Dan Jarvis MP: speeches

Speeches

• 18 Nov 2025 · China Espionage: Government Security Response · Hansard source

  More

  I am grateful to the right hon. Gentleman for his points and the advice that he has offered previously. His points about connected devices and vehicles are well made, and I can give him an absolute assurance that we consider them very carefully. He made a point about engagement and referenced the Chancellor’s visit. I can assure him that all Ministers and officials who visit China will deliver a coherent and strong set of messages about our concerns with regard to our national security. I said earlier that the Foreign Secretary had spoken specifically about these matters with her Chinese counterpart on 6 November. She was absolutely clear with the Foreign Minister that any activity that threatens UK national security would not be tolerated, so I can give the right hon. Gentleman and the House an absolute assurance that, even where there are engagement activities that might, on the face of it, relate to other areas of Government business, there will be a consistency about the messaging. The right hon. Gentleman will know, though, from his time in government that in addition to the areas of co-operation and areas where there is a requirement to engage that I listed earlier, both within departmental responsibilities that sit in the Home Office, there is often merit in engaging with China on a range of matters that are not necessarily particularly well understood. We need to have that constructive engagement with the country, but it needs to be underpinned by a desire to enhance and preserve our national security, and that is the approach that I will always take.

• 18 Nov 2025 · China Espionage: Government Security Response · Hansard source

  More

  The right hon. Member makes an important point about leaking, which is something I take very seriously as the Minister responsible for the Government security group. I can give him an assurance. I hope that the package of measures we have brought forward conveys the strength of feeling and how seriously we take these issues. As he always does, he made a number of other really useful and constructive points. Rather than come back to him now, I will look carefully at them and consider them further.

• 18 Nov 2025 · China Espionage: Government Security Response · Hansard source

  More

  This is a strong package of measures we have announced today, but I have also been crystal clear about our determination to act further where necessary. That is the right approach. It will mean we are best able to guard our national security, while at the same time engaging with China on other areas of policy, including illegal migration.

• 18 Nov 2025 · China Espionage: Government Security Response · Hansard source

  More

  I can give the hon. Member the assurance he seeks in terms of our desire to work closely with the devolved Administrations. That is absolutely the way in which I want to proceed, as I said in response to the hon. Member for Edinburgh West (Christine Jardine) a moment ago. Of course I would be happy to meet with him and his group.

• 18 Nov 2025 · China Espionage: Government Security Response · Hansard source

  More

  It is worth my being clear about the importance this Government attach to academic freedom. We are incredibly proud of our universities, and as a Yorkshire MP, I am incredibly proud of Sheffield Hallam University, as I am of Sheffield University. That is, in part, why we made these announcements today and why we will be holding an event that provides a very good opportunity to engage with vice-chancellors, look carefully at the nature of the challenges they are facing and support them in responding to those challenges.

• 18 Nov 2025 · China Espionage: Government Security Response · Hansard source

  More

  As I said in the House yesterday, and as I hope the hon. Lady and other Members will understand, those decisions were not taken by the Government; they were taken independently by the Crown Prosecution Service, which is rightly independent of Government. The Government have today brought forward a strong package of measures, and I hope that she and her colleagues will support them.

• 18 Nov 2025 · China Espionage: Government Security Response · Hansard source

  More

  I am grateful to the hon. Lady, who makes important points about her great city. I can give her an assurance that there is such engagement, but I will reflect on the points that she makes and consider whether we need to do more. She will acknowledge that I referred specifically to the devolved Assemblies in my opening remarks, but if she thinks that we could and should be doing more, I would be very happy to have that conversation with her.

• 18 Nov 2025 · China Espionage: Government Security Response · Hansard source

  More

  I am grateful to the hon. Lady for her broad welcoming of the plan. She makes a number of points, including several about which she has consistently raised concerns in the Chamber and with me outside it. Let me say to her and to other Members that, with regard to the embassy and any other area of policy, nobody will intimidate members of this Government to do anything other than what is in our country’s national interests. I understand why certain hon. Members want to refer to the embassy as a “super-embassy” or by other descriptive terms. The judgment will have to be made by the Secretary of State, but I, along with other ministerial colleagues, have been crystal clear that national security is and will remain a core priority throughout this process. There have been various comments and points made by people inside and outside this House on the national security implications of the embassy that are not correct. It is a quasi-judicial matter and I am limited in what I can say, but I reiterate the assurance about the importance of the national security elements underpinning any decision. On the elections Bill, the hon. Lady made some important and valid points. She will understand that that piece of legislation sits with another Government Department. I am sure the Department will have heard her points, but if it has not, I will represent those points on her behalf.

