Bernard Jenkin MP: speeches

Speeches

• 9 Jul 2026 · Iran Conflict: Ceasefire · Hansard source

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  I ask this question in all sincerity. Throughout this conflict, the Government have pleaded for de-escalation, but if Iran is gratuitously escalating, should we not give unambiguous support to the Americans for retaliating? Who else is going to retaliate against gratuitous escalation by Iran if it is not the Americans? Rather than hedging our bets, can we not give more unambiguous support—if not military support, then political support—for the United States’ efforts to resolve this conflict? It has already given so much ground in the negotiations. We cannot complain that it has not tried to be as reasonable as it possibly can.

• 9 Jul 2026 · Business of the House · Hansard source

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  The Leader of the House did not mention in the forthcoming business that the House is about to be asked to decide on whether to issue a writ for a farcical and unnecessary by-election. [ Interruption. ] Have we had it already? I beg your pardon; I was not in the Chamber. What opportunity do I have to raise the question of how the by-election should be paid for? Many of my constituents live in the tendering district and will be inflicted with the cost of the by-election. It seems most unfair that this political stunt should cost council tax payers in my constituency or in Clacton.

• 8 Jul 2026 · European Entry and Exit System · Hansard source

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  Will the Minister point out to the European Union that, because we have a common travel area with the Republic of Ireland, and because the Republic of Ireland is not applying any of these checks on British citizens going to and coming from Northern Ireland or direct from the United Kingdom, there is actually an open border between the European Union and the United Kingdom, so they might as well allow the same access through Dover rather than trying to impose all their rubbish on the United Kingdom? On the suggestion that this is all the fault of Brexit, this did not exist when we left the European Union; this is a result of a decision that the dysfunctional European Union is inflicting on travelling British citizens for its own reasons, not for any practical benefit.

• 8 Jul 2026 · Maritime and Coastguard Agency · Hansard source

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  May I help the Minister answer the question he was asked by my hon. Friend the Member for Mid Buckinghamshire (Greg Smith), who is on the Opposition Front Bench? The answer is that the law is an ass and the law should be changed, as the right hon. Member for Orkney and Shetland (Mr Carmichael) said. How can it be that the law is interfering in a perfectly happy relationship between coastguard volunteers and the MCA? The law is an ass, and that is quite clearly the view of the coastguards I met last week in West Mersea in my constituency.

• 8 Jul 2026 · Rearmament and Warfighting Readiness · Hansard source

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  It is an honour to succeed the hon. and gallant Member for Birmingham Selly Oak (Al Carns) in this debate. I congratulate the hon. Member for Tunbridge Wells (Mike Martin) who opened the debate—a very timely debate it is, too. I particularly commend the point that the former Minister for the Armed Forces, the hon. and gallant Member for Birmingham Selly Oak, made about this being a whole-of-nation approach, because we are preparing for war. We might actually be at war in some senses, because Russia is knowingly saying that it is conducting a war against NATO, and we are certainly subject to a hybrid war against our national infrastructure—hacking our hospitals, closing down Jaguar Land Rover and harassing our shipping. This is a very low level of war, but we have certainly been under attack from the way that Russia rations gas to western Europe as a weapon. Turning energy into a weapon, turning food into a weapon—Russia is doing the lot, and the writing is on the wall. The Government still have not woken up to the fact that the head of NATO, and even the Prime Minister at Munich, has said that we have to be ready to fight a war—a shooting, kinetic war—against Russia by 2030. There is no sign in the implementation of policy that the Government understand the urgency of that. There are plenty of people in Government who get the urgency of this, and I met some of them with Lord Robertson earlier this week to be briefed on national resilience, but there is a deep reluctance in the Government to recognise that to mobilise for war is not about the armed forces and a few branches of Government. Armies may fight battles, but nations fight wars. If the whole nation is not galvanised to do what is necessary, to be ready for what is going to happen, and to make the sacrifices and suffer the pain of diverting resources to less popular things than the popular things that Governments tend to spend their money on, we are not ready for war.

