David Simmonds MP: speeches

Speeches

• 14 Oct 2025 · English Devolution and Community Empowerment Bill (Third sitting) · Hansard source

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  I shall speak to the amendments standing in my name. There is a degree of overlap between the points made so far and the subject matter of my amendments: all of them revolve around the issue of localism and consent. As has been clearly expressed, I have a degree of sympathy for the points that have just been made, particularly those about the role of parish and district councils in agreeing to and steering this devolution process. When we had our witness session just a few weeks ago, we heard from Councillor Sam Chapman-Allen of the District Councils’ Network and from Justin Griggs, the head of policy and communications at the National Association of Local Councils, which represents the parish councils and parish meetings of England. Both of them emphasised in their evidence the need for and the importance of that local voice. I reflect on legislation passed recently—particularly the Police, Crime, Sentencing and Courts Act 2022, which strengthened the powers that our communities sought for local authorities to deal with unauthorised encampments. One of the things we missed was the opportunity to enable parish councils and parish meetings to use those powers. That is a really concrete example of where our constituents would have benefited. We know there are both sins of omission and sins of commission. I suspect it is a sin of omission that the Government have failed to use the opportunity of this legislation to complete the devolution work that they talk about, and to ask, “What role will those elected bodies at the town and parish level be able to play in the context of this new devolved world?” It speaks to something that I know the Opposition have real concern about: a form of institutionalised disrespect for local leaders that is built into this process. There is wholesale abolition of the local voice at scale, and proposals that the Secretary of State will direct, rather than consent. Sir John, you will perhaps call to mind Lord Porter, formerly Gary Porter of South Holland, as one of those many local leaders whose approach and insight really shaped the nature of that local community. Reflecting on my time in local government, I had the opportunity to serve with people with very senior public and private sector leadership experience who steered the strategy of the local authority to deliver for local residents. To be told that the Government’s view is that they are to be mere community convenors, and they are not to have a role in that strategic leadership, is frankly insulting to the work that so many of our local leaders do. The value of that was spelled out very clearly in our evidence session. I was particularly struck by Councillor Bev Craig, the Labour group lead and LGA vice-chair at the Local Government Association, who talked about how the Greater Manchester model worked because of that local leadership and the power of those individuals to come to the table and drive forward devolution, efficiency and service quality. The amendments broadly fall into two categories that I have made today. The bulk of them are entirely about removing the ability of the Secretary of State to dictate to local areas—as was threatened by the Government when this devolution process started—what that devolution arrangement would look like, without the consent of those local areas. As my hon. Friend the Member for Hamble Valley has spelled out, of the many proposals that have come forward, we have not seen a single one embracing what the Government have set out, but a number of rival proposals for that reorganisation. It is very clear that there is not any significant degree of local consent. There is a threat, and there is some money on the table to bail local authorities out, but they can have it only if they do what the Government want. If local authorities do not do it now, the Government will take powers to make them do it to their own agenda later on. That is the very opposite of localism. When we put the Localism Act 2011 through Parliament, it was broadly supported by all local leaders and Members of Parliament, and that was because we recognised the value it added at all levels. This process, however—the centralising element of the Bill—says that it will be a man or woman in Whitehall who decides: they will tell us what is in the interest of our community.

• 14 Oct 2025 · English Devolution and Community Empowerment Bill (Third sitting) · Hansard source

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  The Opposition have some sympathy with the amendment, but we spent time reflecting on its implications and appropriateness for the Bill. I suspect that, to a degree, the Minister and I agree on this point. If we reflect on the legislative framework around our local authorities from their earliest origins, the relief of poverty and addressing inequalities—the duties that the amendment refers to—have been enshrined. It goes back as far as the Poor Laws, but in more recent years the National Assistance Act 1948 compelled all local authorities to support those destitute in their areas, and the Localism Act 2011 gives scope for local authorities to use their economic powers through activities such as procurement in ways that specifically benefit the local area. The Levelling-up and Regeneration Act 2023, which was much debated and broadly had cross-party support, is reflected in a lot of this Bill. It was specifically about local authorities using their powers to support the economy of their local area. Just a short time ago, some of the members of the Committee were in this room debating the Planning and Infrastructure Bill, in which the Government set out a vision—contested to some extent—about how those measures affecting local authorities will address persistent issues of inequality. We recognise that sometimes that is about legislation, but sometimes it is about Government action. Mention has been made of food banks, which were rolled out under the last Labour Government as a means of addressing persistent issues of poverty. I remember them being opened during my time as a local authority councillor, and Gordon Brown visiting and saying, “This is an example of how we expect local authorities to address some of these persistent issues.” Local authorities already have these duties at both the strategic and the micro level. I question whether it is necessary to add an amendment that, in essence, reflects existing duties throughout all the different tiers of local government in England.

