Joe Robertson MP: speeches

Speeches

• 21 Apr 2026 · Courts and Tribunals Bill (Eighth sitting) · Hansard source

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  Will the Minister give way?

• 21 Apr 2026 · Courts and Tribunals Bill (Eighth sitting) · Hansard source

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  This looks like another entirely reasonable amendment, which looks to mitigate some of the harsher provisions in the changes that will allow magistrates to give sentences of up to two years. A moment ago, I talked about the difference between the more rough and ready justice in the magistrates court and the more rigorous, lengthy and developed procedure, practice and ability to operate in the Crown court. When it comes to deciding the income threshold for whether a defendant qualifies for legal aid, surely the most important thing is not the process or procedure as such, but the harshness of the possible sanction that the state is looking to impose on that person. Rather than looking at the £22,000 income threshold for magistrates courts and £37,500 for Crown courts, we could instead say that, if someone will be sentenced for up to one year, the income threshold is £22,000, and if someone will be sentenced for more than one year, it is £37,500. That is a true statement—that is how it currently stands. We should merely extend that principle, basing the figures on sentencing thresholds rather than on the venue that dishes out that sentence. That would achieve fairness, so that if somebody might be locked up for two years, they have the legal might and can afford the legal advice to defend themselves and articulate a case in a more professional manner. If having a legal professional does not give someone at least the chance of delivering that in a more professional manner, there is plainly little point in the legal profession. That is the rationale, and the Government do not have to apply a different principle at all if they just see the current threshold as applying to a one-year sentence rather than to venue. This delivers again on other amendments, not only from others on these Benches but from the shadow Minister, and it allows the Government to deliver what they want to deliver. It does not run against the principle of what the Government are trying to do, even though Conservative Members have differences of opinion on that. It merely perfects, improves and cures some of the defects and unintended consequences of the Bill. The entire reason that the Bill Committee sits is to seek to do that, but time and again, the Government would prefer to just vote things down and use their majority rather than taking the time to look at provisions that seem to me objectively reasonable.

• 21 Apr 2026 · Courts and Tribunals Bill (Eighth sitting) · Hansard source

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  I support the position of my hon. Friend the shadow Minister. There is a degree of cross-party support on the Opposition Benches; we heard some very good submissions from the hon. Member for Brighton Pavilion, which seems a while ago now. The Government’s position on many of the contentious issues in Committee has been anchored on Sir Brian Leveson’s report—indeed, why would it not be? It is an independent report that the Government commissioned. But they freely depart from his recommendations, seemingly on a whim, without any substantial justification. This is one of those cases. Sir Brian Leveson was very clear that magistrates should continue to have sentencing powers only up to a year, and the Government are effectively doubling those sentencing powers. This is about more than just sentencing powers; it fundamentally changes what magistrates courts are for and how our criminal courts are structured. The Crown court, whether sitting with only a judge or with a jury, is for more serious cases, with more serious sanctions, because it is able to deal with levels of complexity, be it in relation to evidence or procedure. We have heard about “rough and ready” justice in the magistrates court. That is not a criticism; it is a way of characterising the absolute foundations of our magistrates courts. They do a huge amount of criminal work in this country, but they are meant to be summary courts; they are meant to be courts that act quickly and do not have the rigour or probity of the Crown courts. That is their particular purpose, and it is therefore right that they have always had limited sentencing powers when it comes to deciding whether to lock someone up. Fines and community orders are the sort of sentences that are far more typical of magistrates courts. Depriving someone of their liberty is a very serious matter. It is one thing to deprive someone of their liberty for months, especially given that such sentences are often reduced—in practice, a year can be reduced to months—but it is another thing to deprive someone of their liberty for two years. That would suddenly make the magistrates courts’ summary-style justice, or rough justice—call it whatever; I do not mean any of those words as a criticism—incredibly inappropriate for the powers that the Government would like them to exercise. The clause therefore does much more than just fiddle with thresholds, or however the Government might want to characterise it—we will soon find out. It fundamentally alters what magistrates courts are for.

