Jim Allister MP: speeches

Speeches

• 3 Nov 2025 · Public Office (Accountability) Bill · Hansard source

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  I would give way, if I had not run out of time. I say to the Government, yes, let us go forward with this Bill, but let us make it a better Bill that gives the same rights across this United Kingdom.

• 3 Nov 2025 · Public Office (Accountability) Bill · Hansard source

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  I therefore hope that the Minister, when she comes to reply, will indicate that, subject to legislative consent, she will indeed make this Bill apply across the whole United Kingdom, because my constituents are as entitled as anyone else to the same duty of candour that arises elsewhere.

• 3 Nov 2025 · Public Office (Accountability) Bill · Hansard source

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  In welcoming this Bill, I am very mindful of the tenacity and courage of the campaigners who got us to this point, both outside and inside this House. They can take some comfort from this Bill today. I trust that it is a Bill that will live up to its promise. As I mentioned in my intervention on the Prime Minister, I trust that it will bring justice to the Chinook families, for example, who have been treated to serial cover-ups in respect of that appalling incident. However, there are issues with the Bill that I want to probe. It declares in its very first clause that: “The purpose of this Act is to ensure that public authorities and public officials at all times perform their functions…(a) with candour, transparency and frankness, and (b) in the public interest”. But will it be at all times? We discover in the Bill that the only criminal sanction applies to those who do not show candour, transparency and frankness to a public inquiry or a public investigation. In many such cases, there would already be the threat of perjury, so where is the commitment to ensure that there is candour at all times?

• 3 Nov 2025 · Public Office (Accountability) Bill · Hansard source

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  That is exactly what I said. Why does clause 11 not apply to the whole United Kingdom on the basis of a legislative consent motion? Such a motion could be sought from Stormont and from Edinburgh, and in that means we could have uniformity across the United Kingdom. That is the mechanism for doing it, but the starting point is to make the clause applicable across the United Kingdom, and then to have the legislative consent motion that would enable it to be enforced. That is how Parliament works with the devolved institutions. [ Interruption. ] Members can shake their heads as much as they like, but I was a Member of a devolved institution and know that that is how it works—that emphatically is how it works.

• 3 Nov 2025 · Public Office (Accountability) Bill · Hansard source

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  It does, and then it goes on to tell us in clause 1(2) how it imposes that duty. There are five ways in which it does so. The first is by “imposing a duty on public authorities and public officials to act with candour, transparency and frankness in their dealings with inquiries and investigations and imposing criminal liability for breach of that duty”. That is the only criminal liability that would arise from a breach of the duty of candour. The second way is by imposing an ethical code on public authorities. No criminal offence is committed if someone breaches that ethical code—none whatsoever. The third, fourth and fifth ways, in paragraphs (c), (d) and (e), are by “imposing criminal liability on public authorities and public officials who mislead the public in ways that are seriously improper”, by “imposing criminal liability for seriously improper acts by individuals holding public office and for breaches of duties to prevent death or serious injury”, and by “making provision about parity at inquiries” about legal aid. The Prime Minister told us that the Bill would apply across the whole United Kingdom, but sadly it does not. Clause 24, the extent clause, makes it plain that the last three paragraphs of clause 1, which I have just read out, do not apply to Northern Ireland or to Scotland. The Bill in its entirety applies only to England and Wales, meaning that clause 11, for example—which is an important clause, because it does create a criminal offence, that of misleading the public—does not apply anywhere other than in England and Wales. Why should that be? Why is this Bill not drafted in such a way that those clauses apply to the whole United Kingdom, after which the Assemblies of Scotland and Northern Ireland can deploy the mechanism of legislative consent?

• 3 Nov 2025 · Public Office (Accountability) Bill · Hansard source

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  The Prime Minister has listed a litany of scandals where there have been cover-ups. Will he reflect on including the Chinook disaster, in respect of which there have been repeated attempts to cover up the truth—the state of the aircraft that was sent out that night, in which we lost so many valued members of our intelligence service? Is that not a wrong that now needs to be righted?

