Carla Denyer MP: speeches

Speeches

• 5 Nov 2024 · Renters' Rights Bill (Eighth sitting) · Hansard source

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  I beg to move, That the clause be read a Second time. Thank you for your forbearance, Sir Roger, as I have proposed quite a few new clauses this afternoon, but this is the last one from me. New clause 11 proposes setting a control on the amount that a stated or advertised rent can be. A control would be set by an independent living rent body, taking account of the property’s size and quality, as well as local incomes, location and other criteria that the body sees fit to include. Local flexibility will be vital. We have a generation of people who will never be able to earn enough to have a mortgage, and who cannot even afford their rents now. New clause 11 recognises that and aims to bring some urgently needed fairness and balance to a private rented landscape that has become grossly distorted. Giving an independent body the power to set a ceiling for new rents is similar to models of new rent regulation in Germany and Spain. I have tabled new clause 11 to probe the Minister, and I want to be clear from the outset that I am acutely aware that this is a complex policy area and that there is no silver bullet for the terrible problem of sky-high rents in the private rented sector. I know that I will be challenged in this debate, and I welcome that; there is a vital discussion to be had to ensure that unintended consequences are avoided, and I do not dismiss the importance of that. At the same time, I hope that we recognise the significance of the debate over what we do about the affordability of rents. I put it to the Committee that we need to consider rent controls both within and between tenancies, because unaffordable private rents are hurting people and hurting our economy. Key workers are forced out of cities and out of the communities that they have made their home. Average rents in inner London, as those of us who are newly elected MPs and getting flats in inner London are very aware, are rather high. In fact, they are 106% of a teaching assistant’s salary. The average rent in my constituency of Bristol Central has hit nearly £1,800 a month. If a 21-year-old living in Bristol rents a single room today at the average rate, they will have put £80,000 into their landlord’s bank account by the time they reach their 30th birthday. Rising rents in Bristol forced renter Anny, her key worker partner Alex and their four-month-old baby to move city completely, and to move away from their support network when they needed it most. Private renters spend a disproportionate amount of their income—an average of 33%—on housing costs, compared with just 10% for mortgage holders, and a shocking one in five renters spends more than half of their income on rent. That has a knock-on effect on the economy. Renters are giving more and more of their wages to landlords. Many cannot make ends meet and are ending up homeless, and those who can just about afford not to become homeless are certainly not able to save anything like the eye-watering sums needed to get on the housing ladder. Private renters have less disposable income, and therefore less buying power, in the local economy, too. Research by the Women’s Budget Group and Positive Money UK found that high private rents disproportionately impact the spending power of women and black, Asian and minority ethnic households. The knock-on costs to the taxpayer are high, too, through spending on housing benefit and temporary accommodation. I know that the Minister has already made it clear that he will not accept the solution proposed in new clause 11, but I hope that he will at least accept that private rents are much too high relative to incomes and tell us how the Government plan to address that crisis in the here and now. For two reasons, I am concerned that changes to the tribunal do not go far enough to address high rents, as the Bill stands. First, as discussed previously, most tenants will not use the tribunal system, because they do not have the time and energy to navigate it. Secondly, even if every tenant did so, it would not result in rents coming down overall, in relation to incomes. The tribunal panel judges only whether a rent rise is fair based on the price of new rentals of a similar size in the area, and the prices of new rentals have outstripped inflation consistently. Rental index data from the Deposit Protection Service backs that up. It found that rents outstripped inflation by a third last year, and Rightmove reports show that asking rents outside of London have risen 60% since 2020, far outstripping inflation or wage growth. During our evidence sessions and previous discussions in Committee, we heard the important point that rent controls are not simply one thing; they are a category of policies. In an earlier sitting, we discussed in-tenancy rent controls, to stop rogue landlords hiking rents in order to kick people out, in lieu of using section 21. That is one thing, but the new clause goes further by aiming to address the unaffordable level that private rents have reached and rent hikes between tenancies. I expect that the Minister will mention social housing. I agree that increasing the social housing supply is critical; however, the private rented sector is in an affordability crisis now, and it will take huge amounts of effort and time to increase the social housing supply at the scale and pace needed to have any impact on private rents. Models from Generation Rent and other economists predict that building 1.5 million homes over this Parliament will decrease the rent burden by just over 1%. More social rented homes are essential, but the cost of private renting is so distorted—the market is failing so badly—that we need Ministers to step in and treat rent affordability as the acute housing emergency that it is. I am sure the Minister will also use the example in Scotland as a reason not to have rent controls here. I would strongly caution against that, though, because the data on whether rents have increased overall in Scotland are shaky, as we heard in the evidence sessions, and, if there have been increases, the data on whether they are anything to do with rent controls are even more so—if necessary, I am happy to go into that in more detail in the debate. I imagine that the Minister will also highlight the potential unintended consequences on the supply side and the possibility that landlords will leave the sector. However, it is not enough simply to assert that any form of rent control—remember that this is a whole category of options—will break the private rented sector or cause lots of landlords to leave. That needs to be interrogated, with proper consideration given to the contrary case that rent caps would provide a clear and stable regime for rent rises for landlords, so that they know how much they can raise the rent by and plan for the future. I encourage the Government and the Committee to look to European countries where rent caps co-exist with large private rented sectors, such as in Germany, where more than half the population rents privately and where they also have in-tenancy rent caps. In particular, I draw the Committee’s attention to comments by the chief executive officer of Greystar, one of the world’s biggest landlords, who said recently that rent controls need not stop big investors from funding new homes: “You do not have to have the windfall of a year of 14 per cent rent increases in order to have a viable investment product…We operate in a lot of markets around the world where rent control does exist.” The argument against rent controls is that they will break the private rented sector, but it is already broken, with immediate and severe consequences right now, for all the reasons we heard about in the evidence sessions. However, we need to talk about the risks attached to any policy of in-tenancy and between-tenancy rent controls. Any system to introduce them needs to be carefully designed and built—I acknowledge that, and I know that point will be made to me in a moment. Some robust work already exists on the kind of principles we should consider in designing a workable system, and my new clause 11 is just one suggestion.

