Bernard Jenkin MP: speeches

Speeches

• 5 Dec 2024 · Business of the House · Hansard source

  More

  Will the Leader of the House provide time for a debate about free trade and how best to approach the incoming American Administration to secure a free trade agreement? Will she remind her right hon. and learned Friend the Prime Minister that we already have a free trade agreement with the European Union, but we do not with the United States, which is our single biggest national trading partner? Such an agreement would be greatly to our advantage, rather than aligning with the EU, which might see the United Kingdom subjected to the American tariffs applied to the EU. That would be very much to our disadvantage.

• 2 Dec 2024 · Grenfell Tower Inquiry · Hansard source

  More

  I will certainly give way, because this is a crucial point.

• 2 Dec 2024 · Grenfell Tower Inquiry · Hansard source

  More

  I am not in favour of taking building control away from local authorities, but if we go down the route recommended by the hon. Gentleman, we will not succeed in making buildings safer, not least because of the shortage of capacity in the sector. If it is decided that there cannot be any private sector building control surveyors, there will be even less capacity, and remediating all this will take even longer. An approach that relies entirely on local government or a state body of building control risks worsening a situation that we are already experiencing. The building control workforce is ageing, and recruitment struggles to keep up with demand. Restricting private sector competition would exacerbate these problems, driving skilled professionals not back into local authorities—because they cannot afford them—but into consultancy roles in which they would be working for the construction companies directly, not inspecting what those companies are doing. Rather than narrowing the pool of inspectors, we should be raising the standards of building control across the board. Private sector approved inspectors were already subject to a strict licensing regime through the Construction Industry Council approved inspectors register, with a code of conduct, regular auditing and a complaints process. Moreover, the local authority, not the private sector building control sector, was responsible for the problem at Grenfell. Our recommendation suggests a fully integrated building control service involving both local authorities and registered building control approvers working to common standards within a framework designed to promote continuous improvement. That, I think, is the right answer. To deal with high-rise blocks, multidisciplinary teams would be set up to perform the building control function, recruited on the basis of proven skills and experience from both public and private sectors on a level playing field without the choice being biased in favour of the former. That, I submit, should be the Government’s objective. We welcome the steps taken to require all building inspectors, whether working for local authorities or registered building control approvers, to be individually registered by the BSR, but further steps can and should be taken to drive up standards and to maximise much-needed capacity. However, recommendations 113.37 and 113.38 in the final report of the inquiry could undermine this process. Implicit in recommendation 113.37 is the assumption that it is inappropriate for private sector commercial organisations to be involved in building control work at all, although no evidence is advanced to support that assumption. It is an assumption that many people make, but there is no evidential basis for it. Recommendation 113.37 proposes that there should be a panel to consider the matter, which I hope will happen, but if it decided to ban private sector building control, that would seriously aggravate the capacity problem.

• 2 Dec 2024 · Grenfell Tower Inquiry · Hansard source

  More

  I am sure that may be a very good suggestion, but the point I am making is that we need an apex to our safety system. Whatever else the Government do to remediate the safety system as it exists at the moment, they need an independent safety investigator as the apex of the system, which is like a guardian angel over the whole system. The hon. Member for Kensington and Bayswater said there should be—I think I quote him correctly—an independent oversight body. Well, this is the body he seeks. It would be constantly looking for risks in the system, not just investigating accidents, and following up directly with the Secretary of State to say, “This has not been done.” Crucially, the independence of the bodies is what commands public confidence. They also provide a very significant capability that no other regulator can do—a safety investigation body is not a regulator, of course. They provide a legal safe space where anybody can go and say anything without fear or favour. Witnesses have protection and, if necessary, anonymity, so they can openly speak without fear of retribution of being sued or the words they give in evidence being used against them in court. This creates a culture of openness that accelerates the learning process while maintaining accountability. The introduction of a BSIB would not trespass on any other part of the safety system, such as the HSE or the Building Safety Regulator. It is an essential additional capability which needs to exist, otherwise we do not have that ultimate check over the whole system. Regulators, if necessary, can still run their investigations, as I was saying before. The safe space in the safety investigator does not protect anyone from legal culpability, as we saw when the air accidents investigation branch investigated the Shoreham air crash. It passed a file to the police, because it believed there had been negligence. The pilot was prosecuted. The safe space does not protect someone from wrongdoing.

