Kanishka Narayan MP: speeches

Speeches

• 24 Feb 2026 · Cyber Security and Resilience (Network and Information Systems) Bill (Seventh sitting) · Hansard source

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  I thank hon. Members for their new clauses; I recognise the strong feeling and thoughtful contributions about reforming the Computer Misuse Act. I speak first to new clause 18, which seeks to place a duty on the Secretary of State to review whether amendments to the Computer Misuse Act could support the security and resilience of network and information systems used for carrying out essential activities. I assure the hon. Member for Runnymede and Weybridge that the Government remain committed to ensuring that the Act remains up to date and effective. The Home Office is already conducting a review of the Computer Misuse Act, and is developing proposals that arise from its findings. That includes careful consideration of proposals to introduce a statutory defence that would allow researchers to spot and share vulnerabilities. It will provide an update as soon as the proposals are finalised. However, limiting a defence to only the sectors covered by the NIS regime would be impractical. Any package of workable defence would need to be broad enough to apply economy-wide. New clause 19 raises the introduction of a statutory defence to the Computer Misuse Act. I acknowledge the strong sentiment regarding reform of the CMA. There is no doubt that UK cyber-security professionals play a significant role in maintaining the country’s overall security and resilience. Supporting them is vital. I agree with the principle behind the new clause: that a defence to section 1 of the Computer Misuse Act could strengthen the resilience of network and information systems by allowing researchers to spot and share vulnerabilities. The Government are already conducting a review of the Computer Misuse Act, and we have made significant progress in developing a proposal for a limited defence to the offence provided for in section 1 of the Computer Misuse Act.

• 24 Feb 2026 · Cyber Security and Resilience (Network and Information Systems) Bill (Seventh sitting) · Hansard source

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  My hon. Friend is absolutely right to recognise the shared sense on the principle of reforming the Computer Misuse Act. Although I am not in a position to give him a specific timeline, I absolutely take into account his recognition that the work needs to proceed at pace. Having held an industry engagement recently on specific proposals, with more than 75 attendees from a range of cyber-security organisations, the Home Office is now reviewing specific feedback as a particular proposal. The question is not whether we will reform the Computer Misuse Act, but simply how.

• 24 Feb 2026 · Cyber Security and Resilience (Network and Information Systems) Bill (Seventh sitting) · Hansard source

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  I am happy to write to the hon. Member.

• 24 Feb 2026 · Cyber Security and Resilience (Network and Information Systems) Bill (Seventh sitting) · Hansard source

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  I thank the hon. Member for Brecon, Radnor and Cwm Tawe for his new clauses. I will speak first to new clause 16, which seeks to require boards or equivalent management bodies of operators of essential services, relevant digital service providers, relevant managed service providers and critical suppliers to take specific measures to oversee the security and resilience of their network and information systems. Board-level engagement is a necessary part of proactively and effectively managing cyber-risks. That is why we published the cyber governance code of practice last spring, as part of a wider package of action to support boards in more effectively governing digital risks to enhance their organisation’s cyber-resilience. More recently, the Secretary of State, together with the Chancellor, the Business Secretary, the Security Minister, and leaders of the NCSC and NSA, wrote to the CEOs and chairs of the UK’s leading organisations, asking them to make cyber-risk a board level priority. I agree with the hon. Member that going further on board-level responsibility is necessary. That is why we will introduce security and resilience requirements in secondary legislation, following consultation. We will consult on proposals that are consistent with the NCSC’s cyber assessment framework, as we confirmed in our policy statement last year. The cyber assessment framework includes comprehensive measures on good cyber governance, including clear board level responsibility. It is important that industry is consulted on those measures, that they form part of a holistic package on security and resilience, and that they can be updated flexibly over time. We intend to consult on proposals for security and resilience requirements and wider implementation plans later this year. New clause 17 seeks to require all organisations in scope of the Bill to test the security and resilience of their network and information systems. We agree that proportionate cyber-security testing is critical to identifying and mitigating vulnerabilities in systems and networks. Organisations in scope need to take appropriate and proportionate measures to manage risks to network and information systems on which they rely, and that can include testing of network and information systems. In particular, relevant digital service providers are already required to account for testing as part of their overarching security duty. Additionally, all regulators can use their powers to mandate testing by an inspector, or by the regulated entity, to verify compliance or investigate potential failures. I reassure the hon. Member that we are going further. We will be updating and providing more detail on the measures that regulated entities need to take, as well as setting strategic objectives for regulators. As I have said before, our proposals for the security and resilience requirements in secondary legislation will be consistent with the NCSC’s cyber assessment framework, which includes measures on appropriate testing.