• 5 Nov 2024 · Renters' Rights Bill (Eighth sitting) · Hansard source

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  I support new clause 8, and I would also like to speak in favour of new clause 14, tabled in the name of the hon. Member for Leeds Central and Headingley (Alex Sobel). New clause 14 seeks to address an injustice around guarantors for students. In this speech, I cite heavily evidence provided by the National Union of Students and individual student union officers in my home city of Bristol, all of whom are very concerned about this injustice. The widespread landlord practice of demanding that tenants provide a guarantor is discriminatory, especially in this situation. Tenants are asked to put someone forward, normally a parent or relative, who owns a house in the UK and/or earns an income typically above the national average. The guarantor is asked to guarantee to pay the rent should the tenant default, and to pay for any damage to the property should the tenant be unable to do so. Although for some, this is just an inconvenience, for tenants who are from deprived socioeconomic backgrounds, who are estranged from their families, who have a background in care or who are coming to the UK, such as international students from abroad, it can be a huge barrier to securing a home. The practice can push those unable to find a suitable guarantor into unsustainable debt, because they are forced to pay either months of rent up front or for costly guarantor schemes run by private companies. Others are forced into hostels or sofa surfing, and can even be made homeless. The stats are stark: 13% of students experience homelessness during their studies, and that figure rises to 29% for international students. This issue has a detrimental impact on the lives of student renters and their ability to focus on their studies. It is imperative that we address the issue to ensure fair and equitable access to housing for all tenants, including students, allowing them to flourish in their education. Landlords have several other means available to protect themselves against potential losses, including tenant referencing, rent guarantee insurance and deposit protection schemes, all of which make guarantor schemes unnecessary. I am not pushing for a vote today, but I ask the Minister to have a dialogue—if he is not doing so already—with the hon. Member for Leeds Central and Headingley, who tabled the new clause, and the NUS, with a view to including the changes in the next version of the Bill. Finally, I should mention that I have joined the all-party parliamentary group for students.

