Alex Davies-Jones MP: speeches

Speeches

• 19 Jun 2025 · Victims and Courts Bill (Fourth sitting) · Hansard source

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  I am grateful for the shadow Minister’s questions. He will know that MHCLG already has a legal duty to respond to recommendations in the commissioner’s reports when relating to some of these measures, so it will feed into that more systemically as a result of these new powers. This Government are not legislating in a vacuum; the new powers in this Bill sit alongside and complement the new measures in the Crime and Policing Bill currently before the House, particularly the duty to create the new antisocial behaviour case reviews. It is really important that we do not legislate in a vacuum. That is something that has been done previously, but this Government are taking a different approach, looking at how we can tackle issues across Government. We have made these Bills complementary because, in order to solve these problems, we have to do things together across Government and across different agencies. That is why colleagues across Government and from different Departments, including MHCLG and the Home Office, have been carefully involved in the creation of these new powers. Question put and agreed to. Clause 7 accordingly ordered to stand part of the Bill. Clause 8 Duty of Commissioner to report on compliance with victims code Question proposed, That the clause stand part of the Bill.

• 19 Jun 2025 · Victims and Courts Bill (Fourth sitting) · Hansard source

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  The clause places a duty on local authorities and social housing providers, where they are engaged with victims of antisocial behaviour, to co-operate with the Victims’ Commissioner. Antisocial behaviour is more than merely a nuisance. It can erode personal freedom, harm mental wellbeing and, ultimately, shatter the feeling of safety and belonging that defines a home. Antisocial behaviour is not, however, always a criminal justice issue. Local authorities and social housing providers often play a key role in supporting victims and in finding a resolution. The Victims and Prisoners Act 2024 introduced a duty for certain criminal justice agencies responsible for providing those victims code services to co-operate with the Victims’ Commissioner. That duty does not apply to local authorities or social housing providers, so there is a gap in terms of ensuring that the commissioner has the tools to do their job effectively for victims of antisocial behaviour. This duty will close that gap and ensure that the commissioner is able to access the right information to identify the systemic issues, make more informed recommendations and scrutinise how the system as a whole responds to antisocial behaviour from a victim’s perspective.

• 19 Jun 2025 · Victims and Courts Bill (Fourth sitting) · Hansard source

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  They are included.

• 19 Jun 2025 · Victims and Courts Bill (Fourth sitting) · Hansard source

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  We have already debated these clauses at length. I do not wish to labour the Committee or subject it to my voice any longer than necessary. The spirit of the clauses has been debated on the record. Question put and agreed to. Clause 3 accordingly ordered to stand part of the Bill. Schedule 1 agreed to. Clause 4 ordered to stand part of the Bill. Clause 5 Victims’ rights to make representations and receive information etc Question proposed, That the clause stand part of the Bill.

• 19 Jun 2025 · Victims and Courts Bill (Third sitting) · Hansard source

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  I thank my hon. Friend for that powerful speech. I place on the record my thanks to her and her constituents for all of the brilliant work that they have done in ensuring this measure becomes law, and to ensure that no other families have to face what her constituents and, sadly, many other families have had to face. I will speak to both clauses 1 and 2 at the same time, as they are very much linked. In recent years, as we have heard, several murderers—most recently Lucy Letby and Kyle Clifford—have refused to attend their sentencing hearings. That causes victims’ families significant further distress. It can be seen as a final insult, denying the families the opportunity to see the full administration of justice for their loved ones and allowing offenders to avoid having to hear and confront the consequences of their horrific crimes. The provisions in clause 1 and 2 recognise the impact that such behaviour has on victims and their families in compounding their trauma. Clause 1 inserts proposed new sections 41A and 41B into a new chapter 2A within part 3 of the Sentencing Act 2020. Proposed new section 41A introduces an express statutory power for the Crown court to order an offender to attend their sentencing hearing. It makes clear that an offender who refuses to attend their hearing without reasonable excuse commits a contempt of court, meaning that adult offenders are liable for an additional two years’ custody and/or an unlimited fine, or, in the case of a child offender, a maximum penalty of £2,500. That also applies to offenders who, following an order to attend, commit contempt by misbehaving or disrupting the proceedings and are removed as a result. Proposed new section 41A makes it clear that, for adult offenders, reasonable force, where necessary and proportionate, can be used to give effect to the court’s order to deliver them for their sentencing hearing. The final decision on whether to use reasonable force will remain with the prison and escorting staff. Children will not be subject to reasonable force for this purpose, in line with existing policy. The second part of clause 1, proposed new section 41B, goes further than ever before by introducing a new power for Crown court judges also to impose prison sanctions on any adult offender who is subject to an attendance order and commits a contempt of court by refusing, without reasonable excuse, to attend their sentencing hearing, or who attends, but is removed from the hearing because of their conduct. That can be instead of or alongside any other punishment imposed by the court.