• 2 Dec 2024 · Grenfell Tower Inquiry · Hansard source

  More

  I pay tribute to the hon. Members for Vauxhall and Camberwell Green (Florence Eshalomi) and for Kensington and Bayswater (Joe Powell), who both spoke very movingly on behalf of the victims of this tragedy who want to see justice done. I venture to suggest that what they want above everything is to know that nothing like this will ever happen again—that whatever happened that night, there will be some glimmer of light at the end of the tunnel and that some good will come of it. I praise the Secretary of State for recognising that it is the system itself that needs the most fundamental reform, and that the failures of individuals—whatever incentives existed and whatever conflicts were unresolved—were system failures. The cultural shift will come about as a result of a systemic review—a system change. Hon. Members might well ask why I am taking an interest in this debate. I do not think I represent any community in a high-rise building with cladding problems in leafy Essex. The only interest I have to declare is that it turned out that my late mother was living in a block with unsafe cladding, so, to a very limited and minor extent, my family are suffering the loss of being unable to sell her flat. That is very small beer, but I put that down as an interest I should declare. I have long taken an interest in safety management systems—ever since I was shadow Secretary of State for Transport at the time of the Ladbroke Grove disaster, when I took an interest in what was being submitted to the inquiry and made a submission of my own, recommending that there should be a systemic approach to the safety system. That resulted in the formation of the rail accident investigation branch of the Department for Transport, with the result that no public inquiry into a rail accident has ever taken place again. Similarly, as Chairman of the Public Administration and Constitutional Affairs Committee, I took a close interest in patient safety because we received the reports from the Parliamentary and Health Service Ombudsman. We had Mid Staffordshire and all the maternity scandals, and we had public inquiry after public inquiry, until somebody suggested that there should be an investigation body accountable and answerable to the Secretary of State to look at why things go wrong in patient care and investigate the causes of incidents—without blame, incidentally—to find out what went wrong in order to make recommendations and put it right. Those are the lessons drawn from all the effective safety regimes in other industries, which should perhaps be applied in this case. I co-authored a submission to the Grenfell inquiry with three others. The first was former Labour Housing and Fire Minister Nick Raynsford, who, at the time, was chairman of the Construction Industry Council approved inspector’s register—CICAIR—which relates to the private sector building control surveyors the hon. Member for Taunton and Wellington (Gideon Amos) spoke about. I will come on to that conflict, which the hon. Gentleman is very concerned about. Another co-author was Kevin Savage, a leading figure in the building control profession; he happens to be a constituent of mine, but that was a coincidence. The third was Keith Conradi, the former chief investigator of the air accidents investigation branch of the Department for Transport—who, as it happens, became the first chief investigator for the Health Services Safety Investigations Body, which, as a result of the inquiry conducted by my Committee, is now a statutory body. He helped set that body up; he is now retired. He helped with the submission. Keith Conradi in particular enabled us to understand building safety management as a safety management system. The events leading to the Grenfell disaster were not just the random failings or crimes of individuals. Where there is culpability, prosecutions must certainly follow, but that is not the main point. Grenfell and previous fires, such as Lakanal House, demonstrated that there was a comprehensive failure of the safety system that should exist to keep buildings as safe as possible. We made our submission in September 2021. After seven years—a disadvantage of public inquiries is that they take a very long time—I was disappointed that the inquiry did not really find time to engage with our recommendations. It did publish our submission, but from the recommendations, I think it is fair to say that a number of issues have been handed back to the Department to be resolved. Paragraph 113.58, entitled “Implementing change”, simply suggests that the London Fire Brigade should “establish effective standing arrangements for collecting, considering and effectively implementing lessons learned from previous incidents”. That is an odd recommendation when we think about it, because the London Fire Brigade was itself very, very severely criticised in the report. That it should be left responsible for marking its own homework and making recommendations about itself underlines that the lacuna in the recommendations is the lack of an investigation body. There were two other paragraphs about building control that I shall come to: paragraphs 113.37 and 113.38. Those were our two urgent priorities to be addressed in our submission. By the way, I am very grateful to the Minister for accepting our request for a meeting, which the Prime Minister promised on the Floor of the House when he announced the outcome of the inquiry. We had a very good meeting with the Minister for Policing, Fire and Crime Prevention. I think she was taken with our recommendations but I think that they fall to the Minister’s Department, so I look forward to meeting him later this week.

