Chris Murray MP: speeches

Speeches

• 6 Mar 2025 · Border Security, Asylum and Immigration Bill (Fifth sitting) · Hansard source

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  I take on board the hon. Gentleman’s point, and I can assure him that no one has higher respect than I do for the organisations that have supplied such evidence. I have been in conversations with them myself. The issue at hand here, however—I know this from having worked in the sector—is that they are not set up to stop the gangs or take through criminal prosecutions. That is not their objective. Their job is purely, and properly, to protect migrants. They will lean towards a broad definition, and that is why I think he has inadvertently fallen into a trap. In excluding everyone from the provisions, we avoid the traffickers, but it is not the job of those organisations to target them.

• 6 Mar 2025 · Border Security, Asylum and Immigration Bill (Fifth sitting) · Hansard source

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  I thank the hon. Gentleman for his intervention, but I am afraid I completely disagree with him on what this Bill is doing. Being an asylum seeker is a self-declaration. It is anticipatory. Someone just declares themselves as one; the system later ascertains whether that is correct and whether they are a refugee. He mentioned earlier that the refugee convention does not penalise people for the mechanism by which they enter; he is quite correct, but that is not a blanket immunity from any criminal act committed in the process.

• 6 Mar 2025 · Border Security, Asylum and Immigration Bill (Fifth sitting) · Hansard source

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  It is a pleasure to serve under your chairmanship, Mr Stuart. My hon. Friend is making a really important point: these cross-channel operations and strategies are more diplomatic than they are legislative. Does he agree that, because the UK is unusual in that our Border Force is not a police force, whereas the French police aux frontières, the Belgian police and all other European border agencies are police forces, we have very different kinds of operations and structures, and this work needs to be done gently, through diplomacy and not through amendments to legislation?

• 6 Mar 2025 · Border Security, Asylum and Immigration Bill (Fifth sitting) · Hansard source

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  It is a pleasure to serve under your chairmanship, Mr Stuart. I will make a couple of points about the amendments to the clause, and the clause overall. I have always been frustrated that people from both left and right make the same mistake on immigration policy—we forget that immigrants and asylum seekers are people. That means that, just like any group of people, they vary: some are entirely innocent and exploited, and some seek to exploit others and are criminals. We need to make the distinction between those groups. Amendment 5, tabled by the hon. Member for Perth and Kinross-shire, makes some important points, and my hon. Friend the Member for Clwyd East is right about the passion and compassion that drive the amendment. I absolutely recognise, support and understand that passion and compassion, but we must be clear-eyed about the reality of what is happening in the channel. Yes, people are in great danger, and they are the most exploited, most vulnerable people, but they are not there by accident. They are not panicking because they have stumbled by accident into the boat. There is a large, extremely organised, extremely well-financed criminal enterprise putting them in that position and it does not care one bit whether they live or die. We need to be able to draw a distinction between the vulnerable people who are in that situation and the people who are putting them there.

• 6 Mar 2025 · Border Security, Asylum and Immigration Bill (Sixth sitting) · Hansard source

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  I want to make just a couple of points on the seizure of phones. We have to be incredibly realistic about the threat that the country faces and how these things are organised. We have seen people-smuggling networks and trafficking networks developing in complexity and scale. It does not start in France; it goes all the way through European countries—our allies—and then through countries that are very difficult for us to engage with, including some countries that are at war and some that are hostile states. The evidence from the National Crime Agency is very clear that the networks are organised by phone, and that that is the primary means by which these criminals orchestrate them. We know that they are evolving, so it is really important that we give officials the power to seize those phones not only to understand where these smuggling networks are coming from, which is the only way to intercede and save people in unsafe vessels, but to disrupt those networks later. We heard a whole set of arguments earlier about the insufficiency of deterrents in stopping sea crossings. Professor Walsh from the Migration Observatory was really clear that the demand is inelastic. No matter how many deterrents we introduce, there will still be some demand rising to meet them. That is why disruption is so important, which we can only happen if we have the ability to seize those phones. There is a really important distinction between targeting the demand and targeting the supply of the ability to cross the channel. On the point about whether the powers are applied on a blanket basis, they are not. The Home Office is clear that there will be statutory guidance. The people who seize these phones will be subject to the same rules that are already in place on the handling of material seized from any individual, and they need those powers. The point about family life and private life is absolutely fair, and it applies whenever someone’s phone is stolen, which is a wider debate that we have in society. The truth is, there is no capacity to only seize part of someone’s phone. We cannot seize only some data and not detect, for example, private text messages or family photographs. It is proper that the Home Office officials who seize such data are subject to the rules that we have in this country about protecting the data and returning it when it is decided that it is not required, but we cannot separate out different types of data, and we would be throwing the baby out with the bathwater if we did not allow the powers to seize it.