• 5 Nov 2024 · Renters' Rights Bill (Eighth sitting) · Hansard source

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  I certainly welcome additional funding for social housing, and I know that many local authorities do too, although I suspect that most if not all would also say that they need more than that. In terms of what exact model of rent controls we are talking about and how the independent living rent body works it out, I am deliberately not attached to exactly how to do that. As I mentioned, there are 17 European countries that have some form of rent controls; they are all tailored to specific circumstances and some have worked better than others. My point is that we should not rule out an entire category of available tools on the basis of looking at a few examples that have not worked. I would rather we look at how we could make it work or, if not, at what the Government are going to do instead to tackle affordability in the private rented sector, given that the positive measures on social housing are unlikely to bring down rents in that sector by anything like the necessary amount. As it is clear that the Minister will not support new clause 11, I suggest he should at least consider the merits of setting up a living rent commission to undertake work to inform evidence-based decision making about what we can do on the issue. When I was a Bristol city councillor, I was the co-proposer with a Labour councillor of commissioning a local version of that work to look at how rent controls could theoretically work in Bristol if the Government gave the council the necessary powers. We took that route specifically because we were aware that several options were available, so we first needed research on how it might work and how to avoid unintended consequences. I would love the Government to commission an equivalent study at a national level so that we can make informed decisions in future.

• 5 Nov 2024 · Renters' Rights Bill (Eighth sitting) · Hansard source

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  I will be honest: I am not convinced that the new clause is unnecessary, but I can do the maths so will not seek to divide the Committee. I beg to ask leave to withdraw the new clause. Clause, by leave, withdrawn. New Clause 11 Rent controls “(1) The Secretary of State must establish a body to be known as the Independent Living Rent Body within 12 months of the date of Royal Assent to this Act. (2) The ‘proposed rent’ referred to in section 55(2) must be no more than an amount set by the Independent Living Rent Body. (3) The amount referred to in subsection (2) must be calculated as a function of property size, quality, local incomes, location, and such other criteria as the Independent Living Rent Body sees fit.”— (Carla Denyer.) Brought up, and read the First time.

• 5 Nov 2024 · Renters' Rights Bill (Eighth sitting) · Hansard source

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  I beg to ask leave to withdraw the motion. Clause, by leave, withdrawn. Question proposed, That the Chair do report the Bill, as amended, to the House.

• 5 Nov 2024 · Renters' Rights Bill (Eighth sitting) · Hansard source

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  The hon. Member is correct that I was coming to that, but I thank her for asking anyway—I do welcome a debate. There is some robust work on what rent controls can look like and, without wishing to give any spoilers about the organisations that provided us with evidence, I understand that more is coming. I draw the Committee’s attention to work done in 2019 by the New Economics Foundation, which looked at how we might arrive at a rent control system in London. It set out six key building blocks all about how to transition carefully and gradually from the current market free-for-all to a controlled system, and there are some lessons to be learned there about how we address supply issues.

• 5 Nov 2024 · Renters' Rights Bill (Eighth sitting) · Hansard source

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  I and thank the Minister for his consideration and beg to ask leave to withdraw the motion. Clause, by leave, withdrawn. New Clause 2 Review of the impact of the Act on the housing market “(1) The Secretary of State must publish an annual report outlining the impact of the provisions of this Act on the housing market in the UK. (2) A report under this section must include the impact of this Act on— (a) the availability of homes in the private rental sector; (b) rents charged under tenancies; (c) house prices; and (d) requests for social housing. (3) A report under this section must be laid before Parliament.”— (David Simmonds.) Brought up, and read the First time.