• 3 Nov 2025 · Public Office (Accountability) Bill · Hansard source

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  I agree absolutely, and such interventions have happened many times. If we are serious about saying there is a basis of equal citizenship across this United Kingdom, and that is what it is to belong to a United Kingdom, the duty of candour being given to England and Wales should equally be given to all of the United Kingdom. I welcome it for England and Wales, and I welcome it so far as it goes in Northern Ireland, but it does not go far enough. I am disappointed by the Government’s reticence to accept that this Bill, like any other, could be improved. A mighty step forward in improving it would be ensuring that it provides that duty of candour across the United Kingdom.

• 29 Oct 2025 · Gaza and Hamas · Hansard source

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  Are we expected to believe that in the months and years ahead, the Government will stand by their promise that Hamas must be fully disarmed and play no part in the Government in Palestine? I ask because a previous Labour Government, under Tony Blair, with the present National Security Adviser by his side, promised the people of Northern Ireland that the IRA and other terrorists would be totally disarmed through decommissioning. That did not happen: supposedly decommissioned weapons continued to be able to be used to kill, and we ended up with the surrogates of the IRA in government. Will it be any different in Gaza?

• 29 Oct 2025 · Sentencing Bill · Hansard source

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  Will the Minister give us an assurance that, if there turns out to be a distinction in that foreign nationals cannot be deported from Northern Ireland because of article 2 of the Windsor framework, he will undertake to override that legislatively so that we do have equality right across the United Kingdom?

• 29 Oct 2025 · Sentencing Bill · Hansard source

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  Much of this Bill does not apply to my constituents, because in the main it does not apply to Northern Ireland. However, there is a key component of the Bill that is supposed to apply to Northern Ireland, because the extent clause says that part 4 applies—that is the part of the Bill that deals with the very important issue of deporting foreign criminals. My question to this House tonight is whether it will, in fact, apply to Northern Ireland. Yes, this is said to be the sovereign Parliament of the United Kingdom. It is therefore said that when this Parliament decides something, it is decided; when it applies a law to citizens of the United Kingdom, that is the end of the story. Sadly, though, I know—and this House needs to know, and needs to act upon that knowledge—that three times, this House has passed Bills that it said applied to the whole United Kingdom, and three times, the courts in this land overruled Parliament and disapplied parts of those Bills from applying to my constituents and my part of the United Kingdom. Those were the Rwanda Act, the Illegal Migration Act 2023, and the soon-to-be-defunct legacy Act. How can it be that this sovereign Parliament decides that it is legislating on issues affecting constituents across this United Kingdom and passing laws that it says applies to them all, but it turns out that they do not? The answer, sadly, is article 2 of the Windsor framework, because article 2 purports to trump this sovereign Parliament. In respect of Northern Ireland, it says that where there are EU laws—laws not made by this House, but in a foreign jurisdiction; laws that we do not make and cannot change—that bestow on citizens or those in Northern Ireland rights that are different from those in the rest of the United Kingdom, those rights will trump this sovereign Parliament. That is a frightening reality that this House has been running away from ever since it agreed to the withdrawal agreement and the protocol that is now called the Windsor framework. It comprises a fundamental assault upon not just the sovereignty of this House, but the legitimate expectations of my constituents that they will be subject to the equal citizenship that is supposed to come from being a part of this United Kingdom. Paragraph 1 of article 2 of the Windsor framework states that protections “enshrined in the provisions of Union law”— that is European Union law—are “listed in Annex 1”. Many of those provisions are about rights.

• 28 Oct 2025 · Support for Disabled Veterans · Hansard source

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  I commend the hon. Member for bringing forward this debate. As a representative from Northern Ireland, I am conscious that it is where many of our veterans suffered the injury that gave them their disability; they were defending us from the terrorism of various organisations. For that, we owe a debt of gratitude; their sacrifice is well marked at this time of the year. Flowing from that, in Northern Ireland, there is the victims’ permanent disablement payment scheme, administered from Northern Ireland but available to all veterans across the United Kingdom who suffered their disability in Northern Ireland. Sadly, despite thousands having been injured, fewer than 1,000 veterans from GB have applied to the fund. It provides a monthly payment and the possibility of a 10-year lump sum. Through this debate, may I urge veterans in GB who suffered their injury in Northern Ireland to apply to that scheme before it closes for applications on 31 August next year?