• 14 Oct 2025 · English Devolution and Community Empowerment Bill (Third sitting) · Hansard source

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  We return to the theme that areas can have devolution provided it is in the form that Whitehall dictates. It remains a significant concern to the Opposition that we are proceeding in this manner, but that point is made and I suggest that we move on. Question put and agreed to. Clause 4 accordingly ordered to stand part of the Bill . Schedule 1 Establishment, expansion and functions of combined authorities and CCAs Amendment proposed : 266, in schedule 1, page 79, line 15, leave out subparagraph (b).— (David Simmonds.) This amendment, and Amendments 267 to 273, remove the ability of the Secretary of State to create, or make certain changes to the governance or composition of, combined authorities without consent of the councils involved. Question put, That the amendment be made.

• 14 Oct 2025 · English Devolution and Community Empowerment Bill (Third sitting) · Hansard source

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  We know there will be quite a degree of debate on this in due course. We sympathise with the objectives of the amendment, and we all share the concern that local people should be the ones who initiate change in the structures that govern their local areas, not the Secretary of State or the man in Whitehall who knows best. Therefore we have sympathy with the objective, and we shall return to that debate later on with some of the amendments around the structures.

• 14 Oct 2025 · English Devolution and Community Empowerment Bill (Third sitting) · Hansard source

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  I know that the hon. Gentleman is not the only person with an interest, and that there are other amendments on the same topic. He mentions that he is satisfied with the Government’s assurances. We have not directly sought those assurances; would he be willing to set out for the Committee the nature of them, so that we can all understand what has been committed to and can be well informed when we come to make voting decisions later on?

• 14 Oct 2025 · English Devolution and Community Empowerment Bill (Fourth sitting) · Hansard source

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  I draw the Minister’s attention to the existing arrangements for independent remuneration panels. She has referenced the proposals for how this kind of situation will be handled. However, we can envisage circumstances such as those that we heard about in Greater Manchester, where the mayoral commissioners are effectively drawn from the leadership of those local authorities. There is a degree of ambiguity in proposed new sections 52A(6) and 113E(6), which refer to allowances paid “in respect of the same special responsibilities”. For example, I think of a situation where someone is a cabinet member with responsibility for transport in a constituent authority and also undertakes a strategic transport role as part of the combined authority. We as politicians would recognise that those are two different things, in the same way that a Minister undertaking duties in the Government is paid separately from their role as a Member of Parliament because those two things are distinct. Transparency and clarity are important to retaining public confidence. Clearly, we do not want to create a situation where there is a degree of dispute, such as where a mayoral combined authority expects the constituent council to pay, or vice versa, and where an individual who wishes to take up those duties is inhibited from doing so. It would be helpful if the Minister could set out how the statutory guidance will address that issue so the Committee can be confident that we will not see this act as a barrier to participation in the governance of these new authorities.

• 14 Oct 2025 · English Devolution and Community Empowerment Bill (Fourth sitting) · Hansard source