• 21 Apr 2026 · Courts and Tribunals Bill (Eighth sitting) · Hansard source

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  That is entirely right but, of course, we do not know, because the assessments in respect of the Bill are so light—there is not one on that point. It may or may not at all mean more spending. So many times, the argument on this issue, and on many others, is, “Oh, it doesn’t affect that many cases,” or, “Don’t worry.” Well, it deeply affects the person whose case it is. If a defendant wants to exercise the right that the Government are pulling away, it is hardly an argument for the Government to say, “Well, we’re not pulling that right away from very many people.” For that defendant, the right has been lost. The same applies to the argument when it is about victims or complainants. The Government are rightly willing to focus an argument on individual victims; they should be prepared to do that for the individual defendants who will lose rights and, in the case of sentences of up to two years, may suddenly no longer be able to access legal aid because the regime is focused on the venue rather than on sentencing power. That should be adjusted not because of what previous Governments have done, but because this Government are moving the goalposts on sentencing powers in the magistrates court, so they should make the matching adjustment when it comes to qualifying for legal aid. For that reason, I do not agree with clause 6.

• 21 Apr 2026 · Courts and Tribunals Bill (Eighth sitting) · Hansard source

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  How long is a piece of string? The unanswerable question. I could ask another question: is a 2-metre piece of string a long piece of string? If I asked you that question, Ms Butler, you would have a lot of questions for me before you gave your answer, yet the Minister thinks it is easy to answer the question, “Is a two-week trial a long trial?”. She thinks it is obvious and that a judge will be able to make a decision. She is not willing to put a definition on that, because she says it is evident in the way that the Bill is drafted. I look at the words in the Bill—which is all that a judge will have to make that decision. On length, it says that the judge will have to decide if the “likely length of the trial…makes it appropriate for the trial to be conducted without a jury.” On complexity, they will have to decide whether “the likely complexity of the trial” is “appropriate for the trial to be conducted without a jury.” It is even hard to decipher from that whether it means complex is good or bad for a jury. Complexity is just a description; it is not a value. This is incredibly unusual, novel and, I would say, badly worded legislation. Ordinarily, a provision of this sort would say something along the lines of: “If the court is satisfied that the length of trial is so long that it would make it unreasonable for a jury”. That would be more normal wording. The principle of reasonableness, while giving discretion and, some might argue, a vague term in the English language, is a well-tested word in criminal law and the English legal system. We know what reasonableness means; it is an objective test—“What would an ordinary person think is reasonable?” What about appropriateness? Does that mean appropriate to that judge on that day? Does it mean appropriate to a particular, theoretical juror? There is absolutely no guidance in Bill about how this novel word, “appropriate”, should be interpreted. Even when there are words in legislation such as “reasonableness”, which are backed by decades or even centuries of case law, the judge is very often given guidance in the legislation as to what is and is not reasonable.

• 21 Apr 2026 · Courts and Tribunals Bill (Eighth sitting) · Hansard source

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  My hon. Friend the shadow Minister makes a good point, and we will get on to talking about the provisions relating to the family courts. In relation to this particular provision, the family courts are where we have a judge making a decision on very emotive facts and on procedure. But family courts are far more collaborative in nature. A judge’s role is also about straining to find consensus. That is very different from the criminal courts where, ultimately, a judge or a jury, depending on who is hearing the case, has to make a yes-or-no decision on innocence or guilt. That has wide-ranging and profound impacts, which sometimes turn on a knife edge on hard-to-determine evidence. That is different from the family court, where the intention is to try and find consensus, rather than making those decisions. Of course, juries are used in civil courts in some defamation cases. Again, it is where the value judgment on intention—why somebody made a statement about someone and whether they knew it to be false or not—of 12 ordinary people selected at random in this country is better than a judge’s decision making alone. My issue with clause 5 is that it simply sweeps all sorts of provisions in a number of existing clauses of different legislation passed at different times into judge-only trials when those provisions were designed for jury-led trials. Unless I have misunderstood, that seems to have been done through a set of Government amendments and elements of existing law that were not envisaged on the first drafting of the Bill. That possibly demonstrates the slightly rushed and painful nature of how we are having to deal with this legislation, with so many loopholes and gaps in it. I am happy to be discharging my duties, dissecting and scrutinising the Bill. I do not mind how long it takes because that is my job; it is why I am here and I am pleased to be doing it.

• 21 Apr 2026 · Courts and Tribunals Bill (Eighth sitting) · Hansard source

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  I accept that judges can do all this, and indeed sometimes do all this. Surely, however, the Minister will accept that, given human nature, there is a limit to the extent to which a human being can be so well trained or so professional that they can simply disregard something that they have heard as though they had never heard it. Indeed, that is one reason why we have jury trials. It is also one of the leading reasons why in more complex cases or longer cases—in cases involving murder, or sexual offences, or in all those cases that have to be heard by a jury—we have a jury. It is to separate the decision makers of fact from the decision makers of law and procedure.