• 5 Nov 2024 · Renters' Rights Bill (Eighth sitting) · Hansard source

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  I can see that the Minister is nodding in recognition of that, and I thank him. It does not make sense for local authorities introducing selective licensing schemes to have to spend a lot of money on preparing the paperwork for the scheme without knowing whether it will ultimately go ahead. I have seen at first hand the unnecessary impact on officer time and the cost to local authorities. Similarly, I urge the Minister to commit the Government to removing the requirement for local authorities establishing selective licensing schemes to ensure that the private rented sector forms a high proportion of properties in the area. If there are acute issues in the private rented sector that can be addressed through a selective licensing scheme, it seems arbitrary for local authorities to be unable to establish such a scheme just because that sector does not form a large proportion of the whole housing stock. The reason why those measures are not included in the new clause is that they do not require primary legislation, as far as I understand it, but I raise them because they are directly connected to the content of the new clause. In conclusion, the changes that I am suggesting are small, but they could make a big difference to housing standards on the ground and to the ability of local authorities to do their work. I will not push the new clause to a vote, but I sincerely hope that the Minister will actively consider it. I know that the Chartered Institute of Environmental Health would be happy to meet him to discuss any further details.

• 5 Nov 2024 · Renters' Rights Bill (Eighth sitting) · Hansard source

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  New clause 9 would head in the opposite direction from new clause 5. It is about removing unnecessary barriers to the use of licensing schemes to improve housing standards. The new clause would do two things. First, it would increase the maximum duration of discretionary licensing schemes from five years to 10. Secondly, it would enable local authorities operating selective licensing schemes to use licensing conditions to improve housing conditions. Licensing can be an effective way to improve housing standards for at least three reasons. First, it is proactive. It provides a means for local authorities to inspect privately rented housing using enforceable conditions and to identify and resolve problems without the need for tenants to have complained, and it provides that proactive regulation in a locally tailored form. It makes major contributions to area-based issues such as crime, antisocial behaviour and waste management, and it brings together a range of bodies to focus additional support services—for example, for landlords and tenants, improving public health and reducing burdens on the NHS. There are a huge number of wins, and I have experienced that at first hand with licensing schemes in my local authority. Secondly, licensing is self-funding. It means that the market pays for its own regulation, which is a good principle, rather than relying on the taxpayer. It provides a sustainable and predictable source of income that enables local authorities to maintain staffing levels and support the training of new officers. Thirdly, licensing is targeted. It enables local authorities to target regulation where that is most needed, so that the worst landlords and the most vulnerable tenants get the most attention and landlord costs can be minimised in other areas. The problem, however, is that local authorities have to implement licensing schemes with their hands tied behind their backs, because previous Governments have made various decisions that have placed unnecessary and irrational barriers in their way. Given that licensing schemes are expensive and time-consuming for local authorities to initially introduce, it does not make sense to restrict the period over which they can act to only five years. New clause 9 would amend sections 60 and 84 of the Housing Act 2004 to increase the maximum duration of discretionary licensing schemes, which includes both selective licensing schemes and additional—sorry, jargon again—for HMOs from five to 10 years. That would allow local authorities to advertise for longer-term posts for officers and to include training of new staff in those schemes. It would also provide more time for local partnerships formed through such schemes to become embedded and effective. The new clause also addresses another issue, which was highlighted by the Chartered Institute of Environmental Health during oral evidence. That respected body pointed out that it does not make any sense to have the current peculiar disconnect in the 2004 Act, whereby local authorities can introduce selective licensing schemes to address poor housing conditions, but they cannot include a directly enforceable requirement relating to the housing condition as a condition of the licence—so they do not have the tools to do what they are set up to do. The new clause would therefore amend section 90 of the 2004 Act to enable local authorities to use licence conditions to improve housing conditions directly. I stress that the new clause does not cover all that needs to be done to remove barriers to licensing. For example, I also urge the Minister to commit the Government to removing the Secretary of State’s ability to veto selective licensing schemes covering more than 20% of the local authority area.