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  The Opposition support the amendment; the principle of having a simple majority is sound. In oral evidence, we heard about why Manchester works and London does not, and there is a logic to implementing those measures consistently across the country. We support introducing that consistency. There is a broader question, however. I understand what the Minister and the Government are trying to achieve; it would clearly be frustrating if one authority was effectively acting as a blocker. However, I asked the Minister earlier to give us some assurances about the treatment applied when financial impacts occur that affect one or more of the constituent authorities in a combined authority area. There will be cases—we have seen them in planning, for example—where an authority argues that to deliver its housing target, a site in another local authority’s area must be developed, because it does not have sufficient developable land to hit the target that it has been given; legally, it is not that authority’s decision. There will be other examples. I am mindful of some of the Government’s amendments that introduce a lot more scope into this Bill for mayors and combined authorities to undertake their housing responsibilities. One of the main routes for funding is through borrowing against the housing revenue account, which is ringfenced. Each individual local authority has a legal duty to balance that account and the power to borrow against it; it also holds all of the legal housing duties and responsibilities. The purpose of the measures is to make mayors the vehicle for the delivery of asylum accommodation, as opposed to asylum hotels, as is the case now to some degree. Yesterday, on the Floor of the House, another Minister in the Department alluded to this in his response to a question about asylum accommodation. Those decisions will have a significant impact on the legal obligations of the authorities that sit beneath the mayoral authority. There is a risk that being outvoted in a decision made at combined authority level would put an individual constituent authority in breach of its legal obligations to balance its dedicated schools grant, its housing revenue account or some other element of its council tax account. Will the Minister, either now or in writing, set out what arrangements will apply in the likely situation of a conflict between the legal obligations on a constituent authority to balance the budget and the strategic decisions put forward by the combined authority? How will the conflict be resolved without undue detriment to the constituent authority in particular, which is the one that will find itself in court?

• 14 Oct 2025 · English Devolution and Community Empowerment Bill (Fourth sitting) · Hansard source

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  I beg to move amendment 293, in schedule 3, page 112, line 16, at end insert— “(2A) The relevant remuneration panel may not recommend allowances which exceed the amount paid in salary to a person employed at director level within the relevant authority.”. This amendment ensures that Commissioners cannot be paid more than Directors working for the authority.

• 14 Oct 2025 · English Devolution and Community Empowerment Bill (Fourth sitting) · Hansard source

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  I ask the Minister to reflect that it used to be the practice of this House that any MP appointed as a Minister had to resign and fight a by-election, because they were undertaking a function different from that for which their constituents had originally elected them. That practice was abandoned because of the extent of the disruption it caused to the work of government and of the House, as well as the cost of those by-elections, so I ask the Government to reflect. We have learned from experience, cross-party, that having these types of requirements is not conducive to good democracy. Perhaps the Minister will undertake to reflect on that.

• 14 Oct 2025 · English Devolution and Community Empowerment Bill (Fourth sitting) · Hansard source

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  Again, I have a question of clarification; can the Minister tell the Committee whether these powers apply to a transfer of functions, as opposed to the conferral of functions? We know there have been situations, and we can certainly envisage some within the overall package of the Bill, where the statutory duties of the constituent authorities could be transferred over to the mayor, either en bloc or in part. Indeed, there might be times when it might be a sensible approach; if there is an example of a significant failure in one authority, that could be looked after by the mayoral office while the situation is turned around—that goes to the point raised about South Northamptonshire. However, can the Minister clarify whether this refers solely to new powers that are conferred, or opens up the door to the transfer of functions that are currently statutory duties of constituent authorities?

• 14 Oct 2025 · English Devolution and Community Empowerment Bill (Fourth sitting) · Hansard source

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  The Opposition have sympathy with the points the hon. Member made. We can rarely have too much transparency, but we are conscious that these new bodies and devolution arrangements will be subject to a degree of political oversight. There will be manifestos, on which the public will have a vote. There will be the element of scrutiny, which we have not heard enough about yet but which we would like to think will be built into the new arrangements for these authorities. There will also be a regular process of elections, which will determine who provides the necessary level of leadership. Layered over that, there will be both the political priorities of the devolved authority and those things that are more part of the administrative function. Local authorities have historically had council plans and forward plans that set out decision making, all of which are part of this arrangement. Although the points have been well made, the Opposition are therefore not convinced that what the amendment would add is sufficient to justify its inclusion in the Bill.

• 14 Oct 2025 · English Devolution and Community Empowerment Bill (Fourth sitting) · Hansard source

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  I want to make sure that I can reconcile the Minister’s observations and the import of the amendments with her reply to me earlier, when she said that the requirement to balance in-year will apply. Clearly, the provisions essentially state that the Secretary of State can give consent for a substantial degree of borrowing, but it is not at all clear in the clause or the amendments what the purpose of the borrowing would be. Manchester’s improvements to its transport system are fantastic, but they were funded by central Government as part of the devolution deal, and they are now creating a significant ongoing deficit in the mayoral budget, which has to be covered, essentially, through precepting—by levying those in the local area to cover the cost. There is clearly a concern with that. If the borrowing is for capital purposes there is a clear strategy for its repayment, and it must be for the purposes of capital investment. However, if borrowing is undertaken to cover shortfalls between revenue and the mayor’s expenditure on day-to-day costs, this House would have significant concerns about it in relation to our national accounts. Can the Minister tell the Committee how that decision making will sufficiently constrain a mayor or combined authority from undertaking borrowing that is for the purposes of day-to-day revenue expenditure, so that we do not find a large debt bubble growing underneath these new bodies?