• 8 Jul 2026 · Rearmament and Warfighting Readiness · Hansard source

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  In this paper entitled “Understanding the UK’s Transition to Warfighting Readiness” that I am just about to explain briefly to the House, we refer to Norway’s concept. Norway’s total war concept is being embedded in its national life and embedded across Government policy through all branches of Government. For example, we refer in the report to the need to galvanise our universities to be ready for war, so that research and development programmes are directed towards suitable and useful capability, creating sovereign national capability and protecting those research programmes from foreign infiltration. I love having foreign students in our universities—it is good for the economy and for our universities—but we cannot have Chinese nationals at the heart of chip manufacture and design, robotics or AI systems. We have to protect our national technology from being spied on by people sent to this country to go to our universities in order to collect that information, steal it and give it to our enemies. The context of the document, which is almost old hat even though it is only a few months old, is the changing geopolitical situation, the withdrawal of America from European security, the collapse of the rules-based international order, the failure of democratic governance models to rise to the challenge, the unpreparedness of most western democracies to be ready to confront the hybrid warfare that we already face, and our lack of adaptability. I commend the point made by the former Armed Forces Minister: there is no point in ordering a whole lot of kit that will be out of date as soon as we get to the next war. If the next war starts in the Balkans, the Baltic states or Poland, it will be about drones. The Government are moving some way on that, but we are so slow. The Ukrainians were way ahead of us in helping to protect the Gulf states while we were still sending multimillion-pound aircraft that cost £25 million an hour to fly to shoot down a drone that cost £150,000. We must adapt our industry to produce cheap, numerous capability so that we have the scale to deal with that. We need that whole-of-society mobilisation. We need much more adaptable governance.

• 8 Jul 2026 · Rearmament and Warfighting Readiness · Hansard source

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  We need resilient financial systems. We need sovereign defence capabilities and sovereign critical national infrastructure. I am glad that we have stopped handing over so much of our CNI to foreign owners, but an immediate, radical transformation is required. This document is 19,000 words drafted for me and for my friend the hon. Member for Widnes and Halewood (Derek Twigg), who serves on the Defence Committee and is a renowned expert on defence in the House, by Chris Donnelly, who used to be a Soviet expert at NATO, worked in the Ministry of Defence and finished up teaching at Shrivenham. He is a wise defence guru. If hon. Members want to know how much really needs to be changed, they should just read through these 19,000 words of analysis and recommendations. There is a huge task, but to carry it through we need to carry the people. The SDR promised a national conversation—where is that national conversation?

• 8 Jul 2026 · Rearmament and Warfighting Readiness · Hansard source

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  Yes, and I think the Government have plans for that, but they keep pulling back because it is a difficult thing to talk about. The spin doctors and spads will tell their political masters, “Oh no, don’t talk about that—the polling says it is terrible.” I am afraid that we have to confront the polling. We have to confront the population with the ugly truth: this country is at far greater risk than it has ever been since the height of the cold war.

• 8 Jul 2026 · Rearmament and Warfighting Readiness · Hansard source

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  Will the hon. Member give way?

• 8 Jul 2026 · Rearmament and Warfighting Readiness · Hansard source

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  I happen to agree with the hon. Member about the failure of the coalition Government to make progress with the deterrent, but there were many of us complaining about that at the time, including my right hon. Friend the Member for New Forest East (Sir Julian Lewis). Indeed, as shadow Defence Secretary in the early 2000s, I was complaining about the cuts in defence spending that were then being made as we went to war in Iraq and as we went to war in Afghanistan. I very much welcome the hon. Member’s bipartisan approach, but rather than pretending to be bipartisan, and making oblique references to what happened under previous Governments, he should be bipartisan, and then we would all get on much better.