• 21 Apr 2026 · Courts and Tribunals Bill (Eighth sitting) · Hansard source

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  I recognise evidence, but I give greatest weight to Sir Brian Leveson, the author of the independent report commissioned by the Government. As the hon. Lady knows very well, the youth court is a very different beast, because a different set of principles and rules applies to cross-examination, evidence and so on for people who are of the age of minority. Simply to say that if the youth court can do it, then the magistrates court can do it for people over 18 is a slightly off-the-cuff argument, if I may say so; it does not really have any rigour at all. Allow me to return to my line of argument about magistrates courts. If there is a genuine intention and belief that magistrates should be able to impose sentences of up to two years—as I say, in my view, that fundamentally changes the nature of the court—then that should be met with provisions that make the process in the magistrates court more rigorous. I would not agree with that, but at least it would hang together, show consistency and demonstrate an intention that justice must be delivered in a process that is commensurate with the sanction the state is looking to impose on someone. There is no greater sanction in this country than depriving someone of their liberty and locking them up. In this case, it is more than a threshold argument; the Bill is fundamentally changing what magistrates courts are for, what Crown courts are for, and the difference in procedure between the two.

• 21 Apr 2026 · Courts and Tribunals Bill (Eighth sitting) · Hansard source

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  The central issue here, as with so much of this, is the impact that a single provision, or a single intention—in this case clause 6—has on other areas of the criminal justice system, and indeed provisions in the Bill. There is a lot of interplay between clauses 6 and 7—we are about to discuss clause 7, so I will save my comments on that for a few minutes’ time. The central issue is the unintended consequence, yes, but also the other provisions that Parliament will not get to debate. In this case, Parliament will not get a proper opportunity to debate the fairness of having magistrates courts sentencing up to two years, because the clause effectively creates a power for the Secretary of State to do that job instead. That is why this Committee is having to debate whether it is right that a summary court should suddenly have the power to sentence someone up to two years. The Government can argue that at least some of the provisions that the Opposition do not agree with are anchored somewhere in Sir Brian Leveson’s report. I would argue that this provision is specifically argued out by Sir Brian Leveson. Indeed, he talked about it being contingent on the magistrates court continuing to have sentencing powers of up to only one year. When the Government appear, in my view, to be doing something that specifically runs against Sir Brian Leveson’s report, rather than is simply absent from it, they need to explain their position. It is not good enough to run the same old arguments. The central argument in all this seems to be efficiency. How much will the Government sacrifice at the altar of efficiency? Efficiency cannot trump all, and certainly not the justice arguments already made by me and others, which I will not repeat. If the Government cannot explain where these provisions have come from, when they run counter to Sir Brian Leveson’s report, they should rightly submit these proposals through a proper procedure so that they can be debated by Parliament, rather than just giving a power to the Secretary of State. As I say, I will restrict my comments to the interplay between clause 6 and clause 7, which restricts the right of appeal. We have already heard some good arguments about legal aid, and it does not do much for the Minister, who is quite exercised by the previous Government’s record on legal aid. This is about not necessarily increased funding for legal aid—she says she is doing that already—but the right to it when the state is trying to lock someone up.

• 20 Apr 2026 · Security Vetting · Hansard source

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  The Prime Minister has been absolutely clear that he should have been shown the recommendation of UKSV. He knew he had not seen it, so why did he not ask for it?

• 16 Apr 2026 · Courts and Tribunals Bill (Fifth sitting) · Hansard source

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  The hon. Member speaks with eloquence and experience. I understand the Minister’s point: she has framed this as simply removing a choice from a defendant, as though this is a benefit that need not exist, but does the hon. Member agree with my analysis that this constitutes the removal of a right rather than a choice—the right to be tried in the Crown court, unless trial in a magistrates court is preferred?

• 16 Apr 2026 · Courts and Tribunals Bill (Sixth sitting) · Hansard source

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  I intend to wind up quite shortly, Ms Jardine.