• 2 Dec 2024 · Grenfell Tower Inquiry · Hansard source

  More

  I completely agree. The record keeping of airlines, air engine manufacturers and aircraft maintenance companies has to be absolutely meticulous. It is inspected by the CAA, but the information originally comes from inspections conducted by people who are employed by the private sector. I think the hon. Gentleman agrees that we need to tackle the regulation, not indulge in shorthand for saying that anybody making a profit must be guilty. I abhor the idea of people making a profit at the expense of safety, but that is not what happens in other industries. The success of independent accident investigation and safety investigation branches in other sectors speaks for itself. Aviation and rail safety has much fuller public confidence and a lower accident rate under such models, delivering safety improvements faster, more effectively and at lower cost than traditional public inquiries. Reforming building control would ensure that all inspectorates operate under consistent and rigorous oversight, regardless of whether they are in the public or private sectors. Our proposals are not just about learning from the Grenfell tragedy, but about preventing the next disaster. The inquiry shows the systemic failures in building safety and regulation that led to an avoidable tragedy. I regret to have to warn the House that if we do not get this right, and do not finish working on what the inquiry has presented to us and fill in the gaps, there will one day be another Grenfell, just as Grenfell was a repeat of earlier safety failures. We have an obligation to get this right finally for the Grenfell community, for the memory of those who died and for future communities. The Government now have the opportunity to follow up the inquiry, to build on its findings and to put in place institutional arrangements that will embed learning and safety improvement in residential building management in a comprehensive safety system that matches those of other safety-critical industries.

• 2 Dec 2024 · Grenfell Tower Inquiry · Hansard source

  More

  I will be as quick as I can, Madam Deputy Speaker, but I am extremely grateful for the hon. Gentleman’s question, because that was a failure of regulation. The crucial point is this. In other safety-critical industries, such as the civil aviation, rail and marine sectors, there is no ban on the private sector being selected to perform inspections. Employees of airlines, of aircraft manufacturers and of aircraft engine manufacturers perform the inspections, but they are independently regulated, overseen and certified by the Civil Aviation Authority. The fact that they are employed by the airlines or by commercial interests does not make them incapable of objective judgment. The whole aviation sector flies incredibly safely on the basis of aircraft being inspected not by Government inspectors or public employees, but by the private sector.

• 2 Dec 2024 · Grenfell Tower Inquiry · Hansard source

  More

  No, because a regulator is a part of the system, whereas a safety investigation body stands above the system. It is very simple. If you are a regulator, you are a participant. You are capable of making mistakes, and you need to be independently investigated, or checked, to confirm that you are not breaching rules, or failing in some way—through no fault of your own, perhaps. Everyone makes mistakes. Most bad things happen because of human error, not because of bad people doing bad things.

• 2 Dec 2024 · Grenfell Tower Inquiry · Hansard source

  More

  I will give way once more, but I have rather a lot to say and I do not want to take up too much time.