• 5 Nov 2024 · Renters' Rights Bill (Eighth sitting) · Hansard source

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  I beg to move, That the clause be read a Second time. The new clause would ensure that landlords give permission for home adaptations where a home assessment has been carried out. There are 16 million disabled people in the UK—that is more than a fifth of the population—and 19% of them live in the private rented sector. The Equality and Human Rights Commission estimates that a shocking one in three disabled people live in private rented properties that are unsuitable for them. Research by the National Residential Landlords Association found that only 49% of landlords—less than half—were willing to let to a tenant who required adaptations for accessibility needs. That number does go up when landlords are made aware of the funding that is available, but it still falls far short of where it needs to be. Disabled renters need the landlord’s consent to make any adaptations to their homes. The Equality Act 2010 already imposes a duty on landlords to allow and make reasonable adjustments on request from their disabled tenants. Common home adaptations include changes to make the premises safe, facilitating access to things including use of the bathroom, washing facilities, cooking facilities, light controls and so on—things that it is perhaps easy for us to take for granted. Disabled renters who are unable to self-fund may request that their local authority pays for smaller adaptations. That includes things such as grab rails to make it easier to get in and out of the bath. Through the disabled facilities grant, which is in a separate bucket, local authorities provide up to £30,000 to pay for major works that cost more than £1,000. I tabled the new clause to prompt a discussion about the concern raised by Disability Rights UK, which points out that, unfortunately, the disabled facilities grant is a postcode lottery system that is failing and is not fit for purpose in its current form. An investigation by journalist Vicky Gayle found that in nine council areas in England and Wales, people had to wait on average more than a year to see an occupational therapist and complete the pre-application steps. On top of that, 80% of local authorities in England and Wales are using discretionary powers to top up funding, and that extra money varies wildly from council to council. There are many common barriers, including the fact that private landlords often refuse to make adaptations and many are unaware of their legal obligations to do so.

• 31 Oct 2024 · Renters' Rights Bill (Sixth sitting) · Hansard source

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  I beg to ask leave to withdraw the amendment. Amendment, by leave, withdrawn. Clause 57 ordered to stand part of the Bill. Clause 58 Abandoned premises under assured shorthold tenancies Question proposed, That the clause stand part of the Bill.

• 31 Oct 2024 · Renters' Rights Bill (Sixth sitting) · Hansard source

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  I beg to move amendment 44, in clause 57, page 79, line 31, after “section 1” insert— “— in subsection (4)(a), omit ‘the prescribed sum’ and insert ‘£60,000’; (b)”. This amendment increases the maximum fine for illegal evictions under the Protection from Eviction Act 1977 to £60,000.

• 31 Oct 2024 · Renters' Rights Bill (Sixth sitting) · Hansard source

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  I am sure we are all aware of the risk that the abolition of section 21 may lead to a rise in illegal evictions. The Renters’ Rights Bill needs measures to protect against that, and that is the purpose of amendment 44. Across the country, a segment of private landlords evade the courts and attempt to evict tenants themselves by taking actions that include changing locks, disposing of belongings, and even cutting off electricity and water supply and harassing tenants. Many illegal evictions take place in the shadow market, where landlords and letting agents deliberately breach the law to maximise rental profits. Many renters in the shadow market are on lower incomes in marginal employment, and they are unfamiliar with their rights. In 2019, there were just 30 prosecutions of offences under the Protection from Eviction Act 1977 in the whole of England and Wales. Such a low prosecution rate allows criminal landlords to act with impunity. When sentencing, magistrates are also very lenient; fines of less than £1,000, community service and conditional discharge are common penalties for such behaviour. If the maximum fine is £40,000—as it currently is in the Bill—because of the nature of civil penalty notices, it is unlikely that the fine will ever reach that maximum unless the offence is particularly violent. So—and here is the rub—landlords may still take a calculated risk that they can save money by unlawfully evicting tenants, given the abolition of section 21. Even where illegal eviction is not violent, it is still a horrific crime, so it is appropriate that fines reflect that. I therefore propose a maximum fine of £60,000, to give space for appropriate fines to reflect the criminality and harm caused within that range. The change would help to ensure that, for rogue landlords, illegal eviction is not the path of least resistance, as I fear it could otherwise be. Increasing the maximum will also give a strong indication to the courts that this is not just a technical breach, and that will hopefully therefore have a knock-on effect on sentences issued upon conviction. These cases are particularly complicated and expensive for councils to pursue, and that brings us back to the point about the cost to councils that we discussed earlier, especially where landlords refer a case to the first-tier tribunal. If local authorities are bound to lose money even when they win the case, they will be hesitant to begin proceedings. Increasing the maximum fine will help them to have more confidence that they will not lose a substantial amount of money. That is particularly important in the context of 14 years of council funding cuts, as we all know, which mean that if councils stand to lose a lot, they are disincentivised to act.