• 19 Jun 2025 · Victims and Courts Bill (Third sitting) · Hansard source

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  I agree that the current situation in the family courts is difficult, and it can be traumatic for parents who are seeking to have a parental order removed. That is why we have taken the measure in the Bill. It is a new approach, through which we seek to remove parental responsibility on automatic conviction in the Crown court. As I said in oral evidence, this is not something we do lightly, but we feel that it is necessary in order to protect offenders’ and perpetrators’ own children from the most serious offences. I am happy to work with the hon. Member for North East Hampshire to consider what further work we can do to reform the family courts. The Department is working closely on that, and we know we need to get it right in order to protect all children from these crimes, whether or not restrictions to parental responsibility are sought via the family courts or automatically, with this measure, in the Crown court. Amendments 18, 24 and 8 seek to expand the circumstances in which the Crown court should make a prohibited steps order to include cases in which the offences were committed against any child. Again, it is important to be clear that child sexual abuse is an abhorrent crime that leaves a lasting impact on victims and their families. Those affected have my deepest sympathies, and it is they who we must have in our minds when we debate the measure. The current provision is carefully targeted. It ensures that automatic restrictions on the exercise of parental responsibility apply only when there is a direct and recognised relationship between the offender and the child victims. Our focus on offenders who have committed a serious child sexual abuse offence against a child for whom they hold parental responsibility is based on a desire to tackle the cases involving child sexual abuse with the highest direct harm to the perpetrator’s children. This is, as I have already said, a novel and untested change to the law, and the response from perpetrators is unpredictable. We know that perpetrators often seek to use the family courts, as we have already heard, to further traumatise victims, and they could therefore seek to appeal the removal of responsibility.

• 19 Jun 2025 · Victims and Courts Bill (Third sitting) · Hansard source

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  We need to be careful on what we deem as noise. If, as we have heard in the Committee’s evidence sessions, an offender is beginning to make the sentencing hearing a spectacle or a circus and that is causing more distress to the victims and their families and preventing the course of justice, the judge will have the power to remove the offender from the court. However, with our new measures, the judge will have the power to impose these sanctions on them in prison, issue the unlimited fine and impose more time in prison. That will still be a measure even if they attend, cause a spectacle and have to be removed. They will be punished, and that will be explained to them if they continue to carry on. I go back to the Armed Forces Act and the effect that these new measures will also have on service courts, because that is important. We need to remember that justice is done in a number of courts in our country and not just in the Crown court. Offenders before service courts who commit a contempt are liable for a fine or 28 days’ service custody—or, alternatively, the offence may be considered by a civilian court for the purposes of contempt of court proceedings. Where an offender is ordered to attend a service court from prison, but fails to do so or—as the hon. Member for Bexhill and Battle said—attends, but is removed from the hearing because of their conduct, they may similarly receive a prison sanctions order. I recognise that these provisions may not guarantee that every offender will attend their sentencing hearing when so ordered or that they will not create a spectacle during the sentencing hearing. However, these measures reinforce the expectation that offenders should attend their sentencing hearing and behave appropriately. We need to ensure that justice is seen to be done by victims, their families and the wider public, to create trust in our justice system. The measures will ensure that offenders are appropriately punished for failing to do that. Judges will retain the discretion to make decisions based on the facts of the case in front of them. I therefore urge that clauses 1 and 2 stand part of the Bill. Question put and agreed to . Clause 1 accordingly ordered to stand part of the Bill. Clause 2 Power to compel attendance at sentencing hearing: armed forces Amendment proposed : 14, in clause 2, page 4, line 11, at end insert— “(3A) If the court is minded not to make an order under subsection (2), the court has a duty to consult the victim and their family if they are deceased.”— (Dr Mullan.) Question put, That the amendment be made.

• 19 Jun 2025 · Victims and Courts Bill (Third sitting) · Hansard source

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  I implore the hon. Gentleman, in his efforts to ensure that offenders face families and justice, to explain why none of the additional measures that he proposes were in the previous Government’s Bill.