• 28 Oct 2025 · Family Farming in Northern Ireland · Hansard source

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  Does the hon. Lady agree that although the Government say that the effect of the inheritance tax on farms will be pro-growth, it will actually be anti-growth? In order to prepare for the day when a huge tax bill will have to be met, rather than investing in growing their enterprise, farmers are holding back so that they can hopefully make some contribution towards the exorbitant demands that are made upon death.

• 28 Oct 2025 · Family Farming in Northern Ireland · Hansard source

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  In that context, does the CenTax report not make evident sense? If we impose the full-blooded inheritance tax on the top end—on those above £10 million—are we not reaping the same tax return, while at the same time not punishing and driving out of existence those at the bottom end? Is that not logical, and is that not right?

• 28 Oct 2025 · China Spying Case · Hansard source

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  Among all the finger-pointing in this House, there are some immutable facts, and one is that in the spring of 2024, the evidential burden to bring a prosecution was met, because the CPS levelled a charge that the two individuals were guilty under the 1911 Act of having information capable of assisting an enemy. The first point is that a deficiency in the 1911 Act is not the problem, because the CPS was capable of bringing the charge. The second point is that to bring the charge, the evidential tests for bringing a prosecution had to be met: that there was a reasonable prospect of conviction and that it was in the public interest. The unanswered question in all this is what happened between the spring of 2024 and September 2025, when suddenly the same evidential test was not met. What changed? It was met, or the charges could never have been brought, but suddenly it was not met and the charges were dropped. It seems pretty clear from what has been said to a Committee of this House that what changed was that the Government backed off in their evidence as to what would establish whether China was an enemy. The Government were assisted in the meantime by the Bulgarian case, where the Court of Appeal refined “enemy” to “posing threat or threats”. Indeed, the Court said it was a matter of common sense as to whether something or someone was an enemy. There is no greater jury question than to decide whether or not something is common sense. The prosecution looked easier after the Court of Appeal decision, not harder, yet the prosecution was dropped. That is yet to be explained to this House. It seems to me that it can only be explained by the Government’s failing to come up to proof. Since they had come up to proof to bring the charge in the first place, they obviously retreated. We can talk around this as much as we like, but that seems to me to be the immovable reality of the situation. There are, of course, issues here about the equivocation of the Government towards China, but it is an equivocation that is even infecting devolution. Coming up in Northern Ireland is a co-sponsored conference between the Chinese Government and the Sinn Féin Economy Minister to talk about infrastructure and investment. I say to this Government that they need to take a long, hard look at the way in which devolved institutions, particularly in Stormont, are playing footsie with the Chinese Government.

• 27 Oct 2025 · Prisoner Release Checks · Hansard source

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  I think we all know that it is the notoriety of the Kebatu case which has brought the Justice Secretary to the House today, but we also know that there were 262 such wrongful releases in 2024-25. How many independent investigations were held into any of those and with what result, and how have we got to the point where, on average, we have five wrongful releases per week? Shouldn’t action have been taken long ago?

• 22 Oct 2025 · Draft Control of Mercury (Enforcement) (Amendment) Regulations 2025 · Hansard source

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  Absolutely. We have seen that dozens upon dozens of times, with suppliers in all sorts of sectors simply saying that it is beyond their reach in terms of finance—it is too bureaucratic, they cannot afford it and they cannot afford the extra staff to do the paperwork. It could well be that suppliers, particularly since it has to come through the red lane—the full-throated Irish sea border—decide not to send it. If they do, then we are back to where we started: NHS dentistry would face collapse, because we cannot possibly afford the alternatives, according to the dentists. The regulation is riddled with absurd inconsistencies. My own dentist has confirmed to me that this regulation says that, whereas he can put a dental amalgam filling in my mouth because I am a resident of the United Kingdom, if he treats somebody from the EU—that does happen along the border, where someone might live in the Republic of Ireland, but come to a Northern Ireland dentist—he cannot give them a dental amalgam filling. The thing is so absurd that it is unbelievable. As parliamentarians, in the dignity that we should attach to our position, we should be very sceptical and very resistant to doing only what a foreign jurisdiction allows us to. We should be working towards the proper restoration of full and equal citizenship, so that this House makes the laws for all the people of the United Kingdom.