• 8 Jul 2026 · Rearmament and Warfighting Readiness · Hansard source

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  There is a national conversation about who will be the next Prime Minister or whether there will be a by-election in Clacton, but there is no such national conversation about the existential threats to our freedom and democracy. It is democracy across the western world that is failing this challenge. The autocracies are winning at the moment. We are facing circumstances where Russia may well be struggling in the Ukraine war, but that makes it more unpredictable. What will Putin do as he feels that his political support is slipping away and Russia’s vulnerability is increasing now that there are petrol queues in Moscow and explosions in Russian cities? There is a growing awareness—it has even been said in the last 24 hours by a serious propagandist for Mr Putin—that this is no longer a special military operation; it is a war. The circumstances are changing as we speak, and I am afraid that a lack of urgency is being shown by the whole House, apart from, say, the Defence Committee and the Joint Committee on the National Security Strategy. This is how we get into wars—by being unprepared for them. We need to change our whole concept of deterrence from the old concept that somehow just having a nuclear weapon keeps us safe. No, we must have a much more flexible ability to respond to changing circumstances. What will happen when the Russians move into a Russian-speaking town in one of the Balkan states? What will we do as our soldiers start being killed? Will we start letting off nuclear weapons or will we have analogous, appropriate, flexible military capability to be able to respond and escalate at pace? Our inability to escalate is the greatest danger at the moment.

• 6 Jul 2026 · Patient Safety Review · Hansard source

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  Very briefly—I have a lot to say.

• 6 Jul 2026 · Patient Safety Review · Hansard source

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  I am grateful for this opportunity to evaluate the Dash review of patient safety, and I thank the Minister for the meeting with her this afternoon. I hope that the House and Penny Dash will forgive me, but in the interests of brevity and clarity, I shall be direct. Whenever asked to justify the abolition of the Health Services Safety Investigations Body, Ministers refer to Dash, but Dash fails to make the case for what it recommends. This new clinical incident investigator was established less than three years ago. HSSIB is a new concept in healthcare, conceived to challenge the culture of denial and blame in the NHS. It is proving itself, even with its very limited budget. One early report on aortic dissection led to 300 more people receiving lifesaving treatment. The Minister now has a list of key recommendation impacts produced by HSSIB. A lot of them may seem small or piecemeal, but so far it is only a small body. After a boy suffered an avoidable death from cancer, HSSIB recommended to NHS England a new community language translation and interpreting services framework so that non-English speaking patients would get appointment letters for their children that they could read and understand. HSSIB recommended a protocol between prisons and ambulance services to avoid wasting ambulance time and new guidance for non-accidental injury of babies in emergency departments where no specific guidance had existed before. The Dash review shows no understanding of HSSIB’s purpose and no comprehension of coherent safety systems management. Dash gets facts wrong and misinterprets the law, either through a failure of understanding or because the recommendation to abolish HSSIB somehow reflected the desired outcome of the review, regardless of the facts. I will set out some specific questions, most of which the Minister has had in advance. If she does not have enough time to respond, I look forward to discussing them at a future meeting that we discussed having.

• 6 Jul 2026 · Patient Safety Review · Hansard source

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  I am listening very carefully to what the Minister is saying. She has engaged positively with the questions I have asked, but she has actually made the case for keeping HSSIB separate. Will she reflect on that? If the only thing she wants is for the CQC to own the recommendations, she should amend HSSIB and say, “The CQC must ensure that the recommendations are implemented.” In fact, the recommendations are directed at Ministers and bits of the health service that are answerable to her and to the Secretary of State. We should keep HSSIB separate, but by all means let us discuss how to ensure that the recommendations are implemented properly.

