patient and elective procedure appointments. The hon. Member for Bognor Regis and Littlehampton and the shadow Minister are quite right that this kind of attack should be considered an incident under the NIS regime. Because of the changes to incident reporting introduced by the Bill, I can confirm to the Committee that ransomware attacks will be in scope. The Bill updates the definition of “incident” so that it applies to any event that has, or is capable of having, an adverse effect on the operation or security of network and information systems. Ransomware attacks already fall well within that definition. Although I welcome the principle and intent behind the new clause, its content is already addressed by the Bill. I hope that assures hon. Members across the Committee. New clause 7 would require the Government to publish a review of the new incident reporting regime within a year of the Bill’s receiving Royal Assent. It is important that the effectiveness of the NIS regulations, including the reforms to incident reporting introduced by the Bill, should be reviewed periodically. That is why the Bill requires the Government to conduct a review and lay it before Parliament once every five years. That timeframe will enable the new regime to bed in and allow a meaningful period of time to measure change before the Government report on its effectiveness. As my hon. Friend the Member for Stoke-on-Trent South said, notwithstanding her and the shadow Minister’s confidence in me and the Government, to publish a review after only one year would risk giving an incomplete picture, as regulators and regulated entities may still be transitioning to the new processes. The new clause would also require the Government to publish proposals for a single reporting platform for cyber-incidents, again within a year of the Bill’s passing. We have heard the clear ask from businesses to minimise the time they spend filling in different reporting templates following an attack, to ensure they can prioritise the technical response. I share the concerns of the hon. Member for Bognor Regis and Littlehampton, and we are exploring all options to enable a proportionate and efficient reporting system. That said, setting a fixed time limit of one year to develop proposals does not reflect the inherent complexity of the task and the need to get it absolutely right for the businesses in scope of the Bill, not least because the proposals will need to be rigorously evidenced, consulted on and tested. For those reasons, I am unable to accept the new clause. Question put and agreed to. Clause 15 accordingly ordered to stand part of the Bill. Clause 16 ordered to stand part of the Bill. Clause 17 Powers to impose charges Question proposed, That the clause stand part of the Bill.

• 10 Feb 2026 · Cyber Security and Resilience (Network and Information Systems) Bill (Fifth sitting) · Hansard source

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  The clause introduces vital reforms to how information can be shared in the context of the NIS framework. Right now, as we have heard again and again from both hon. Members across the Committee and witnesses, the NIS regulations have limitations that restrict how and with whom information can be shared. That has serious implications for the effectiveness and efficiency of the regime including business burdens as well as the ability of the UK’s authorities to act on national security or criminal intelligence. One important limitation in the current regulations is the inability of regulators to share information with many public authorities in the UK and vice versa. For example, NIS regulators currently cannot share information to support the evaluation of the NIS framework or policy development relating to cyber-resilience and national security. The clause addresses those concerns by enabling information to be shared between NIS regulators and UK public authorities, including the Government. That will be done for the purposes of supporting the NIS regulations as well as wider objectives alike, reducing business burdens and for national security and crime purposes. The clause also imposes strict requirements and safeguards on how the information can be further shared. The net effect of the changes will be fewer burdens on business, better and more informed regulatory decision making, joined-up incident response and improved security for the United Kingdom. Government amendment 14 makes targeted but important changes to the clause. It proposes a further ground for sharing information focused on wider cyber-security and resilience outside the context of the NIS regulations and NIS sectors. In practice, it means that NIS regulators will be able to share information with regulators who are responsible for overseeing the cyber-security and resilience of other vital sectors under different regulatory frameworks and vice versa. The amendment is a crucial addition to the Bill. It means that the UK’s regulators can think holistically about the risks that their sectors are facing, the interventions they propose to take and the obligations they are placing on business. That in turn will mean better outcomes, more effective and informed incident response, more co-ordinated oversight and lower business burdens. The amendment will be particularly important in supporting co-ordination with the financial regulators responsible for the critical third parties regime, which could be used to designate organisations already in scope of the NIS regulations such as cloud service providers. It also anticipates the need for co-ordination for other sectors, such as civil nuclear and space, in the future. In short, the amendment is necessary to ensure that UK regulators can take a more co-ordinated approach to protecting the UK’s most essential services. Government amendments 15 to 18 are consequential on amendment 14. I urge the Committee to support the amendments, and I commend clause 18 to the Committee.

• 10 Feb 2026 · Cyber Security and Resilience (Network and Information Systems) Bill (Sixth sitting) · Hansard source

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  To repeat, exactly as I said: once a direction is issued, it will be laid before Parliament for scrutiny. If there is any misunderstanding, I am happy for the shadow Minister to write to me so that I can confirm it.