• 24 Feb 2026 · Cyber Security and Resilience (Network and Information Systems) Bill (Seventh sitting) · Hansard source

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  New clause 14 would require the Government to establish a dedicated support service for small and medium-sized enterprises that are operators of essential services, relevant digital service providers, relevant managed service providers or critical suppliers. That would include provision of advice, technical assistance and recovery guidance following a cyber-incident. It is worth noting that the Bill exempts small and micro enterprises from the regulations as relevant digital service providers or relevant managed service providers. Although regulators can designate a small or micro entity as a critical supplier, very few are expected to meet the threshold for criticality in practice. Similarly, there are limited examples of small or micro operators of essential services. Improving the cyber-security of our nation’s small and medium-sized businesses is important for the resilience of our wider economy. That is why the Government have developed a wide range of free tools, guidance and training to help those businesses implement cyber-security measures. Such tools include the recently launched cyber action toolkit, which provides small and medium-sized businesses with tailored advice and the offer of free 30-minute consultations with NCSC-certified cyber advisers. Report Fraud, a reporting service for cyber-crime and fraud, runs a 24/7 cyber business incident reporting line, with regional cyber-resilience centres across England and Wales also providing support for small and medium-sized businesses, including incident response and business continuity advice in line with NCSC standards. I hope that reassures the hon. Member for Henley and Thame that there is already considerable support available for small and medium-sized entities. Considering that, a new dedicated service is unnecessary, and it could divert resources from existing Government and NCSC schemes and impact our efficacy. For those reasons, I hope he will withdraw the new clause. Question put, That the clause be read a Second time.

• 24 Feb 2026 · Cyber Security and Resilience (Network and Information Systems) Bill (Seventh sitting) · Hansard source

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  The hon. Member has made that point a couple of times before. I am happy to write to him about the calculations, so that he is able to understand the survey and the significant uplift on which the figures are based. In response to the hon. Member for Brecon, Radnor and Cwm Tawe, given that the two reports can already include the topics addressed by his new clause, adding another report would risk confusing their purposes and increasing administrative burdens on those involved unnecessarily. The Government will not hesitate to adapt our support offering based on the findings of those reports. That will include using our flexible mechanisms—for example, updating our guidance to regulators, the statement of strategic priorities and the code of practice. Beyond that, we will continue to engage with regulators as the Bill is implemented, and consider whether any other means of improving regulators’ and regulated entities’ resourcing and capabilities are necessary and proportionate. For those reasons, I ask the hon. Member to withdraw his new clause. Question put , That the clause be read a Second time.

• 24 Feb 2026 · Cyber Security and Resilience (Network and Information Systems) Bill (Seventh sitting) · Hansard source

