Andrew Murrison MP: speeches

Speeches

• 24 Feb 2025 · Ukraine · Hansard source

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  Does the Foreign Secretary agree that the 2.5% of GDP ship has now sailed, and that we and our allies have to find the resources to spend 3% within a recognisable timeframe? When he is in Washington this week, will he discuss with his interlocuters how the billions of pounds he proposes to give Mauritius for taking on the Chagos Islands could be better served by being devoted to building and re-equipping our armed forces?

• 10 Feb 2025 · Topical Questions · Hansard source

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  Last week, the Gurkha class of 2025 proudly attested in Pokhara. There is one part of the British armed forces that does not yet have women: the Brigade of Gurkhas. Will Ministers do what—sadly, and not for the want of trying—I failed to do, and rectify that omission?

• 10 Feb 2025 · Inheritance Tax Relief: Farms · Hansard source

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  I hope that colleagues who want to speak are on my list. If you are on the list, that is great, but you must still bob; otherwise, I will assume that you no longer wish to speak.

• 10 Feb 2025 · Inheritance Tax Relief: Farms · Hansard source

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  Colleagues, we have some time available, so I am prepared to give a bit of latitude for the Front Bench speeches. I would suggest an indicative 15 minutes, starting with the Liberal Democrat spokesperson, Sarah Dyke.

• 10 Feb 2025 · Inheritance Tax Relief: Farms · Hansard source

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  The shadow Minister will know that is not a point or order either, but his remarks are on the record.

• 10 Feb 2025 · Inheritance Tax Relief: Farms · Hansard source

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  I am grateful to the hon. Lady for giving me notice of her point of order. As she probably knows, it is not a point of order, but her remarks are now on the record.

• 10 Feb 2025 · Biomass Generation · Hansard source

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  The Minister said that he is looking for “strong and credible low carbon alternatives” to burning biomass in order to generate electricity. Will he ensure that those alternatives do not include so-called energy from waste plants, since burning waste is as dirty as coal? And will he follow Scotland and Wales in placing a moratorium on the construction of new waste incinerators?

• 5 Feb 2025 · Chagos Islands · Hansard source

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  What does it say about this Government’s priorities that they will deny pensioners the winter fuel payment, leave WASPI women with nothing and fail to support jobs on Merseyside by supporting AstraZeneca at Speke, and that they should be contemplating an emergency Budget to raise more taxes on hard-working British people, while spaffing £9 billion on Mauritius?

• 4 Feb 2025 · National Cancer Plan · Hansard source

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  In his remarks yesterday, the Minister for Data Protection and Telecoms, the hon. Member for Rhondda and Ogmore (Chris Bryant), implied that he was discussing the future with AstraZeneca, which has had some bad news this week. AstraZeneca makes immunotherapies, among other things, and therefore is very important in allowing people to live better for longer. What discussion will the Minister be having as part of his plan with the pharmaceutical sector, since plainly the national health service cannot do this alone?

• 4 Feb 2025 · Energy Suppliers: Winter Support for Consumers · Hansard source

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  People living in rural locations disproportionately live in housing stock that is older and colder and does not have gas. In the Minister’s discussions with energy suppliers, will she please not forget to talk to the suppliers of liquefied petroleum gas and oil, since many of our constituents—particularly with the withdrawal of the winter fuel payment—are suffering a great deal?

• 3 Feb 2025 · School Accountability and Intervention · Hansard source

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  How will the selection of colour-coded performance areas on the report card be determined by the views and needs of parents as much as by Ministers and the education establishment? How do the exceptional schools that the Minister has described differ from the beacon schools that the then Labour Government created in 1998 and abolished in 2004?

• 3 Feb 2025 · AstraZeneca · Hansard source

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  I am grateful to the Minister for providing some insight into the way in which the Government and their Ministers look on economic matters. Does he appreciate that investment per capita in R&D is very much greater in America than in this country? There are now a range of incentives at federal and state level that will act as a draw to life sciences, notwithstanding what has happened in Washington over the past few days. What is there to tie a company such as AstraZeneca to this country? Why would it not look more favourably on America as a destination of choice?

• 29 Jan 2025 · Growing the UK Economy · Hansard source

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  The Chief Secretary to the Treasury did a good job of name-checking places across the country that might benefit from growth, except not once did he mention anywhere in the south-west. He is the Member for Bristol North West, so why is that? Does he have no confidence in the potential of the south-west? Will he redeem himself by visiting Trowbridge, the county town of Wiltshire, and specifically the Tech Trowbridge initiative, which is trying to create the conditions for growth? The Government might like to be involved in that.