• 18 Nov 2025 · China Espionage: Government Security Response · Hansard source

  More

  I am grateful to the hon. Member, as I always am. I hope he sees the commitment this Government have to ensuring that we are best equipped to engage with the nature of the threats we face. That is precisely why I brought forward this package of measures and why I have been crystal clear about the requirement potentially to go further in certain areas. I hope he sees—if he does not, let me give him an assurance—how seriously we take these matters and our desire to work with Members right across the House and with the devolved Administrations, to do everything we can to guard against the nature of the threat, while at the same time ensuring we engage in a way that is in our national interest.

• 18 Nov 2025 · China Espionage: Government Security Response · Hansard source

  More

  With your permission, Mr Speaker, I would like to make a statement on Chinese espionage targeting UK democratic institutions, and on the Government’s action to counter the breadth of threats posed by China and wider state actors. Before I begin, let me first pay tribute to the crew member of the Royal Fleet Auxiliary Tidesurge who is missing off the coast of the Republic of Ireland. I know that the whole House will join me in sending our very best wishes to the ship’s company, and to their families back home. This tragic incident is a reminder of the sacrifice that members of our armed forces make in the service of our country. Earlier today, MI5 issued an espionage alert to Members of this House, Members of the other place and parliamentary staff to warn them about ongoing targeting of our democratic institutions by Chinese actors. Before I set out the threat and what we are doing to meet it, let me thank you, Mr Speaker, for your support in issuing the alert, and for your tireless efforts to safeguard the security of this place and the people who serve within it. I encourage all parliamentary colleagues to read the alert, and to get in touch with the Parliamentary Security Department if they have any immediate concerns. Our intelligence agencies have warned that China is attempting to recruit and cultivate individuals with access to sensitive information about Parliament and the UK Government. MI5 has stated that this activity is being carried out by a group of Chinese intelligence officers—often masked through the use of cover companies or external headhunters. It is not just parliamentarians who should be concerned by this; parliamentary staff, economists, think-tank employees, geopolitical consultants and Government officials have all been targeted for their networks and access to politicians. I urge all parliamentarians and their staff to be wary that China has a low threshold for what information is considered to be of value, and will gather individual pieces of information to build a wider picture. Let me speak plainly: this activity involves a covert and calculated attempt by a foreign power to interfere with our sovereign affairs in favour of its own interests, and this Government will not tolerate it. It builds on a pattern of activity that we have seen from China, with cyber-operations by Chinese state-affiliated actors targeting parliamentarians’ emails in 2021, attempted foreign interference activity by Christine Lee in 2022, and other more recent cases. We will take all necessary measures to protect our national interests, our citizens and our democratic way of life, including by working with our allies and partners. The world has changed a great deal since I first stepped forward to serve our country almost 30 years ago, and while some things have changed, some things remain the same. In the various roles I have held since then, I have always believed in the importance of being clear-eyed about the nature of the threats that we face, and about the need to ensure that the tools we use to respond to those threats are kept up to date. This Government’s first duty is to protect our national security, and we will not hesitate to hold all state actors to account. On 6 November, my right hon. Friend the Foreign Secretary spoke with her Chinese counterpart, Director Wang Yi. She was clear with the Foreign Minister that any activity that threatens UK national security, particularly relating to the UK’s Parliament and democracy, will not be tolerated. Today, I am setting out a comprehensive package of measures that we are taking to disrupt and deter the threats posed by China, as well as by state actors more widely. We are launching a counter political interference and espionage action plan, which is supported by Ministers from across Government and co-ordinated by me. I will set out in detail to the House what that plan will entail. First, we will strengthen the legislative tools available to Government to disrupt the threat. We will introduce the elections Bill, which will include measures to safeguard against covert political funding. They will include tougher risk assessment rules for donor recipients, and enhanced enforcement powers for the Electoral Commission. I can confirm that we are also working on new powers to counter foreign interference, including a proscription-type tool to disrupt proxy organisations that are undermining our security, and an extension to the maximum penalties for election interference offences. Secondly, working with the parliamentary security authorities, we are launching a series of protective security campaigns, co-ordinated through the defending democracy taskforce. These will help all those who work in politics to recognise, resist and report suspicious state threat activity. The campaigns, which will build on the guidance that was launched by the National Protective Security Authority in October, will include tailored security briefings for the devolved Governments and for political parties via the parliamentary parties panel by the end of this year, as well as new security guidance in January for all candidates taking part in devolved and local elections in May. Thirdly, we are building a campaign that uses all levers at the Government’s disposal to degrade the ecosystem of proxy cover companies, organisations and individuals that are being