• 31 Oct 2024 · Renters' Rights Bill (Fifth sitting) · Hansard source

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  I am seconds away from finishing my point, so I will give way shortly. My amendments 78 and 79 are designed to ensure that the ambition to eradicate discrimination in the private rented sector is realised, by giving tenants incentives to take the step of reporting and aiding investigations. I ask the Minister to consider that because, to put it bluntly, I am not sure that a public information campaign from councils will incentivise tenants as he suggested.

• 31 Oct 2024 · Renters' Rights Bill (Fifth sitting) · Hansard source

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  I thank the hon. Lady for her question, which I will come to in a moment. I have considered the role of the ombudsman, but the point of amendment 78 is predominantly to incentivise tenants to engage with the enforcement of the local housing authority. Given the seriousness and scale of discrimination, bold measures are required. Though I welcome the Bill’s intention to stamp out discrimination, the reforms will only be as effective as the enforcement that underpins them. Under the legislation, local authorities will remain dependent on prospective tenants reporting a breach in the first instance. Let us bear in mind that we are discussing discrimination before somebody becomes a tenant—it is discrimination in the advertising of a property—so the prospective tenant may well not have an incentive for pursuing it. Local authorities will be dependent on tenants reporting the breach in the first instance, maintaining a potentially lengthy co-operation with the local authority and assisting the inquiry all the way to its conclusion. That is a real burden. A tenant who has been refused a tenancy will likely still be contending with the extremely pressing issue of where they are going to live—they may have just been served an eviction notice or they may have had to move out of their accommodation quickly for another reason. They are unlikely to have the time or energy to volunteer their services for free to the local authority in exchange for no benefit. I want to address a point that the Minister made against the amendment. In the circumstances I mentioned, the chance of tenants falsely or speculatively submitting a complaint is pretty slim, because they will have pressures on their time. If the prospective tenant were to get a cut of the amount received by the local housing authority, that would be a good incentive for them to report discrimination to the local authority, and discriminatory landlords would begin to be rooted out.

• 31 Oct 2024 · Renters' Rights Bill (Fifth sitting) · Hansard source

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  I have not myself done the calculations and consultations on what that might take a local authority. However, the amendment is based on evidence provided by experts in the evidence gathering part of the Committee’s work. I am trying to get the written evidence up on my parliamentary laptop, which is not co-operating. Off the top of my head, I believe it was from Shelter—I will try to look in a moment, when I have sat down. I am sure Shelter has done the work, so I would be pleased to get back to the Minister on the details when I can lay my hands on them. Apologies, but I have forgotten the second thing the Minister said.

• 31 Oct 2024 · Renters' Rights Bill (Fifth sitting) · Hansard source

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  Can I get to my next point? I suspect that I am about to answer the Minister’s question.

• 31 Oct 2024 · Renters' Rights Bill (Fifth sitting) · Hansard source

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  I will quickly clarify the comments made about my amendment 78 by the shadow Minister, and then I will discuss my amendment and answer some of the Minister’s points. If I heard correctly, the shadow Minister said that he did not support the amendment because it mixes up compensation with criminal penalties, but my understanding of the conversation that we have just had is that the clause uses civil law rather than criminal law, so that point does not stand—or have I misunderstood something?

• 31 Oct 2024 · Renters' Rights Bill (Fifth sitting) · Hansard source

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  A number of the organisations that gave evidence suggested something along those lines, and they had looked into the viability of both mechanisms existing in parallel. I do not have the exact chapter and verse of what they said in my head; we can look at that in Hansard .