• 2 Dec 2024 · Grenfell Tower Inquiry · Hansard source

  More

  I have got the point. The problem with a public inquiry is that it starts from ground zero. It assembles a group of people who may be expert, but most of the lawyers will not be expert and will have to learn everything from scratch. The advantage of a standing capability is that there are experts who are permanently employed and who really understand everything about building safety, as it would be in this case. There would be human factors analysts, structural engineers, architects—key people with key skills, fully knowledgeable about the safety system that exists. They would start immediately after a tragedy, and they would conclude much more quickly on the basis of much better expertise. I had hoped that the inquiry would adopt this recommendation, as did the Cullen inquiry into Ladbroke Grove, and also the inquiry into offshore safety following the Piper Alpha disaster. It now falls to the Government and Parliament to get this right. The second recommendation in our submission is for a comprehensive reform of building control. Building control is the inspection system which should ensure that building regulations are followed, but Grenfell demonstrated its failure. I accept that there has already been some reform here since we wrote our submission. Much has been said, as we heard earlier, about how private sector building inspectors are endemically conflicted because they are appointed and paid by constructors and others, but that misses a horrible truth about the Grenfell case. Ironically, it was the building control function of a local authority, the Royal Borough of Kensington and Chelsea, that failed so disastrously in Grenfell’s case. Despite that, everyone’s emphasis still seems to be more focused on restricting private sector involvement than on reform of the whole building control sector.

• 2 Dec 2024 · Grenfell Tower Inquiry · Hansard source

  More

  I am very happy to agree with the hon. Gentleman and to welcome the Secretary of State’s announcements today about accelerating all of this and ensuring that action is taken much more quickly. I hope that that will result in much quicker action for his constituents. I was addressing the first major recommendation in our submission to the inquiry, which is that there should be established an independent building safety investigation branch of the Ministry of Housing, Communities and Local Government, reporting directly to the Secretary of State. That removes any possible conflict that investigations have with any other part of the system. The idea that the Health and Safety Executive or the new Building Safety Regulator should be conducting investigations is absolutely fine, but we can never guarantee that they will not come across a failing of their own and be conflicted in that investigation. The public will not have confidence in any investigation that they conduct unless there is an independent investigation that looks at all the elements of the system. The Hackitt review rather overlooked this issue. It failed to underline how future fire incidents would be investigated. This is a gap that is still to be addressed. The current system of resort to public inquiries, as the hon. Member for Vauxhall and Camberwell Green confirmed, takes far too long. I feel for those who were caught up in the tragedy directly. They have waited far too long. An air accident investigation rarely takes more than a few months because the capability exists. In the Grenfell case, the Housing Ombudsman still felt that “residents’ complaints were dismissed and devalued.” I think the inquiry was overwhelmed with so much material and so many different elements. In a way, its terms of reference were too wide to be able to capably come up with a comprehensive set of safety system recommendations. It is also notable that although there was an inquiry into the Lakanal House fire, we had another inquiry into Grenfell. Public inquiries do not seem to resolve problems. A building safety investigation branch would transform that. It would operate independently, modelled on similar bodies for air, marine and rail. These bodies have proven their worth in both the rail and aviation. No public inquiry has taken place into an aviation accident since 1972 and there has not been a public inquiry into a rail accident since the Ladbroke Grove inquiry, because people have confidence in the new independent arrangements. They conduct rapid investigations. They focus not on blame, but on understanding failures and issuing binding recommendations for the future.

• 2 Dec 2024 · Chagos Islands: UK-US Defence Relationship · Hansard source

  More

  First, may I ask, what is the rush? Why is the Minister in such a hurry to get this done? May I suggest that it would be to the Government’s advantage, if their case is so strong, to allow this House to debate the agreed text in public before it is signed? May I also suggest that it stretches incredulity for him to tell the House that there have been no discussions at all with the incoming American Administration? Can he at least tell the House what informal dialogue there is with the incoming Administration about what their view really is? Can he report that to the House, please?

• 26 Nov 2024 · Electricity Grid Upgrades · Hansard source

  More

  Very briefly, the ESO review of the east of England network demonstrated that there is a higher up-front cost for undergrounding of an extra £1 billion from Norwich to Tilbury, but in the longer term it saves money. It is just not correct to say that undergrounding is automatically much more expensive. That is a departmental mantra that is now discredited—just read the ESO and NESO documents.

• 26 Nov 2024 · Electricity Grid Upgrades · Hansard source

  More

  I thank the Minister for his engagement and for the meeting he had with MPs. It would be very kind if he could write to me with the further detail that he has not been able to put on the record today. I would also point out that the only orange flag against ultrahigh voltage direct current undergrounding in the ESO review in the spring was about cable availability. It was not a red flag but an orange flag. With streamlining of the planning process, this could be sped up. It is a possibility, and I hope the Minister will continue dialogue on this issue, because I think he will need this as a solution to the problems he will run into. Motion lapsed (Standing Order. No. 10(6)).