• 10 Feb 2026 · Cyber Security and Resilience (Network and Information Systems) Bill (Sixth sitting) · Hansard source

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  First, to ensure that the shadow Minister and I are representing the intent behind the code clearly, in legal terms it is not the case that an organisation that fails to follow the code of practice is automatically a regulated organisation that has broken the law. Clause 38 makes it clear that not following the code does not by itself constitute a breach of duty or mean that an organisation is automatically liable to legal action. Organisations can take different approaches to complying with security duties, but if they adopt an approach that is not within the code, they may need to explain why their approach still meets the required standards set out in the regulations, and regulators will be required to take the code into account when preparing guidance. On the shadow Minister’s question about ensuring appropriate timing and preparation for companies, I would very much expect that the regulators in question would be closely regulated entities to ensure the proportionate implementation of codes.

• 10 Feb 2026 · Cyber Security and Resilience (Network and Information Systems) Bill (Sixth sitting) · Hansard source

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  I thank the shadow Minister for raising an important point. His broader question is one of the most important in this context: Bills are only as good as the ultimate enforcement capability, capacity and framework in which regulators enforce them. Particular aspects of the Bill are focused on that question. One ensures that regulators have not just the resource through the cost recovery and charging schemes that the Bill allows for, but the information through the information-gathering powers—and not just the information, but a statement of strategic priorities as new horizontal risks emerge across sectors. So regulators are armed with resource, information and strategic priorities that emerge from time to time. Alongside all those resources, data and information powers, regulators need also to have accountability, of course. In that context, the statement of strategic priorities is intended to be one vehicle through which regulators’ compliance with overarching objectives of the Bill will be looked at as well, alongside ongoing oversight of each of the regulators through the usual departmental channels.

• 10 Feb 2026 · Cyber Security and Resilience (Network and Information Systems) Bill (Sixth sitting) · Hansard source

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  Yes.

• 10 Feb 2026 · Cyber Security and Resilience (Network and Information Systems) Bill (Sixth sitting) · Hansard source

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  To return to the point made by my hon. Friend the Member for Milton Keynes Central about the Bill’s provisions, the Bill looks at particular risks posed by hostile states, related actors and a wide range of other actors. Network and information systems for essential services and the identity of risk sources may be one consideration for organisations and regulators as well as the NCSC. The Bill does not look at specific actors but the outcome of the risk. Of course, hostile actors are an important part of that. I am happy to write to my hon. Friend about wider initiatives outside the Bill, particularly in the public sector, which I know is an important concern for her in relation to hostile state actors. There are a range of initiatives that the Government are taking forward in that context. Clause 43 grants the Secretary of State the power to direct an NIS-regulated entity to take necessary and proportionate actions in response to national security threats. The power can be used where the entity’s network and information systems have been compromised or there is a threat of such compromise. The clause sets out the sorts of action that a direction could require. A direction could, for example, require an energy provider to take action to remove a hostile actor’s presence from their networks, in response to intelligence that a hostile state actor was pre-positioned for an attack. Cyber-attacks on NIS sectors represent a serious and growing threat to the UK’s national security. High-capability actors and hostile states can mount increasingly targeted and sophisticated attacks. At present, however, the Government lack powers to require regulated entities to take necessary action in response. That gap could be exploited with increasing frequency and impact. The clause will remedy that, ensuring that the Government have the necessary powers to act quickly to protect our national security.

• 10 Feb 2026 · Cyber Security and Resilience (Network and Information Systems) Bill (Sixth sitting) · Hansard source

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  I am grateful to the hon. Gentleman for his points about proportionality and scrutiny. I want to give him assurances about that, as I did in our earlier conversation. On cross-border compliance, the hon. Gentleman rightly points out that relevant information can be requested, regardless of whether it is held the UK. I am very happy to write to him with further detail on our ongoing engagement with counterparts elsewhere. During this process, we have engaged more broadly to understand other regulatory regimes and ensure compliance with them. Question put and agreed to. Clause 45 accordingly ordered to stand part of the Bill. Clauses 46 and 47 ordered to stand part of the Bill. Clause 48 Notification of contravention Question proposed, That the clause stand part of the Bill.

• 10 Feb 2026 · Cyber Security and Resilience (Network and Information Systems) Bill (Sixth sitting) · Hansard source

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  I am very happy to give the broad assurance that we will keep codes under review from time to time, and that any changes to the code will require deep consultation with regulators and businesses to ensure that the codes keep in touch with moving technology.