• 16 Apr 2026 · Courts and Tribunals Bill (Sixth sitting) · Hansard source

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  The hon. Member for Chichester has set out the reasoning behind her amendment very well. If the amendment were agreed to, it would not go anywhere near restoring jury trials, but it would plainly be an improvement. The leading argument in its favour is that it is what Sir Brian Leveson recommended. The Government have repeatedly cited Brian Leveson’s review, and rightly so—that is what the Bill flows out of—but as the hon. Member for Chichester says, it cannot be a pick and mix. The Government cannot cite Leveson on the one hand and ignore him on the other. Quite aside from the fact that the opinion expressed in the independent review has been ignored here, there are objectively good reasons why a trial heard by a judge and two magistrates is preferable to a trial heard by a judge alone. For a start, there would be three decision makers rather than one; with a jury there are 12, but clearly three is better than one. But it is not just a matter of numbers. Magistrates could be viewed, and certainly have been viewed, as a hybrid of jurors and judges. They are not judges, and they are not legally qualified people. They bring the quality that jurors bring—varied life experience—to the decision-making process. Of course, in a magistrates court, they are guided in the law by a legally qualified clerk. It is fairly obvious that magistrates as a group are less diverse than the population of the United Kingdom, from which jurors are drawn, but at least they represent a greater diversity and variety of experience than judges. Judges all share one thing: they went to law school, they are legally qualified and they have had a career that is privileged—that is not a criticism, but I do not think it is an unfair word to describe a judge’s career. Magistrates have a greater variety of life experience. To bring magistrates into the decision making alongside a judge, as Sir Brian Leveson envisaged, would be to bring at least some element of a jury trial: the quality of being unjaded by a career in law and being unencumbered by the experience of being a well-paid legal professional. I struggle to support the amendment, because it does not go anywhere near maintaining the system that we have today, but it would at least be a small improvement. It is an obvious point, but judges sit alongside magistrates today; it is a tried, tested and understood approach, not an obscure or novel one. Indeed, appeals are often heard in that way, as I understand it, because there is added rigour in having a magistrate sitting alongside a judge. Of course, having a judge sitting alongside magistrates is an improvement on having magistrates alone, because judges bring professionalism from their legal training and experience of the law as part of the judiciary. There is a benefit there, although of course the benefit is already delivered by the Government’s own amendment, notwithstanding that it is worse than what we have today. I commend, or at least understand, what the hon. Member for Chichester is trying to achieve. It comes from a good place, but unfortunately—this is not her fault, but the Government’s—it does not go anywhere near maintaining the status quo, which in my view is plainly greatly preferable both to her amendment and to the Government’s approach.

• 16 Apr 2026 · Courts and Tribunals Bill (Sixth sitting) · Hansard source

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  I will go on to my next bit, which is even more relevant than my previous bit. The Police (Detention and Bail) Act 2011 is Parliament’s most recent example of retrospective criminal legislation. It reversed the effect of the High Court’s decision in R (on the application of Chief Constable of Greater Manchester Police) v . Salford Magistrates’ Court and Hookway on the calculation of detention time under the Police and Criminal Evidence Act 1984, and did so by deeming the amendments always to have had effect. They had not. The then Policing Minister described the matter as too urgent to await a Supreme Court appeal. This Government have made no case that the current backlog is so urgent that it must be all shifted to the magistrates court. It wants to tackle the backlog, yes, by changing the right to elect, but removing people who have made that election into a different court is something quite different. The Government have not argued that it is too urgent. That is unsurprising, because it is plainly not. Even in the emergency context of the Police (Detention and Bail) Act, when the Government faced systemic liability for unlawful detentions, the retrospective approach attracted intense criticism, just as I am criticising this Government. It was acknowledged in the explanatory notes that it was deliberately retrospective and it remains subject to potential ECHR challenge. It is interesting to note that this legislation may also be subject to challenge, even if it leaves this place and passes into law. No equivalent emergency exists here; there is no systemic liability to reverse. The War Crimes Act 1991 is cited as a paradigm case of retrospective criminal legislation, allowing proceedings for war crimes committed in German-occupied territory in the second world war, notwithstanding that the defendants were not British at the time. Parliament considered that the exception was justified by the gravity of the crimes involved—they were heinous crimes—but even then the Act was controversial.

• 16 Apr 2026 · Courts and Tribunals Bill (Sixth sitting) · Hansard source

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  I look forward to spending the afternoon exchanging ideas with the hon. Member. Let me begin by expanding a little on what I had intended to say. I do not agree with the narrative that it is either the defendant or the victim who wins out, not least because not every defendant is a guilty person. I would also say that victims of the worst crimes, when they are waiting for a guilty person to be found as such, already face the backlog. They will not have a choice to go to the magistrates court, because those are not either-way offences. The jury system will always take longer, and the people who have suffered the worst will always be subject to the longer jury trial. There is a reason why that is right: a jury is asked to take a decision on whether something happened, and its decision could mean that someone loses their liberty for a very long time. The criminal system in this country is tilted in favour of the defendant, so I am afraid that it is tilted in favour of people who commit heinous crimes. However, in our system we must believe that those who commit heinous crimes will be found out, convicted and serve the very toughest sentences.

