Ben Obese-Jecty MP: speeches

Speeches

• 4 Mar 2026 · Ministry of Defence · Hansard source

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  Does the hon. Member agree that the very best advert for the Typhoon is its ability to engage in air-to-air combat, and that this week’s confirmed kills by the Qatari air force of two Iranian Sukhoi Su-24s is a fantastic advert for just how lethal the Typhoon remains in this day and age, despite only being a gen 4 fighter?

• 4 Mar 2026 · China: Foreign Interference Arrests · Hansard source

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  Will the Security Minister confirm whether the partner of the sitting Labour MP arrested on espionage charges of spying for China had a parliamentary pass?

• 4 Mar 2026 · NATO and the High Arctic · Hansard source

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  The hon. and gallant Member is making a hoofing speech. He mentioned the Greenland-Iceland gap. We have committed to Operation Firecrest later this year, which will see the carrier strike group go to the High North as a deterrent against the Russian northern fleet breaking out of the Kola peninsula and moving across the Barents sea and into the open ocean. With the emergence of the conflict in the middle east, a potential commitment to a post-conflict force in Ukraine, a commitment to troops in Norway and Operation Firecrest, does he share my concern that we may have to make some very difficult decisions about how much capability we are able to deploy to ensure that our interests are looked after across all those fronts?

• 3 Mar 2026 · Spring Forecast · Hansard source

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  We have heard several different discussions about defence today, but may I remind the Chancellor that yesterday morning an Iranian Shahed drone struck the runway at RAF Akrotiri? It was not taken out by any counter-drone technology—technology that was due to be included in the defence investment plan that the Minister for the Armed Forces informed me would be announced in autumn 2025. It is now spring 2026 and, despite the fact that we have had a Budget and now a spring forecast since the autumn, we have still not seen the defence investment plan. Will the Chancellor assure us that all the recommendations from the strategic defence review that the Government have pledged to deliver will be delivered in the defence investment plan when it is announced?

• 2 Mar 2026 · Middle East · Hansard source

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  I would like to come back to the drone attack on RAF Akrotiri and the alarming ease with which the Iranian regime was able to penetrate our defences and strike the airfield. That very much suggests that it has little by way of counter-uncrewed aerial systems capability and nothing by way of No. 2 Counter UAS Wing squadrons to deter such attacks. Will the Prime Minister confirm what type of drone struck the airfield? Will he also confirm the origin of that drone? Did it fly from Iran all the way across Israeli airspace to strike Cyprus, or did it come from Hezbollah in Lebanon? Given that we have been attacking Daesh targets this year via Operation Shader, will he strike back at Hezbollah if it proves that the drone came from Lebanon?

• 2 Mar 2026 · EHCP Backlog: Cambridgeshire · Hansard source

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  3. What steps she is taking to help tackle the education, health and care plan backlog in Cambridgeshire.

• 2 Mar 2026 · EHCP Backlog: Cambridgeshire · Hansard source

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  The EHCP backlog in Cambridgeshire is a significant challenge. I appreciate what the Minister said about the help that is currently in place. Having read the SEND White Paper, I am struggling to see where the immediate impact will come. I had a letter from a constituent at the weekend who thanked me for helping her child get an EHCP after 74 weeks, and I can give examples that stretch up to nearly two years from an EHCP needs assessment being signed off. I am due to meet Cambridgeshire county council on Friday to discuss this issue in more detail. What advice can the Minister give it on how the SEND White Paper will help it to get on top of the EHCP backlog?

• 25 Feb 2026 · Ukraine · Hansard source

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  When will this House see the force structure of the British component of Multinational Force Ukraine so that we can properly scrutinise it?