• 28 Jan 2025 · Airport Expansion · Hansard source

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  Does the Minister agree that one of the many benefits of a third runway at Heathrow is that it would require the removal of one of the largest waste incinerators in the country? When this matter comes before him, will he ensure that there is no reprovisioning of this monster in a densely populated area, but that we see its deletion altogether so that we deal with waste in a truly sustainable way?

• 28 Jan 2025 · Extremism Review · Hansard source

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  It is good to see the Minister at the Dispatch Box to distance himself from the conclusions of a report commissioned by his Department, but reports do not leak themselves. Why does he think that whoever leaked this does not agree with him that there is “Nothing to see here”?

• 28 Jan 2025 · Sudan and Eastern DRC · Hansard source

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  The Foreign Secretary is right to come here to express his dismay and frustration, which we all share, but what assessment has he made of the effectiveness of the United Nations in this? It seems that its mission is failing. Even the measured and balanced resolution that he put together with Sierra Leone failed to get through on 18 November. Would it not be better to look instead at underscoring the importance of an African solution to this? In that respect, what discussions has he had with the African Union, notwithstanding that it is crucial that currently suspended members are involved in the process?

• 28 Jan 2025 · Gaza: Humanitarian Situation · Hansard source

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  Before the current crisis, construction in Gaza was made much more difficult by the surprisingly long list of proscribed materials, which included things like drain pipes, which Israel feared could be used as componentry for weapons and was understandably uncomfortable with. What can we do to ensure that the strip can be rebuilt, with all the materials that will require, while giving Israel reassurance on diversion of materials by Hamas—or what remains of it—and other Iranian proxies?

• 22 Jan 2025 · Russian Maritime Activity and UK Response · Hansard source

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  I commend the Defence Secretary for his statement and for the actions that he has taken—particularly to change the rules of engagement to allow for the closer inspection of that vessel. However, he does not control all the maritime assets of this country. In December, the Transport Secretary told me that there had been no instances of the UK using its agencies to board and inspect bits of the Russian black and grey fleet. Will he speak to his colleagues across Government to ensure that we use all the arms of government and its agencies to interdict unlicensed, unregistered threats to our security?

• 21 Jan 2025 · Armed Forces Commissioner Bill · Hansard source

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  Given the support that the hon. Gentleman and the hon. Member for Reading Central (Matt Rodda) have expressed for improvements in service housing, which must be one of the principal issues affecting the welfare of serving members of armed forces, what is the hon. Gentleman’s objection to amendment 10? Given what he has said, I should have thought that he would be fully supportive of it.

• 21 Jan 2025 · Armed Forces Commissioner Bill · Hansard source

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  I join the hon. and learned Gentleman in paying tribute to Danny Kinahan; as a Minister who had some dealings with him, I would certainly say he did a very good job indeed. I wish his successor all the very best. Will the hon. and learned Gentleman acknowledge that the previous Government actually went one step further by appointing a Minister for Veterans’ Affairs of Cabinet rank—a very experienced individual—which this Government have failed to replicate?

• 21 Jan 2025 · Environmental Protection · Hansard source

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  The Minister will know that incinerators are now the dirtiest way in which we generate electricity—dirtier than coal. Further to her Department’s advice note dated 30 December, what will she do to place a moratorium on the construction of new waste burners, thus bringing us in line with more enlightened Administrations—in this respect at least—in Wales and Scotland?

• 21 Jan 2025 · Environmental Protection · Hansard source

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  Does my hon. Friend agree that if the Government were really serious about reduce, reuse, recycle, they would put a moratorium on the construction of new waste incinerators, as we put in our manifesto in July? If we now had a Conservative Government, there would be no more waste incinerators, including in Westbury, in my constituency, which would be matching what the Welsh and Scots have already done.

• 21 Jan 2025 · Southport Attack · Hansard source

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  If the authorities remain silent, bad people write the script. On 16 October 2021, those authorities, and then their political masters, were frank about what had happened the previous day in Southend, and there were no riots. Why is that different from this?