• 16 Apr 2026 · Courts and Tribunals Bill (Sixth sitting) · Hansard source

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  I continue to be grateful to the hon. Member for hanging on my every word, and I am grateful for the opportunity to expand on that. As I said, it is a basic tenet of English common law, and the ECHR effectively replicates what is already in our legal system. I am very happy to engage in a wide-ranging debate on the ECHR, but I fear that you, Ms Jardine, are also hanging on my every word and may stop me.

• 16 Apr 2026 · Courts and Tribunals Bill (Sixth sitting) · Hansard source

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  I echo the points made by the shadow Minister. The issue here is where sentences may go above three years. A sentence of three years or more is fairly significant. The crime, of course, will match the sentence; no one is suggesting that the sentence is inappropriate in these cases—someone has been convicted. However, the issue is that the trial—the fact of innocence or guilt—will have been decided by a judge. Without raking over too much old ground, the point in a jury trial is that on more serious offences, jury decides innocence or guilt. What we have here, without the amendment, is a back-door way for a judge to decide what turns out to be a more serious case than perhaps had originally been thought, because the sentence passed is more than three years. As I understand it, it is not the intention of the Government to capture more cases of that serious nature than they had originally intended would be decided by a judge. They themselves are not arguing that jury trials do not have a place in this country for a great number of cases—unfortunately, not enough after this legislation. The hon. Member for Rugby made the point in an earlier sitting that other Governments have adjusted the threshold, notwithstanding our disagreement over what is being proposed in this legislation. Clearly, the issue with this provision, if it remains unamended, is that more serious crimes, with a sentence of more than three years, will inadvertently get caught. I cannot quite understand why the Minister will not accept the amendment, but I am sure she will address that. Once again, it would not, in any material way, move away from what she is trying to achieve with the legislation, which is tackling the backlog of Crown court cases. Again, that intention that is perfectly well meant. The amendment would not, in any way, get rid of her primary intent to get rid of either-way offences so that they are not heard by a jury. Notwithstanding the fact that I do not agree with her on that, the amendment would not defeat what she is trying to do there. Effectively, what it would do is close a loophole. I invite the Minister to address that point about instances where a judge decides, on their own without a jury, that a case is of significant seriousness—and that may mean complexity that was not apparent at the outset but became apparent during the trial—that he or she wishes to pass a sentence of more than three years. Three years is a serious length of time for someone to be locked up and deprived of their liberty. Wherever we think that the threshold should sit, I think that we all agree that jury trials have a role in this country for more serious crimes. If the threshold can rise above three years through that avenue, how high a threshold is the Minister willing to tolerate? In how many cases is she willing to tolerate that apparent loophole? Maybe she does not see it as a loophole. Maybe there is purpose behind it. If there is, perhaps she can explain why it is important enough to risk even her principle by having more serious crimes—those with a sentence over three years—potentially being heard without a jury. Again, I reiterate that I disagree with the primary disapplication of jury trials for what are now either-way offences. That is not what this is about; this is about the Bill doing something more than the Government may wish to do. I invite the Minister to address that in some detail.