used by foreign states to facilitate interference and espionage targeting our democratic institutions. The National Protective Security Authority, building on its “Think Before You Link” campaign, will strengthen its engagement with professional networking sites to make them a more hostile operating environment for foreign agents. As Security Minister, I am privileged to see the diligence of the security services, law enforcement and civil servants who work tirelessly, day and night, to keep the UK safe. Noting China’s low threshold for information gathering, this Government are providing the resources needed to protect our national interests. I can announce that the Government have committed to investing £170 million to renew the sovereign encrypted technology that our officials use to do their vital work. This programme of work will help to ensure that sensitive diplomatic, economic, trade, security, law enforcement and policy development arrangements are safeguarded from espionage by any state threat actor. I can also announce that this Government have completed the removal of surveillance equipment manufactured by companies subject to the national intelligence law of the People’s Republic of China from all sensitive sites we maintain in the UK and around the world. Moreover, we will invest £130 million next year, through the integrated security fund, in building the UK’s resilience against threats posed by states such as China. Among other projects, this investment will build Counter Terrorism Policing’s ability to enforce the National Security Act 2023, and fund the National Cyber Security Centre and the National Protective Security Authority’s work supporting our most critical businesses in protecting their intellectual property. Indeed, the National Protective Security Authority’s work is an important reminder that China poses threats not just to our democratic institutions, but to other sectors. Let me talk briefly about two other sectors in particular. The first sector is education, which is one of the UK’s most important global assets, in part due to the UK’s steadfast commitment to academic freedom and excellence. There is value for the UK in engagement with China on education. However, operating in today’s uncertain international context presents many challenges for our great universities. It is because of their excellence that states like China are attempting to influence these universities’ independent research, and to interfere with activity on campuses. Ministers have already raised our concerns about this activity with their counterparts in Beijing, and the Office for Students recently issued new guidance to help universities protect the freedoms that their staff and students enjoy. I can announce that as part of our ongoing commitment to working collectively to address these risks, Ministers will host a closed event with vice-chancellors to discuss the risks posed by foreign interference, and to signpost our plans to further increase the sector’s resilience. Secondly, on advanced manufacturing, the Department for Business and Trade is working to strengthen and scale our new economic security advisory service, which will help businesses navigate economic security issues, such as espionage and intellectual property theft. The service is already engaging with businesses in the advanced manufacturing sector, and as it matures, it will support other sectors of the economy. It will provide a new digital offer, and will assist businesses with complex economic security cases in navigating the support from His Majesty’s Government. In October, I told the House that this Government remain steadfast in our commitment to disrupting and holding state actors accountable for widescale cyber-espionage operations. We stand ready to go further to disrupt, degrade and protect against the dangerous and unrestrained offensive cyber-ecosystem that China has allowed to take hold. Earlier this year, the NCSC, with international allies, called out three technology companies, based in China, for their global malicious cyber-campaign targeting critical networks. Just last week, we introduced the Cyber Security and Resilience (Network and Information Systems) Bill, which will help make it harder to target critical sectors of the economy and the public sector with cyber-attacks, including malicious cyber-activity emanating from China’s territory. The Government will continue to take further action against China-based actors involved in malicious cyber-activity against the UK and our allies. This will form part of a broader campaign that the UK is delivering to disrupt and degrade the dangerous cyber-ecosystem that China has allowed to take hold within its territory. Let me assure hon. Members that we will not shy away from using all the tools at our disposal, including sanctions, as necessary. Our country has a long and proud history as a seafaring nation that trades with countries around the world that share our way of life, and with those that do not. China is the world’s second-largest economy, and, together with Hong Kong, is the UK’s third-largest trading partner. It is in our long-term strategic interests to continue to engage with China. We must co-operate on issues on which our interests align—climate, global health, trade, scientific research, illegal migration, and serious and organised crime, to name just a few—but we will always challenge any country, including China, that attempts to interfere, influence or undermine the integrity of our democratic institutions, and we will take all measures necessary to protect UK national security. That is why we have taken action today. I am clear that further steps can and absolutely will be taken to disrupt and deter China’s espionage activity, wherever it takes place. We will update our security powers to keep pace with the threat, help those who work in politics to recognise, resist and report the threat, and work with partners across the economy to strengthen their security against the threat. Our strategy is not just to co-operate. We will engage China where necessary, but we will always act to defend our interests, and challenge where our values are threatened. I commend this statement to the House.