• 22 Oct 2025 · Draft Control of Mercury (Enforcement) (Amendment) Regulations 2025 · Hansard source

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  It is a pleasure to serve under your chairmanship, Ms Lewell. We are all supposed to be part of the United Kingdom, and with that comes the supposed assurance of equal citizenship. The greatest manifestation of equal citizenship for parliamentarians is that we make the laws that govern our citizens, and yet that is the first glaring thing about this proposition. We are being asked to approve a situation that is under the control of not this Parliament, not the devolved Assembly, but a foreign Parliament, namely the European Parliament, because it is its 2017 regulation, updated in 2024, that bans mercury in dental amalgam. As a result of the Windsor framework, which the Opposition party delivered to us, we have this situation where Northern Ireland, without consent, without being asked, is subject to the making of laws in 300 areas of which this is one—not to the laws of this Parliament or of Stormont, but to the laws of a foreign jurisdiction, that of the European Parliament. That is why we are subject to the mercury laws of the European Parliament. The genesis of this proposition is important to understanding the resentment that it causes for me and my constituents. Yes, it is correct that if the original ban date of 2026 had been adhered to, according to the British Dental Association, NHS dentistry in Northern Ireland would have collapsed, because dental amalgam with mercury is the cheapest and quickest form of filling. For a dental practice that is literally already struggling to survive, the consequence of removing the cheapest form of filling, and imposing the most expensive and the one that takes longer to do, is that we will push it under. That was why the BDA said that that would cause the end of NHS dentistry. We are then expected, on foot of that, to be appreciative that our foreign colonial masters have deigned to give us another few years of affordable dentistry, by awarding us with the concession to 2034. The regulation before us today is on foot of the grace and favour of the EU. It is not because of this House—this House has surrendered the power to make this regulation of its own volition. It is because of the grace and favour of the EU in allowing us this concession, that we then have dressed up a statutory instrument to give authority to what they have allowed us to do. Think for a moment as a parliamentarian how insulting it is—to my role, to the Minister’s role and to our citizens—that we are only allowed to make a regulation courtesy of the grace and favour of the EU. And yet that is the basis of the regulation. It comes about because the EU issued what it calls a Commission notice. A Commission notice has no legal standing. That is clear when one reads the Commission notice: it starts with a disclaimer that says there is no legal authority, because the legal authority lies with the European Court of Justice. The ECJ could step in and say, “You can’t do this.” Subject to that, it has issued a Commission notice to allow this extension. The Commission notice contains some other interesting and compelling things. For example, it says that Northern Ireland can continue to produce dental amalgam, but only until the end of next June, and then it is banned from being produced. That Commission notice also says that from then on we have to import it from GB, but through the EU’s full international customs border established in the Irish sea. It says expressly that it is category 1, and it cannot come through the green lane—or the now misnamed internal market lane; it has to come through the red lane. Under this concessionary Commission notice that we are meant to be so grateful for, the EU is saying that the dental amalgam that we need we cannot produce ourselves; we can only import it from GB, and if we do, we can only import it through the full-throated international customs border that is the Irish sea border. As a citizen, and as a representative of those who I should be making the laws for, I am meant to be grateful for that concession. They could not make it more difficult in terms of bringing it in from GB if they tried.

• 22 Oct 2025 · Life Sciences Innovative Manufacturing Fund · Hansard source

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  Northern Ireland has a vibrant life sciences manufacturing sector. I am looking to the Minister for an assurance relating to article 10 of the Windsor framework, which subjects Northern Ireland to EU state aid rules. Can the Minister assure us that there is no impediment arising therein that would impede successful applications to the fund from Northern Ireland manufacturers? That could also have a knock-on effect on GB, because if the goods produced are transported to Northern Ireland, they, too, come under the state aid rules. Has the Department examined that? What assurance can the Government give us on the protection against EU state aid rules for the fund?