• 16 Apr 2026 · Courts and Tribunals Bill (Sixth sitting) · Hansard source

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  Evidently, I support the amendment in the name of the shadow Minister. As he set out, this is about confidence in the trial when it gets under way. It is about understanding what a judge, in exercising their procedural decision making, may have seen prior to the trial getting under way and the evidence being heard. As I see it, the amendment would go some way to at least mitigating what is lost in the Government’s abolition of jury trials for certain offences: that is, the objectivity of jury trials, where a jury decide on the conviction—guilt or innocence, effectively—and the judge decides on the sentencing. In jury trials, there is separation between a judge’s procedural decision making about how the trial runs, including throughout the trial, and the facts of the case—whether someone is guilty or not—being decided on by the jury. When a trial is heard by a judge, the judge makes both those decisions. The disadvantage there, of course, is that when either party to proceedings—the defence or the prosecution—wishes to make representations about the way a trial is being conducted or about the evidence in a jury trial, the jury get sent out of the room. They do not see that argument, and their minds are not clouded by what is discussed in the courtroom on a procedural matter that a judge may rule is inadmissible in the hearing. Frequently in trials, that would be a dispute over evidence, such as whether a certain bit of evidence should be brought before a jury. The jury will not hear that discussion; if a judge says no, the jury come back in and they never see it. In a judge-only trial, where the judge is also deciding innocence or guilt, they have to decide whether a piece of evidence is relevant and, if they decide it is not, they have to effectively pretend that they never saw it and to disregard it. Our judges are capable of doing that because of their training, career, expertise and experience. I would suggest that judges in this country are among the best in the world; as I have said before, I believe our common law English legal system is the best, and I believe our judiciary is the best. But it is simply the case—it is human nature—that when someone has seen something they cannot unsee it. That is precisely one of the arguments for why we have jury trials in this country. This is about the arguments a judge hears and assesses when it comes to allocation. They could be fairly contested and, of course, the decision made by a judge could be controversial—not necessarily wrong, but controversial—and against what the defendant is seeking. When a judge chooses a judge-only trial, the defendant’s wishes are not disregarded but considered and set to one side, and the judge then hears the facts of the case. The argument is that the judge may be clouded in their view of a defendant, given the robust, perhaps sometimes controversial, arguments the defendant is making about where they want the trial to be heard. That may then unfairly cloud the judge’s view of the defendant when hearing the case itself. In the vast majority of cases, judges have a professional separation as they move on from an important single decision about where to hear the case to hearing the case itself. It is not just about whether a judge was clouded by the earlier decision-making process. In truth, in the vast majority of cases we can never know. We do not want to get into philosophy here, but some philosophers may argue that judges themselves do not realise when they are clouded. Probably more relevant in practice, though, is the confidence that the defendant has in the judge’s decision. If there has been a highly contentious, contested argument about where the trial should be held, if the defendant did not get their way, which in my view they should have, because I do not agree with this legislation, and if the defendant does not believe that their case is being tried properly and sees bias in the judge, that will make the trial harder to run even if it is not a reasonable view to hold. It could lead to defendants, some of whom may be representing themselves and giving evidence, not being able to set aside their disagreement with the judge. There will therefore not be a fair, objective process with a judge and a fair-minded defendant who at least has confidence in the system. Of course, not every defendant will have objective confidence in the system, but at least we can assist the process by not creating an opportunity for the defendant to disagree with a judge’s allocation decision and then have to face the same judge making a decision on their innocence or guilt in the trial itself. I use the analogy of juries, because that is what we are discussing, albeit not under this amendment. An important example arises in the family courts, when two people are contesting finances during a divorce. That is an area I am more familiar with, as a former family practitioner, and the principle is similar. I apologise if the language I use to describe the proceedings is slightly out of date; it has been a few years since I practised. A financial dispute resolution hearing is effectively an interim hearing before people get to a final hearing; they are seeking to avoid the final hearing by having a financial dispute resolution hearing. A judge hears the arguments made at that hearing and tries to assist the parties to at least narrow the areas of dispute, or indeed resolve their dispute and come up with an agreement by consent. If consent is not reached at that hearing, the FDR judge will not hear the final hearing, because they have seen things that they cannot unsee and heard things that they cannot unhear. The perception is that the judge has been unable to assist in the settlement, they will be unable to hear an objective final hearing and make a decision. The principle runs through not just criminal courts and jury trials, but family courts and the civil courts. It is a fundamental principle, in this country, that judge who makes a final decision should be as unclouded as possible by earlier arguments or decisions of a more procedural nature. For those reasons, I support the shadow Minister’s amendment. It would not drive a coach and horses through what the Government want to achieve in the Bill. I have already said that I disagree with a lot of the Government’s intentions, but the Government can still do what they want to do while taking the amendment on board. I hope that they will at least consider accepting some amendments. If not, what is the point of scrutiny of a Bill? What is the point of the process?

• 16 Apr 2026 · Courts and Tribunals Bill (Sixth sitting) · Hansard source

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  I think it is for the Government to set out the state of emergency. I do not accept that there is one; in fact, I do not think the Government are saying that there is one, when it comes to taking away a right that someone has already elected. We are not talking about getting rid of jury trials for a trial for either-way offences. I disagree with that; we have dealt with that, and we will go back to it. In this clause, we are talking about applying that to a number of people who have already made an election. It is for the Government to set out the emergency. I do not believe that there is one, and I think that they have not set it out because they do not believe that there is one.

• 16 Apr 2026 · Courts and Tribunals Bill (Sixth sitting) · Hansard source

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  Yes. Let us get back to principles here. I support what the Government are trying to do in reducing the backlog. Of course, that is the right thing to do, and it benefits both those awaiting trial and the victims and complaints who want to see justice. On amendment 25, my particular issue here the retrospective application of the law. Even if Members agree with the Government that either-way offences should go and that people who commit or are accused of committing a crime in the future should no longer have the right that people used to, the clause will apply that new law to things that have already happened. That is highly controversial and an affront to the common law legal system in this country.