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  It is a pleasure to serve with you in the Chair, Ms McVey. I thank the shadow Minister, the hon. Member for Runnymede and Weybridge, for the new clauses in his name, which would require the Secretary of State to create a register of foreign powers that pose a threat to UK cyber-security, to review that register, and to lay a report before Parliament. This is intended to inform the use of powers granted under part 4 of the Bill. I empathise with the shadow Minister’s concerns that hostile foreign actors could target the network and information systems of operators of essential services or critical supplies. That is a clear risk, and one that we are addressing through the Bill. As drafted, the Bill grants the Secretary of State new powers to issue national security directions to regulated entities or regulators where their compromise poses a national security risk. So long as those tests are met, the powers may be used by the Secretary of State irrespective of the actor that is causing the national security incident or threat. New clause 2 would require the creation of a register of foreign states that pose a risk to the UK based on GCHQ advice. I reassure the shadow Minister that regardless of the proposed new clause, any decision to use the powers in this part of the Bill will be informed by expert national security advice from GCHQ. As a result, it is unclear what additional support the proposed register would provide to the Secretary of State when, for example, deciding whether to issue a direction to a regulated entity. Additionally, the report required by new clause 3 would effectively be a list of the vulnerabilities of the network and information systems of our essential services, and would therefore be an asset to malicious actors. That would be counterproductive to national security. The new clause would allow the Secretary of State not to publish part or all of the report, if publishing would be contrary to the interests of national security. However, it is unclear how even part of the report could be published without harming national security, given its intended content. Drafting a report of vulnerabilities that cannot be disclosed to Parliament without harming national security would simply duplicate existing assessments, and run the risk of distracting Government from more effective measures to protect from hostile foreign actors. That is not to say that we shirk transparency about these kinds of risk. The Government are already able to communicate with Parliament and the public about such cyber-security risks where it is appropriate to do so, through things such as the National Cyber Security Centre’s annual report and advisories. I therefore kindly ask that the shadow Minister withdraw the new clause. I thank the hon. Member for Henley and Thame for the Liberal Democrat new clauses in his name, which would require the Secretary of State to publish a statement of how the Government intend to address risks posed by foreign actors to UK network and information systems, and to assess how many entities regulated by the NIS regime are owned in part or in full by foreign states. Let me reassure the hon. Member that the Government take the risks posed by foreign interference seriously. The NCSC’s annual reviews continue to highlight cyber-risks to the UK from foreign actors, as well as measures to mitigate those risks. We have robust processes for assessing such threats, drawing on the expertise of the intelligence community, including the National Cyber Security Centre and the National Protective Security Authority. The measures introduced by the Bill will boost the security and resilience of network and information systems across essential services, managed services and relevant digital services, protecting them from the risks of foreign interference. Where that is not enough, the Bill provides a backstop: the new direction powers in the Bill will enable the Government to protect our critical services from exactly those kinds of national security risks. We will be able to require a regulated entity to undertake any action that is necessary and proportionate for national security in response to the threat of a compromise. Conducting assessments of the ownership structures of the many thousands of in-scope entities within six months would be disproportionately resource intensive, distracting Government from more effective measures to protect our services. Publishing a review identifying national security risks caused by foreign state ownership, or assessing whether our powers are adequate, as the Opposition’s new clause 3 would require, would provide valuable insight to our adversaries. As I have previously set out, there is a clear pathway for Government to communicate with Parliament and the public about such cyber-risks where it is appropriate to do so, but where we identify specific concerns, it is right that we retain the ability to assess and respond without disclosing our conclusions to those who might exploit them. Finally, it is worth pointing out that, as drafted, new clause 13 is not aligned with the intended scope of the Bill. The Bill is solely concerned with entities that are currently, or could one day be, regulated under the NIS regulations. This new clause would require a statement on the risks posed to all UK network and information systems, which is a significant broadening of the scope of NIS-regulated entities and sectors. Similarly, the focus on Government procurement seems outside that scope, given that Government network and information systems are not wholly regulated by the Bill. For those reasons, I ask that the hon. Member for Henley and Thame kindly consider not pressing his amendment.

• 24 Feb 2026 · Cyber Security and Resilience (Network and Information Systems) Bill (Seventh sitting) · Hansard source

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  I thank the hon. Member for his point. I am also aware that the National Cyber Security Centre’s cyber assessment framework has very specific measures on appropriate testing as well. It already exists, and we want to make sure that it is an important part of specific security and resilience requirements in secondary legislation. It is crucial that industry is consulted on the nature of any requirements related to testing. As mentioned, we intend to consult on the proposals later in the year. We will also issue a statement of strategic priorities for regulators, and will explore whether that is an appropriate vehicle for driving consistency in the behaviours of regulators in respect of their approach to testing for their sector. Overall, any approach to going further on proportionate and regular testing must be developed alongside the full set of security and resilience requirements, and co-ordinated and communicated with a wider package of implementing measures. That will allow the impact of options to be assessed, and provide the industry with clarity on the overall approach, including how the components fit together. The shadow Minister asked about the consideration of NIS2 requirements. We have looked at NIS2 provisions, and variability in member states’ implementation of it, as part of a wider set of considerations on which we will be consulting regarding secondary legislation on governance. My hon. Friend the Member for Milton Keynes Central made an incredibly important point about security by design, which I very much take into account. The Government Digital Service is already working on a secure by design standard. We want to make sure that it is as robust as possible, and extend it across not just the public sector but parts of the private sector. I will make sure that security by design remains at the heart of the Government’s cyber action plan, as well as that of the private sector.

• 24 Feb 2026 · Cyber Security and Resilience (Network and Information Systems) Bill (Seventh sitting) · Hansard source

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  I thank the shadow Minister for his recognition of our shared approach on this question. Reform of the Computer Misuse Act is led by the Home Office. I have given my personal commitment to ensuring that reform, but I will also write to him and members of the Committee with as much detail as possible on the timeline to ensure that we are moving fast on it. In that spirit, I thank hon. Members for their work on this question of the amendment to the Computer Misuse Act and use this opportunity to thank you, Ms McVey, the entire Committee staff and hon. Members for their expertise and perhaps for their sense of fun as well. I thank all staff members, in particular the Bill team in the Department, which has been fabulous throughout the entire process.