• 19 Jun 2025 · Victims and Courts Bill (Third sitting) · Hansard source

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  It is important to note that a line does need to be drawn, as the hon. Member has recognised; there does have to be a balance. In the previous Government’s version of the Bill, there was a different threshold, which was child rape of any child. We have changed that.; in this version, the measure is any child sexual offence where there is four years or more in custody, but only of the offender’s own child. As a Government, we have determined that as the necessary threshold. That is different from the previous Government’s threshold, which was only child rape. I think that recognises the difficulty in drawing a balance here. We need to take a more limited approach for the time being, especially initially, to ensure that, as I have already said, the family court is not overwhelmed by endless appeals from perpetrators causing even more traumatisation to victims, and especially children. This is essential so that other victims and families with cases in the family court are not detrimentally impacted. Our intention with clause 3 is to tackle the cases with the highest direct harm to the perpetrator’s children. That is why we have chosen to focus the measure in the way that we have. It is important that we properly understand the impact any additional family court proceedings will have on the children and families involved. The cohort in scope of this measure is at the highest risk of immediate harm from the perpetrator, which is why we have chosen to focus on that cohort. This does not prevent an application being made to the family court for parental responsibility to be restricted in other circumstances, as is already available. Amendment 8 suggests using the Crown court to gather evidence on the best interests of the child and the level of risk the offender poses to the child. Doing so would place a significant new burden on the criminal court, meaning less capacity to hear criminal cases and even longer waiting times for those seeking justice. The proper forum for that consideration to happen is the family court, where the judge can hear from all relevant professionals and have access to any necessary reports before making a decision that will always be based on the best interests of the children involved. We are already going further than the previous Government did with their Criminal Justice Bill. Those proposals were limited to child rape; our measure includes not only child rape, but a broader range of child sexual offences. Most important of all, the previous Government talked of change, but failed to deliver. We will deliver this change to protect children. We all have a huge amount of sympathy for families in these circumstances, and I want to do all we can to support them in getting the right outcome for their children. New clause 13, tabled by the hon. Member for Bromsgrove, seeks to expand the instances where the Crown court will be under a duty to restrict the exercise of a perpetrator’s parental responsibility at the point they are sentenced to 10 years or more for a serious sexual offence or violent offence committed against someone with whom they share parental responsibility for the child. I reassure the hon. Member that there are already clear powers in the family court to restrict parental responsibility where it would be in the best interests of the children involved. If a parent or other interested party wishes to make an application, they can do so. Where relevant, the family court is able to and will remove parental responsibility or restrict it to the point that it cannot be exercised in any meaningful way. The existing law is clear that in every case, the court’s paramount consideration must be what will be in the best interests of the child. We cannot rule out that sometimes it may not be in the child’s best interests for parental responsibility to be removed or restricted, particularly where the child is not the direct victim of the offence. However, as the Lord Chancellor and I have said, we look forward to working constructively across the House on this measure. While we cannot support new clause 13, we remain committed to ensuring that the law robustly protects children. I reassure hon. Members that the Government will continue to work to strike the right balance on this issue. For the reasons I have outlined, I urge hon. Members to withdraw their amendments so that we can continue to develop this important legislation in a way that is principled and practical and gets the balance right for children.

• 19 Jun 2025 · Victims and Courts Bill (Third sitting) · Hansard source

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  Amendments 15 and 16 would change the circumstances in which force may be used to bring an offender to court. They would effectively extend those circumstances to situations in which disproportionate—but not grossly disproportionate—force is required to secure attendance. Based on the debate we have had, it might be beneficial if I explain how the system currently works. The use of force by prison officers is currently justified, and therefore lawful, only if it is necessary, reasonable and proportionate. We are quite deliberately legislating to permit the use of lawful force, which is a test that is well understood and used throughout the criminal justice system. I remind hon. Members that the previous Government used the same test in their attempt to get this measure passed. Prison and prisoner escort staff are trained to employ the lawful use of force and are experienced in making judgments about the circumstances in which the use of force is necessary, reasonable and proportionate. They are also trained in the use of existing approved techniques for moving reluctant or resistant prisoners safely around the prison and court estate. In recent cases, such as that of Nicholas Prosper, we have seen how they effectively employ the same techniques to restrain offenders and bring them to court to hear justice being done. Clearly defined boundaries for the use of force, which are well understood by custody officers, ensure that escorting staff are not subject to unreasonable or unmitigated risks when bringing offenders to court. Where it is deemed unsafe or unreasonable to use force, prisons will discuss with courts how best to proceed. Where attendance is considered necessary, the court can consider making a direction for the offender to appear via live video link. That option is more manageable for the prison to enforce and minimises the potential for impactful disruption to proceedings, which can, as we have heard, lead to a spectacle in the court. An offender who is deemed too violent or disruptive to attend court in person or by live link would, under these measures, be found in contempt of court and subject to a further prison sentence or other punishment. We are going further than the previous Government and ensuring that, where offenders do not take responsibility and face victims’ families, they are punished. Offenders should not be forced to attend court if it would risk the safety of custody officers or court users, or disrupt proceedings, causing undue distress and further delay to victims and their families. Our measures strike the right balance in requiring that the use of force must be proportionate, reasonable and necessary, ensuring the safety of all court users and minimum disruption to court proceedings. Amendment 23 would give judges the power to order a disruptive offender to be restrained and gagged in court during their sentencing hearing. It would also introduce a duty on the court to consult victims or their families before making a decision to have the offender removed from the hearing instead. The Government appreciate that an offender’s refusal to attend their sentencing hearing, or their disruptive behaviour during that hearing, can cause anger and upset for victims and their families, and we heard that during the evidence sessions. That is why the measures in the Bill reinforce the expectation that offenders should attend their sentencing hearings and behave appropriately in court. They give judges the powers they need to do what is right in each individual case. Decisions on the use of restraints to manage offender behaviour are a matter for prison officers and prison escort staff. They will make decisions about the use of force depending on the circumstances of each individual case. The use of force must be reasonable, necessary and proportionate, and restrained prisoners must be brought to court using approved techniques in our prison system for moving individuals safely. Gagging prisoners is not an approved technique in our prison system and is unlikely to be considered a lawful use of force in these circumstances. Its use may in fact increase the risk of violence or disruption to the point where officers would have no choice but to remove the offender from court. Amendment 23 is therefore unlikely to achieve its intended outcomes. We will not allow offenders to achieve the outcomes they intend of continuing to traumatise victims and families or disrupting proceedings, by not attending court or causing a circus or spectacle. Should a judge deem it necessary, the offender will be removed and the judge can add an additional sanction to punish them properly. Forcing disruptive prisoners to remain in court at any cost would jeopardise officer safety and delay proceedings and could cause unnecessary distress for victims and their families. Is that what the hon. Member for Bexhill and Battle intends with his amendments? They are unlikely to achieve the intended objective of the Bill, which is to ensure that offenders face up to their crimes and hear the impact of their actions on victims and their families. A more productive and realistic approach would be to punish the offender for disobeying the order to attend their hearing and failing to show any respect for victims and their families or the court. The measures in the Bill were produced in consultation with families; they asked for them and we listened. Our measures give judges the option to punish any adult offender who, following an attendance order, becomes disruptive in court and is removed from the hearing, by ordering up to two additional years in prison, an unlimited fine and/or the imposition of numerous potential prison sanctions. I therefore urge the hon. Member for Bexhill and Battle to withdraw his amendment because of the risk of unintended consequences and the prevention of justice for victims and their families.