• 16 Apr 2026 · Courts and Tribunals Bill (Sixth sitting) · Hansard source

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  I am grateful for that indication, Ms Jardine, and I understand. It had interfered with ongoing legal proceedings in favour of the state, which is exactly what is happening here: legal proceedings are being interrupted in order to favour the state, removing from appellants what would otherwise have been a conclusive ground of appeal without justification by compelling grounds of the general interest. The Court of Appeal upheld this conclusion, with Lord Justice Underhill emphasising the importance to be attached to observance of the rule of law. Mrs Justice Lang further held that the absence of consultation with the representative organisations, which I say has happened here too, and the lack of scrutiny by relevant parliamentary Committees may have contributed to some misconceptions about the legal justification for the retrospective legislation. She said that the Government’s ECHR statement to Parliament failed to explain that a departure from the legal norm—exactly what is happening here, in my view—was being sought. Those observations plainly apply with equal force to this Bill. The parallels are direct: the Government are introducing new legislation that will alter the legal position of defendants who are already engaged. As in Reilly, no compelling grounds of the general interest have been articulated for why existing elected cases must also be captured. Lots of arguments have been made about why either-way offences should no longer exist, but not why that must be the case for people who have already made an election in that way.

• 16 Apr 2026 · Courts and Tribunals Bill (Sixth sitting) · Hansard source

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  I do. Perhaps I could encourage a Tea Room conversation between the hon. Members for Gloucester and for Bolton South and Walkden, in the hope that her wisdom might rub off on her hon. Friend when it comes to pitching this as a contest between victim and defendant. Of course, on a technical point, it is not the victim or complainant who brings the case; it is the Crown—the state. Yes, there is a victim who must see justice, but in criminal law, the offence is seen as a crime against the state. In countries where there is not a monarchy, it is the people versus the defendant, because the defendant’s crime is an affront to the people. We have a monarchy in this country, and we know it is the Crown against the defendant.

• 16 Apr 2026 · Courts and Tribunals Bill (Sixth sitting) · Hansard source

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  To the extent that it is necessary, I declare an interest in that I used to be a solicitor regulated by the Solicitors Regulation Authority and registered with the Law Society. I, too, support amendments 25, 12 and 43. They are not technical or political amendments, but constitutional amendments, and I hope that the Committee will consider them in that spirit. Let me begin with some facts that I think we can all agree on. There are thousands of defendants who are currently part-way through the criminal justice process having made a formal, consequential and, they thought, irreversible election to be tried by jury in the Crown court. They made that election under the law as it existed when they made it—indeed, as it exists today. If the Bill passes unamended, that election, that choice, that right, which they have already exercised, will be taken away from them before they ever reach trial. It is a bitter irony that they have not yet reached trial because of the situation that the country is in. I accept that it is not this Government’s fault that we are where we are, but the state is the state, and the Government are responsible for it. For those people to be awaiting trial because of the state and then have their rights taken away from them by the state because of this Government’s actions goes far beyond disagreement on the Bill and on the principle of jury trial, no matter how important that is.