• 24 Feb 2026 · Cyber Security and Resilience (Network and Information Systems) Bill (Seventh sitting) · Hansard source

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  I thank the hon. Member for Brecon, Radnor and Cwm Tawe for his new clause, which seeks to require a consultation on the resourcing and capabilities of regulators and regulated entities, assessment on whether additional Government support is needed, and a report on the findings. I reassure the hon. Gentleman that the Bill was developed in close collaboration with regulators and industry to ensure that regulators have the right information and tools to implement it. The Bill already requires the Government to produce two regular reports to monitor the effectiveness of the legislation, and those would naturally include reviews of whether resourcing and capability were impacting on the effectiveness of the regime. The first of those is the annual report on regulator activities in relation to the statement of strategic priorities. The second is the report on the operation of the legislation, which must take place at least every five years.

• 24 Feb 2026 · Cyber Security and Resilience (Network and Information Systems) Bill (Seventh sitting) · Hansard source

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  I thank the shadow Minister for this amendment, which would require the Secretary of State to review how information sharing and analysis centres support the functioning of the NIS regime and what steps the Government can take to improve them. I recognise the intent of this new clause. These centres play a key role in promoting collaboration and co-ordination in the cyber-security space, allowing organisations to share information, intelligence and best practice. In fact, the UK already benefits from a range of such initiatives, many of which are facilitated by the National Cyber Security Centre. In its latest annual report, the NCSC noted that more than 200 companies now meet regularly in trust groups to exchange intelligence and best practice, and to support each other in incident response. NIS regulators also support organisations to share information with each other in sector-specific groups. However, while I fully endorse the value of those initiatives, I do not believe it is the Government’s role to review how they operate or to mandate how or where they are established. Such centres are meant to be a forum in which organisations can voluntarily engage in the exchange of information. As such, they operate most effectively where the initiative for participation comes from the organisations themselves or from technical authorities such as the NCSC. The Government are, of course, committed to ensuring that the information-sharing provisions within the Bill are effective, and that will be assessed through the formal review of the legislation already required under clause 40. I kindly ask the shadow Minister to withdraw the new clause.

• 24 Feb 2026 · Cyber Security and Resilience (Network and Information Systems) Bill (Seventh sitting) · Hansard source

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  My hon. Friend has extensive expertise, from which I benefit extensively. I will be keen to make sure that the Government Digital Service does so too. In the light of those commitments, I kindly ask the hon. Member for Brecon, Radnor and Cwm Tawe not to press the new clauses.

• 24 Feb 2026 · Cyber Security and Resilience (Network and Information Systems) Bill (Seventh sitting) · Hansard source

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  I simply repeat my prior sentence: this Government have already adopted a duty to provide biannual reporting on progress against the recommendations of these two reports. In addition, the Government’s cyber action plan was published in January this year. It sets out how the Government will rapidly improve the cyber-security and resilience of public services to deliver a step change in cyber and digital resilience across the public sector. The plan sets out clear accountability structures to ensure that cyber-risks at all levels of Government are actively owned and effectively managed, with those responsible held to account.

• 24 Feb 2026 · Cyber Security and Resilience (Network and Information Systems) Bill (Seventh sitting) · Hansard source

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  Sure. I would not wish to define it technically, but my understanding is that it is research aimed at ethical hacking. It is effectively trying to find vulnerabilities through simulated attack systems, which can broaden our understanding of risks and vulnerabilities and allow us to mitigate them accordingly. I return to new clause 19. Limiting a defence to just the sectors covered by the NIS regime would be impractical; any proposal for a workable defence needs to be broad enough to apply across the economy. That is why we are making sure that, through the Home Office, we are working as promptly as possible to ensure a proposal that is strong in its safeguards to prevent misuse. Engagement, including with the cyber-security industry, is already under way to refine our approach.

• 24 Feb 2026 · Cyber Security and Resilience (Network and Information Systems) Bill (Seventh sitting) · Hansard source

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  The hon. Member makes a very important point. We have heard of two major sources of risk from a cyber point of view: legacy technology and technology debt, and frontier AI attacks. The Government’s cyber action plan is not technology-specific, but both those sources of risk are very much on my mind, and I will make sure they are also on the mind of those implementing the Government’s cyber action plan. I assure Members that we will continue to work with Parliament to support oversight of the plan’s implementation and to explore additional avenues for scrutiny of the Government’s cyber-resilience to guarantee the right level of accountability. I therefore kindly ask the shadow Minister to withdraw his new clause. Question put , That the clause be read a Second time.