• 19 Jun 2025 · Victims and Courts Bill (Third sitting) · Hansard source

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  The amendment seeks to amend the process in clause 3 if an offender has been acquitted or had their sentence reduced on appeal. The Bill provides a clear route for considering a prohibited steps order following an appeal that has resulted in an acquittal or a reduction in the offender’s sentence. In such cases, the relevant local authority will be under a duty to bring an application to the family court to consider whether the original order should be upheld, varied or discharged. The drafting of the amendment is deficient and risks creating confusion. It would provide that any prohibited steps order made under proposed new section 10C of the Children Act 1989 would cease to have effect where a person is acquitted, effectively discharging the order. In practice, there would be no order in place to discharge the original prohibited steps order, and therefore no documentary evidence that the order had been discharged. Compounding that, the amendment would retain an obligation for the relevant local authority to make an application to the family court to consider the prohibited steps order, under proposed new section 10D(2), and yet there would be no order for the family court to consider, because it would have ceased to have effect. In short, the amendment would not make sense in practice and would risk creating confusion in a context where clarity is particularly important.

• 19 Jun 2025 · Victims and Courts Bill (Third sitting) · Hansard source

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  It is an honour to serve under your chairship today, Mr Stringer. I thank the shadow Justice Minister for introducing the amendments he tabled, and the Government appreciate his support of the Bill in principle. The amendments would place a statutory duty on judges to consult victims or their families before deciding whether to use their powers under the measures in clauses 1 and 2 to order an offender to attend their sentencing hearing. I want to stress that victims and their families have been at the forefront of this legislation, and clause 1 will help to ensure that their voices and the impact of the crimes they have suffered are heard and understood by the perpetrators. We anticipate that, in making decisions, judges will take into consideration all the circumstances of the case, including the wishes and views of the victims and their families. However, mandating a duty to consult victims risks undermining judicial discretion and the ability of judges to make decisions based on the facts in front of them. Judges will of course consider any representations put to them by the prosecution on behalf of victims and their families, but they must also take into account the safety of prison and court staff, the efficiency and fairness of proceedings and the risks that a disruptive or resistant offender may cause further distress to victims and delays to justice. Retaining judicial discretion in such cases is therefore crucial to ensure that courts can make decisions in the interests of justice, taking into account all the circumstances of the case, including those of victims and their families. I therefore urge the shadow Minister to withdraw the amendment.

• 19 Jun 2025 · Victims and Courts Bill (Third sitting) · Hansard source

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  I will happily answer that point. We are not saying that we would not remove the prohibited steps order; of course there will be a route to remove it. If the offender or alleged perpetrator is then acquitted through the Court of Appeal, there should always be a route to do that, and there will be within 30 days. However, the correct route for doing that is the family court, which will have all the reports available to determine the best interests of that child’s welfare, given everything they have been through, rather than the Crown court, which is not equipped to make that assessment.