• 4 Mar 2025 · Border Security, Asylum and Immigration Bill (Third sitting) · Hansard source

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  On that point, the 2015 Act does refer to the Council of Europe protections and its definitions are taken from there. But there is not a clause that says that due regard has to be given—

• 4 Mar 2025 · Border Security, Asylum and Immigration Bill (Third sitting) · Hansard source

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  What, then, is the hon. Gentleman’s view of how UKBA functioned? In her testimony, Theresa May said that, where it had that kind of independence, it became “closed, secretive and defensive”, and she had to completely restructure UK border defence because the independence that the hon. Gentleman is talking about actually made it difficult for Ministers to have proper oversight.

• 4 Mar 2025 · Border Security, Asylum and Immigration Bill (Third sitting) · Hansard source

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  It is a pleasure to serve under your chairmanship, Dr Murrison. I would like to make a couple of points about the amendment. As the Minister set out, clause 1 does not mean that someone who is not a civil servant cannot apply for the role. We have to be careful not to have an old-fashioned view of how the civil service operates. External candidates are increasingly common nowadays as outside specialisms are required by the Government, even for roles that are not particularly senior. Even if an external candidate applies, they will get the support of the civil service. The role compares to Home Office roles such as the independent chief inspector of borders and immigration and the commissioner on modern slavery, who are separate from the Home Office apparatus and often report—especially at the Home Affairs Committee—that they do not get the support and structural backing they need. Clause 1 would obviate that. The commander will also be subject to the civil service code, which is important given the high levels of public expectation for the role. The one difference between this and other directors general, and other senior figures in the Home Office, is that the role is set out in primary legislation. We will thereby create a distinction for the role by passing the Bill. The shadow Minister suggested that we should discuss the suitable qualifications for the role, but the role is very operational so we should be wary of setting out in legislation or in this debate the exact specifications of every task. Finally, we must be careful of the pendulum swinging in one direction with one Government and then, with a change of Government, straight back in the other direction, meaning we repeat the mistakes of the past. When the coalition Government came into office in 2010, Home Secretary Theresa May—now Baroness May—restructured the UK Border Agency, as it was under the Labour Administration. She commented at the time that the UKBA had been structured in such a way as to be so independent that it would “keep its work at an arm’s length from Ministers—that was wrong. It created a closed, secretive and defensive culture. So I can tell the House that the new entities will not have agency status and will sit in the Home Office, reporting to Ministers.” —[ Official Report , 26 March 2013; Vol. 560, c. 1500.] Although we are trying to correct what has clearly gone wrong over the previous 14 years of Conservative government of Border Force, it is important that we do not overcorrect and go back to the situation we were in before, which Baroness May pointed out did not work then.

• 4 Mar 2025 · Border Security, Asylum and Immigration Bill (Third sitting) · Hansard source

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  Before I was elected and before Brexit, I was the justice and home affairs attaché at the British embassy in Paris. I helped to co-ordinate engagement between the Home Office, the French Government and Europol. I do not know how much the hon. Lady knows about how Europol functions, but it has a lot of operations and is a very busy organisation. It would frequently take us more than three months to arrange a meeting. Would the new clause not put civil servants at risk of breaching the law just because they could not set up a meeting fast enough?

• 4 Mar 2025 · Border Security, Asylum and Immigration Bill (Third sitting) · Hansard source

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  The most comparable piece of legislation on this topic in a devolved context is the Human Trafficking and Exploitation (Scotland) Act 2015. That Act does not require a clause that specifies the obligation to respect international law. Those things are implicit in legislation passed by the Scottish Government, even on this topic.

• 4 Mar 2025 · Border Security, Asylum and Immigration Bill (Third sitting) · Hansard source

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  Does the hon. Gentleman accept that although Commissioner Miekelson is a fictional character, the role was created by statute—by the SNP Scottish Government when they created Police Scotland?

• 4 Mar 2025 · Border Security, Asylum and Immigration Bill (Third sitting) · Hansard source

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  But in an implicit way, just as this Bill is. There is nothing on the face of the Act, in the way the hon. Member is proposing for this Bill.