• 24 Feb 2026 · Online Harm: Child Protection · Hansard source

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  I will simply repeat the point I have made, which is that we are going to act by the summer. We have already sought permissive powers to ensure that the Government are able to act on the outcome of the consultation through rapid legislation. I hope the combination of those two commitments gives the hon. Member some assurance. The engagement and consultation will take place alongside work with counterparts. We will be monitoring developments in Australia on its social media ban for under-16s to share learnings and best practice. We are steadfast in our belief that the right way to deliver the next steps to protect our children online is to be led by the evidence through our short, sharp three-month consultation.

• 24 Feb 2026 · Online Harm: Child Protection · Hansard source

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  Both of my hon. Friend’s points—on the scope of how we look at particular platforms and at their functionalities—are not just considered by the consultation, but deeply important. I engaged with the Australian Minister on this issue just last week, trying to understand their experiences of this and the uncertainty of getting those two things right. That is exactly why the consultation has been an appropriate approach in this context. Where services fail to comply with their duties in the Act, Ofcom’s enforcement powers include fines of up to £18 million or 10% of qualifying worldwide revenue. Ofcom has indicated that it has issued financial penalties to six companies under the Online Safety Act amounting to more than £3 million. I can confirm to the House that just yesterday, Ofcom announced that it has fined a porn company £1.35 million for failing to introduce proper age verification on its websites—the largest fine levied so far under the Act. I welcome this strong action to protect children online. We have always been clear that while the Online Safety Act provides the foundations, there is more to do to ensure that children live enriching online lives. Like all regulatory regimes, it must remain agile. That is all the more critical given that we are dealing with fast-moving technology. That is why this Government have already taken a number of decisive steps to build on these protections. The first act of my right hon. Friend the Secretary of State was to make online content that promotes self-harm and suicide a priority offence under the Online Safety Act. That means that platforms must take proactive steps to stop users seeing this content in the first place. If it does appear, platforms must minimise the time that it is online. As well as that, both intimate image abuse and cyber-flashing are now priority offences under the Online Safety Act. Last month, my right hon. Friend the Secretary of State stood in this Chamber and made it clear that the creation of non-consensual deepfakes on X is shocking, despicable and abhorrent. She confirmed that we would expedite legislation to criminalise the creation of non-consensual intimate images, and I am pleased to confirm to the House that that came into effect earlier this month. That will also be designated as a priority offence under the Online Safety Act, and it complements the existing criminal offence of sharing or threatening to share a deepfake intimate image without consent. Alongside that, it was announced that we will legislate to criminalise nudification tools to make it illegal for companies to supply tools to be used as generators of non-consensual intimate images. Last week, we went further still and announced that we will introduce a legal duty requiring tech companies to remove non-consensual intimate images within 48 hours of them being reported. These measures will provide real protection for women and girls online. However, we recognise the strength of feeling up and down the country and right across this House—not least in this debate. We share the concern of many parents about the wider impact of social media and technology on children’s wellbeing. The rapid growth of grassroots campaigns such as Smartphone Free Childhood highlights how concerned parents are about the pull of these technologies and what it means for their children. That includes the potential impacts on mental health, sleep and self-esteem. We have set out our commitment to supporting parents and children with these issues. We want to find solutions that genuinely support the wellbeing of our children and to give parents the help that they need as they guide children through online spaces safely.

• 24 Feb 2026 · Online Harm: Child Protection · Hansard source

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  We will be very glad to come to the House as soon as the consultation is launched. It will be very soon indeed. As we have said, Members will expect not just a consultation— [ Interruption. ] I have not committed to debate the consultation today, prior to having published it. Perhaps the Liberal Democrats will take a lesson from that and follow appropriate procedure in this place. The illegal content and child safety duties came into effect last year. Those duties represent a major milestone in protecting children from illegal and harmful content online, as well as helping them to have age-appropriate online experiences.