• 25 Feb 2026 · Ukraine · Hansard source

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  As he marked the fourth anniversary of the conflict in Ukraine, following Russia’s illegal invasion, President Zelensky said that Putin “has already started” world war three. He went on: “The question is how much territory he will be able to seize and how to stop him…Russia wants to impose on the world a different way of life and change the lives people have chosen for themselves.” It is humbling to address the House as we enter the fifth year of this conflict—seemingly a conflict without end; peace talks are faltering and at an impasse. The last four years of conflict in Ukraine have been savage, unrelenting and at a level of total war that we have been fortunate enough to become unacquainted with in this country during of our lifetime. The toll that has taken on the civilian population has been horrific: there have been over 15,000 Ukrainian civilian deaths, thousands more displaced, and an entire population whose lives have been put on hold, forever changed. We have seen lives lost, families devastated and future hopes and dreams shattered, yet Ukraine has held firm against the Russian onslaught. It did in 2022 as it does today. The Government have remained steadfast in their support for Ukraine, and that same support was extended when they were in opposition. When we were in government, we stood four-square behind Ukraine from the very start, and we were the first nation to openly back the Ukrainian forces with weapons. This House has been united in its support, and that support has been vital. Not only is it there to protect Ukrainian sovereignty in the face of such flagrant disregard for international law, but it represents the FLOT—the forward line of own troops—for the defence of Europe. We have all seen the changes that this war has brought: a new cold war—maybe even a phoney war—and a generational leap in the nature of warfare in just four years that has catapulted drones from a nerdy hobby to a horrific “Black Mirror” reimagining of modern warfare.

• 25 Feb 2026 · Ukraine · Hansard source

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  I thank the hon. Member for his contribution. I hope he has not stolen a look at my speech, as I am about to come on to just that point, but I agree with him. There is potentially a trade-off to be made between putting troops on the ground in Ukraine and in the High North. There is a possibility that doing both those things to the sufficient level that we require may prove too much of a challenge. We are committed in Estonia, just as we are to be committed in Ukraine. It has been reported that our commitment to a post-ceasefire force would be around 7,500 troops. That is smaller than our peak commitment in Afghanistan, but that reflects the difference in posture. While 7,500 does not sound like a lot—only circa 10% of the current Army—it does not reflect the fact that three times that number is needed to sustain the deployment. By the time of a second six-month rotation through Ukraine, we would have 7,500 who have just returned from the first tour, the second 7,500 currently doing the job and the next 7,500 training to go. That is 22,000-odd from a field army of, say, 40,000, meaning that over half the Army will be committed to manning the eastern flank deterrence line. It was reported in The Telegraph yesterday that multiple members of the coalition of the willing have privately conceded that their contributions to the post-ceasefire peacekeeping mission depend on permission from Vladimir Putin. Could the Minister in his summing-up confirm whether every country in the coalition of the willing has committed to deploying troops to the peacekeeping mission in Ukraine alongside us? If we include the aforementioned battlegroup in Estonia, that is another 3,000 troops operating on the same cycle. If we factor in ongoing commitments, such as NATO’s Allied Reaction Force special operations component, which we lead for the next year, the Falkland Islands Roulement Infantry Company and the Resident Infantry Battalion in Dhekelia, as well as the process of retraining and rearming for the plethora of planned new capabilities, the number of personnel quickly adds up under the stacked readiness of multiple commitments. With the Prime Minister announcing our commitment to Operation Firecrest this year with the carrier strike group, as well as the expanded Royal Marines commitment in Norway, suddenly our armed forces are on the cusp of looking overstretched, and doubly so in the event that anything else comes into scope or goes hot. I highlight these challenges to draw out the complexity of the broader strategic issue. The only way this level of operational commitment will be feasible is if, like our European allies, we properly fund defence. That is why we have called on the Government to go faster and spend 3% of GDP on defence by the end of this Parliament to ensure that they can deliver the 62 recommendations in the strategic defence review that they have already pledged to deliver. But the defence investment plan itself is six months late, strongly suggesting that the plan as it stands is unaffordable. Can the Minister confirm that the plan will finally be published before the Easter recess? It is imperative that the plan addresses the growing capability gaps as the warfare spiral develops in eastern Europe. In conclusion, “I believe we are on a collision course with a Russia that is on a war footing, that is replenishing its lost equipment and that is re-arming fast… Putin will only take us seriously when he sees our factories producing at wartime rates. And that’s why I believe so strongly in the need to rebuild our own national arsenal and reconnect society with its Armed Forces… The urgency could not be clearer. Just ask yourself: If you knew now that our soldiers would be involved in large-scale combat operations in 2027, what would you be doing differently—and why are you not doing it?” Those are not my words, but the words of the Chief of the General Staff, General Sir Roly Walker. He said them yesterday. As we mark the fourth anniversary of Vladimir Putin’s needless and tragic war, I am sure everyone in this House would agree with me when I say that I hope we are not here to mark a fifth. Slava Ukraini.