• 14 Oct 2025 · English Devolution and Community Empowerment Bill (Fourth sitting) · Hansard source

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  The Opposition have a high degree of sympathy with the points made by the hon. Member for Brighton Pavilion. It is very striking when we compare our local and regional democracy with those of other countries: in our nearest neighbour, France, with the cumul des mandats, there is almost an expectation enshrined in their politics that, for someone to become Member of the national Parliament, they will have represented their area as a mayor. Indeed, when President Chirac cast around to find someone who was eminently qualified to become Prime Minister of that country, he took the view that there was nobody within the National Assembly who could possibly meet that standard; it needed to be somebody from local or regional government. He lighted on Alain Juppé, the well-reputed mayor of Bordeaux, who served with great distinction as Prime Minister. If we begin to introduce restrictions of this nature, it will significantly constrain the ability of our politics to rise to the challenges that our communities and our areas face.

• 14 Oct 2025 · English Devolution and Community Empowerment Bill (Fourth sitting) · Hansard source

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  I have listened intently to what the Minister has said. I think the risk is that, if things are delegated to statutory guidance, what emerges later on will not meet the expectations set out in the debate. I will therefore push for a vote on these amendments. Question put, That the amendment be made.

• 14 Oct 2025 · English Devolution and Community Empowerment Bill (Fourth sitting) · Hansard source

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  I have two questions for the Minister. First, given that these budgets, and the precepts that the amendments relate to, will sit within that bit of the Local Government Finance Act 1992, will the requirement for budgets to be balanced in-year apply to all the accounts that the Secretary of State will be giving direction to? The second question—the Minister may wish to write to the Committee on this—is, will the consistency that she referred to be introduced by giving the Secretary of State individual, and in effect case-by-case, power to issue these directions for different authorities? Clearly, our concern is that if the door has been opened to, in effect, unlimited precept rises, and these were to be used by the Secretary of State to bail out a significant amount of debt in one of these reorganised local authorities—which I know is a significant concern of many of the local authorities that are proposing reorganisation—that would not apply everywhere. There are certain parts of the country where there are very high levels of debt, and others where those levels of debt do not exist at all. It would be, in effect, a condition of those constituent authorities’ doing the devolution at all that they were not asked to bear that cost. Yet this Bill introduces a back-door power for the Secretary of State to direct that they would go down that route. How do the Government propose to ensure that that is forestalled, so that they can have the assurances that they would need as a necessary minimum?

• 14 Oct 2025 · English Devolution and Community Empowerment Bill (Fourth sitting) · Hansard source

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  Turning to the question of how a mayoral precept will be used under this group of amendments that the Government have tabled, if we think of the reorganisation in Thurrock or Surrey, both those local authority areas contain a single authority that has a very high level of capital borrowing, or a high level of debt. Those authorities have been assured that there will be three years’ worth of revenue support; in effect, there will be a Government grant to cover the revenue cost of the borrowing for three years. However, the borrowing cost is extended over 40 or 50 years, so there will be a very long period of time where, as things currently stand, that local authority will be expected to meet that cost, when it comes into being. Clearly, one way of doing that is for the Secretary to State to say, “You will raise your precept, and that is how we will deal with the debt,” but that runs contrary to the proposals for devolution where those authorities have said, “We will do this, but it is simply not fair or ethical for us to accept those debts on to our books.” I am just seeking an assurance from the Minister that either the existing provisions that require the in-year balancing will apply, in which case the Government will deal with this prior to the devolution arrangement coming into existence, or the provisions will not apply, in which case those authorities need to be mindful that the likely consequence of devolution will be a massive increase in the precept levy purely for the purpose of paying off someone else’s debt.