• 20 Oct 2025 · Diego Garcia Military Base and British Indian Ocean Territory Bill · Hansard source

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  I will primarily focus on new clause 8, which is in my name and the names of colleagues. First and foremost, this Bill is about perfecting the decolonisation of the British Indian Ocean Territory—that is self-evident in clause 2—but it does that in a way that ignores a primary component of decolonisation. We subscribe to United Nations resolution 1514. That resolution talks about respecting not only the integrity of territory, but self-determination. The British Indian Ocean Territory has existed, de facto and de jure, for over 50 years, yet the Government’s approach in justifying this completion of decolonisation is to focus solely on territorial integrity by claiming that the Chagos islands are, in fact, part of Mauritius. Resolution 1514 contains a number of components. Its first point is that “The subjection of peoples to alien subjugation, domination and exploitation constitutes a denial of fundamental human rights”. Its second point is that “All peoples have the right to self-determination”. The question for this House is surely this: are the Chagossians a people? I certainly think that they are. They are distinct from the Mauritians by their ethnic background, by their religion and by geography. Mauritius and the Chagos islands are over 1,300 miles apart, approximately as far as it is from this House to north Africa, so after 50 years of the existence of the BIOT, it really is a stretch to say that the sole defining issue is that of territorial integrity. To say that is to ignore the right to self-determination. This nation has dealt with decolonisation before, and we did not approach it on the basis that it is only about territorial integrity. Take the example of India. We decolonised in India, but we allowed it to be subject to self-determination—that is why we have India, Pakistan and Bangladesh. It is quite clear that this is not a situation in which territorial integrity trumps everything else. It does not trump self-determination. An experience of decolonisation such as India’s shows that territorial integrity is secondary to self-determination, yet the right of the people who claim the Chagos islands as their homeland to any measure of self-determination is the one thing that has been utterly ignored in this process. We have in our history the shameful episode of their forceful removal from the Chagos islands, and now under this treaty, we are going to compound that shame by legitimising that removal. Saying that this is only about territorial integrity is to legitimise their forceful removal from the Chagos islands—that is how we get around the question of self-determination. That is wrong. The people of the Chagos islands are a people. They are a people with a homeland; therefore, under international law, they are a people with a right to self-determination, so why do this treaty and this Bill trash that right? That is the fundamental haunting question when it comes to the humanity and international legal requirements of the situation that prevails. The Government are obviously holding to the line, “It is only about territorial integrity,” but they are hoisted by their own petard, because they have recognised the Chagossians as a people by setting aside some millions of pounds for them. They cannot say it is only about territorial integrity, and there is no people to whom to give the right to self-determination, and then say, “For those people to whom we deny the right to self-determination, here is some conscience money.” They cannot do that, yet that is what the treaty does. The BIOT recognised the separateness of the people of the Chagos islands, and even the much-vaunted advisory judgment of the International Court of Justice gives respect and acknowledgment—to an extent—to the question of self-determination. At one point, the judgment states: “It follows that any detachment by the administering Power of part of a non-self-governing territory, unless based on the freely expressed and genuine will of the people of the territory concerned, is contrary to the right to self-determination.” Even that advisory judgment recognised the exception of the freely expressed and genuine will of the people, but that is what we have not had on this issue. This Government have gone out of their way to deny the free and genuine expression of opinion by the people whose homeland is the Chagos islands. That shameful indictment compounds what we did to those people at the end of the 1960s. The Government now totally dehumanise their human rights by saying, “You have no rights whatever when it comes to self-determination.” That is fundamentally wrong. If the splitting of that wider colony in 1965 was illegitimate because there was no self-determination, according to the advisory judgment of the Court, then equally the Chagos islands rejoining Mauritius without self-determination is illegitimate. The Government cannot have it both ways, but that is what this Bill is seeking to do. The Government say that because it was illegitimate to split the Chagos islands off from Mauritius in 1965 because there was no self-determination, the Bill is about territorial integrity only, but if the basis of rejoining the Chagos islands to Mauritius is without self-determination, then that equally is illegitimate. Those are some of the points that this Government have not faced, and if they have faced them, they have not answered them. This House is legitimately asking those questions tonight, and waiting for answers. If those answers do not come, it will illustrate how this is the tawdry, unacceptable and unenforceable Bill that it will ultimately be seen to be.