• 24 Feb 2026 · Online Harm: Child Protection · Hansard source

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  I will make a little progress having already given way twice to Liberal Democrat Members in short succession. To be clear, it is crucial that we allow for a short, sharp consultation to allow the different parts of the debate to be heard, including crucially the voices of children themselves, who are too often under-represented in the debate. This is a complex area and it is vital that we get it right. We have already announced that we will act both with speed and appropriate scrutiny to legislate based on the outcome of the consultation. Last month, the Secretary of State set out to the House that technology has huge potential for good: to create goods, to drive growth, to transform our public services and so much more. However, we have also been clear that in order to harness the potential benefits, parents need to have confidence that their children can benefit from the opportunities that the online world offers, ensuring that technology enriches, not harms, children’s lives. Most children report benefits from being online, such as interacting with their peers, finding useful information or learning a new skill. But we also know that there are concerns about children’s online experience. This Government have always been clear that the protection of children online is our top priority. The Online Safety Act 2023 introduced one of the most robust systems globally for protecting children from harm online.

• 24 Feb 2026 · Online Harm: Child Protection · Hansard source

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  I am happy to repeat to the hon. Member this Government’s commitment, which is that we will act by the summer. That is about as short and sharp as a consultation period gets. The Online Safety Act took seven years; we are simply asking for one quarter to make sure that young people, parents and families across the country are properly heard from.

• 24 Feb 2026 · Online Harm: Child Protection · Hansard source

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  I take the hon. Member’s point about wanting to work together. The Government are committed to doing exactly that. It is not a question of whether we act, but how we implement specific changes to secure our children’s future. I encourage her and the entire Liberal Democrat party to engage with the consultation.

• 24 Feb 2026 · Online Harm: Child Protection · Hansard source

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  I can confirm to the hon. Member that the Government have committed to act robustly by the summer, which is about as short and sharp as a consultation can get. Instead of procrastinating on this question, I encourage her to engage intensively with the process of consultation and the national conversation. I mentioned illegal content duties, as well as child safety duties. Under those duties, services must now conduct highly effective age assurance, precisely addressing the point raised by the hon. Member for Upper Bann (Carla Lockhart), to prevent children in the UK from encountering pornography, as well as content that encourages, promotes or provides instructions for self-harm, suicide or eating disorders. Platforms are also now legally required to put in place measures to protect children from other types of harmful content. That includes abusive or hateful content, bullying content and violent content.

• 24 Feb 2026 · Online Harm: Child Protection · Hansard source

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  I thank the hon. Member for that point, and commit to her that we are going to try to do that as soon as possible. She will be aware that the legislative process is already very tight, so I will come back to her and the House with the wording of the motion as soon as possible. Last week, as I have mentioned, the Secretary of State confirmed that we will take new legal powers to allow us to act quickly on the outcomes of the consultation, delivering on our promises to parents. We will make sure that the wording is presented to the House at the earliest opportunity. We also recognise the importance of parliamentary scrutiny and the expertise that parliamentarians in both Houses provide, and have already committed that when regulations are brought forward, they will be debated on the Floor of the House and there will be a vote in both Houses, ensuring proper scrutiny. We are clear that the question is not whether we will act, but what type of action we will take. We will ensure that we do so effectively, in lockstep with our children and in the interests of British families.

• 24 Feb 2026 · Online Harm: Child Protection · Hansard source

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  It is a pleasure to respond to this debate, not least to further my education in my personal passion area of parliamentary procedure. Let me begin by responding to the motion, and then I will turn to the substance of the debate. The hon. Member for Twickenham (Munira Wilson) will accept that no Government could accept a motion such as that proposed by the Liberal Democrats. The motion goes against the Standing Orders of the House, which state that the Government as elected by the people control the Order Paper, apart from specific exemptions such as Opposition days. The motion would give the Liberal Democrats free rein to schedule the business on 9 March. Today they introduced a Bill. It is still not available to Members across the House, yet they are asking the House to hand them control of business to complete all stages of the Bill within a day. That is no way to make complex changes to the law in this area. This is not just a procedural outrage; more than that I am sorry to see the Liberal Democrats join the Conservative party yet again in their usual coalition of putting political desperation on this question ahead of the interests of British children and families. I urge the Liberal Democrats to forget this approach, and to take part in the Government’s consultation, which is a true attempt at engaging across parties and across the country, so that we find the right solution for children and parents. This Government have already set out a way forward that considers those vital issues in a responsible way, and allows for swift action in response. That is how we will give children the childhood that they deserve and prepare them for the future.

• 24 Feb 2026 · Online Harm: Child Protection · Hansard source

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  I commend my hon. Friend on her consistent commitment to evidence-based policy making in this place, and beyond it too. I commit to her that both the Born in Bradford study, which she mentioned, and wider research will be in the front of the Government’s mind.