• 19 Jun 2025 · Victims and Courts Bill (Third sitting) · Hansard source

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  It is a pleasure to speak to this group of amendments: amendment 8, tabled by my hon. Friend the Member for Lowestoft (Jess Asato); amendments 17 and 18, tabled by the hon. Member for Bexhill and Battle; amendment 24, tabled by the hon. Member for Eastbourne (Josh Babarinde); and new clause 13, tabled by the hon. Member for Bromsgrove. Amendments 17 and 24 seek to remove the four-year custodial threshold for the automatic restriction of the exercise of parental responsibility. The restriction of the exercise of parental responsibility is a serious and far-reaching measure. It must be applied with care and in a manner that is a legally robust, while also protecting the most vulnerable. The requirement for a four-year custodial sentence provides a defined marker of seriousness. This thresholds aligns with existing sentencing frameworks. Section 244ZA and schedule 15 of the Criminal Justice Act 2003 specify a list of serious offences, including child sexual offences, that are considered serious enough to warrant that the offender must serve at least two thirds of their sentence in custody, rather than the standard half when they are sentenced. The amendment would lower this threshold and require the Crown court to make the prohibited steps order when the offender is sentenced for any period of imprisonment or detention. I want to be clear that any offence against a child is unacceptable and one of the most heinous crimes in society. Restricting the exercise of parental responsibility is a serious step and not a decision to be taken lightly. That predetermined marker of seriousness ensures that any order made by the Crown court happens automatically only where the offender has committed serious and grave offences against a child who they are supposed to look after.

• 19 Jun 2025 · Victims and Courts Bill (Third sitting) · Hansard source

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  I agree with that point. It is important that we recognise, as I have stated, that there are other measures to remove a person’s parental responsibility for their own child through the family courts. I stress that this is a novel approach. We need to look at the justice system as a whole; we cannot consider our various courts in isolation. The measure being carried out in the Crown court could make an impact on the delays that exist in the family courts, thanks to the backlog that we inherited from the previous Government. I do not wish to exacerbate that, or to traumatise any other children and families who are going through the family courts, by further increasing that backlog. For that reason, we wish to keep the measure quite small and novel, as it is untested at present; however, once we have seen how it works, there is the possibility perhaps to go further in the future.

• 19 Jun 2025 · Victims and Courts Bill (Third sitting) · Hansard source

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  The hon. Gentleman will know, having been in Government before the election, how Government collective responsibility and consultation with other Government Departments work. The safeguarding Minister and I are responsible for the Government’s strategy on violence against women and girls, which commits to halving it within a decade. Of course, the family courts are playing an integral role in that, and we seek to build on it. I will talk more about that shortly. Where we need to go further, this Government will. We have used the statutory framework because it reflects the Government’s view that the offences are exceptionally serious. It is therefore appropriate that the same threshold be used to determine when an automatic restriction on the exercise of parental responsibility should apply. I understand and appreciate the rationale but, because there are existing processes to seek the restriction of parental responsibility, it is essential that there is a threshold and a clear marker for it to happen automatically.

• 19 Jun 2025 · Victims and Courts Bill (Third sitting) · Hansard source

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  Amendment 25 was tabled by the hon. Member for Eastbourne, for whom I have much respect, and seeks to amend clause 3 to allow the Crown court discretion not to make a prohibited steps order in cases where it considers such an order not to be in the best interests of the child or the non-offending parent. Let me begin by acknowledging the intent behind this amendment. It is of course right that we consider the welfare of children and the rights of non-offending parents in all decisions made by the court. However, the Government cannot support this amendment for several reasons. The clause as drafted already strikes a careful and considered balance between protecting children and respecting judicial oversight. We have included a narrowly defined exemption to allow the Crown court the flexibility not to make a prohibited steps order, which is a section 8 order under the Children Act 1989, where it would not be in the interests of justice to do so. That provision is intended to cover exceptional circumstances where the Crown court does not consider it to be in the interests of justice, which may arise from unusual facts or a case that is particularly complex. It ensures a degree of flexibility without undermining the core safeguarding purpose of the provision in the Bill. The family court is the appropriate forum for determining what would be in the best interests of children and navigating the complexities of individual family circumstances. It is uniquely equipped to consider the full facts of each individual case, drawing on the expertise of all relevant professionals and supported by any necessary reports. That enables the judge to make a fully informed decision, one that is always guided by the paramount principle of the child’s best interests. The Crown court simply is not equipped to carry out that detailed consideration. Legislation already provides a route for family members to bring an application to the family court, so it can consider whether the order should be varied or discharged and whether a more tailored order or other family court orders are required, and ensure that any order is consistent with the best interests of the child or children involved in the individual circumstances. This avenue is still open for families where the Crown court has made an order under the provisions of clause 4. Alongside that existing route into the family court, we are also providing a clear new route in certain circumstances. If the offender is acquitted of the relevant offence, or their sentence is reduced to less than four years—I am grateful for the opportunity to clarify this point, because it was raised when I gave evidence to the Committee—the local authority is under a duty to bring the matter back before the family court. This ensures that decisions remain responsive to the best interests of the child, without compromising the initial safeguarding intent of the judge. The Government are committed to ensuring that the justice system protects children from further harm from such offenders. The provisions in clause 3 are a vital part of that commitment. I also place on record the Government’s commitment to consulting on a new victims’ code, specifically with the intention of addressing concerns, raised by the hon. Member for North East Hampshire, regarding how we can ensure that child victims are at the centre of the justice system. As she has said, for the first time ever, children are considered victims in their own right for crimes such as domestic abuse, in law; but, as we know, in practice that sadly is not the reality for many child victims. Therefore this Government are determined to go further. Under our new consultation on the victims’ code, which we are hoping to launch later this year, we will make it a key focus to ensure that the code works for all victims, with a particular focus on children in mind. I understand the reasons why the hon. Member for Eastbourne has tabled this amendment, but I hope that he and the hon. Member for North East Hampshire are reassured that there are already strong provisions in place to ensure that the family court can consider the interests of the children involved in these types of cases, and their families. As such, I urge the hon. Member to withdraw amendment 25.