• 18 Nov 2025 · China Espionage: Government Security Response · Hansard source

  More

  I am grateful to the Chair of the Select Committee, as I always am. On her second point, let me come back to her. She raises a valid concern and, rather than give her a response now, let me consider the facts of the case and I will come back to her with a more considered response. On her first point, I fear that I will disappoint her and maybe some other Conservative Members by not diverting from the policy that the Government have previously confirmed in this place. The Government fully recognise that China poses a series of threats to UK national security in the form of cyber-attacks, foreign interference and espionage targeting our democratic institutions, including the transnational oppression of Hongkongers in this country. That is why we have made the announcements that we have and why we will continue to do everything that we can to guard against that threat.

• 18 Nov 2025 · China Espionage: Government Security Response · Hansard source

  More

  That is an entirely fair and reasonable point. Let me give the hon. Gentleman a reassurance, further to what I have already said today and on other occasions. The Government will continue to stand with and support members of the Hong Kong community who have relocated here to the UK. I recently met members of that community myself, specifically to discuss their concerns. The defending democracy taskforce is doing a lot of work on our response to transnational repression, but if the hon. Gentleman has any further concerns, I would be happy to meet him to discuss them further.

• 18 Nov 2025 · China Espionage: Government Security Response · Hansard source

  More

  I am grateful to my right hon. Friend, not least for his opening remarks, which I know will have been shared by the whole House. He raises an important point about transnational repression. The Government take these matters incredibly seriously. We have relatively recently completed a very significant piece of work looking at the issue of transnational repression through the defending democracy taskforce. The Government are absolutely crystal clear that it is completely unacceptable for China—or any other country, for that matter—to target individuals resident in this country. I recently met members of the Hong Kong community, who raised significant concerns about their being targeted. I was clear to them, as I am clear to my right hon. Friend, that none of that activity is remotely acceptable to the Government, and that we will do everything we can to ensure both that the individuals he refers to are kept safe and that they feel as though they are being kept safe.

• 18 Nov 2025 · China Espionage: Government Security Response · Hansard source

  More

  First, let me say that I very much appreciate the work of the hon. Member’s Committee, and specifically the report it published on transnational repression, to which we responded fully. I understand why he makes the point about FIRS. He knows what the Government’s position is at this particular moment, and I spelt it out earlier: FIRS is an important tool, and we will carefully consider how best to use it.

• 18 Nov 2025 · China Espionage: Government Security Response · Hansard source

  More

  I admire the hon. Gentleman’s perseverance and patience on this issue. Unfortunately, I am going to disappoint him by referring him to the answer I gave previously.

• 18 Nov 2025 · China Espionage: Government Security Response · Hansard source

  More

  Let me reiterate what I said previously about how completely unacceptable it is that any transnational repression takes place in this country. The Government will continue to stand with and support members of the Hong Kong community who have relocated here to the UK. My hon. Friend is right to raise the important work done by the Speaker’s Conference. At the most recent meeting of the defending democracy taskforce, we looked carefully at the recommendations. A lot of positive work has been done, and we want to work closely with Mr Speaker to deliver where we can on the recommendations. My hon. Friend is also right to raise the importance of the online environment, and these are conversations that I am having with colleagues across Government, including in the Department for Science, Innovation and Technology. On her point about a meeting, she will understand that that particular piece of legislation is a Ministry of Housing, Communities and Local Government lead, but I will make sure that she gets a meeting with the relevant Minister, whether that is myself or a colleague in the other Department.