• 10 Feb 2026 · Cyber Security and Resilience (Network and Information Systems) Bill (Sixth sitting) · Hansard source

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  I thank the hon. Member for that important point. The expectation is that the powers used here are scrutinised appropriately. If it helps, I can set out which uses of the power, particularly under clause 42, will trigger consultation requirements and the affirmative procedure, which will perhaps give her the assurance she seeks. In essence, all changes that may have considerable impact on how the NIS regime operates will be subject to consultation and the affirmative procedure. In practice, this means that regulations concerning the designation of essential services, as well as changes to the duties of regulated entities and functions of regulators, will be subject to both consultation and affirmative procedure requirements. In each of the cases I mentioned, clause 42 requires the Secretary of State to undertake consultation with appropriate persons before any regulations can be made. It also specifies that regulations of this kind can be approved only through the affirmative parliamentary procedure. These provisions ensure that any substantive regulations made through the Bill’s future-proofing powers will be properly tested. They provide the necessary checks and balances that such wide-ranging powers require, and they will ensure the credibility and legitimacy of future regulations made using these powers. For those reasons, I propose that clause 42 stand part of the Bill.

• 10 Feb 2026 · Cyber Security and Resilience (Network and Information Systems) Bill (Sixth sitting) · Hansard source

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  I thank the hon. Member for Brecon, Radnor and Cwm Tawe for moving amendment 26, in the name of the hon. Member for Henley and Thame. It seeks to reduce the period for publishing a report on the operation of the legislation from at least every five years to at least every three. I reassure him that the Government recognise the importance of regular assessments of the regime to ensure that it is as effective as possible. The legislation sets five years as the minimum period. That is an appropriate and proportionate timeframe in which to meaningfully assess the progress, at a regular frequency, of the entire regime set out in the Bill, following the approach set by existing legislation such as the Online Safety Act 2023.

• 10 Feb 2026 · Cyber Security and Resilience (Network and Information Systems) Bill (Sixth sitting) · Hansard source

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  This group concerns the power for the Secretary of State to issue directions to the NIS regulators, as well as general provisions relating to the power and the power to direct regulated entities. That includes the procedure for reviewing, varying or revoking directions, the procedure whereby Parliament can scrutinise these directions, how information concerning directions can be shared, the means by which directions can be issued and the clarifications of key terms concerning part 4 of the Bill. I shall speak to each clause in turn. Clause 53 grants the Secretary of State the power to direct NIS regulators in the exercise of their NIS functions, where it is necessary and proportionate in the interests of national security. The current system requires regulated entities to undertake “appropriate and proportionate” measures to secure themselves against cyber-threats. Regulators issue guidance to their sectors to help them to interpret that duty. However, geopolitical or technological developments could lead to rapid, unexpected increases in the cyber-threat that quickly leave whole sectors vulnerable and create a national security risk. In such circumstances, it is essential that the Secretary of State can leverage the expertise and powers of NIS regulators to drive the implementation of enhanced security procedures and practices. For example, they may need to direct a regulator to issue an urgent advisory to its sector regarding new cyber-threats or to update guidance on what measures are “appropriate and proportionate” for them to take. This power will not extend to other Government Departments or devolved Governments, for which any actions to mitigate significant national security threats will be agreed through engagement. Given the changing nature of national security threats, there may be times at which a national security direction needs to be varied or revoked. Clause 54 introduces powers for the Secretary of State to change the content of a direction, or revoke it altogether, where it is necessary and proportionate to do so in the interests of national security. The Secretary of State will be able to vary a direction to add new requirements, or to simplify directions by removing requirements that are no longer needed. To ensure that regulated entities are able to make representations, the Secretary of State is required to consult them before a direction is varied, where practicable. This requirement does not apply if consultation would be detrimental to the interests of national security.

• 10 Feb 2026 · Cyber Security and Resilience (Network and Information Systems) Bill (Sixth sitting) · Hansard source

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  The hon. Member raises a very important point. We want Parliament to play an important role in the scrutiny of the overarching regime as a whole, but particularly in the operation of the statement. Perhaps I can break it into two parts: scrutiny of the statement in the first instance, and scrutiny of regulators’ compliance with the statement. Once a draft statement has been consulted on, the Government will be required to lay it before Parliament, and that will be subject to the negative procedure. Parliament will have 40 days to scrutinise the proposed statement and express disagreement with it, which is very similar to the procedure for statements of strategic priorities in other areas—not least online safety. In terms of confidence in Parliament about actions that regulators have taken, the Secretary of State will be required to publish an annual report setting out, in general terms, the activity undertaken by regulators in the prior 12 months, alongside activity planned for the following 12 months. My expectation is that, very similarly, Parliament will have sight of that, and have the ability to scrutinise it and ask questions of the Secretary of State in the usual way.

• 10 Feb 2026 · Cyber Security and Resilience (Network and Information Systems) Bill (Sixth sitting) · Hansard source

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  I am grateful to my hon. Friend the Member for Harlow for his affirmation of that important point of parliamentary scrutiny. As I mentioned, the report in question will set out how NIS regulators have sought and will seek to achieve the objectives in the statement through the exercise of their regulatory functions. The clause requires the Secretary of State to lay the annual report before Parliament, as well as to publish it in an appropriate manner. Clause 28 also introduces information-gathering powers for the Secretary of State so that they can collect the necessary information from regulators to draft the report. I commend the clauses to the Committee.