• 14 Oct 2025 · English Devolution and Community Empowerment Bill (Fourth sitting) · Hansard source

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  That was a fairly shameless political pitch, but we should just reflect on the debates that took place across the Dispatch Boxes yesterday during Housing, Communities and Local Government questions, when it was highlighted that we have a Mayor of London who is quite happy to issue precepts to indulge his personal political priorities but is an abject failure in discharging his mayoral functions around housing. Thousands of people are unable to find homes in the capital because the mayor is failing to build out more than 300,000 planning permissions that have already been granted by the local authorities. That is an injustice that is being inflicted on the citizens of our capital, and this provision, as envisaged by this Labour Government, potentially inflicts the same, or an even greater, injustice on other areas of the country. For those reasons, we remain deeply concerned about it. Particularly in an environment where, as we heard earlier, local authorities were left £1.5 billion worse off—net—by the Government’s decision to introduce additional taxes on their employees, the temptation will be for the mayoral precept to be seen as the catch-all or safety valve through which additional taxes can be extracted to meet whatever demand central Government choose to impose, without central Government being accountable for it. That is why we oppose the measures.

• 14 Oct 2025 · English Devolution and Community Empowerment Bill (Fourth sitting) · Hansard source

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  Will the hon. Member give way?

• 14 Oct 2025 · English Devolution and Community Empowerment Bill (Fourth sitting) · Hansard source

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  I thank the Minister for that introduction. It is the implementation of this that is the subject of political contention, but a great deal has been said, and a vote has been taken. There is nothing further we can do on those issues at this stage, but I expect they will be the subject of great debate in the remaining stages of the Bill. Question put and agreed to. Clause 5 accordingly ordered to stand part of the Bill . Clause 6 Combined authorities and CCAs: decision-making and validity of proceedings Question proposed, That the clause stand part of the Bill.

• 14 Oct 2025 · English Devolution and Community Empowerment Bill (Fourth sitting) · Hansard source

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  Let me give a concrete example: the long-standing proposal for Heathrow expansion airport. The Chancellor of the Exchequer has set out her absolute determination to ensure that happens, because it is part of her Government’s growth agenda. It is likely to be directed under these powers and in the purview of the Mayor of London, who will ultimately have some planning role in the decision making. However, as well as being the planning authority, the London borough of Hillingdon, within which Heathrow sits entirely, has legal duties in respect of air quality. It is already breaching those duties, which it has no means of fulfilling, simply because of that external factor. If the Treasury and the Mayor of London were say to the combined authority, “In pursuit of the growth agenda with which we have been tasked, we are determined to see this expansion take place,” immediately that local authority would be put in significant legal jeopardy. To give an indication of the scale, when the Localism Act 2011 was debated and there was also interaction with European Union standards, it equated to an annual fine of £150 million to be paid by the legally responsible local authority. That is a significant jeopardy, and it is by no means the only one—in the case of special educational needs and disabilities obligations, for example, there are significant duties to pay compensation in the event of failure. We can all envisage situations where a mayor decides that, for the good of everybody, they want an individual place to take a hit, but through the judicial review process that places that individual local authority at significant moral and financial risk. If the Minister sets out how those very significant and real risks will be addressed, I will be grateful.

• 14 Oct 2025 · English Devolution and Community Empowerment Bill (Fourth sitting) · Hansard source

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  These amendments concern the remuneration of commissioners and have two purposes. There is a long-established principle within the arrangements for the remuneration of elected officials in local government that an independent panel, which is able to take evidence from the public and other good sources in the local area, will make a recommendation to the local authority about what the scheme of allowances payable should be. That brings a degree of transparency. Councils are currently required to consider the recommendations and to update their scheme from time to time, including voting to renew it each year. That has certain elements. One is whether commissioners—in this case, those who are appointed and are part of a mayoral combined authority—should be eligible for the local government pension scheme. We heard an announcement from the Secretary of State on this issue, and it is the view of the shadow team that it is a sensible step. Changing the local government pension scheme from a final salary scheme to an average salary scheme was led by councillors, and it was instrumental in convincing a very large body of appointed officials to move over to that scheme, saving the taxpayer millions of pounds. However, it is also important that those appointed as commissioners are considered for eligibility and that each mayor is transparent about the recommendations and advice they have undertaken around that. The second point to consider is around remuneration. We often hear it cited that there are people in the civil service, the NHS and local government who are paid more than the Prime Minister, which is used as a benchmark for excessive pay. Whether or not we agree with that—personally, I do not, as I recognise that there is a professional salary structure for these roles, in which those people will participate for the whole of their careers, that is very different from the context for politicians—it is none the less important to recognise that those who are appointed into mayoral roles should be subject to some degree of constraint. As is the case with local government, it seems reasonable that we do not see elected officials appointed on a very significantly higher salary than senior professionals who are advising in the same field. The amendments aim to bring a degree of transparency and rigour to that, and to ensure that, in the potential circumstance where a mayor chooses to stretch the limits of their powers of appointment, shall we say, there is some degree of constraint so that the public can see that the taxpayer pound is being carefully husbanded.