• 17 Nov 2025 · Official Secrets Act: Alleged Breach · Hansard source

  More

  As set out on multiple occasions in this House, no Ministers and no special advisers played any role in the provision of evidence. The Director of Public Prosecutions has confirmed that publicly.

• 17 Nov 2025 · Official Secrets Act: Alleged Breach · Hansard source

  More

  This was an independent decision by the CPS, and we have repeatedly made clear that there was no political interference in the evidence provided. This Government are extremely disappointed with the outcome of this case, and remain concerned about the espionage threat posed to the UK. We are working relentlessly to counter it.

• 17 Nov 2025 · Topical Questions · Hansard source

  More

  The Department is committed to reinvesting criminal proceeds into asset recovery and tackling related economic crime. In 2024-25, £174 million supported law enforcement, including through the ARIS top slice, a multi-year fund that is ringfenced for core and innovative capabilities. We are reviewing ARIS with stakeholders to improve stability and effectiveness. I know that my hon. Friend is engaging with the noble Lord Hanson of Flint, but I would be very happy to discuss this matter with him further.

• 17 Nov 2025 · Topical Questions · Hansard source

  More

  Everyone deserves to feel safe and to be able fully to participate in public and political life, free from the threat of violence or exclusion driven by hateful prejudice. We will persist in our efforts to challenge extremist narratives, disrupt the activity of radicalising groups and directly tackle the causes of radicalisation. Alongside our work to tackle extremism, the defending democracy taskforce is driving forward a whole-of-Government response to the full range of threats we face to our democracy.

• 17 Nov 2025 · Topical Questions · Hansard source

  More

  My hon. Friend raises an important point. The assessment of the terrorist threat to the UK is made independently by the Joint Terrorism Analysis Centre. Government partners, including JTAC, the National Protective Security Authority and counter-terrorism police, work closely with industry to ensure that the latest threat picture is appropriately responded to by owners of CNI. I am happy to discuss that further with him.

• 28 Oct 2025 · China Spying Case · Hansard source

  More

  Simply because a number of Departments were represented at this meeting, as would normally be the case.

• 28 Oct 2025 · China Spying Case · Hansard source

  More

  I am just going to make a bit of progress. Let me be clear about two things right from the start. First, we would not be discussing this here today had the outdated Official Secrets Act 1911 been replaced sooner. Secondly, it is the responsibility of the CPS and the DPP to bring criminal prosecutions and compile evidence. The statements submitted to the JCNSS confirm that, as does the evidence that the Joint Committee heard yesterday from the Cabinet Secretary and the DNSA. We have been consistently clear that no Ministers and no special advisers interfered in the provision of evidence under this Government.

• 28 Oct 2025 · China Spying Case · Hansard source

  More

  The Liberal Democrats spokesman, the hon. Member for Cheltenham (Max Wilkinson), offered his service as a marriage guidance counsellor. I would advise him not to give up his job.

• 28 Oct 2025 · China Spying Case · Hansard source

  More

  I say to the right hon. Gentleman—whom I hold in high regard, not least for the work that he did on the ISC—that I can give him the assurances that he seeks. I can also assure him and the House how seriously this Government take the challenges that we face from countries right around the world. Let me return to the DNSA’s evidence. As his written evidence makes clear—this is an important point that the House will want to note—from the moment the DNSA’s witness statement was submitted, he was a fully bound witness in criminal proceedings. His evidence had not yet been heard or tested in court, so his witness evidence could not be and was not shared, and this was later confirmed by the CPS. In this debate and in recent weeks, there have been a number of different, and at times conflicting, claims about this Government’s involvement in the case, and I want to address those claims directly today. At the DNSA’s request, the word “enemy” was removed from the first witness statement during the drafting process, because it did not reflect the Government’s policy at the time. The DNSA made amendments to ensure that his witness statement text reflected his assessment of the strongest elements of the evidential material provided by Counter Terrorism Policing, by demonstrating that the information that was alleged to have been provided was prejudicial to the safety or the interests of the UK. When CTP approached the DNSA to write a supplementary statement in November 2024, he was specifically asked to comment on whether China posed an active threat to the UK’s national security during the period of 31 December 2021 to 3 February 2023, and to confirm whether that remains the position at the time of writing. That is why paragraph 6 of the second statement references part of the current Government policy towards China.