• 25 Feb 2026 · Ukraine · Hansard source

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  I wholeheartedly concur. The Iranians, in particular, are global leaders in exporting terror, backing, as they do, the Houthis, Hezbollah and Hamas. Their provision of the Shahed drone to Russia and the bombardment that the Ukrainians face lead to a terrible toll and are a terrible result. Anyone who has seen any of the innumerable videos of first-person-view drone footage of soldiers being stalked and killed by drones cannot fail to appreciate the new reality of modern warfare. On the point made by the hon. Member for Cowdenbeath and Kirkcaldy (Melanie Ward), the last year alone has seen Russia increase its use of drones by 200%. Such a capability sea change cannot be overstated. Four years into Putin’s three-day special military operation, Russia has sustained a staggering 1.2 million casualties, 325,000 of them fatalities. That is fast approaching the number of soldiers that we lost in the entirety of the second world war. The majority of casualties—reportedly 70% to 80%—are now caused by drones. It is reported that Russia can no longer recruit new soldiers at the rate that they are being lost, and in the past fortnight, Ukraine has liberated 300 square kilometres in its southern counter-offensive. We are four years into this conflict, and the remarkable bravery of the Ukrainian armed forces remains undiminished. Yes, we have supported them with matériel, intelligence, rapid procurement and funding, but the human sacrifice required to win, or crucially not lose, a war of sovereignty and survival is something that we perhaps do not address enough. Fifty-five thousand Ukrainian soldiers have been killed since 2022—the equivalent of more than two thirds of our regular Army. From the contributions this afternoon, it is clear that Members on both sides of this House want an end to this conflict, and an end on Ukraine’s terms—one that does not see them acquiesce to the Russian threat that it has given so much to keep at bay. In the broader context of European security, what comes next? There are significant lessons to be learned from the conflict in Ukraine. No war has been as visually documented at such close quarters as this. The Lessons Exploitation Centre at the Land Warfare Centre will have been busy shaping our future tactics. An example of that is the recently released outcome of NATO’s Exercise Hedgehog 2025 in Estonia, in which a team of just 10, training against experienced Ukrainian drone operators, were able to render two battalions combat-ineffective in just half a day. We are through the looking glass. Last Saturday, the Defence Secretary wrote a piece for The Telegraph in which he explicitly stated: “I want to be the Defence Secretary who deploys British troops to Ukraine–because this will mean that the war is finally over.” But to quote Winston Churchill, that will simply be “the end of the beginning.” The Minister does not need me to tell him that the ceasefire will simply facilitate a reconstitution of Russian forces. To use an old adage, Russia will trade space for time. When it returns to its barracks in the Leningrad military district, it will be based only a few minutes from the Estonian border. Pskov, home of the 76th Guards Air Assault Division and the 2nd Spetsnaz Brigade, is just 35 km away. The NATO Forward Land Forces already man the line in Estonia via Operation Cabrit—one of our ongoing commitments. The battlegroup deployed there serves as a deterrent to further Russian expansionism and belligerence. No longer just a strategic tripwire, it is now a force equipped with a capability in Project Asgard that presents a lethal recce-strike system—a force whose very presence provides Estonia with the security of the NATO umbrella; a force so vital that its ongoing presence is apparently written into Estonia’s defence strategy.

• 25 Feb 2026 · Diego Garcia and British Indian Ocean Territory · Hansard source

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  I will push back slightly on what the Minister is saying. As we know, the discussion between the UK and the Government of Mauritius around the sovereignty of the Chagos islands started in January 2009 under the previous Labour Government. That was confirmed to me by the Minister for the Overseas Territories, so he might want to bear that in mind. The question I want to ask is about Jonathan Powell, the National Security Adviser who, prior to being National Security Adviser was the Prime Minister’s special envoy to the British Indian Ocean Territories—and still is today. Prior to being appointed on 6 September, he conducted meetings with the FCDO. He confirmed that he had already seen the deal prior to being in post and was then given a hard copy of the deal when he reached Port Louis. When did he attend Port Louis? Was it prior to his appointment as the PM’s special envoy? What security clearance did he have when he saw the Chagos deal for the first time?