• 4 Mar 2025 · Border Security, Asylum and Immigration Bill (Fourth sitting) · Hansard source

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  I apologise for my longer interventions, Mr Stuart; I will try to bundle them all into this speech. One of the most important things that we heard during evidence was from Dr Walsh from the Migration Observatory. He said that demand for cross-channel crossings is essentially inelastic. Even if the price of a crossing doubles, there will still be demand for it; people rise to meet that price. That tells us that deterrence and disruption of the demand alone will never be enough to tackle the horrors that we are seeing in the channel at the moment. We must also disrupt the supply of ability to cross the channel. That is an important part of the Bill, and these clauses go right to the heart of it. On the point about criminalising all asylum seekers, ahead of oral evidence, I read carefully the submissions we have had from organisations I have worked with in the past. I found the testimony of the Crown Prosecution Service very convincing. It stated clearly that in addition to the primary legislation, the CPS will produce guidance that will set out both the public interest threshold and evidential test that it would seek in order for a case to go to prosecution. It was very clear that the kind of hypothetical examples set out by the hon. Member for Perth and Kinross-shire would not meet that threshold. On the point about decriminalising all asylum seekers, to clarify the point I was trying to make in my interventions, during a crossing anyone can declare themselves an asylum seeker. That then breaks down into different categories: someone who is genuinely eligible for asylum in the UK and will, when they go through the process, get refugee status; someone who is genuinely seeking asylum, but will not meet the threshold when they go through the process and will not get such status; and someone who knows that they are ineligible, or might be eligible on some counts, but is engaged in the criminal act of facilitating illegal entry into the UK and putting those other people’s lives in danger. At that moment, it is not possible to distinguish between those people; the asylum process is there to do that. Were we to accept the premise of the hon. Gentleman’s amendment, it would be a wrecking amendment. I know it is not intended that way, but it would in reality be a wrecking amendment to any kind of intervention on a crossing at sea.

• 4 Mar 2025 · Border Security, Asylum and Immigration Bill (Fourth sitting) · Hansard source

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  It is quite interesting to hear the points that the Minister is making, considering the conversation we had this morning about the commander being functionally a civil servant. Although I was never officially a civil servant in the proper sense, from my experience it is really important that senior leaders within the civil service are able to avail themselves of delegation capacities as needed. It can be done for many reasons. It could be a bandwidth issue, where someone has multiple priorities and needs to delegate to someone else because they are not able to be in two places at once—and looking at the responsibilities of the commander as set out in the legislation, there are a lot. It could also be a resourcing issue or because of a conflict of interest. That brings me to the point I was making about this being a civil service role; there need to be proper conflict of interest considerations. That is what we are taking account of here.

• 4 Mar 2025 · Border Security, Asylum and Immigration Bill (Fourth sitting) · Hansard source

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  Weald of Kent, sorry—that is quite far south for me. The hon. Lady made a point about the sector and charging for services. Some organisations out there are charitable and provide services for free, and some organisations charge enormous fees and are extremely exploitative. That is where that distinction comes from. That would be my interpretation of the legislation.

• 4 Mar 2025 · Border Security, Asylum and Immigration Bill (Fourth sitting) · Hansard source

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  The hon. Gentleman is making an important point, but I do not accept that the proposal is creating new criminal offences for all asylum seekers or for all people; it is creating new criminal offences for those engaged in the exploitation of people and the trafficking or smuggling of them across the channel in great danger. We cannot allow that to continue if we care about those people’s lives at all. In the constituency of every single MP in this room, there will be a cannabis factory where a probably under-age Vietnamese child is working at cultivating cannabis. If they arrived in the past two years, they came across in one of those boats. Significant, serious organised crime networks are exploiting the vulnerability of those people in order to facilitate such crossings. This proposal is how we stop them doing it, and that affects every one of our communities. I am aware that I am testing people’s patience, but I want to make two final points. The first is about the criminalisation of organisations that help asylum seekers. That is an important point, and the distinction has to be clear. I did have concerns about this measure being in the Bill, but the evidence sessions completely reassured me. The testimony of the CPS was that asking about the weather in Dover when in Calais, and those kinds of things, would not be facilitating immigration crime. The testimony that the National Crime Agency is using these measures to tackle serious and organised crime makes it clear what the purpose of the clauses is. The hon. Member for Kent—

• 4 Mar 2025 · Border Security, Asylum and Immigration Bill (Fourth sitting) · Hansard source

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  There is an issue around taxonomy and categorisation here. Anyone is entitled to claim asylum. It is a universal human right. Anyone from any nationality and background, whatever their criminal history, is entitled to make a claim to be an asylum seeker. It is possible to be a member of a criminal gang and plan on claiming asylum. From my 15 years of working in the asylum and immigration service, I know it is an undeniable point of fact that some people exploit that to delay or get around the system, and we must act on such abuse. Does the hon. Member agree that we have to be careful in our classifications? There is a distinction between an asylum seeker who has a genuine claim to refugee status but who might not be eligible, and someone exploiting the system.