• 26 Nov 2024 · Electricity Grid Upgrades · Hansard source

  More

  I beg to move, That this House has considered the delivery of electricity grid upgrades. It is wonderful to serve under your chairmanship, Sir Christopher. I am grateful to have the opportunity of this debate. I chair a cross-party group of MPs from Essex, Norfolk and Suffolk. We are working to promote the Clean Power 2030 objective, but we want to deliver it more cheaply and quickly, because it is becoming increasingly clear that undergrounding high voltage direct current cables is the way forward for the great national grid upgrade. Undergrounding will carry public consent and will avoid delays, and will therefore be cheaper as well as better for the countryside. Relying on new lines of pylons for the entire upgrade, as proposed, will delay decarbonising the national grid, because they arouse such hostility and will end up costing more because of the delays. This debate is therefore not just local. Decarbonisation is one of the great national challenges that the United Kingdom faces. How it is achieved, how quickly and at what cost is an issue of national importance. The National Energy System Operator’s “Clean Power 2030” report is welcome, but it highlights the scale of the challenge. NESO is clear that public support is critical to achieving those ambitions, but its response to the Secretary of State in that document warns that losing public consent is a significant threat to delivering projects on time and within budget. Fintan Slye, the executive director of NESO, made the importance of engaging community support clear on Radio 4 when the report was launched on 5 November: “I am acutely conscious that building infrastructure, pylons, does impose on people and their locality.” He also emphasised that “it is really important…that we bring people and communities with us on this journey”, and that the transition to net zero only works “if we can bring society with us”. He is clearly saying that infrastructure solutions must align with community priorities. The challenge to install new capacity is enormous. The UK has around 14 GW of offshore wind capacity but, to meet future energy demands, that capacity will need to grow nearly threefold by 2030 and continue expanding so it can handle 125 GW of wind by 2050. That is a much faster rate of investment than we have seen so far, but projects for 2030 are already falling behind. Given the strength of public opposition to overhead pylons, it is highly unlikely that any pylon proposals will be delivered on time. The “Clean Power 2030” report sets out how delays are already affecting key projects such as the one from Norwich to Tilbury, which is 184 km of pylons across Norfolk, Suffolk and Essex. NESO says that it will now be delayed by a year to 2031, and that delay is very costly. NESO estimates that the cost of delay is £4 billion a year—far higher than previous estimates—mainly because of the constraint payments that have to be paid to wind power generators. Given the public opposition to the Norwich to Tilbury project, the funds being amassed for legal challenges, and the opportunity for judicial review at least twice during the process, it is likely to be delayed for far longer than just one year. That risk is likely to apply to the other 17 pylon schemes proposed in the great grid upgrade. Nevertheless, National Grid plans to use overhead pylons as the primary infrastructure for the massive reinforcement of the national grid. I put it to the Minister that the current concept is not deliverable. The implication is clear. The way to secure public consent is by pursuing strategies that respect and protect local communities and what they value—their property, their livelihoods and the countryside.

• 26 Nov 2024 · Electricity Grid Upgrades · Hansard source

  More

  My right hon. Friend is completely right. It affects other colleagues, including some present here today representing, for example, Lincolnshire. We know that there are concerns in north Wales, and on the east coast of Scotland in the area represented by my hon. Friend the Member for West Aberdeenshire and Kincardine (Andrew Bowie), who is representing the Opposition Front Bench. This is a very widespread problem. Undergrounding HVDC cables is not only technically viable, but the most sensible and sustainable solution for the future of our energy network—that is, if we cannot have it offshore. I acknowledge that quite a lot is going offshore, but it rubs salt in the wound that other areas, from Scotland to north-east England, have the luxury of offshore schemes, but we in East Anglia do not. Our countryside is not worth the investment.