• 25 Feb 2026 · Diego Garcia and British Indian Ocean Territory · Hansard source

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  On a point of order, Madam Deputy Speaker. On 9 February I asked a named day question about the role of Jonathan Powell in the Chagos islands deal, which was due for answer on 12 February. As of now, 25 February, it has still not been responded to by the Government. How can I best encourage the Government to produce timely and accurate answers to named day written questions on this subject?

• 23 Feb 2026 · Labour Together and APCO Worldwide: Cabinet Office Review · Hansard source

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  Far be it for me to insert myself into the internecine warfare fast breaking out on the Government Benches, but the Minister pushed back when it was suggested that he had received donations from Labour Together. His entry in the Register of Members’ Financial Interests shows £63,000-plus of donations in kind with regards to both his time in opposition and his time in government. With that in mind, if the Public Administration and Constitutional Affairs Committee launches an inquiry into Labour Together, will the Minister and his Department co-operate with it?

• 23 Feb 2026 · Schools White Paper: Every Child Achieving and Thriving · Hansard source

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  It was not lost on me this morning that the Secretary of State announced the SEND White Paper in Peterborough, just down the road from my constituency of Huntingdon. It comes under Cambridgeshire county council, which has a terrible record of delivering EHCPs. I have spoken to dozens of schools and hundreds of parents in my constituency who are beside themselves at the length of time it is taking Cambridgeshire county council to deliver EHCPs. Not only is it not within the 20-week statutory timeframe; it sometimes takes 20 months-plus. Can the Secretary of State reassure my constituents that these plans will immediately address those concerns about the delivery of EHCPs and make a real difference to the children who are waiting for those much-needed plans?

• 23 Feb 2026 · Oxford-Cambridge Growth Corridor · Hansard source

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  Defence will be a key pillar of the Oxford-Cambridge growth corridor. In my Huntingdon constituency, we are lucky to have RAF Wyton. It is in the middle of a very ambitious project, Project Fairfax, which will use surplus Ministry of Defence land. The MOD signed a memorandum of understanding with Huntingdonshire district council last year, and Homes England is a key part of that. Will the Minister meet me and the chief executive of Huntingdonshire district council to discuss how we can best supercharge these growth plans and make good progress on them?

• 12 Feb 2026 · Lord Mandelson: Government Response to Humble Address Motion · Hansard source

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  Whose fault is that?

• 12 Feb 2026 · Lord Mandelson: Government Response to Humble Address Motion · Hansard source

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  The issues surrounding Lord Mandelson and Lord Doyle and their proximity to paedophiles are now intertwined. On 2 January 2026, I tabled a written question, asking the Cabinet Office to publish the findings of the internal investigation that took place prior to the granting of the peerage for Lord Doyle. That investigation was carried out by former chief of staff Morgan McSweeney, but also by his deputy Jill Cuthbertson, who is now interim chief of staff. An investigation is currently under way, but there has already been an investigation. Given that this issue has already been investigated, will the Government commit to publishing the findings of that investigation?

• 12 Feb 2026 · Business of the House · Hansard source

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  The town of Huntingdon in my constituency has a rich cultural and historical heritage and is the birthplace of Oliver Cromwell—one of my predecessors in this House. It is the former home of the diarist Samuel Pepys, it is the first place in the UK where chocolate ice cream appeared on these shores, and it is also the birthplace of the sandwich—something very close to my heart. Because of this cultural heritage, we are putting the town forward to be the town of culture in 2028. I thank Paul Sweeney and the business improvement district team in Huntingdon for their hard work in putting forward a bid, not only to celebrate our cultural heritage but to build a legacy going forward. Will the Leader of the House join me in championing Huntingdon as the very best opportunity for Huntingdonshire to cement a town of culture for 2028?

• 11 Feb 2026 · Police Grant Report · Hansard source

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  The Minister mentions the factors that will go into the police allocation formula. That formula is currently based on the 2014 population size, and density and sparsity figures from 2001. However, since that formula first came into effect, an additional 300,000 people now live in Cambridgeshire. Will that be factored into the formula? From what date will the population data be taken? Will it be the 2021 census or the 2011 census?