• 4 Mar 2025 · Border Security, Asylum and Immigration Bill (Fourth sitting) · Hansard source

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  That is absolutely right—but, in my experience of the channel coast and of working in the refugee sector, those do not exist. Anyone who was to do that would probably be giving immigration advice, which is a regulated component under UK legislation. That would be structured differently from someone on the coast or on a boat or vessel, in the way that this legislation sets out. I am happy to be corrected, but that would be my interpretation. Finally, I come to the point about mobile phones and the different things listed that can be seized when a vessel is disrupted. Last week, we heard so much evidence—there is so much evidence out there—that the crossing of the channel is the final stage in a very long process involving criminal gang networks, organised crime networks and just immigration networks that stretch through Europe, including allied countries and countries very difficult for us to have relationships with. We know that those smuggling networks are all orchestrated by mobile phone, so it is important that the Bill incorporates that. On the concerns that the hon. Member for Perth and Kinross-shire about criminalising the most wretched people in the world, the exemptions in the Bill are clearly humanitarian. They are clearly the kinds of things that people need to survive on a dangerous sea crossing or on their arrival. The only exception is their phone. It is because we know that the data taken from those phones is critical in the fight that phones are excluded. That is why it is important that that component remains in the Bill.

• 27 Feb 2025 · Border Security, Asylum and Immigration Bill (Second sitting) · Hansard source

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  But they passed the Act. David Coleman: It was never tried. It might well have failed, but it was certainly a different avenue. It was not the one you had in mind, I am sure, but it was none the less a different way of doing it. It was attacking the problem from a different angle—from the question of demand rather than control.

• 27 Feb 2025 · Border Security, Asylum and Immigration Bill (Second sitting) · Hansard source

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  Q In 2018, the Government was spending £18,000 per asylum seeker, per year. Then they brought in the Illegal Migration Act, the Nationality and Borders Act, and the Safety of Rwanda Act. By 2024, they were spending £47,000 per asylum seeker, per year. If you have any respect for public money at all, is it not self-evident that this legislation has failed and that we should try a different approach on immigration? David Coleman: That, I suppose, is the reason why the previous Government wanted to try to do something very different indeed in the Rwanda policy.

• 27 Feb 2025 · Border Security, Asylum and Immigration Bill (Second sitting) · Hansard source

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  Q Thank you for coming today. We heard some evidence this morning about the Illegal Migration and Safety of Rwanda (Asylum and Immigration) Acts. Witnesses have called them a disaster, a meltdown, and a fundamental system breakdown. What is your assessment of those Acts on the functioning of the Home Office systems and on the cost to the public purse? How effective have they been in reducing migrant numbers? Professor Brian Bell: I will take those questions in reverse order. I do not think they were very effective. Again, I would caution that there is always this problem that you see a piece of legislation passing and then look at the numbers and try to guess whether it was the legislation that caused the change that you see. Other things are going on, so it is always difficult to do that. More broadly, the evidence that we have from people seeking asylum is that the exact nature of the rules that exist in the country they are going to are not big drivers of their decision to go there. People have asked asylum seekers to list the reasons they want to come to the UK, and very rarely are they things like the legal system in operation for dealing with asylum claims. It is all about the fact that English is the most common language in the world and often the second language of these people. There is often a diaspora in the country, or labour market opportunities are potentially better than in some of the other countries. Those things are generally much more important than whether your asylum claim will be dealt with in Rwanda. I do not think that many people concern themselves with that. The numbers are certainly not consistent with a story of a very significant deterrent effect from the Rwanda Act. Of course, asylum seekers might have been really clever and spotted that it was probably going to be declared illegal by the Supreme Court—perhaps they were prejudging the legality of the measures. The cost was staggering for a policy that was very unlikely to have a significant deterrent effect. The previous Government’s difficulty was that they could never actually tell you how many people they thought would be sent to Rwanda. It is not a deterrent if you are sending a few thousand people every year.