• 19 Jun 2025 · Victims and Courts Bill (Third sitting) · Hansard source

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  That goes to the heart of why we have kept these measures as niche and tight as possible—because they are quite novel. We are restricting parental responsibility where an offender has been found guilty in a Crown court, with a jury and a judge, of any sexual offence against their own child for which they will be sentenced to four years or more in prison. That is incredibly traumatic for the child and family involved. The person will have already been found guilty. This is not similar to cases in which someone is acquitted and a prohibited steps order can be removed immediately. We have to consider the impact on the child. These are offences that the perpetrator will have been found guilty of, in a court of law, against their own child.

• 19 Jun 2025 · Victims and Courts Bill (Third sitting) · Hansard source

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  The shadow Minister cannot think of any and, off the top of my head, stood here right now, I cannot think of any either, but that goes to the heart of the reason why we need to keep these novel measures quite tight—it is because of their potential impact. Primarily, my interest, and the interest of the Government, is to protect children and child victims, and I put my faith in the family court system to do what is in the best interest of the child following an acquittal, given everything that that child—that victim—has been through. We must remember that if the perpetrator is acquitted in the Court of Appeal, there is still a child victim and a crime that has been committed against that child.

• 19 Jun 2025 · Victims and Courts Bill (Third sitting) · Hansard source

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  We need to remember that for a criminal case to have been brought, the child or another party will have made an allegation of serious sexual abuse committed against that child, and that will have been followed by criminal proceedings and an initial guilty verdict. The relationship between the child and the accused parent may have completely broken down during that process. When the family court reviews the case, the judge will undertake a holistic review of all the circumstances, including the acquittal, before deciding what is in the best interests of the child. We must also remember that the prohibited steps order does not form part of the sentence when it is made by the Crown court. The order is not part of the punishment, or an additional punishment, for an offender; it is a tool to protect children who have been the victims of a dreadful crime, and their families. Even where the individual is acquitted—I have huge sympathy for those who are found innocent and acquitted—it is likely that the case will have gone through lengthy proceedings, and complex family dynamics will be involved. We must keep in mind the overarching aim of protecting children and doing what is best for them. That is why the order will not be automatically discharged following a successful appeal. I think it is important that if there is a successful appeal, there is a clearly defined process during which the best interests of the children involved are considered, which is why we have put that measure in place. We understand that following a successful appeal, it is important that decisions about a prohibited steps order are made quickly. That is why the process already included in clause 3 requires the local authority to make the application within 30 days of the acquittal. By placing the duty to make the application on the local authority, we are reducing the burden on the families involved, at what will already be a difficult and potentially traumatic time. Moving the proceedings to the family court centres deliberations in the correct forum. The family court will consider whether varying, discharging or, indeed, upholding the order will be in the best interests of the children involved, which I am sure we can agree is what we all want.

• 19 Jun 2025 · Victims and Courts Bill (Third sitting) · Hansard source

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  That is exactly why we have included a route to remove the prohibited steps order, and we feel the appropriate route for that is the family court. That is the measure in the Bill, and it still stands that that is the safest route to protect the welfare of the child in the circumstances, given what—I was going to say, “I can only imagine”, but I cannot even imagine it—will be an immensely traumatising and awful experience for everyone involved. For that reason, I urge the hon. Member to withdraw the amendment.

• 19 Jun 2025 · Victims and Courts Bill (Third sitting) · Hansard source

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  I welcome that intervention, but I disagree with the hon. Member. We have seen most recently cases in which offenders have been brought to court despite their reluctance. The prison officers and court staff have been able to get them there with the use of reasonable force. Then they have started to disrupt proceedings, but once the judge has explained to them some of the measures that are available currently—not these sanctions, because we have not yet made this law, but those measures that are currently available—that has resulted in the sentencing hearing being allowed to go ahead. What the hon. Member says is not always the case.