• 11 Feb 2026 · Police Grant Report · Hansard source

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  The police are required to pick up the slack in so many different aspects of this, and I do not think that that is factored into or reflected in the way we are looking at the force structures. I hope that it will be factored into the review of the forces. Coming back to rural crime, in my constituency of Huntingdon, Cambridgeshire constabulary has an effective and successful rural crime action team, but they are only 14 strong and cover a huge rural area. This must be factored into discussions and not risk being lost in the maelstrom of big-ticket policing items brought under national control and a myopic focus on urban and neighbourhood policing. It is my understanding that the rural crime action team, who specialise in dealing with machinery theft, GPS theft and hare coursing, have been moved from being operational support unit officers to being designated as neighbourhood policing officers. They are specialist officers required to do a specialist role. They are not bobbies on the beat in the villages around my constituency and they are never going to be that, so it is annoying to see that they are being restructured in that way. Redesignating rural crime specialist officers as neighbourhood officers to balance the books and tick an administrative box is not going to cut it. Cambridgeshire constabulary proved itself to be an effective force with the swift manner in which it neutralised the assailant following the Huntingdon train attack last November. Speaking to my local officers, I know that there are huge inconsistencies in the way in which each force is managed, and I ask the Policing Minister for clarity on how those discrepancies will be harmonised intra-force. We know that overtime calculations for police officers lack consistency from force to force, as does the application of the adjustment bank for outstanding hours owed. These issues are affecting officers on the ground. Not every issue in policing is an operational resourcing question. Much of the pressure officers are experiencing is due to administrative inconsistencies, from pay inequality, given the south-east allowance, to officers wearing body armour that is past its expiration date because of failings in the procurement system—a tragic front-page scandal waiting to happen. To conclude, I ask the Policing Minister to consider: ringfenced funding for rural crime action teams in the new force structure so that rural crime can be eradicated once and for all; pay disparities, particularly in regard to eligibility for the south-east allowance, the application of overtime eligibility and the management of the adjustment bank; and consortium contracting, and particularly the risk posed by reliance on one make of vehicle, including the use of Volvos by any force, given that Volvo is now owned by the Chinese Zhejiang Geely Holding Group. I believe I have a meeting scheduled with the Policing Minister, and I would be keen to continue the discussion around these issues with her on behalf of the officers in my county who have received a raw deal for far too long.

• 11 Feb 2026 · Police Grant Report · Hansard source

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  On that point, will the Minister give way?

• 11 Feb 2026 · Police Grant Report · Hansard source

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  I appreciate the Minister’s intervention. I understood that point, but my point was that those 2,400 officers do not even make up the 2,611 by which the Government have already reduced the number of neighbourhood police officers by recounting the officers that we have.

• 11 Feb 2026 · Police Grant Report · Hansard source

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  Smoke and mirrors, indeed. Last month’s police reform White Paper does little to clear up any confusion. The Association of Police and Crime Commissioners said: “We are aware the cost of police reform has been estimated at around £500 million. While the Government has announced that £119 million will be allocated to the reform programme in 2026/27”. Those police and crime commissioners have been scrapped, and in 2028 police governance will be transferred to strategic authority mayors or policing and crime boards. While the White Paper mentions that the latter will be expanded to reflect larger forces in the future, it does not explain how strategic authority mayors’ responsibilities would be restructured.

• 11 Feb 2026 · Police Grant Report · Hansard source

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  I agree with my right hon. Friend, and I hope that that will clarified by the Minister who winds up, or through further clarification of the White Paper. I have read the White Paper, and it currently is not explained. We have also received little explanation about how the independent review of force structures will work; who the independent chair will be; when and how they will be appointed; when the terms of reference will be published; and whether we as Members of Parliament will be included within the scope of the “policing stakeholders” referenced in the White Paper. Some clarity regarding the process behind such seismic and sweeping changes desperately needs to be outlined. There are serious concerns that the new model for policing will not address some of the key resource requirements for rural forces, instead seeing cities and larger towns taking up an ever-growing share of the available resources. Last week I spoke to local National Farmers Union members in my constituency. For the second year running, concerns regarding rural crime, specifically hare coursing, were raised by local farmers. This is a topic that we rarely hear spoken about in this Chamber or by the Government. It is incomprehensible to many that idyllic rural locations could find themselves in the grip of violent and organised crime, but that is the situation that so many find themselves in.