• 6 Jul 2026 · Patient Safety Review · Hansard source

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  I thank the hon. Gentleman. Recommendation 1 in the Dash review says that the new National Quality Board should “avoid unfunded mandates being imposed on the system without due consideration”. Public inquiries have certainly made well meaning but unaffordable recommendations—I think of the Francis inquiry recommendation on blanket standards for minimum staffing—but it is wrong to see safety as a cost in opposition to other benefits. The cost of safety failures is astronomic, with NHS clinical negligence costing £3.6 billion a year, despite all the public inquiries. Effective safety management is about the cost-effective management of risk, not risk elimination at any cost. If the air accidents investigation branch did not balance costs with effective risk management, aeroplanes would not fly. Can the Minister therefore point out which of HSSIB’s recommendations have been too expensive to implement? If not, where is the justification for abolishing HSSIB? Neither the NQB nor the CQC should control investigations. The AAIB cannot be prevented from making independent recommendations by the Civil Aviation Authority, the Transport Secretary or airlines themselves. Why should the NQB, which will be subject to political direction, be allowed to decide what safety recommendations should be made and what should be investigated, as Dash recommends? On page 31, Dash incorrectly states: “HSSIB was not able to retain the maternity programme because the Health and Care Act 2022 does not make provision for maternity investigations under HSSIB.” Why have the Government accepted that assertion as true? It is wrong in fact and law. The new statutory HSSIB did not take on maternity and newborn safety investigations, because they were commenced without the safe space protections, so their evidence is available for legal proceedings. That is not how HSSIB operates. Since 2023, HSSIB has been conducting its own maternity investigations. Indeed, when the Amos review was established, it took on the relevant investigations from HSSIB and then relied on HSSIB for assistance with them. With sufficient resources, HSSIB could conduct all maternity investigations much more effectively than the maternity and newborn safety investigations programme. Amos reported that MNSI investigations are not trusted by families, as my right hon. Friend the Member for Godalming and Ash (Sir Jeremy Hunt) was saying, and are not consistent or effective in identifying learning or providing accountability. Amos also says that families should have access to an independent investigation if they lose confidence in the local investigations. Without HSSIB, who will provide those independent investigations? Finding 6 accuses HSSIB of having “expanded” its “scope of work beyond the original remit…For example, HSSIB was originally established, along the lines of safety investigatory bodies in other industries, to look at specific cases or incidents of severe harm, but it has since broadened its work into making more systemic recommendations.” That is what Dash says. It is complete nonsense. HSSIB is exactly equivalent to the AAIB, the marine accident investigation branch and RAIB, and was, like them, set up to conduct systemic investigations. That is why they are such effective bodies. The Health and Care Act 2022 does not limit HSSIB investigations to individual incidents. There is no reference whatsoever to “severe harm”, as Dash puts it, in the 2022 Act. It was always intended by Parliament that HSSIB should make systemic recommendations arising from the investigation of specific incidents or groups of incidents. I can say that with authority because it was my Select Committee that recommended HSSIB in the first place, and I also chaired the pre-legislative scrutiny Committee on the draft legislation, so how can Ministers give any authority to the Dash review, which claimed that HSSIB has expanded its remit, when it has done no such thing? Recommendation 3 proposes: “Most investigations into safety incidents should continue to be managed within provider organisations”. This really is the fundamental flaw in Dash. Recent maternity investigations conducted by trusts have highlighted the deficiency of provider-led investigations, as Ockenden and Amos have pointed out. Do the Government accept that investigations by provider organisations are inherently conflicted? Just ask the clinicians, patients, families and patient safety organisations what they think about trusts marking their own homework. None of them has confidence, because providers are keen to protect themselves from litigation and reputational damage. How can Ministers accept the Dash recommendation that we should rely on investigations conducted by provider organisations?