• 16 Apr 2026 · Courts and Tribunals Bill (Sixth sitting) · Hansard source

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  The shadow Minister is absolutely right. I invite the Minister to address that point head on in her speech. Even the Government themselves do not seem to be saying it is an emergency, whereas when any previous Government, Conservative or Labour, have tried to enact something retrospectively, they have at least made the case for an emergency. Heinous crimes committed during a war, loopholes that have left the state open to repeat, ongoing litigation into perpetuity—those are the sorts of threshold that have been met in previous times. I hope that that goes some way to answering the question asked by the hon. Member for Gloucester. Let us hear from the Government why retrospective application in this case is so urgent. The answer cannot be about future cases; it must only be about those who have already elected trial. I draw attention to a post on the UK Constitutional Law Association blog in July last year, which addresses and objects to the idea of using the Crown court backlog crisis to justify this provision. It is not an adequate justification that it is equivalent to wartime. Jury trials were not suspended even in the first world war, the second world war or the covid pandemic, all of which produced a more acute systemic issue than the one we have today. The present difficulties, however real they are—and I say again that they are real—do not plainly reach that threshold. The Government’s own stated policy is that they must balance conflicting public interests and consider whether the general public interest in the law not being changed retrospectively may be outweighed by any competing public interest with regard to ECHR. The Solicitor General’s answer to a parliamentary question set that out explicitly. For the sake of brevity, I will not repeat that answer. However, whatever views are taken about that balancing exercise, there appears to have been no such exercise on which to take a view. It is apparent in the Bill’s explanatory notes. No compelling justification for retrospectivity is advanced. It should be in the notes, and it should have been done already, but at least the Minister can address it now. This has not been a case of closing an unforeseeable loophole. It is not an emergency requiring same-day legislation. It is not a response to a systemic injustice in wartime. It is a policy reform that operates perfectly well on a prospective basis if that is what the Government want to do, although I do not agree with abolishing jury trials. But the retrospective reach of clause 3 appears—I hope—to be inadvertent. The amendments would correct it. The Government’s reform agenda could be delivered even if the amendments are made. Future cases would be fully captured by the new regime applied prospectively. Where defendants have already elected—and there will be relatively few of those over the lifetime of this law, compared with all the crimes that it will capture in future—their cases can be resolved under the existing system. It raises the question of what happens when we take a number of cases and put them straight into the magistrates courts now, rather than allowing the natural wasting away of the election to trial by jury for those who face what, today, are either-way offences. The cost of honouring the amendments is minimal, even to the Government. The cost of not honouring them is significant. I will not repeat the arguments that I have already made. In my view, the Committee should support amendments 25, 12 and 43. They are constitutionally proper and correct, legally secure and practically proportionate. The Government have offered no principled justification for the retrospective application of clause 3. In the absence of such justification, the presumption against retrospectivity must surely prevail. The Government can still achieve the aims of the Bill, no matter how much I disagree with a number of them.

• 16 Apr 2026 · Courts and Tribunals Bill (Sixth sitting) · Hansard source

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  Again, I invite a Tea Room conversation —although we may have to meet somewhere geographically in the middle of the Tea Room. Any measure that materially and detrimentally alters the regime to which a defendant is subject in a way not foreseeable at the relevant time engages article 7. The Government’s own ECHR memorandum on the Crime and Policing Bill of April this year acknowledged that article 7 is engaged where the defendant could not “reasonably have foreseen” the application of a measure “at the material time”. At least we can agree that article 7 is at least engaged. A defendant who elected Crown court trial under the existing law could not have foreseen that that election would be nullified, not least of all because some such defendants have been waiting rather a long time—and that is the issue this Government are trying to deal with. I say again that I support what they are trying to do, although I disagree with some of the means they are using to achieve those aims. This is precisely the kind of unforeseeable retrospective detriment that article 7 exists to prevent. While we are on the ECHR, I turn to paragraph 2 of article 6, on the right to a fair trial, and pending proceedings. Paragraph 1 guarantees the right to a “fair and public hearing” before an “independent and impartial tribunal”. The European Court has repeatedly held that the principle of the rule of law and the notion of a fair trial preclude any interference by the legislature—that is, Parliament—other than on “compelling grounds of the general interest”, with the administration of justice designed to influence the judicial determination of a dispute. This principle was established in a number of cases and applied domestically in Reilly (No. 2), 2014. Where a defendant has an existing elected case in train, the application to them of the new clause 3 regime is precisely the form of retrospective interference with pending proceedings that article 6 prohibits. The Government must demonstrate compelling grounds of the general interest. Processing efficiency—the rationale advanced for these reforms—does not satisfy that threshold, in my view. I say again that we are talking about cases that are already in proceedings. The Government’s own Criminal Procedure Rules 2025 identify, as part of the overriding objective, the recognition of the rights of a defendant, particularly those under article 6 of the European convention on human rights. Retrospective removal of the elected mode of trial is directly at odds with the overriding objective that the Government have enshrined in their own procedure rules. I turn to the more recent Reilly litigation that went on between 2013 and 2015, because, although this is a historic principle, it is one that has been repeatedly upheld. The R (on the application of Reilly) v. Secretary of State for Work and Pensions litigation provides, in my view, the closest and most instructive domestic parallel. In 2013, Parliament fast-tracked the Jobseekers (Back to Work Schemes) Act 2013 to retrospectively validate regulations that the Court of Appeal had already found to be unlawful. The Act was introduced before the Supreme Court appeal was complete. That is a direct analogy to the present situation, in which the Bill would alter the mode of trial for defendants who are already part-way through criminal proceedings. In Reilly (No. 2), Mrs Justice Lang held that the 2013 Act was incompatible with article 6(1) of the ECHR, in that it had interfered with—