• 31 Oct 2024 · Renters' Rights Bill (Fifth sitting) · Hansard source

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  Will the Minister give way?

• 31 Oct 2024 · Renters' Rights Bill (Fifth sitting) · Hansard source

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  In that case, I am pleased to confirm that I have anticipated those questions and concerns, and I can answer them now. Amendments 78 and 79 provide a mechanism for the complainant—the tenant, or the prospective tenant in this case—to receive a portion of the financial penalty imposed by a local housing authority as compensation for being discriminated against. First, let me give a little context. As the Committee has heard in oral and written evidence, discrimination is rife in our private rented sector, and the Bill has the potential to deliver real change for those who find themselves wrongly and consistently locked out of housing. A YouGov survey from last year shows that 52% of landlords harbour a preference against tenants who are in receipt of benefits, and the English housing survey 2021 to 2022 found that one in 10 private renters said they had been refused a tenancy in the past 12 months because they received benefits. That shows the scale of the problem. Families with children also face serious discrimination. There are 1.4 million families in the private rented sector with dependent children, and we have already discussed the harmful effect that it can have on them.

• 31 Oct 2024 · Renters' Rights Bill (Fifth sitting) · Hansard source

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  I have a few follow-up questions for the Minister based on what he just said. First, does he recognise that 20% of double the amount still leaves a significant increase for the local authority? He was talking about the local authority receiving a reduced amount, but losing 20% of double the amount still means a larger amount than previously.

• 31 Oct 2024 · Renters' Rights Bill (Fifth sitting) · Hansard source

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  I will follow up with the Minister on the details.

• 31 Oct 2024 · Renters' Rights Bill (Fifth sitting) · Hansard source

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  I will plough on, because I was indeed going to come to that issue. First, however, I will address one of the Minister’s other points on the convergence of penalty and compensation principles. I understand his purpose in pointing out that these are not normally combined, but there is a precedent. Sharing the proceeds of a civil penalty between public bodies and the person on the end of the wrongdoing is a departure from the norm but, as I understand it, under section 214 of the Housing Act 2004, if a landlord has failed to comply with the tenancy deposit protection regulations, a court can award a tenant a sum of between one and three times the deposit they paid. While there is no question in that legislation of sharing an award with the local authority, it is nevertheless an example of the convergence of penalty and compensation principles in a single move. Although deposit protection rules do not give us a blueprint for the proposal I put forward in amendments 78 and 79, they demonstrate that an acknowledgment elsewhere in housing law of the importance, proportionality and justification of restitution for tenants, which also serves as a form of deterrent and admonition for rule breaking, all in one go. The Minister may be aware that I tabled an amendment to increase civil penalties for exactly the reason that he has highlighted: if the local authority is to share the proceeds with the tenant, the total amount should be higher to ensure that it covers the cost of the local authority taking on the enforcement. That amendment was not selected for debate, so I will not shoehorn in my comments on the subject, but since the Minister specifically asked me about it, I will make the case for increasing the total civil penalty. I proposed that it be increased to £15,000 so as to not harm the local authority’s ability to undertake enforcement activity, as well as to properly reflect the time and expertise involved in the local authority pursuing such cases. I think that addresses the concerns the Minister raised. In conclusion, the tenant is the linchpin upon which a discrimination case such as this depends. On that basis, I believe that some form of financial compensation for the person on the end of the illegal treatment is fair and proportionate. They can pursue a case with the housing ombudsman case as well, and there is an argument for taking into account whether the tenant has received something through the housing ombudsman in determining what they receive in my proposed scheme, or vice versa, but the function of the two tools is different.

• 31 Oct 2024 · Renters' Rights Bill (Fifth sitting) · Hansard source

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  My next point relates, so the Minister can probably address them together. Secondly, the Minister said there were good reasons why he had selected £7,000 specifically and not a few thousand above or below that. Will he expand on why £7,000 is the magic number? Thirdly, I would like to understand the Minister’s view on how tenants will be incentivised to have the prolonged engagement with a local authority that would be necessary to see the process through to conclusion—with only a public information campaign?