• 18 Jun 2025 · Marriage between First Cousins · Hansard source

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  It is a pleasure to serve under your chairship, Dame Siobhain. I thank the right hon. Member for Basildon and Billericay (Mr Holden) for securing this important debate and commend him for all his brilliant work to support women, in the previous Parliament and going forward. I know that he feels strongly about this issue and, as he said, has introduced a private Member’s Bill on the subject. It goes without saying that it is a sensitive and complex issue, which requires nuance and respect. I thank him for the way he presented his arguments today. It is important first to understand the current law around marriage. In England and Wales, marriage law is governed primarily by the Marriage Act 1949, which outlines the conditions under which a marriage is considered void, meaning not legally valid. That includes situations where one party is under 18 or where one party is serving a whole-life order in prison. Under the Act, marriages between individuals who are considered too closely related are also considered void. Those relationships fall within so-called prohibited degrees of relationship, which include close blood relations, such as siblings, and certain step relations, such as someone marrying the child of a former spouse. As we all know, the prohibited degrees of relationship in the 1949 Act do not include first cousins. To understand why that exception exists, it is helpful to consider the context. As the right hon. Member mentioned when he introduced his Bill and in his speech today, marriage between first cousins has been permitted since Henry VIII changed the law in order to marry Anne Boleyn’s cousin, Catherine Howard. The list of relationships that are legally too close for marriage—prohibited degrees—has been around for centuries. It was first officially written into law in the Marriage Act 1835. It was updated by various laws passed between 1907 and 1931, and was eventually brought together into the 1949 Act. The law has continued to evolve since then; for example, the Children Act 1975 added a prohibition on marriages between adoptive parents and their adopted children. There have been studies that seem to reinforce our anecdotal understanding that individuals from communities are increasingly moving away from traditional practices and opting for relationships outside their extended families. This shift reflects a broader trend of integration into wider society, alongside awareness of certain health and societal implications that are associated, as the right hon. Member mentioned, with cousin marriage. Let me address the right hon. Member’s concerns about those health risks, and specifically the risk of congenital disease in children. There is a continued debate about the genetic risks involved in first cousin marriages. As my noble Friend Baroness Merron highlighted in the other place earlier this year, the NHS offers support for families who may be at higher risk of genetic abnormalities. The Government also understand the importance of having better data in this area, which is why the National Congenital Anomaly and Rare Disease Registration Service collects and analyses data to support doctors, charities and policymakers to improve treatments and care in England. NHS England has also recently published guidance to improve recording of national data on closely related couples. I listened carefully to the right hon. Member’s argument that banning first cousin marriage could promote community integration. We recognise that the practice is permitted in some faith communities, while it is not permitted in others. As I have said, this is a complex and sensitive area of law, and I am happy to continue to engage with him on it as the Government consider the issue more broadly. The right hon. Member also suggested that banning first cousin marriage could help to reduce forced marriages. Let me be absolutely clear: forced marriage is a serious human rights violation. It is illegal and carries a maximum prison sentence of up to seven years. It is a complex form of honour or culture-based abuse, and our response must be comprehensive, with a focus on preventing such crimes, on supporting and protecting survivors and those at risk, and on bringing perpetrators to justice. Tackling forced marriage is a key part of the Government’s mission to halve violence against women and girls within a decade. The forced marriage unit, which is a joint effort between the Home Office and the Foreign Office, works tirelessly to combat forced marriage, both at home and abroad. The unit provides a vital range of materials, including free e-learning. Last year alone, over 5,800 professionals, such as registrars, completed that training. A new forced marriage resource pack has also been launched to help raise awareness of forced marriage among professionals. I recognise that there is a lot of interest across the House in bringing forward a number of changes to weddings law more generally. I know that many Members are keen to see changes brought forward quickly, but it is important that any such changes are made in the round. Just last week, during a debate on humanist marriage, I explained to a packed Westminster Hall that it is not possible for the Government simply to ignore the Law Commission’s 2022 report. We cannot ignore the fact that that report identified a number of complex and significant issues within the current legal framework.

• 18 Jun 2025 · Marriage between First Cousins · Hansard source

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  I totally agree with the right hon. Member. He makes a very powerful point, which speaks to why we need to look at this issue very carefully. With certain groups engaging in this practice, we cannot just have a knee-jerk reaction; he mentioned that in his speech. Others are calling for me to have a knee-jerk reaction on humanist weddings, for example, and to just quickly lay a statutory instrument to make that change possible. I am not about creating piecemeal legislation in an area that is very complex. I want to reassure the right hon. Member that the Government are not ignoring this issue. We are considering it deeply and in the round, but it is responsible of us to consider it carefully and with the appropriate communities, which he mentioned, so that we get a full picture of the situation. That brings me to the central proposal in this debate, which is to ban first cousin marriage. It is worth noting that during the past 14 years, when the prevalence of first cousin marriage was higher than it is now, the previous Government, in which the right hon. Member was a Minister, took no steps to introduce a ban. As I have said, first cousin marriage is complex and sensitive, and this Government are considering it with the seriousness that it rightly deserves. The right hon. Member will also be aware that in 2022, when the Law Commission published its comprehensive review of weddings law, the previous Government had ample opportunity to raise the issue of first cousin marriage in response to that report, but they chose not to respond at all. In the report, the Law Commission set out a number of issues with marriage law, including inconsistency and unfairness across different groups and faith communities. We are considering the report and the wider issues of weddings law, including first cousin marriage, and I want to put that on record today. My officials are working hard on weddings law reform, as am I, and an update from the Government on our position will come very soon. I am happy to continue to engage with the right hon. Member and any other Members or those outside this place who want to discuss this matter further as we prepare our plan for weddings reform. Question put and agreed to.