• 26 Nov 2024 · Electricity Grid Upgrades · Hansard source

  More

  The hon. Member for East Thanet (Ms Billington) made the relevant point that there are balancing factors. First, once cables are undergrounded, they are maintenance free, but pylons require constant maintenance, which therefore adds to their carbon footprint. Everybody has seen that. Secondly, salt marshes are very often Ramsar sites and migration bird sites, and we do not want overhead power lines interfering with the migration of birds. We often see that scores of swans have been killed on power lines because they are not very good at navigating around these things.

• 26 Nov 2024 · Electricity Grid Upgrades · Hansard source

  More

  What is interesting about Germany is that its presumption was in favour of undergrounding, so the idea that that is a great big experiment and we do not know what it means is incorrect. There is plenty of expertise in Europe. When we look at cost comparisons between undergrounding and pylons, it also depends on the territory we are dealing with. Our problem is lack of community consent, as Fintan Slye, the executive director of the National Energy System Operator, rightly says. It is a question of swings and roundabouts, but in the case of Norwich to Tilbury, the consequence of delays from trying to run roughshod over the very widespread and well-funded public opposition will be to put up the cost, which makes the cost of undergrounding advantageous over pylons. That is my point. I am not necessarily disagreeing with the principle of what the hon. Member for Bournemouth East (Tom Hayes) says, but undergrounding DC cables has great advantages. The latest estimated cost of just one year’s delay for Norwich to Tilbury is four times more than the additional £1 billion cost of undergrounding HVDC— I hope the hon. Gentleman was listening to that: £4 billion a year for delay against £1 billion extra for DC undergrounding. I think that puts this into the field of a no-brainer. Why would we spend all that money fighting through the courts for a very unpopular scheme when we could save time and legal expense by going for a different method? In the National Energy System Operator’s East Anglia network study, which was published earlier this year, undergrounding HVDC was set out as alternative option 8. The great advantage of undergrounding HVDC is that there will be far less public resistance. Moreover, as I have said, the planning procedures could be streamlined— as recommended to the Government recently by Charles Banner—to conform to the regime for installing new major water pipes. If we had the same planning regime for underground cables as we did for water pipes, we could speed up the process for undergrounding cables. Underground HVDC offers a scalable, future-proof solution that can be delivered with far less environmental impact, with public support and much more quickly. Schemes without pylons that are already planned by National Grid—for example, in north-east England—are being delivered without public opposition or long delays, which seems to be an enormous advantage for the Government’s objective of decarbonising the grid. There is no comparable resistance from campaign groups, which is clear evidence that underground HVDC gets public support, making it a far more practical and feasible solution.

• 26 Nov 2024 · Electricity Grid Upgrades · Hansard source

  More

  Does the hon. Lady acknowledge it was the previous Government who commissioned the Banner report on streamlining the system? Let us approach this on a bipartisan basis—we are all on the same side, trying to achieve the great upgrade of our electricity grid—and stop scoring party political points, shall we?

• 26 Nov 2024 · Electricity Grid Upgrades · Hansard source

  More

  I accept that the present Government have inherited a planning system and a philosophy of upgrading the national grid that is out of date. When we were in Government, we were very slow to recognise that such a big, strategic upgrade needed a proper strategy. We started moving towards holistic network design. We commissioned a report from Charles Banner KC to look at streamlining the planning process—I will come on to putting that streamlining in place—and I very much welcome that the Government have commissioned a spatial review of the entire network, which should have been done years ago. I think we were blind to the failings of the structure inherited from the Electricity Act 1989; we should have moved much sooner. That report should make it easier for the Government to change the out-of-date policy of a presumption in favour of pylons, which we said in our manifesto that we would review. I am very happy for the Minister to blame the previous Government for the difficulties he is facing and to change the policy accordingly, but it will be very odd if he comes to the Dispatch Box to defend what the previous Government were doing, after what the hon. Member for Camborne and Redruth (Perran Moon) just said—but I suspect that that is what he will do. I put this issue forward in a bipartisan manner. We should all be able to agree that the great grid upgrade is not going fast enough, and that we need to streamline the planning process and speed up delivery. However, we also need to mend our ideas about how we deliver it, because as I have said, undergrounding high voltage direct current cables is not only technically viable, but the most sensible and sustainable solution for the future of our entire energy network.