• 16 Jan 2025 · UK Air Defence · Hansard source

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  I am grateful for this opportunity and declare my interests as a reservist, the father of two servicewomen and the brother of a serving admiral. Among the many issues that should be keeping Ministers awake at night are two tech-based conundrums that particularly worry me. One is future access to critical minerals and their products, which I have spoken about in the past. The other related issue is the patchy nature of the protection of these islands against missiles and drones. That is what I want to raise this evening. Everything costs, and it is easy when one is not in government to wish the ends without the means. At the moment, defence is spread too thinly and what I am suggesting would spread it even more thinly. Whether the UK should be globally deployable or focus on the defence of the homeland and its Euro-Atlantic neighbourhood is moot. The likelihood is that we will soldier on, make do and mend—we always have. But the scene is set for the biggest retrenchment since Suez. I wish it were otherwise, but it falls to this Government to make the call. Their attempted unforced surrender of the Chagos islands is perhaps an indication of where their thinking lies. In 1963, the 35th US President told his National Security Council that European NATO members were not paying their fair share. John F. Kennedy said, “We have been very generous to Europe and it is now time for us to look out for ourselves”. On Monday, the 45th and 47th President will likely be saying the same thing. Clearly, American frustration with Europe enjoying the insurance policy without paying the premium is nothing new. What is new is the American willingness to strong-arm Europe into changing its ways. Forget 2% or 2.5%—Trump says he wants 5% of GDP spent on defence by all NATO members, and here is the kicker: he wants a 20% tariff on all goods imported to the US. Combine the two and it is not a stretch to imagine him slapping tariffs on European goods unless Europeans step up to the plate. Ultimately, the single most important reason Trump can do what we fear he is about to do is that America is no longer principally competing with Europe’s proximate threat—Russia. A vast but thinly populated nation of 144 million, a busted economy and a military whose weaknesses have been generously displayed for all to see since February 2022 is not perceived by Washington as a main threat. An America emerging from the 9/11 Bush counter-terrorism era is back to facing off with great powers once again, but the great power is not Russia; it is China. As the US pivots, European states of all sizes must step up to defend their homeland and safeguard the north Atlantic. There are no free passes. Israel is a small state, but its military capabilities are unmatched in the middle east. Its layered missile defence systems—the famous Iron Dome, David’s Sling and Arrow—and its formidable fleet of aircraft demonstrate how small states, with a little help from their friends, can punch way above their weight. Several of those small states will provide the first line of defence against Putin’s Russia. The bulk of the cruise, ballistic and hypersonic missiles that Putin would fire at Britain as a proxy for the US will be intercepted by existing defence systems and fighter aircraft stationed in the Baltic states, the Czech Republic, Slovakia or Poland. While our geography, as so often in our history, gives strategic depth and protection from long-range attack, we can have less confidence in dealing with proximate threats from sea and subsea platforms and with threats to deployed and overseas assets, such as Cyprus, that fall well within the scope of short-range missiles and drones from Russia, Iran and their proxies. In any event, some missiles directed at the homeland would get through in the event of a full-on attack right now by the Russian Federation. That has been our blind spot. The public would expect that missiles evading the first line of integrated missile defence would be destroyed closer to their target. The Type 45-mounted Sea Viper and the ground-based Sky Sabre are exquisite examples of air and missile defence systems, but there are simply not enough of them—not enough missiles ready to go and not enough industrial capacity to enable resilience in anything more than the very short term. Russia’s war on Ukraine has helpfully made us alive to our vulnerability. Russia, as we have seen in Ukraine and throughout its history, is capable of taking long-term pain in a way that it seems unlikely we would. As things stand, the capital is particularly vulnerable to Russian missile attack, unless we park all our Type 45s—those that are operational—on the Thames. Happily, unlike Israel and Ukraine, we are surrounded by friends. It makes sense to be a full part of, and a contributor to, NATO integrated air and missile defence, but European IAMD, and its suppression and destruction of enemy air defence systems, are currently completely reliant on the US. In any event, the suspicion is that a full-on attack by Russia right now would find too many holes in the patchy architecture that has evolved to protect against missiles. Germany has recognised that threat; it has owned the consequences of doing nothing. It has established the European Sky Shield initiative, and has begun procuring trusted systems such as Patriot and Arrow 3. The UK has been considering joining ESSI. Where are we with that? What about off-the-shelf systems such as Arrow 3?