• 27 Feb 2025 · Border Security, Asylum and Immigration Bill (Second sitting) · Hansard source

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  Q Thank you for the really interesting testimonies that you have brought today; we really appreciate it. I have two questions. We heard from the Migration Observatory earlier that one of the challenges in this world is that demand is essentially inelastic: they could double the price of the crossings and there would still be a market of people who would pay it, even for very flimsy boats. Picking up Tom’s question, it strikes me that the Rwanda scheme, which this legislation repeals, was ostensibly focused on deterrence and therefore trying to tackle demand—but, because demand is inelastic, it was not having the effect. It sounds like you are saying that this legislation is focusing on the supply and just making it impossible for people to cross the channel, no matter how much demand there is for it. Is that right? Have I understood that correctly? My second question is for Sarah. I should probably declare an interest because I was previously the home affairs attaché at the embassy in Paris. You talked about international co-operation and mentioned things like JITs and Eurojust and the challenges we face there. We heard from a previous witness about how the UK no longer being in Dublin is being cited by migrants as one of the reasons that they are going in. Can you say more about the challenges that the UK is facing post Brexit? How do we build relations with key allies to overcome them? Sarah Dineley: I will start with how we rebuild relations with key allies. I have talked about our network of liaison prosecutors. We regularly engage and hold engagement events with our overseas prosecutors: this year alone, we have had engagement events in Ireland, Spain and, two weeks ago, Italy. That is about building those relationships and finding out what their challenges are, as well as finding out about their legal systems and what barriers there are to the co-operation that we are seeking. I think we do have to recognise that different countries have a different legal framework, and we cannot simply impose our framework on another country; we have to be able to work around their framework to try to get what we need from them.

• 27 Feb 2025 · Border Security, Asylum and Immigration Bill (Second sitting) · Hansard source

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  Q Or four. Professor Brian Bell: Well, four went voluntarily, but if the policy had been implemented in full, there were never any guarantees. We certainly would not have been able to send 100,000 a year to Rwanda; Rwanda was never going to accept that. The cost was astounding, given the likely deterrence effect. It illustrates a problem in the Home Office at the time: there was little rational thinking about what the costs and benefits of different policies were. My personal view is that getting asylum claims dealt with more quickly would have been a much more effective use of public resources. That is in the interests of not only the British public but asylum seekers, as most of their claims are accepted. If we could have got them through the system faster, got them approved if they were approved, got them into work and integrating within their communities and, if they were rejected, actually deported them, that would have been a much better use of public resources.

• 27 Feb 2025 · Border Security, Asylum and Immigration Bill (First sitting) · Hansard source

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  I did too.

• 27 Feb 2025 · Border Security, Asylum and Immigration Bill (First sitting) · Hansard source

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  Q I should probably declare that I used to work on refugee and asylum issues in Scotland, including with the Scottish Refugee Council. Enver, you talked a bit about the fundamental system meltdown, and the disfunction that the IMA and the Rwanda Act caused. I want to ask you a bit more about that. Would I be right in saying that those Acts basically caused a complete stop, or a complete slowdown, in any processing of asylum applications? What impact does that have on the communities where asylum seekers are placed, and on the people who serve those communities—the councils and charities? Does it make it hard for them to do their job? Does it cause local tensions? If we are repealing those components of the IMA and the Rwanda Act, would that address some of the challenges those communities are facing as a result of migration? Enver Solomon: In short, what happened with the system meltdown that I referred to is that processing did pretty much come to a standstill. You had a huge and ever-growing backlog, and people were stuck in limbo indefinitely in the system. The number of people in hotels—asylum contingency accommodation, as it is called—reached record numbers. Hotels were being stood up in communities without proper prior assessments with relevant agencies of the potential needs—health, the NHS, and tensions vis-à-vis the police. We work in Rotherham, where a hotel was brutally attacked and refugees were almost burned alive in the summer. My staff were in contact with people in the hotel who were live streaming what was happening. They thought that they were going to get burned alive. That hotel in Rotherham should never have been opened. It was always going to be a flashpoint. It was located in an incredibly isolated area, there were not appropriate support services, the local services were not properly engaged with in advance and there was no appropriate planning and preparation. That story, I am afraid, was repeated across the country because of the dysfunction and the system meltdown that the previous pieces of legislation resulted in. It is absolutely critical that we learn the lessons from that and do not repeat those mistakes. There is no need to use asylum hotels. As I understand it, there are roughly 70,000 individual places within the asylum dispersal system today. If we had timely decisions being made in a matter of months, people moving through the system, a growing backlog in the appeal system dealt with by ensuring the decisions are right first time, and people having good access to appropriate legal information and advice from representation, which is a huge problem, you would begin gradually to fix the system. It will take time to fix the system and create efficiencies, but it is absolutely vital that plans to move away from the use of hotels are taken forward rapidly, and that the current contracts in place with the three private providers to provide dispersal accommodation are radically reformed, because they just create community tensions. They are pivoted towards placing people in parts of the country where accommodation is usually cheap and where there are going to be growing tensions, often without support in place for people in those communities. Mubeen Bhutta: I did not fully catch your question, Chris—I apologise.