• 26 Nov 2024 · Electricity Grid Upgrades · Hansard source

  More

  I am grateful for the hon. Lady’s intervention. As the new Liberal Democrat MP for Chelmsford, she demonstrates that this is a cross-party campaign, supported by people who are as committed to decarbonisation as anything else. As has been said, there is no comparable resistance from campaign groups in the north-east of England. That is clear evidence that underground HVDC receives public support, making it a far more practical and feasible solution. In East Anglia, the opposition to overhead pylons is not subsiding; it is growing and becoming more intense. Campaign groups are united in their resistance to this outdated approach to infrastructure. The Government, including the Minister, have made it clear that local campaigners will not be able to block their nationally important mission to build clean energy infrastructure across the UK. We are not blocking; we are trying to help. In my constituency, one local group wrote to National Grid, in response to a consultation, saying: “By all means, build closer to our houses and shorten the route, just put it underground.” That demonstrates that communities are not opposed to infrastructure or the objectives behind it. They are just against bad decisions to achieve it. I mentioned streamlining the planning system to bring it into line with what is required of water companies laying major water pipes. There is a massive underground Anglian water pipe being installed from Bury St Edmunds, across my constituency to Abberton reservoir in the constituency of my right hon. Friend the Member for Witham (Priti Patel). That includes digging a trench through the sensitive landscape of Dedham vale across the Stour valley, almost exactly where the pylons or alternating current undergrounding will go. Nobody is objecting to that underground scheme. I have not had a whimper of complaint about that pipe going in. Why stick to pylons when that method is slower and delays will make it far more expensive? The Government may argue, as the hon. Member for Chelmsford (Marie Goldman) mentioned, that community benefits will compensate for the disruption to affected areas caused by pylons, but those ideas will not buy off the hostility to pylons and other unwanted infrastructure. Solutions that respect communities and their interests, as well as deliver for our energy network, are the future. For Norwich to Tilbury, the onshore undergrounding HVDC proposal will cause significantly less environmental damage than overhead cables and AC undergrounding. Let me expand on that. For a start, the entire route would be underground, not just through the sensitive landscapes. The cable trenches required for undergrounding HVDC cables are far narrower than for AC cables. AC undergrounding is proposed for the area of outstanding natural beauty, the special landscape area that I share with my hon. Friend the Member for South Suffolk (James Cartlidge). That requires a 120-metre-wide trench, because AC cables need to be spaced out. That means a very wide swathe of destruction, as that vast trench is dug and refilled, and everything in its path is destroyed. It is extremely expensive to avoid going through archaeological sites. The Stour valley is an archaeological site of the same importance as Stonehenge. If there had been stones in the Stour valley, we would have a Stonehenge, because there is evidence of a wooden henge. Ancient tribes lived there in prehistoric times and it was a significant area throughout Roman times and the middle ages. All of that is at risk, in addition to the massive destruction of trees, ancient woodland and hedges, in order to install AC underground cables. I am all for mitigating the effect of pylons by undergrounding, but let us not kid ourselves that it is a solution for the most sensitive areas of landscape. It is also much more expensive to underground AC cables than DC cables. I would very much like the proposal to underground cables to be extended to other areas, such as the Roman River valley, which is technically not in the special landscape area but is just as special. The Government have an obligation to respect sensitive countryside, so that could be another cause for a judicial review. A much better solution would be to underground DC, not AC, cables through that sensitive landscape. Another reason why this proposal is so advantageous is that offshore DC to onshore AC requires huge DC-to-AC converters at the cable end points. When DC current generated by a wind farm lands somewhere such as Friston in the constituency of Suffolk Coastal, there has to be a massive DC-to-AC converter for it to go into the AC grid network. If we started building a DC grid network—for example, if energy ran all the way from Norwich to Tilbury on a DC line—all those connections could go straight into the DC network, avoiding the need for extra infrastructure. Incidentally, that would apply to the interconnectors for energy coming from the continent. Electricity arriving from the proposed Tarchon Energy interconnector would be DC, so we would not need a massive DC-to-AC converter at Ardley in my constituency; we could have just one DC-to-AC converter at the point at which the electricity needs to be converted to AC much nearer London—at Tilbury or even the Isle of Grain. It is clear that HVDC is right for many parts of the United Kingdom, not just East Anglia. Wind power stations are increasingly located along the coast or just off our coastline, and a DC transmission network would reflect that. Converting power to AC at landfall is inefficient and duplicative. A properly designed onshore and offshore HVDC network would reduce the infrastructure needed, cut down on converter stations and enable us to focus on building for real demand, rather than just peak production. Globally, HVDC is becoming the standard for modern energy networks. By investing in HVDC now, the UK can maintain its leadership in renewable energy, create jobs and develop skills that will keep us competitive. The alternative is clinging to outdated, mid-20th century technology that will leave us falling behind other countries. Germany will not give up HVDC undergrounding altogether, but that is the presumption in our planning system, which I suggest the Government need to revise. The Government must show decisive leadership and embrace an HVDC future. This is about more than just reducing costs and avoiding delays; it is about ensuring we meet our renewable energy goals in a way that works for communities, the environment, the economy and the planet.