• 14 Oct 2025 · English Devolution and Community Empowerment Bill (Fourth sitting) · Hansard source

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  The Opposition have significant concerns about the import of amendments 82, 76 and 79. We have made a number of references to some interactions with different elements of local government finance, but clearly the measures will open the door to very substantial tax rises through the vehicle of the mayoral precept. Worse than that, they open it up to being used for any purpose, in effect. In the sometimes tense relationship between central and local government, there are disputes about who should pick up the tab—for example, the ongoing debate about asylum costs. That is very much having an effect in my local authority, which has the highest number of asylum seekers per capita of any in the country. Such individuals are only a cost to the local authority, as a result of central Government policy. The Bill opens up the scope for mayors to directly tax people for the purposes of environmental legislation, or social care, which consumes around 70% of the budgets of local authorities, or any other function that authorities may choose to undertake—making Manchester a nuclear-free zone, or whatever it may be—despite the fact that those are not functions that mayors undertake by statute. I am sure we all agree that there should be an opportunity for politicians to speak up, but there needs to be some limit on it.

• 14 Oct 2025 · English Devolution and Community Empowerment Bill (Fourth sitting) · Hansard source

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  I am listening attentively to what the hon. Lady described. We heard in evidence from Councillor Sam Chapman-Allen of the District Councils’ Network that under these proposals, shire England stands to lose 90% of its elected representation, which the hon. Lady referred to. There is not anything really concrete in the Bill that sets out what scrutiny should look like—what those minimum standards should be. There are elements about conduct and things like that, but that is very basic. Does the hon. Lady have a view about what a good model should look like, so that local residents can exercise their control over what happens in their neighbourhood effectively?

• 14 Oct 2025 · English Devolution and Community Empowerment Bill (Fourth sitting) · Hansard source

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  The Opposition have some sympathy with the points that have been made in the debate. It is an area in which there is scope to move towards a degree of consensus. I think that we all recognise that part of the underlying thinking behind the mayoral combined authority is that it brings a new element of leadership, and from those models where they are established, such as in London, we can identify some of the issues. As we heard at the start of the Committee, there is clear evidence about accountability. One of the issues that persists in London is that there are a number of advisers—whether they are commissioners or not is a moot point—who undertake sometimes quite highly paid roles on behalf of the mayor, but they are not visibly accountable to the GLA, the boroughs or anybody else. That begins to undermine public confidence, and it clearly creates a sense of distance between those who are elected and those who they are there to serve. While I agree that there is no reason why somebody who is elected should not occupy those roles, one of the issues with the proposed amendment is that there is clearly a risk of constraining them—in particular, in relation to the wording of the proposed amendment. When we consider some of the statutory roles that might be occupied—directors of children’s services, statutory directors of social care, monitoring officers, section 151 officers and others who have legal duties—there is a risk that by defining it as narrowly as the amendment does, we create some concerns about the interaction between those who are part of the professional officer corps that serves local government and those who are political appointees. I do not think that that is intentional; it is simply a risk that arises from the way in which it is drafted. We will not be supporting the amendment, but I am mindful of the comments that have been made by those on the Government Benches about the need to ensure that those who occupy the roles are fit to do so, and that they are publicly accountable, because they will be public servants and they need to be answerable to effective scrutiny measures for the work that they do.

• 14 Oct 2025 · English Devolution and Community Empowerment Bill (Fourth sitting) · Hansard source

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  I draw the Committee’s attention to a topic to which we will return throughout our proceedings: the extent to which the devolution legislation is about the powers of the Secretary of State to designate this or direct that. Ironically, we are embarked on a course of action that started with us hearing about how it was going to be locally led, despite all evidence to the contrary, yet as we proceed, we have clause after clause and paragraph after paragraph referring to new powers for the Government to make local authorities do this or to direct them to do that. It is clearly not in the spirit of devolution.