• 16 Jan 2025 · UK Air Defence · Hansard source

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  There is a great deal in what my hon. Friend says. Historically, buying off the shelf has proved to be somewhat more cost-effective than designing exquisite systems of our own. I hope very much that, as we go further into this process, we can partner with others to ensure that what we buy is both integrated and cost-effective. I would be interested to hear the Minister’s thoughts on ESSI. Ukraine has shown the limitations of the “just in time, not just in case” policy that has driven our failure to stockpile the materiel of war in recent decades. In the 1930s, the shadow factories initiative fitted commercial premises that typically produced cars for reconfiguration as armament factories, in case the need should arise, which it did. Car workers would switch to become the basis of the skilled workforce necessary to create materiel for prosecuting the war effort. That then happened, to the point that in 1940, this country was outstripping Germany in the production of fighter aircraft. With every respect due to the Few, the Battle of Britain was won in Britain’s factories and on its production lines as much as in the skies. Victory hinges just as much on logistics now, except the timelines are far shorter. The defence ecosystem in the US 2022 national defence strategy had more than a whiff of the 1930s in advancing an intertwined commercial-military co-operative. In a good light, we can see shadow factories in the thematic approach to missile defence taken by the Defence Science and Technology Laboratory missile defence centre. Crucially, it is industry partner-based, with a heavy focus on growing suitably qualified and experienced people, of whom we are desperately short. The MDC is now 20 years old. What assessment has the Minister made of it, and what changes does he propose to its structure and remit to help plug holes in our missile defence architecture? In the light of prevailing circumstances, will he consider upgrading the MDC so that it has the salience and clout approaching that of the pre-war directorate of aeronautical production? Then, it was Spitfires and Hurricanes; today it is missile defence, SDEAD—suppression and destruction of enemy air defences—and drones. Then, it was preparation for the total war to come; now—God willing—it is deterrence. There are those who say that the solution to our vulnerability to missile attack from the east is simple: it is Israel’s Iron Dome—the close-in element of the layered missile defence system used successfully to thwart Iran in April. However, Israel is a small country with a small population concentrated in a small number of cities with limited critical national infrastructure. It is surrounded by hostiles. Happily, none of that applies here. Our missile defence must be fully integrated with NATO partners. NATO needs European leadership as the US pivots, and we must not encourage those whose primary interest in defence lies in extending the remit of the institutions of the European Union, rather than the defence and security of Europeans. We do not need the distraction of a separate, competing EU defence architecture; NATO is our strength and our stay, and we must use our status as the continent’s leading military power to ensure it remains so. In particular, we must articulate clearly the case for layered missile defence and SDEAD within a NATO construct, as the US pivots towards the Indo-Pacific. The UK and Europe need NATO integrated air and missile defence that incorporates close-in systems to guarantee major centres of population, defence assets and critical national infrastructure. Crucially, member states must not give an aggressor capable of waging an attritional war grounds for believing that the west will exhaust its ordnance in the first few hours or days. Where are we with the versatile and scalable very short to medium-range modular ground-based air defence system envisaged by NATO Defence Ministers at their meeting in October 2020? What application might that system have to provide the last arrow in our quiver—one that will destroy missiles that have evaded intermediate layers and are about to land on critical sites in the UK? For a country with no money, directed energy weapons offer a potential solution for dealing with drones and missiles, albeit in line of sight and in good weather. Is DSTL’s DragonFire weapon still on course for service with the Royal Navy in 2027, and what export opportunities are Ministers exploring? Do they expect that Type 26s, Type 31s, and any Type 32s will carry DragonFire or successor directed energy weapons? Will they be fitted as standard, or as expensive retrofits? Do we really need a sixth-generation manned—or even hybrid—fast jet to replace Typhoon? Would it not be better to rely on the F-35 airframe with mid-life upgrades in a future that is surely progressively unmanned? The lineal, if less romantic, descendants of the Few will be tech geeks, gamers, coders and those who provide a human interface with artificial intelligence. What are we doing to grow them, and will the Minister visit the #TechTrowbridge initiative that I started in Wiltshire’s county town, which was once a centre for Spitfire manufacture? He would be warmly welcomed on his way to his constituency. The reason that a grisly artillery war has played out in Ukraine is because nobody has been able to command the airspace. Happily and to our surprise, Russia has been unable to suppress or destroy Ukraine’s air defences. In the future, unmanned combat aerial vehicles configured to shoot the archer, not the arrow, will do that. I would be very surprised if Lord Robertson were not casting a critical eye over the global combat air programme, and comparing and contrasting its cost and effectiveness with those of unmanned combat aerial vehicles. I appreciate the deep cultural difficulty of envisaging an unmanned future battlespace. It is deeply unsettling for those of us steeped in the traditions of the armed forces, but while there will always be a need for sufficient booted and spurred combat troops ready to close with and kill the enemy and hold the ground—as the Member of Parliament for a garrison town, I am not for one moment suggesting a further reduction in headcount—this country will never again be able to expose itself to attritional warfare of the sort we are seeing being played out in Ukraine. Politically and societally, that would be impossible and unconscionable. That means integrated missile defence, SDEAD, drones, and command of the electromagnetic spectrum. Once again at a dreadnought crossroads, Britain must configure the forces at its disposal for the long term in all domains and take a lead as what is still the principal military power in its Euro-Atlantic voisinage. Early pointers suggesting that this Government are taking the right fork in the road would include difficult and unpopular decisions such as standing firm on the deep space advanced radar capability envisaged for Cawdor barracks on the St David’s peninsula, which was bottled by previous Governments. As we chop to an unmanned future, those pointers would—for example, and very painfully—include consignment of the RAF Red Arrows aero-acrobatics team to the historic flight. This Government have four years left to run—the time the directorate of aeronautical production had to fit out this country with what it needed to prevail. Recent events have revealed the fundamental truth that we are vulnerable now, as we were then, and the shifting geopolitical plates will likely make us more so. The public will never forgive an Administration of whatever colour who muddle through, leaving them open to the predations of Putin’s advancing missile programme.