• 26 Nov 2024 · Electricity Grid Upgrades · Hansard source

  More

  Here we go.

• 25 Nov 2024 · Speaker’s Statement · Hansard source

  More

  Further to that point of order, Mr Speaker. I first collided—if that is the right word—with John Prescott when I was shadow Secretary of State for Transport as he ploughed on with his integrated transport plan, which was one of the centrepieces of the first Blair Administration. I found that some of my colleagues tried to treat John Prescott as a bit of a joke. That was a mistake. Yes, we teased him about his two Jags, and he rather loved that, but he was utterly sincere in what he did, passionate, and pretty brutal with his Opposition opponents when he felt he was on top. We clashed again over the proposals for regional assemblies. Great campaigner though he was, he lost the north-east referendum, and I do not think he ever really forgave me for that. When required, however, John could be a great statesman. He was right to insist on a public inquiry into the Marchioness disaster, which the previous Government had refused to hold, and he was right immediately to announce an inquiry into the Paddington rail disaster as soon as it happened. I recall getting one of the most surprising telephone calls of my political life when, having told the Conservative conference that he was right to call that public inquiry and that we should wait for its outcome, I got a call from him to thank me for that bit of bipartisanship—something even he was capable of when the cameras were not looking. I pay tribute to John for that, because the Cullen inquiry came up with a completely new safety regime for rail, including a rail accident investigation branch for the Department for Transport. We have not had a public inquiry into a rail accident ever since, because of the safety regime that he implemented following the inquiry. Every survivor of the Paddington rail crash and subsequent rail crashes is grateful to him for what he did for passenger safety on our railways. If for nothing else, we should remember him for that. I send my best wishes to John’s family and to all his friends and colleagues on the Government Benches at this sad time.

• 25 Nov 2024 · Israel-Gaza Conflict: Arrest Warrants · Hansard source

  More

  Can we be absolutely clear about what the Government are saying? It seems that the Government are not saying that there would be an automatic arrest should Benjamin Netanyahu arrive in this country, but they are saying that there would due process. Can the Minister confirm that “customary international law…does not permit the arrest or delivery of the serving Prime Minister of a non-State party to the ICC”? So the Minister is committing himself to due process but not to arrest. Am I correct in my understanding?

• 20 Nov 2024 · Defence Programmes Developments · Hansard source

  More

  What does this announcement tell us about how the strategic defence review is going? One lesson of the Ukraine war is that old kit can be very useful. As my right hon. Friend the Member for Chingford and Woodford Green (Sir Iain Duncan Smith) said, America’s airfields and dockyards are stacked full of old kit for future contingencies. We are throwing away capabilities that are only out of commission because there was not enough money. Now the Secretary of State is telling us that there is probably even less money. Please will he not come to this House and pretend he is just clearing out an old cupboard of rubbish that everybody had forgotten about and that the defence chiefs are hopping up and down with delight at his clearing out.