• 20 Oct 2025 · Alleged Spying Case: Home Office Involvement · Hansard source

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  It seems to me that the key question, which has not been answered despite three sessions on this subject, is the following. We know that in April 2024 the evidential test for prosecution under the Official Secrets Act 1911 was met. We also know that come September ’25, the CPS was saying that it was not met. The key question is: what changed? Part of the answer seemed to come from the CPS, when it said that it asked for Government information, which it did not get to a satisfactory level. Does that not suggest that there was a failure on the part of Government that contributed to the collapse of this prosecution? If the Government simply said, “On the one hand, China is a threat; on the other hand, it is an opportunity,” how could we ever put beyond all reasonable doubt in a criminal case the fact that it was a threat? Was that equivocation not the source of the problem?

• 15 Oct 2025 · Northern Ireland Troubles (Legacy and Reconciliation) Act 2023 · Hansard source

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  The Secretary of State has done much to talk up the alleged special provisions in relation to ex-servicemen, but legally is it not the case that any such provisions would have to apply across the board? If I am wrong about that, will the Secretary of State now tell the House which special provisions apply exclusively and only to servicemen?

• 14 Oct 2025 · Middle East · Hansard source

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  I gladly join in the tributes of appreciation to all, including President Trump, who made the long-awaited release of the hostages a reality yesterday. May I press the Prime Minister on the disarming of Hamas? For the Prime Minister, is that wholly non-negotiable? How is it to be delivered? If it is not delivered in totality, where does that leave this nation? We would have recognised a Palestine that then would have a continuing presence of an armed and controlling Hamas.

• 14 Oct 2025 · Postural Tachycardia Syndrome · Hansard source

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  I am much obliged to the hon. Lady. On the theme of this being a nationwide problem, in Northern Ireland not only does it take seven years for diagnosis, but we do not, it appears, have a single PoTS specialist, which is aggravating the situation. If the Government are to address this issue, they need to address it on a nationwide basis and they need to give it the urgency and funding that it obviously deserves and that to date has been neglected.

• 14 Oct 2025 · Northern Ireland Troubles · Hansard source

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  Scores, if not hundreds, of people in Northern Ireland lost their lives because of the safe base and the haven that the Republic of Ireland offered their IRA murderers. That was where they had their arms dumps, that was where they had their training camps and that was where they returned to for sanctuary, safe in the knowledge that extradition would invariably be refused. Yet it is with the Government of that territory that the Secretary of State has chosen to co-design these proposals. He did not co-design them with the innocent victims of terrorism; he chose to co-design them with the Government of the territory that facilitated the victim makers. Why, then, should any innocent victim have any confidence in these proposals, particularly as they still require nothing meaningful from the Republic of Ireland? There is a tentative promise that, if necessary, there will be co-operation, but there is no apology for the Republic’s role in facilitating terrorism for years. Did the Secretary of State even seek an apology publicly from the Republic of Ireland? That is the same Government who to this day continue with an inter-state action against this Government. How could any of this proposal command widespread support when that is its genealogy?

• 13 Oct 2025 · Security Update: Official Secrets Act Case · Hansard source

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  It seems to me that the right hon. Member for Islington South and Finsbury (Emily Thornberry), the Chair of the Foreign Affairs Committee, put her finger on the nub of this matter. We know that in April 2024, the CPS decided that the evidential test was met. The evidential test was that there was a reasonable prospect of conviction for the offence of passing useful information to an enemy. We know that in September ’25, the DPP maintained that the evidential test was not met, so what changed? Who changed it? How did we move from the evidential test being met to the evidential test not being met? Was the evidence before the DPP withdrawn? Was it found to be unreliable, or did the Government fail to substantiate the evidence that enabled the evidential test to be met back in April 2024?