• 6 Jul 2026 · Patient Safety Review · Hansard source

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  I thank the hon. Lady for that intervention. Only an independent investigator can find the causes of the incident that may be part of the culture or practice of that provider, or of the system as a whole. It is like suggesting that airlines or aircraft manufacturers can protect passenger safety without the independent accountability provided by the AAIB. Of course, providers should have the capacity and capability of conducting patient safety investigations, but they must know that HSSIB can and will look at that work and will hold them to account. Recommendation 3 also says that HSSIB should continue as what it calls “a centre of excellence for investigations” in the CQC, but I am afraid that this is just a sop. The CQC, as was pointed out by my right hon. Friend the Member for Godalming and Ash, is a regulator and compliance enforcer, not an investigator. How can the CQC also be an independent investigator? Dash also says that the CQC internal successor should collaborate through the NQB to agree the scope of any investigations it carries out and agree the recommendations. Dash is effectively saying that CQC investigations will be overseen by the NQB. That is a direct attack on the independence of investigations. Can the Minister explain who in future will conduct independent and unconflicted investigations into safety incidents in the NHS? For example, how would an investigation under the CQC be free to find that the CQC inspections themselves were causing unintended harm to patients, or is it back to the misery of litigation through the courts and more public inquiries? The recommendation also makes no reference to the statutory safe space raised by the hon. Member for Shipley (Anna Dixon) that provides for protected disclosure by patients and their families, clinicians and others in safety investigation bodies. It is a crucial safeguard, allowing people to speak. It allows for the duty of candour. I would just point out that the duty of candour does not work if it is just imposed on people. People cannot be forced to incriminate themselves. If placed under the CQC, confidence in the safe space investigations will collapse—and back we go to public inquiries. The Health Bill does attempt to address this by replicating the 2022 Act’s safe space provisions, but that Act also provided for disclosure in certain circumstances, which is allowed on the basis that the benefits for the safety of patients outweighs any impact on current and future investigations. But under this Bill, who will decide what protected information can be disclosed? How will the CQC give the same confidence that the safe space is not being compromised as HSSIB? Finally, Dash fails to look at the comparative cost of HSSIB investigations versus the cost of public inquiries. HSSIB at the moment only costs £6.3 million per year. To save money, the Secretary of State should request that HSSIB conducts far more investigations into matters which he thinks are important, provided that he also provides the funding for the necessary capacity. HSSIB, for example, has conducted eight investigations into mental health suicides since 2023. Each was completed in a few weeks or months, costing a total of £850,000. In comparison, the Lampard inquiry into the Essex partnership university trust in my constituency—investigating the same problem—is expected to cost more than £5 million. Ockenden cost £14 million. This is very far from the best use of resources for conducting investigations. So I ask the Minister, why have Dash and the Government ignored the whole question of HSSIB’s value for money? Even if HSSIB only saves a fraction of the £3.6 billion in costs of clinical negligence, it will pay for itself many fold. I do hope that Ministers will reconsider the whole issue, reflecting on the fact that none of the Royal colleges, nor any of the patient safety organisations, nor the all-party group on patient safety support this unjustifiable policy.

• 6 Jul 2026 · Patient Safety Review · Hansard source

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  I 100% agree with my right hon. Friend. He will note that I will pick up on those points during my remarks. I come back to the questions that I want to put to the Secretary of State. First, if HSSIB’s investigations are intended to continue unaffected by the transfer to the CQC, why bother with the expense of the transfer? Are Ministers simply using Dash as the pretext for what people in the Department or elsewhere in the NHS would like to have? HSSIB was deliberately started very small, but the intention was that over time it would take over more investigations in health and replace the need for wasteful, lengthy, inexpert ad hoc public inquiries. Over the years, inquiries have proved to be a chaotic means of investigation, assembling expertise from scratch, which is then lost after the inquiry, and failing to command public confidence or to fix the system. That is why, after the 1999 Paddington rail crash, the Ladbroke Grove inquiry in 2001 established the rail accident investigation branch. Since then, despite many fatal rail accidents, there has been no public inquiry into a rail crash—nor has the public felt the need to demand one—and rail safety has improved. Given that HSSIB is expert, full time, and can conduct much cheaper and quicker investigations than public inquiries, how can Ministers accept the Dash recommendation to abolish it? Why not consider expanding HSSIB to avoid the need for so many costly public inquiries? Dash complains about there being far too many recommendations—yes, there are—but, as Dash itself enumerates, it is the 30 public inquiries that, in its language, have “cluttered” the “landscape” with some 1,400 recommendations over recent years. HSSIB is therefore not the source of those recommendations. In HSSIB’s first 34 months of operation, it has produced only 56 recommendations. How can Ministers use that reason to justify HSSIB’s abolition? Dash refers more than once to “quality (including safety) of care”. That elides quality of care with safety. In any other safety-critical industry, safety is seen as a distinct, separate and overriding priority. It is telling that in the report, the words “including safety” are added merely in parentheses, as though safety is ancillary to quality, but that becomes justification for rationalisation while actually compromising safety. Safety system management is intrinsic to safety and public confidence in other safety-critical activities, such as aviation, but this is alien to NHS culture. I therefore ask the Minister again: without HSSIB, which independent body will promote a coherent understanding of safety system management in health, and who is to hold the NHS and Government to account for safety failures?