• 17 Jun 2025 · Crime and Policing Bill · Hansard source

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  I will not give way. This is a complex new clause, and I will not address all of its provisions or the policy intentions behind them. However, I will highlight areas where the House may want to consider whether the duties or delegated powers may be unclear or give rise to unintended consequences. I acknowledge that my hon. Friend’s approach seeks to mirror the model used to decriminalise abortion in Northern Ireland. However, it is important to recognise that the circumstances in Northern Ireland at the time were markedly different from those in England and Wales. There was no functioning Executive, no provision of abortion services except in the most exceptional circumstances and no equivalent to the Abortion Act 1967, so provision had to be made to create a regime for abortion services. As such, the approach to decriminalising abortion in England and Wales, where the provision and regulation of lawful abortions already exists, needs to reflect the distinct legal context. New clause 20 would impose a duty on the Secretary of State to implement paragraphs 85 and 86 of the convention on the elimination of all forms of discrimination against women in England and Wales by using the regulation-making powers in subsection (8). The CEDAW report contains recommendations relating to the criminal law on abortion, which would, in so far as they relate to England and Wales, already be addressed by the repealing of the offences through subsections (2) and (4) of the new clause. The report includes recommendations that go beyond the provision of abortion services, such as on the provision of sexual and reproductive health and education. As I have mentioned, the CEDAW report and its recommendations were developed in the specific context of Northern Ireland and therefore reflected the position there at the time. The position in England and Wales is different, with existing guidance, services and legislation that already address many of the report’s recommendations. I turn to the criminal law aspect of the new clause. Subsections (2) and (3) would repeal sections 58 to 60 of the Offences Against the Person Act 1861, as well as the Infant Life Preservation Act 1929. Repealing those offences would remove criminal liability for a woman acting in relation to her own pregnancy and would also decriminalise any other person doing the relevant acts to a pregnant woman, or in relation to the body of a child. For example, there would no longer be a specific offence to cover cases of forced abortion. That would mean that situations in which an individual subjected a pregnant woman to violence with the intention of causing a miscarriage would be dealt with under different offences relating to assaults and bodily harm rather than section 58 of the Infant Life Preservation Act. The moratorium on investigations and prosecutions contained in subsection (4) would discontinue such cases. Therefore, those suspected of forcing a woman to have an abortion before the offences were repealed could not be investigated for those offences. Subsection (2) seeks to repeal section 60 of the Offences Against the Person Act 1861, which criminalises concealing a birth by disposing of a child’s body after its birth. Unlike sections 58 and 59 of the 1861 Act, that offence is not limited to abortion-related acts. Repealing it entirely could therefore create a gap in the law regarding non-abortion-related concealment of birth following a child’s death. While I understand the concern of my hon. Friend the Member for Walthamstow about investigations under section 60 relating to alleged illegal abortions, a full repeal may have unintended consequences. I will briefly address a point that my hon. Friend made about existing offences that cover this matter. The offence of perverting the course of justice requires a positive act coupled with an ulterior intent that the course of justice will be perverted. Therefore, it is not necessarily the same and we do not want to provide unintended consequences. It is important to note that subsection (12) grants the Secretary of State regulation-making powers in the light of the repeal of these offences, subject to certain restrictions. The power could be used, for example, to create offences specifically targeted at forced abortions or concealing a birth by disposing of a child’s body. While I do not comment on the policy intent, the House typically exercises its full powers of scrutiny over the introduction of new and serious offences, rather than conferring a power on the Secretary of State to do so through secondary legislation. New clause 106, which was tabled by the hon. Member for Sleaford and North Hykeham (Dr Johnson), deals directly with the Abortion Act 1967. The intended purpose of the new clause is to require women to attend an in-person consultation. Section 1(3D) of the Abortion Act 1967 does not apply to consultations that take place before the medicine is prescribed. Women would therefore continue to have remote consultations for prescription of the medicine, but would then be required to travel to a hospital or clinic for an in-person consultation before being able to self-administer the medicine at home. Alternatively, women could have an in-person consultation to be prescribed the medicine and then the medication could be posted to the women at home. The overall effect of this new clause would mean that no woman could legally have an at-home early medical abortion without an in-person consultation. In conclusion, if it is the will of Parliament that the law should change, the Government, in fulfilling our duty to ensure that the legislation is legally robust and workable, will work closely with my hon. Friends the Members for Gower and for Walthamstow to ensure that their new clauses accurately reflect their intentions and the will of Parliament, and are coherent with the statute book. As I have already stated, the Government take no position. I hope these observations are helpful to the House when considering the new clauses. Question put, That the clause be read a Second time.